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This study considers the potential for the implementation of performance budgeting within the 
Maltese public sector, exploring the pressures which support and inhibit this reform, 
proposing a possible implementation approach and identifying the issues surrounding the 
implementation of changes to the budgetary system. The study also seeks to identify the 
recent reforms of the budgetary framework, which have occurred since the change in 
government in March 2013. Change is inevitable as the government is committed to meet 
specific targets for fiscal deficit and debt reduction, in line with its EU obligations.   
The research follows a qualitative approach, using data gathered from documentary sources, 
corroborated with empirical evidence collected from in-depth, semi-structured interviews. 
Access has been obtained to discuss relevant issues with senior politicians from the 
government and the opposition, including former ministers and Prime Ministers. 
The findings indicate that there are a number of macro-level and institutional pressures acting 
as triggers for the implementation of budgetary reform; at the same time, there are elements 
constituting resistance to change which have to be tackled should government intend to 
change the budgetary framework. A combined approach, with more emphasis on the bottom-
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“Performance budgeting refers to procedures or mechanisms intended to strengthen 
links between the funds provided to public sector entities and their outcomes and/or 
outputs through the use of formal performance information in resource allocation 
decision-making” (Robinson and Brumby, 2005: 5). 
Performance budgeting (PB) is an important theme of public financial management reforms, 
which is targeted at enhancing public sector performance, bettering the use of public funds, 
and increasing accountability to the public. In the past few years, Malta has faced fiscal deficit 
issues and high government debt. Being a member of the European Union (EU), Malta has to 
comply with the Union‟s laws and regulations. The fiscal issues faced by the country could 
stimulate government‟s efforts to introduce budgetary reforms, in order to secure fiscal 
sustainability. This study considers the potential for the implementation of PB in the Maltese 
public sector, exploring the pressures for and against the reform, proposing a possible 
implementation approach and identifying the issues surrounding the implementation of the 
changes to the budget system.   
This chapter gives an introduction to the study. Section 1.2 provides some background 
information, whilst section 1.3 explains some key terms. This is followed by section 1.4, 
which gives an overview of the Maltese scenario by providing some insights of the 
environment in which the research is undertaken. Subsequently, the rationale for the study is 
explained in section 1.5 and the research objectives are set out in section 1.6. Section 1.7 
describes the scope and limitations underlying the study, whilst the last section (1.8) provides 
a road map for the rest of the dissertation. 
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1.2 Background to the study  
The “…all-important thing in budgeting is the work or service to be accomplished and what 
that work or services will cost” (Schick, 1971). This statement postulates the underlying 
objective of the various forms of budgeting that have been developed and implemented over 
the years. According to Martin et al (1995), budgets are more critical than financial statements 
in governments. This is because a budget represents a financial planning tool for matching 
limited public resources to the citizens‟ needs; furthermore, the adoption of a budget 
constitutes legal authority for spending money. Conversely, a set of financial statements 
summarises historic financial activities undertaken by government in the past year. 
Most academics concur that budget systems are multifunctional. Schick (1966) defined three 
competing budget functions: planning, management, and control. Campos and Pradhan (1997) 
stated that a budget system has three basic expenditure outcomes that need to be achieved: (a) 
to ensure aggregate fiscal discipline, (b) to facilitate strategic prioritization of expenditures 
across programmes and projects, and (c) to encourage technical efficiency in the use of 
budgeted resources. Wildavsky (1978: 501) claimed that: “Budgeting is supposed to 
contribute to continuity (for planning), to change (for policy evaluation), to flexibility (for the 
economy) and to provide rigidity (for limiting spending)”. Budgeting facilitates the two main 
elements of a management information system, namely decision-making and control 
(Zimmerman, 2003).  
In the context of the public sector, the budgeting process assists decision makers within 
government departments in the allocation of scarce resources amongst various competing 
programmes. It also controls the behaviours of appointed public officials by limiting the waste 
or misuse of governmental resources (Smith and Cheng, 2006). The authors note that there are 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
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similarities between budgeting practices in business and in government, in that both 
businesses and government allocate resources among competing programmes, and both are 
concerned with enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in these selected programmes.  
The economic and financial crises have triggered huge pressures for expenditure cuts and 
public debt reduction (Anessi-Pessina et al, 2016). Constraints in government revenue, 
coupled with increased demands for services from the citizens, have led to the restructuring of 
the public budgeting systems in a number of countries. The traditional view of budget systems 
focused mainly on resource allocation and input control, with little follow-up action 
undertaken to assess the actual performance of spending departments (Diamond, 2003). The 
new budget system, referred to in this document as „performance budgeting‟, aims to establish 
a more direct link between performance in achieving pre-determined objectives and resource 
allocation through the budget process (Diamond, 2003). Thus, budgetary reform can be seen 
as representing a move from an emphasis on inputs, to a focus on performance, outcomes or 
results. 
All results-oriented budget reforms have the objective of making government more efficient 
and effective by introducing modern management and policy-making concepts into 
government (Sterck and Scheers, 2006). Governments today are especially trying to ascertain 
how well public organisations and programmes are doing in providing services and products 
to their citizenry (Young, 2003). King (1995) suggests a number of reasons for the 
employment of PB, including the following: (i) government must be driven by citizen desires 
and needs, not government rules and regulations; (ii) taxpayers will pay for results, not 
efforts; (iii) government must better communicate progress toward goals and objectives. 
Governments are asking: “What kind and how many services are we getting from allocated 
dollars? Are these public services of good value? Are they making a difference in citizens‟ 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
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lives?” (Young, 2003: 12). The implementation of PB systems by public administrations is 
targeted at addressing these questions, and other similar ones. 
1.3 Key terms and definitions  
The table below sets out some key definitions pertinent to the study. 
Table 1: Key definitions 
 
1.4 The Maltese scenario  
Malta currently operates a traditional cash budgeting system. The annual government budget 
presents expenditures by inputs for each ministry and for the government departments and 
Term Definition
Performance budgeting PB (also referred to as „performance-based budgeting‟ in this document) has been
defined by the OECD (2008: 2) as “budgeting that links the funds allocated to
measurable results ”. PB has been defined as the provision of information in the
budget document which explains what the organisation or department has achieved
or expects to do with the funds at its disposal (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999;
Melkers and Willoughby, 1998).
Traditional / conventional / 
line-item budgeting
The line-item budget presents expenditures by inputs purchased and classifies
expenditure items by operating and capital expenditures (Shah and Shen, 2007).
Performance measures A performance measure has been defined as a “quantifiable expression of the
amount, cost, or result of activities that indicate how much, how well, and at
what level, products or services are provided to customers during a given
time period ” (Office of Financial Management, 2011: 1). Performance measures
include output and outcome measures.
Inputs “Inputs are those resources that contribute to production and
delivery...Taking the medical sector as an example, inputs commonly include
things such as labour, physical assets and IT systems (e.g. doctors, nurses,
scanning equipment, etc.) ” (OECD, 2007: 193). 
Outputs “Outputs are the final products, or goods and services, produced by the
organisation for delivery to the customer (e.g. the number of effective
medical treatments or operations that take place) ” (OECD, 2007: 193).
Outcomes “Outcomes are the impacts or consequences for the community or individual
of government activities, and normally represent what the organisation is
trying to achieve (e.g. longer life expectancy and better health) ” (OECD,
2007: 193).
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agencies falling under that ministry. Focus is placed upon ensuring that the ministries do not 
spend in excess of the stipulated line item caps and no performance information is 
incorporated in the budget documents. 
1.4.1 Key facts and figures  
Malta is a European country situated in the Mediterranean sea. The island has a population of 
approximately 425,000 people (as per an estimate of 2013) and covers around 316 km², which 
makes it one of the world‟s smallest and most densely populated countries (Malta Tourism 
Authority, 2015). Malta‟s gross domestic product (GDP) for 2014 was of €7.96 billion, which 
translated into a GDP per capita (PPP) for 2014 of about €18,700 (National Statistics Office, 
2015a). The unemployment rate stood at 5.7% of the total labour force, in the first quarter of 
2015 (Trading Economics website). 
Malta joined the EU on 1 May 2004 and became part of the Eurozone on 1 January 2008. 
Malta has established itself as an international financial services centre. The country has 
sound wealth management, fund, insurance and banking sectors which have drawn investment 
from high net-worth individuals and leading financial institutions across the world (NexiaBT 
website). Malta has also been successful in attracting aircraft and ship registration and gaming 
businesses (Wikipedia, 2015). The hospitality industry is also a major contributor to the 
country's economy. 
1.4.2 The public sector in Malta 
The public sector in Malta is composed of the general government‟s entities and the public 
corporations, which are also referred to as non-EBUs (non-Extra Budgetary Units) – refer to 
Figure 1 below. 
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The general government‟s administrative responsibility is divided between the central 
government and the local councils.  
The central government comprises the Office of the President, the House of Representatives, 
the Office of the Prime Minister, fourteen ministries split into various government 
departments and agencies that fall under their direct responsibility, and a number of EBUs
2
 
(Extra Budgetary Units).  
Malta‟s local government system, which has been in operation since 1993, holds 
responsibility for the general upkeep of the locality and performs general administration 
duties on behalf of central government. Local government consists of 68 local councils. 
There are no intermediate levels between central government and local government. 
                                                          
1
 Different colour coding has been applied for the „central government‟ component since this falls under the 
scope of the study. 
2
 An EBU is an autonomous government body which depends on government‟s budget allocations for its 
financing. Conversely, a non-EBU, which is also autonomous from the government, does not depend on central 
funds for its financing requirements. As at 31 December 2014, there were 49 EBUs, including two tertiary 
education institutes, two hospitals, a waste management unit, a number of culture and sports entities, units in 
social protection and units dealing with the administration and regulation of services offered to the public 
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This study will focus on central government. Central government in Malta has a considerably 
broad scope, with most public functions falling under the responsibility of the central 
government. For example, the relevant ministries manage public schools and hospitals 
(including health clinics), and their employees are considered part of central government. 
1.4.3 Politics 
Malta became a parliamentary democracy within the Commonwealth in 1964, having 
previously been under the sovereign reign of Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom 
(UK). In 1974, Malta became a republic. The President of Malta holds executive authority; 
however, the Prime Minister of Malta, as head of government, is responsible for the overall 
direction of the Maltese government. The Parliament of Malta, which consists of the President 
and the House of Representatives, forms the legislative body of the country. The House of 
Representatives consists of 69 parliamentary members. 
The main political parties are the Labour party, which is a social democratic party, and the 
Nationalist party, which is a Christian democratic party. The Labour Party is presently in 
government, having won the 2013 general election after nearly 25 years in opposition. The 
Prime Minister of Malta and leader of the Labour party is presently Dr. Joseph Muscat. The 
Nationalist Party is currently in opposition, led by Dr. Simon Busuttil. There are a few other 
small political parties, which do not have any parliamentary representation. 
1.4.4 Government accounting 
The central government of Malta uses a cash-based accounting system for its government 
ministries and departments, supplemented by accrual based information.  
Chapter 1  Introduction 
9 
 
The accrual accounting reform was originally launched by the Ministry for Finance (MOF) in 
1999 (Department of Information, 2001) and it is to date still on-going. A decision has 
recently been taken by the public administration to adopt International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS), being the only recognised public sector accounting standards. 
Though the appropriate structures are now in place, government is still at the beginning of the 
implementation process. In this regard, the Treasury is aiming for 2019/2020 to have the first 
dry run, consisting of the compilation of consolidated accounts. 
In the meantime, the cash-based accounting system is being supplemented by accrual-based 
data collected manually from the government departments which, however, does not meet 
IPSAS requirements (Camilleri, 2014). The gathering of accrual data is an unreliable process, 
because it is too dependent on the people compiling the information (Camilleri, 2014).  
A report prepared by the UK Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), 
dated November 2013, was commissioned by the Maltese authorities to provide a „gap 
analysis‟ for moving to accrual accounting on the basis of IPSAS (Camilleri, 2014). The main 
conclusions of this report were categorised under five headings: Accounting, Systems, 
Processes, People and Programme Management. When tackling „Accounting‟, this report 
commented on the choice of the accounting basis underlying financial reporting, on the one 
hand, and budgeting, on the other: 
“Budgeting on a cash basis and reporting on a full accrual basis will give rise to 
complexity, and raise questions about which figures people are accountable for. The 
full potential benefits of the move to accrual reporting can only be realised if the 
budget framework moves to a full accrual basis in the medium to longer-term.” 
(Camilleri, 2014: 39) 
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1.4.5 EU influence on Malta’s implementation of budgetary reform 
As Malta is an EU Member State, it has to adhere to EU laws and regulations and meet the 
demands of such affiliation. Van Nispen and Posseth (2009) claim that fiscal stress is a key 
driver for budgetary reform, but it‟s not the only reason for such reform. There are other 
triggers for budgetary reform, such as the Maastricht criteria for qualification and 
participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (van Nispen and Posseth, 2009).  
The Maastricht criteria specify, in two separate protocols, five conditions that need to be 
satisfied by EU member countries (Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure and Protocol 
on the convergence criteria) (European Union, 1992), as detailed in the following table: 
Table 2: Conditions of EU membership 
 
The first two criteria are targeted at reinforcing the stability of the euro, by protecting the EU 
from threats of inflation which may arise from government budget deficits (Afxentiou, 2000). 
If a Member State does not satisfy these two criteria, the European Commission can open an 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for that country. Article 3 of the Protocol on the EDP 
a) The planned or actual government deficit should not exceed 3% of each country‟s GDP at
market prices
b) The government debt is not to exceed 60% of GDP at market prices
c) The average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination, does
not exceed more than 1.5 percentage points of, at most, the three Member States with the
lowest inflation rates
d) No exchange rate realignment for at least two years
e) Over a period of one year before the examination, the average nominal long-term interest rate
does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three Member States
with the lowest inflation rates.
Conditions to be satisfied by EU member countries
Source: Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure and Protocol on the convergence criteria 
(European Union, 1992)
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(European Union, 1992) states that “The Member States shall ensure that national procedures 
in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations in this area.” The last three 
criteria mentioned above are designed to ensure monetary stability by supporting a fixed 
exchange rate regime among member countries (Afxentiou, 2000). 
With respect to the local scenario, in June 2013, the EU placed Malta under an EDP, since the 
fiscal deficit was observed at 3.3% of GDP at the end of 2012, above the EU's 3% of GDP 
reference value for government deficits. The EU called on Malta to take corrective actions 
and it set a deficit target of 3.4% of GDP for 2013 and 2.7% of GDP for 2014 (Malta Today, 
2013a). The Maltese government was committed to reduce the country‟s deficit and targeted a 
2.7% deficit by the end of 2013 (Xuereb, 2013). This target was nearly met, with Malta 
ending 2013 with a deficit of 2.8% of the GDP (Times of Malta, 2014a). By the end of 2014, 
the deficit was reduced to 2.1% of GDP and was forecast to remain at 3% of GDP in 2015 and 
2016 (Times of Malta, 2015a) – as a result, the EDP against Malta was lifted in June 2015 
(Times of Malta, 2015b). Nevertheless, the EU has made a number of recommendations 
(targeting health care, energy and pension reforms, amongst others) in order for Malta to 
ensure long term fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, the interview data collected for the 
purposes of the study showed that the deficit reduction has, to some extent, been attained, by 
sacrificing expenditure in certain areas, such as infrastructure. 
The fiscal deficit issues that Malta has been facing could stimulate the country‟s efforts to 
introduce budgetary reforms in order to ensure that the Maastricht criteria for qualification 
and participation in the Eurozone are consistently adhered to.  
In view of this background, the implementation of financial management reform in the 
Maltese public sector is fundamental in order to ensure that the public finance domain will 
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support macroeconomic stability and ensure smooth financing of government functions. In the 
absence of sustainable changes in public financial management, there is a risk that the 
government will face fiscal stress and unexpected surprises, which need to be resolved 
immediately. In these circumstances, quick-fix decisions will need to be made which would 
consider only the short-term impact, without taking into account the medium and long-term 
risks and impact. 
1.4.6 The traditional budgeting system 
The line-item cash budgeting system has been in operation within the Maltese public 
administration for several years. This relatively simple system potentially facilitates the 
control of public expenditure by stipulating the line-item cap in the fund allocation process to 
ensure that departments do not spend in excess of their ceiling (Shah and Shen, 2007). The 
resilience of traditional line-item budgeting has been the result of the strong advocacy by 
budget offices and ministries of finance for the control of public funds (Shah and Shen, 2007). 
Notwithstanding its endurance, this system embodies certain limitations which impede the 
effective planning and decision-making processes vis-à-vis resource allocation, as well as 
limit performance-oriented accountability in the public sector (Shah and Shen, 2007). The 
line-item budget focuses on how much money is spent and on whether expense items have 
increased or declined in comparison with the previous year‟s budget, rather than on how 
efficiently resources have been used (Shah and Shen, 2007). As a result of its inherent 
characteristics, this budgeting system makes it difficult to assess the performance of 
government programmes and to appraise the level of service delivered by public officials. 
Moreover, it adopts a short term perspective for budgeting, focusing on year-on-year changes 
in expenditure levels; this may create planning problems for government. 
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1.4.7 Motivations for budgetary reform in the local context 
Budgetary reforms seek to remedy the deficiencies embedded in the traditional line-item 
budgeting system. By concentrating on the performance dimension in resource allocation 
decisions, PB is aimed at achieving operational efficiency and enhancing accountability for 
results attained (Shah and Shen, 2007). 
An overview of the Maltese context, as illustrated above, reveals that the Maltese government 
is operating under tight financial conditions, facing fiscal deficit problems and high 
government debt. This fiscal stress coupled with the country‟s requirement to comply with 
EU laws and regulations, may act as triggers for budgetary reform.  
The implementation of PB in the local scenario may prove to be a useful tool for making 
spending decisions based on the results achieved by programmes within the various 
government‟s ministries. In view of government‟s commitment to keep the fiscal deficit under 
control, PB may indicate which government programmes are ineffective or under-performing, 
such that decisions vis-à-vis budgetary cuts are taken after considering their full impact. 
1.5 Rationale for the study 
As stated earlier, Malta‟s budgetary system is presently based on the conventional, line-item 
budgeting approach. Though this method still enjoys popularity in some countries due to its 
simplicity, it is considered by many developed countries‟ governments to be out-dated and 
has been replaced by budgeting systems which seek to link input resources to performance 
and results. A common budgetary reform which has been applied in a number of developed 
countries (including US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Netherlands and 
Denmark) is the implementation of a PB system.  
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To my knowledge, no study has been undertaken to date which explores the possibility of 
implementing PB within the Maltese central government. In this respect, my research could 
be valuable for Malta because it provides insights to government on the possible 
implementation of budgetary reform and the issues surrounding such implementation. The 
research also sheds light on the requirement to create capacities for the implementation of the 
reform. 
The results emanating from my research could also be extended to other small EU countries 
which intend to implement PB within their central government. It is hoped that this study will 
make a contribution to performance-related issues surrounding the budgeting process in small 
countries. In this regard, the implementation approach proposed by the study, the identified 
issues underlying the implementation of PB and the means for successfully addressing such 
issues, could be applied to other small EU countries in the future. Furthermore, the 
application of institutional theory, radical change and policy implementation, in the context of 
the Maltese public sector, could be drawn upon by other small countries seeking to 
understand public financial management reforms.  
1.6 Objectives of the study 
The basic research question endeavours to assess why and how the Maltese public 
administration might transition from the existing line-item budgeting system to a performance 
based system. The study will raise an understanding of the current reform situation with 
respect to the budgeting system. 
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The context of a small nation, within which the research is carried out, forms the underlying 
concept of the study. The research attempts to address the objectives set out below in respect 
of budgeting reforms in Malta.  
1. Understand why the reforms in the budgetary system might be implemented in the local 
context. This will include a discussion of the pressures which support and inhibit the 
implementation of PB. 
2. Identify the reforms of the budgetary framework which have occurred since the change of 
government in March 2013. 
3. Ascertain the conceptual implications of including performance information in budget 
documents and holding public officials responsible for the actual performance of their 
department/programmes. 
4. Propose a suitable implementation approach and determine the potential issues around the 
implementation of PB. 
1.7 Scope and limitations 
This study is limited to central government, which comprises government ministries and 
departments and government bodies that depend on budget allocations for their financing. 
The research is based on empirical data collected during the period commencing August 2014 
and ending April 2015. It is to be noted that the EDP against Malta was lifted by the EU in 
June 2015; thus, the empirical data was gathered during a period when the EDP was still in 
force. 
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Given that the study has been carried out within the context of a small country, the findings 
emanating from the research may not apply within the framework of a medium-sized or large 
country.  
1.8 Overview of the document  
This document is composed of eight chapters, as illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 2: Dissertation overview 
 This chapter has introduced the study, giving some background information 
about the subject researched, namely PB, and providing some facts about 
Malta and its public finance situation. It has also given an overview of the 
rationale and objectives of this research. 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the literature about PB, highlighting its benefits and 
implementation challenges. 
Chapter 2  
Literature Review I:  
PB 
 Chapter three then sets out the theoretical framework underpinning the study 
and presents a preliminary perspective of the application of the theory to the 
Maltese context. 
Chapter 3  
Literature Review II: 
Theoretical framework 
 Chapter four describes the current budgeting framework within the Maltese 
public sector. 
 
Chapter 4  
Literature Review III: 
Budgeting in Malta 
 
 The fifth chapter explains the methodology used to conduct this study. This 
research follows a qualitative methodology, using documentary sources and 
semi-structured interviews. 
Chapter 5  
Research Methodology 
 Chapter six presents the data gathered from the interviews. 
Chapter 6  
Findings - Interviews 
 Chapter seven discusses these findings, linking them to the literature review 
and theoretical framework set out in Chapters two and three. 
Chapter 7 
 Discussion on Findings 
 The final chapter concludes the study, giving a brief summary of its findings 
and setting out recommendations and action points emanating from the 
findings. 
































This chapter gives an overview of the literature reviewed in relation to PB in the context of 
the public sector. Section 2.2 looks into some definitions put forward for PB. Sections 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively, describe the objectives and advantages of a performance-based budgeting 
system. Next, the weaknesses of traditional line-item budgeting are highlighted in section 2.5. 
This is followed by section 2.6, which explains the challenges surrounding the 
implementation of a PB system. Subsequently, an explanation of performance measurement 
and an illustration of a PB system are presented in section 2.7. Section 2.8 then sets out a 
discussion of the accrual basis of accounting for historical financial reporting and budgeting, 
whilst the last section (2.9) gives a brief overview of the experiences of countries which have 
implemented PB.  
2.2 What is performance budgeting?  
PB has been defined in various ways to refer to similar or various practices (Joyce and Sieg, 
2000). Notwithstanding, there is agreement in the literature that performance is increasingly 
being incorporated in the budgeting practices of public organisations, though to different 
degrees and in different ways (e.g. Guthrie et al, 1999).  
In the broadest possible context, PB has been defined as any reform that attempts to 
incorporate performance measures in the budget process (Kong, 2005). PB deals with the 
allocation of funds to achieve pre-determined goals – this requires measurement of work, 
efficiency and/or effectiveness (e.g. Robinson and Brumby, 2005; Young, 2003; Garsombke 
and Schrad, 1999). In this context, PB represents a budget in which an increase in resources is 
explicitly linked to an increase in the number of products or services delivered. 




Mikesell (1999) states that performance budgets are basically the linking of inputs or costs to 
programme activities and goals. Joyce (1999: 598), while acknowledging that “no standard 
definition” of PB exists, states that it “involves a sophisticated web of relations, from inputs to 
outputs, to outcomes… the connecting of resources to results for budgeting purposes”. 
Similarly, Dawson (1995, cited in Young, 2003: 12) describes performance measurement and 
budgeting “as general terms applied to systemic efforts to assess government activity and 
enhance accountability for progress and outcomes in achieving results”. 
In a report published in the US by the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1994, PB 
was defined as follows: 
“Performance budgets use statements of missions, goals and objectives to explain why 
the money is being spent…[It is a way to allocate] resources to achieve specific 
objectives based on programme goals and measured results…Performance budgeting 
differs from traditional approaches because it focuses on spending results rather than 
the money spent – on what the money buys rather than the amount that is made 
available” (Carter, 1994: 2-3).  
Van Reeth (2002) states that the concepts of „performance budgets‟ and „performance 
budgeting‟ have been used as the antithesis of traditional budget formats and budgeting 
procedures. Whereas PB involves making budgetary decisions on the basis of programme 
goals and measured results, in traditional systems budgetary choices are based on criteria at a 
macro-level, in the sense that budgetary increments are either granted across the board to 
minimise political conflict or budgetary cuts are made without considering their impact on 
programme performance (Van Reeth, 2002). Changing from traditional budgeting towards a 
budgetary process which is informed by performance requires the availability of performance 
information (PI) and the use of that information for decision-making “at each stage of the 
budgeting cycle” (Joyce, 2011: 357).  




Young (2003) suggests that PB has four primary characteristics: first, it sets a goal, or a set of 
goals, to which monies are allocated; second, PB provides information and data on past 
performance and proceeds to allow for meaningful comparisons between „expected‟ and 
„actual‟ progress; third, adjustments to programmes are made either at this point or during a 
future budget preparation cycle to close any performance gaps that may exist; fourth, PB 
provides an opportunity for regular or ad hoc programme evaluations which give independent 
and verifiable information to budget decision makers. 
OECD (2008) defines PB as budgeting that links the funds allocated to measurable results. 
This definition is close to that advanced by the US General Accounting Office where PB is 
defined as the process of linking budget levels to expected results, rather than to inputs or 
activities (General Accounting Office, 2005).  
OECD (2007) has categorised PB into three types: presentational, performance-informed and 
direct. In presentational PB, the PI presented in budget documents does not play a role in 
decision-making and does not affect the way in which resources are allocated. PI is included 
as background information for the purposes of accountability and dialogue with legislators 
and citizens, on public policy issues and government direction. In performance-informed 
budgeting, the PI is important in the budget decision-making process, but does not determine 
the amount of resources allocated. Therefore, under this type of PB, past performance or 
proposed future performance impact resource allocation indirectly. Direct PB involves 
allocating resources based on results achieved. Appropriations are based on a 
formula/contract with specific performance or activity indicators, and funding is directly 
based on results achieved. The PB categories proposed by the OECD are summarised 
hereunder. 




Table 3: PB categories 
 
2.3 Objectives of performance budgeting 
PI incorporated into budgets holds public officials accountable for service quality, cost-
efficiency, and programme effectiveness (Young, 2003). If PB is used to hold public officials 
accountable for their actual performance, the implications are either to reward officials who 
meet or exceed performance expectations or to punish officials who perform poorly. Hou et al 
(2011) advise that the evaluation of performance must be linked to incentives, such as status, 
pay or promotion. OECD (2007) has mentioned a number of mechanisms that can be used to 
motivate performance, distinguishing between financial or non-financial incentives. As set out 
in the table below, these incentives have been categorised into: (1) financial rewards or 
sanctions; (2) increasing or decreasing financial and/or managerial flexibility; and (3) making 
the results public, i.e. naming and shaming poor performers and recognising good performers. 
Otley (1999) referred to the establishment of rewards/penalties as one of the issues to be 
addressed when developing a model for the management of organisational performance. 
Burgess and Ratto (2003) suggested that team-based rewards may be preferable to individual 
compensation schemes, especially where only aggregate performance measures are available 
and where cooperation is essential for the achievement of the organisation‟s goals.  
Type Linkage between performance 
information and funding
Main purpose in the budget process
Presentational No link Accountability
Performance-informed budgeting Loose/indirect link Planning and/or accountability
Direct performance budgeting Tight/direct link Resource allocation and accountability
Source: OECD (2007)
Performance budgeting categories




Table 4: Mechanisms to motivate performance 
 
According to Sterck (2007), PB initiatives have had two major objectives: improving 
allocation decisions and increasing operational efficiency; moreover, the budget is also a 
control instrument. Joyce (1999) also mentions improved decision-making and enhanced 
service delivery, as the two main aims that PB strives to fulfil. Firstly, for improved decision-
making, public officials require qualitative, timely and comprehensive information. PB 
provides this through its various components, such as, the setting of goals and objectives, the 
prioritizing of these ends, and the measuring of performance levels (Young, 2003). Secondly, 
PB aids improved superior service delivery by establishing performance targets and 
simultaneously providing for some measuring device to monitor efficiency and effectiveness 
of service delivery efforts (Young, 2003).  
Robinson and Brumby (2005) claim that the core objectives of PB are enhanced allocative 
and productive efficiency in public expenditure. According to Gilmour and Lewis (2006), the 
Mechanism Rewards Sanctions
Funding Increase funding to the agency Reduce or restrict agency funding
Maintain status quo on agency funding Eliminate agency funding
Provide management and/or employee 
bonuses
Cut the salary of management and/or 
employees
Increase the staff budget Cut the staff budget
Allow the agency to retain and carry over 
efficiency gains
Return all funding to the centre
Allow flexibility to transfer funds between 
different programmes and/or operating 
expenditures
Restrict the ability to transfer funds
Exempt the agency from certain reporting 
requirements
Increase the reporting requirements
Order a management audit of the agency
Public recognition Publicly recognise the agency's 
achievements
Publicly criticise the agency's performance
Source: OECD (2007)
Flexibility




most important reason for adopting PB is to determine which government programmes are 
delivering results and therefore, qualify for budget increases.  
There is also an important link between PB and macro-level goals relating to the level of 
aggregate expenditure and to fiscal sustainability (Robinson and Brumby, 2005). If productive 
efficiency is enhanced such that a product or a service is delivered at the minimum cost 
without sacrificing on quality, overall public expenditure would be lower, other things being 
equal. This would translate either in the funding of new products and services or in reducing 
the citizens‟ tax burdens. Where the public administration is seeking to reduce government 
expenditure to narrow the fiscal deficit, improved expenditure prioritisation assumes 
fundamental importance. PB is a useful tool which assists governments to reduce expenditure 
on lower-priority or ineffective programmes, instead of making across-the-board expenditure 
cuts which might harm effective, value-for-money programmes. Governments are constantly 
challenged to provide effective public services and to do more with less, in view of the current 
economic and fiscal environment – thus, policy results, public service performance and 
budgeting are indivisible (Lu et al, 2015). In this regard, Lu et al (2015) believe that PB will 
remain important in public budgeting and governance.  
2.4 Advantages of performance budgeting 
PB improves communication between public officials involved in budgeting and the citizens – 
through the identification of programme objectives and the establishment of targets for 
performance, it provides clear parameters for expected performance by government (Shah and 
Shen, 2007). Unlike the conventional line-item budget, a performance budget comprises PI on 
each government programme, thus facilitating the public officials‟ task of providing 
information to the public about the programmes being undertaken and obtaining the public‟s 




support for government‟s activities (Shah and Shen, 2007). McGeough (2014) argued that PI 
plays a critical role in discharging accountability for performance, as the public administration 
attempts to justify the utilisation of public funds and to respond to criticisms of poor 
performance. Lack of performance reporting indicates weak accountability, since the 
assessment of the organisation‟s performance by users of annual reports will be rendered 
more difficult; this will result in less pressure for the improvement of performance by 
management (McGeough, 2014). 
Whilst PB might not alter the political budgeting process, the availability of PI adds value to 
the discussions involved when deciding on the resources to be allocated (Shah and Shen, 
2007; McGeough, 2014). PI could prove useful in fund allocation decisions relating to new 
proposed programmes or in justifying funding decreases or increases (Shah and Shen, 2007). 
Conventional budgets, which are typically presented on the basis of line-item inputs, do not 
provide meaningful information as to how government programmes are performing (Shah and 
Shen, 2007). In contrast, a performance budget organises funds by programmes and sets out 
performance measures and indicators, making it easier for the citizens to understand 
government‟s achievement vis-à-vis the activities being pursued (Shah and Shen, 2007). As a 
result, the budget document provides the public and the legislative body, with a tool of 
transparency and accountability for the results achieved by public officials (Shah and Shen, 
2007). Sinclair (1995) has identified five forms of accountability as follows: (i) political 
accountability links the public official with the civil servant heading the ministry (Permanent 
Secretary), who, in turn, has to respond to the minister or to the Cabinet, to Parliament and to 
the electors; (ii) public accountability involves dealing with public concerns about 
administrative activity; (iii) managerial accountability is concerned with holding managers in 
the public sector accountable for meeting their budget (fiscal accountability) and for 




delivering expected results (outcome or programme accountability); (iv) professional 
accountability arises from the public officials‟ duty to adhere to the standards of professional 
groups to which they belong; and (v) personal accountability involves being faithful to one‟s 
moral and ethical values. 
2.5 Conventional budgeting  
The conventional (line-item) budget presents expenditures by inputs or resources purchased. 
A salient feature of a conventional budget system is to stipulate the line item ceiling in the 
budget allocation process, ensuring that government departments do not spend in excess of 
these caps (Shah and Shen, 2007). The strengths of such a system rest on its relative 
simplicity and the potential control of public spending in view of the detailed specification of 
resource inputs (Shah and Shen, 2007).  
2.5.1 An illustration of a line-item budget 
An example of a conventional line-item budget is demonstrated in the table below – the 
figures, which are being presented for illustration purposes only, have been extracted from the 
2016 Financial Estimates, compiled by the Ministry for Finance (2015d) in Malta. 




Table 5: Recurrent expenditure - Ministry for Education and Employment 
 
2.5.2 Limitations of line-item budgeting 
The line-item budget has a number of limitations, as explained in the table below. 




Personal Emoluments 3,716 4,050 4,243
Operational and Maintenance Expenses 1,612 1,112 1,864
Programmes and Initiatives 98,601 96,572 114,797
Contributions to Government Entities 101,838 111,239 121,460
Total Ministry for Education and Employment 205,767 212,973 242,364
Source: Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016 [https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-Budget]




Table 6: Limitations of line-item budgeting 
 
2.6 Challenges to performance budgeting 
In contrast with conventional line-item budgeting, PB seeks to introduce an incentive 
mechanism in the budgetary process. According to Kong (2005), in view of the fact that 
Limitation Explanation
Lack of quality assessment This form of budgeting makes it difficult to assess the quality of the
services delivered by the government (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011).
The focus is not on whether an item of expenditure is appropriate or
whether a particular programme is effective, but on how much the cost
has gone up or down compared to last year‟s budget. Furthermore,
because line-item budgeting focuses on expense categories, the
associated reporting systems provide information on how much is spent
rather than how efficiently or effectively it was spent (Shah & Shen,
2007).
Short-term focus As a process, line-item budgeting concentrates on year-to-year changes
by revenue and/or expense categories and penalises, rather than
rewards, cost-saving decisions (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011).
Consequently, if a public official delivers the product or service with
fewer resources than allocated in the budget, then the department‟s
budget is usually reduced for the following year. This may result in
spending decisions which lead to sub-optimal resource utilisation.
Moreover, there is no medium-term perspective for budgeting, which
might lead to expenditure planning problems for government.
Changing economic conditions Line-item budgeting is especially ineffective during times of fiscal
turbulence (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). During times of economic
uncertainty or in the midst of a fiscal crisis, government might need to
effect budgetary expenditure cuts in an attempt to keep the government
deficit under control. Jogiste et al (2012) remark that when resources
are going to be limited, equal across-the-board cuts could be imposed
by government, rather than decreasing resource allocation for ineffective
or inefficient programmes. Thus the cuts in services and programmes are 
made without any identified connection to their value for the citizens and
the benefits they provide for the country (Murray and Efendioglu,
2011).
The line-item budget suffers from a number of weaknesses as detailed below:




conventional budgeting focuses on control, it promotes destructive budget maximising 
competition among agencies and discourages cost-saving efforts. “Public managers are 
penalised for identifying and implementing cost-saving techniques… [in that] departments 
that realise cost savings through process improvement or managerial reforms may have their 
budgets cut in the following fiscal year and resources transferred to organisations that met or 
exceeded their funding levels” (McNab and Melese, 2003: 78). PB shifts the focus from inputs 
to results and outcomes, and thus restrains the culture of using all the department‟s funding 
for fear of having the expenditure cut the following year. 
There are, however, challenges in the application of PB in the public sector as explained in 
the following table. 
Table 7: Challenges to PB 
 
Challenge Explanation
Effect on fund allocation The allocation of resources is mainly driven by traditional budget practice, whilst PI
is used to support internal management decisions on setting priorities and adjusting
operations (OECD, 2002a). In this regard, PB initiatives have been successful in
managing programmes, but have had little influence in affecting actual
appropriations (Willoughby and Melkers, 2000; Broom and McGuire, 1995; Ho,
2011). Wildavsky (1961) noted that the principal purpose of budgetary reform is
changing fund allocations, “Otherwise, why bother? ”
Use of outcome information According to Aristigueta and Justice (2006), an issue that arises is how outcome
information is to be applied in the allocation of resources. If the PI indicates that a
programme is effective, will the allocation of additional funds generate more valued
outcomes, or should government cut the programme budget and still get the
targeted results? On the other hand, where a programme is underperforming,
should government allocate more money because the ineffectiveness is a sign of
underfunding or should the programme be terminated to stop wasting public funds?
(Aristigueta and Justice, 2006). On a similar note, Caiden (1998: 44) commented
that "If a programme is doing badly, and showing few results, does this mean
it should be terminated, or provided with more resources to do a better job?
Conversely, if a programme is doing well and achieving its objectives, should
it be provided with more resources to do an even better job, or should it be
cut back on the grounds that its purpose has been achieved and it is no
longer needed? "
The application of PB in the public sector comes up against a number of challenges





2.7 A performance budgeting system 
Public budgets increasingly contain information about outputs and outcomes in addition to the 
traditional information about the inputs and activities (OECD, 2002b).  
Target setting In the political background surrounding public budgeting, setting up outcome
targets which are agreed upon by various stakeholders is not a simple task.
Furthermore, even if agreeable outcome targets are established, it will be difficult to
determine who is responsible for the outcomes because of a multitude of factors
including time lag and uncontrollability (Kong, 2005). The impact of some
programmes may not be seen for years and this factor invalidates annual incentive
systems whilst at the same time encourages public officials to aim for short-term
outcomes (Kong, 2005). Additionally, some outcomes are not within the direct
control of public officials (Stiefel et al., 1999). Under this scenario, it is
inappropriate to provide rewards or impose penalties. 
Cultural change required PB is not universally used today by local governments (Murray and Efendioglu,
2011). Firstly, a shift from conventional to PB requires a culture change, which is
both time-consuming and expensive (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). Secondly, the
main motivation for shifting to PB usually is the result of citizens‟ initiative, rather
than legislation (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). These initiatives are time-
consuming and expensive and require significant effort by citizens to develop plans,
determine targeted outcomes and monitor the process to ensure that the cultural
change occurs (Willoughby and Melkers, 2005).
Leadership skills The implementation of a reform in the public sector requires strong leadership.
Good leadership provides a clear vision of the PB system with well-documented
directives and it should bring in all stakeholders - policy makers, citizens, clients,
budget analysts, outside consultants, department heads, managers and unions -
throughout the whole planning and implementation process (Kong, 2005).
Adequate resources A common issue in the implementation of new systems within government is that
they are often launched without adequate financial and human resources (Kong,
2005). Kong (2005) also claims that many new systems fade away due to the lack
of financial or human support. Apart from human and financial resources, "budget 
process reform requires a significant investment in accounting and
information systems " (McNab and Melese, 2003: 80). Furthermore, a
reasonable timeframe is critical for the successful implementation of the new
system. The timeframe should take into account both the time required for the
mechanics of the reform and also the time necessary for behavioural changes
(Kong, 2005). A hurdle to creating and maintaining an effective PB system has
been insufficient capacity to develop high quality mechanisms to track and report PI 
(Kopczynski and Lombardo, 1999).




The figure below identifies the main elements of a budgeting system, namely resource 
allocation, organisational management and customers. Traditional line-item budgeting focuses 
on the allocation of resources including funding, human resources, facilities and equipment 
(Kong, 2005). The early forms of PB were focused on organisational elements such as the 
mission statement, policy goals, services and activities (Kong, 2005). In later years, the focus 
of PB shifted to outcomes, service quality, and citizen/customer satisfaction (Kong, 2005). 
Figure 3: The focus of budgeting: conventional vs. performance-based (Source: Kong, 
2005: 96) 
 
2.7.1 Performance measures 
Robinson and Brumby (2005) note that the development of performance measures – including 
output and outcome measures – is a necessary precondition of PB and this is something which 
takes both time and serious effort. A performance measure is a “quantifiable expression of the 
amount, cost, or result of activities that indicate how much, how well, and at what level, 
products or services are provided to customers during a given time period” (Office of 




Financial Management, 2011: 1). Performance measures provide a snapshot of current 
performance capabilities and track whether actual performance is getting better, staying the 
same, or getting worse over time (Office of Financial Management, 2011). Performance 
measurement facilitates accountability and attempts to gauge whether progress is being made 
towards achieving the targets.  
Performance measures are linked to time-frames - annual, intermediate, and long-term. 
Annual measures are relevant for annual performance evaluation and budget appropriations; 
intermediate measures, mostly in a 3-5 year range, are designed to assess the early results of a 
programme and are useful when the objectives of the programme will not be achieved until 
years into the future (Tigue and Greene, 1994). The meaningful use of long-term, strategic 
measures (mostly in a 10 year range) is almost non-existent (Kong, 2005). The different types 
of measures are explained in the table hereunder. 




Table 8: Types of performance measures 
 
An important consideration to make is that all types of measures are inter-linked. Although 
each type of measure has some value, it appears that more governments are inclined to use 
outcome measures and client/citizen satisfaction (Kong, 2005).  
Type Description
Input measures These measures, which have been the core of conventional budgeting, provide information
as to the amount of resources required to offer a product or service (Kong, 2005). These
measures show the total cost of providing a product or service, the mix of resources used
to provide the service, and the amount of resources used for one service in relation to other
services (Tigue and Greene, 1994).
Output measures These measures, which are the most common measures of the earlier versions of PB, focus
on the organisational activities required for the provision of a product or service. Workload
measures, which are designed to show how staff time will be allocated to respond to
service demand, are most commonly reported. Output measures can be a significant
operational/managerial tool, but they may be of limited interest to elected officials and
citizens (Tigue and Greene, 1994). Output measures are usually the easiest kind of data to
obtain and are the least sensitive or threatening in an evaluation context (Poister and Streib,
1999).
Outcome measures These are used to assess the quality of programmes and to evaluate whether a
service/programme is meeting its predetermined objectives. Though outcome measures are
of greatest interest to citizens and policy makers, they are the least utilised, partly, in view
of the cost of gathering the information needed to produce the measures and also, due to
the difficulty of ascertaining the relationship between the government programme and the
needed outcome (Tigue and Greene, 1994).
Citizen satisfaction This represents an external measure, focusing on customers. The measurement of citizen
satisfaction can be problematic: “It is unclear what criteria the citizens are using to
evaluate effectiveness. Also questionable is how much accurate information citizens
have on which to base their evaluations ” (Kelly and Swindell, 2002: 610). In addition,
Vigoda (2002) claims that the users of „client/citizen satisfaction‟ measures may run a risk
that such measures may overestimate short-term considerations and popular decisions, and
may not represent the true voice of the majority.
Cost measures Cost measures provide information to evaluate cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Cost
efficiency refers to unit costs for output measures while cost-effectiveness refers to unit
costs for outcome measures (Kong, 2005). Cost measures will be more important as
indirect and overhead costs have become a much greater portion of total costs while labour 
cost as a percentage of total costs is decreasing (Brown et al., 1999).
Performance measures




2.7.2 An illustration of performance budgeting 
By shifting the emphasis from inputs to results, the performance budget moves away from a 
discussion of detailed line items, focusing instead on the overall objectives and performance 
targets of government programmes – this leads to more informed decision-making in the 
budgetary context (Shah and Shen, 2007).  
The table below provides an illustration of the application of PB within Australia‟s Education 
Portfolio. The figures, which are provided for illustrative purposes only, have been extracted 
from the Portfolio Budget Statements for 2014–15 and relate to the „Child Care Benefit‟ 
programme. The table shows that the budgeted expenditure allocated to this programme is 
being linked to the quantification of the deliverables expected to be achieved and the key 
performance indicators identified for the programme. 




Table 9: Australia's Child Care Benefit Programme 
 
Programme 1.2 - Child Care Benefit
Performance objectives:
Assists parents with the cost of approved and registered child care. The provision of this assistance means more
families are able to access quality child care services.
Administered items:
The payment of Child Care Benefit (CCB) varies depending on family income, the number of children in care, the 
hours of care, and the type of child care used. Low income families receive the highest rate of Child Care Benefit.
Programme expenses:
2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Estimated Budget Forward Forward Forward
actual Estimate Estimate Estimate
$'000 $'000 $'000 $'000 $'000
Total programme expenses 2,359,607 3,140,717 3,294,464 3,494,066 3,721,701
Deliverables:
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18
Revised Budget
Budget
1,436,000 1,570,000 1,620,000 1,672,000 1,725,000
998,000 1,091,000 1,125,000 1,161,000 1,199,000
978,000 1,069,000 1,103,000 1,138,000 1,175,000
-98% -98% -98% -98% -98%
686,000 750,000 774,000 799,000 824,000
89,000 97,000 100,000 104,000 107,000
Key performance indicators:
2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18
Revised Budget
Budget
expenses as a proportion of weekly
disposable income after child care subsidies
Source: Department of Education, Government of Australia, 2014
8 to 12% 8 to 12% 8 to 12% 8 to 12%
Number of families receiving both CCB 
and Child Care Rebate
Number of families receiving only CCB
Number of families using approved child 
care services and receiving a child care 
payment (percentage of families who use 
care and receive a payment)
Percentage of child care out-of-pocket
8 to 12%
Number of children using approved child 
care places
Number of families using approved child 
care services




2.8 Accrual accounting and budgeting 
The purpose of this section is twofold: (i) to consider the use of the accrual basis for 
budgeting; and (ii) to ascertain whether the accrual basis is a prerequisite for the 
implementation of PB.  
2.8.1 The accrual basis 
The adoption of accrual accounting and budgeting is controversial and has been extensively 
debated in the public sector accounting literature (Martí, 2006). 
In terms of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS, 2009: 1513), 
accrual accounting is defined as “a basis of accounting under which transactions and other 
events are recognized when they occur (and not only when cash or its equivalent is received 
or paid)”. The objective of adopting the accruals basis for historical financial reporting is to 
make the real cost of government services more transparent; for example, when undertaking 
capital projects, these are incorporated into the annual operating expenditure through a 
depreciation charge, instead of having spikes in expenditure when capital projects are carried 
out (Blöndal, 2003). A further objective for adopting accruals is to improve decision-making 
in government by using this enhanced information (Blöndal, 2003). In 1992, New Zealand 
became the first country in the world to produce Whole of Government financial statements 
on a full accrual basis (Pallot, 2001). 




2.8.2 Accrual budgeting 
Cash and accruals
3
 represent two extremes on a continuum of possible budgeting bases. 
Between these extremes, a number of variations have been applied by countries in practice. 
According to Robinson (2009: 3), accrual budgeting “means that spending ministries are 
given budgets which are defined in terms of accrual concepts…the budget sets quantitative 
limits on the expenses which they incur rather than the cash payments they make.” Accrual 
budgeting refers to the use of accrual accounting records and measures in the budgeting 
process (Lüder and Jones, 2003: 35). The main benefits of accrual budgeting include (1) the 
improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure and (2) the improvement in 
decision-making with regard to assets (Robinson, 2009). Expenditure prioritisation is 
enhanced in view of the fact that budgetary decisions are made on the basis of the true costs 
of the inputs required to produce public goods or services (Robinson, 2009). Decisions related 
to the acquisition, disposal and maintenance of fixed assets, as well as those related to the 
management of stocks are enhanced; ministries are encouraged to sell surplus assets, thus 
reducing their depreciation charge and permitting increased spending on other types of 
expenses (Robinson 2009).  
With regard to the implementation of accrual budgeting, Sterck and Scheers (2006) 
distinguish three groups: (a) countries that have adopted full accrual budgeting, (b) countries 
                                                          
3
 Cash basis accounting is a method of bookkeeping that records financial events based on cash flows and cash 
position (Sterck, 2007). Revenue is recognised when cash is received and expense is recognised when cash is 
paid (Sterck, 2007). On the other hand, accrual basis accounting records financial events based on events that 
change your net worth (Sterck, 2007). Revenues are recorded in the period in which they are generated and 
expenses are recorded in the period in which they are incurred (Sterck, 2007). Even though cash is not received 
or paid in a credit transaction, they are recorded because they are consequential in the future income and cash 
flow of the organisation (Sterck, 2007). In fact, cash is an inherent feature of the accruals basis - accruals records 
transactions both on an accruals basis, as described above, and on a cash basis. The operating (profit and loss) 
statement presents the information on an accruals basis and the cash-flow statement presents the information on 
a cash basis (Blöndal, 2004). 




that have partly implemented accrual budgeting, and (c) countries with a budget system based 
on cash and commitments.  
According to Blöndal (2003), there is much greater acceptance of accruals for financial 
reporting than for budgeting purposes. The reasons for this are that, firstly, the accrual budget 
is believed to risk budget discipline because only cash provides a match between when money 
is spent and when it is reported in the budget; secondly, the accruals basis is believed to be 
extremely complex. With respect to the first issue mentioned, whilst accounting for current 
budgeted expenditure in accrual terms does not result in significant changes because accrual 
and cash measurement are almost the same, accrual budgeting delays cost recognition of 
capital expenditure compared with a cash-based budget (Martí, 2006). However, the problem 
with applying accruals only to financial reporting and not to budgeting is that there is a risk 
that the historical financial statements might become a purely technical accounting exercise. 
This is because the budget is the key management document in the public sector, and if it is 
on a cash basis, it will serve as the main basis on which politicians work (Blöndal, 2003).  
2.8.3 Accrual basis – Financial statements versus budgets 
The table below lists some OECD countries and indicates the basis of accounting adopted by 
each country in the reporting of historic financial information and in the budgeting system. 
The information contained therein demonstrates that the majority of these countries are using 
accruals accounting in their historic financial statements and a number of countries are in 
transition to accruals. With respect to the budgeting system, very few countries have adopted 
or are in the process of switching to accrual budgeting.   




Table 10: Basis of accounting for financial statements and budgets 
 
Country Financial statements Budgets
Australia Full accruals Full accruals
Austria Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.)
Belgium Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.)
Brazil Cash – Transitioning to Accruals Full Cash
Canada Full accruals Full Cash
China Cash – Transitioning to Accruals Full Cash
Czech Republic Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full Cash
Denmark Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.)
Estonia Full accruals Cash – Transitioning to Accruals
France Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full Cash
Germany Full Cash Full Cash
Greece
Cash (Supplementary Accrual Information 
Provided) 
Full Cash
Hungary Full accruals Full Cash
Iceland
Full accruals (No Capitalisation / 
Depreciation of Assets)
Full accruals (No Capitalisation / 
Depreciation of Assets)
Ireland




Cash (Supplementary Accrual Information 
Provided)
Cash (Supplemental Accrual Information 
Provided)
Japan Cash (Accrual Basis Statements Also) Full Cash
Korea Full accruals Full Cash
Latvia Full accruals Full Cash
Lithuania Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full Cash
Luxembourg




Cash (Supplementary Accrual 
Information Provided)
Full Cash
Mexico Full Cash Full Cash
Netherlands Cash (Agency Reporting on Accruals) Full Cash
New Zealand Full accruals Full accruals
Norway
Cash (Supplementary Accrual Information 
Provided)
Cash (Supplemental Accrual Information 
Provided)
Poland Full accruals Full Cash
Portugal Cash (Agency Reporting on Accruals) Full Cash
Slovak Republic Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full Cash
Spain Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full Cash
Sweden Full accruals Cash (Running Costs on Accruals)
Switzerland Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.) Full accruals (Public Service Pensions excl.)
UK Full accruals Full accruals
USA
Full accruals Cash (Loan and Guarantee Programmes on 
Accruals)
Source: OECD (2015)




2.8.4 Is the accrual basis required to implement performance budgeting? 
PB and the accrual basis are among the most prominent reforms on the budget agenda 
(Schick, 2007). In the context of public financial management reform, with its emphasis on 
performance, the need to introduce the accrual basis was identified in order “to encompass 
accounting and reporting on the allocation and use of total economic resources (both cash 
and non-cash) at the disposal of managers” (OECD 1993: 3). Mauro et al (2015) opine that 
the link between accrual accounting and PB is not fully explored, while Diamond (2002) 
rejects the assumption that PB requires accrual accounting. The experience of countries that 
have cash budgets, such as Canada, the US, Sweden and the Netherlands, demonstrates that 
accrual budgeting is not necessarily required for the purpose of implementing PB (Sterck, 
2007). Diamond (2002) argues that the implementation of an accrual-based system for 
government accounting, given the costs involved, is perhaps only worthwhile in the context of 
an overall transformation of public sector management. In view of the fact that the 
introduction of accrual accounting is hardly a costless exercise, it is important to recognise 
that there may be intermediate solutions or alternative ways of gaining some of the benefits 
afforded by accrual accounting (Diamond, 2002). Furthermore, Diamond (2002) notes that in 
assessing the need for accrual accounting in the implementation of PB, the focus should be on 
why there is the need for the additional information obtained from an accrual accounting 
system.  
Though not a prerequisite for implementing PB, accrual budgeting can add value to PB in 
various ways, including providing a measure of the full cost of outputs in the budgetary 
statements, measuring efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the services provided and basing 
expenditure prioritisation on the full costs of programmes within a medium and long-term 
expenditure framework (Martí, 2013). 




2.9 Countries’ experiences with performance budgeting systems  
A number of countries have been working on introducing PI into budgeting for various years 
(OECD, 2007). The major reform motivators are summarised as financial crisis pressure to 
reduce public expenditures, improve efficiency and reduce waste; and a change in political 
administration (OECD, 2007). 
2.9.1 Implementation strategies 
The OECD (2007) undertook a study on the PB reforms in eight OECD countries. The table 
below summarises the implementation strategies adopted in these countries. 
Table 11: Summary of country implementation strategies 
 
As illustrated in the above table, OECD countries have adopted diverse implementation 
strategies for introducing PI into budgeting systems. This reflects the countries‟ cognizance 
that there is no „best practice‟ in the implementation of these reforms, but each country has to 
design and adapt such reforms to its own priorities, culture and national capacities.  
One of the considerations that a country needs to make is whether the reform should be 
enacted in law - if the reforms are introduced through legislation, this ensures some form of 
Top-down Bottom-up Comprehensive Partial Big bang Incremental
Australia √ √ √
Canada √ √ √
Denmark √ √ √
Korea √ √ √
Netherlands √ √ √
Sweden √ √ √
UK √ √ √
US √ √ √
Source: OECD (2007)
Strategies Coverage Timescale




permanence because if there is a change in government, it might be easier for the reform to 
continue (OECD, 2007).  
Another issue to be taken into account is whether to adopt a top-down versus a bottom-up 
implementation approach. In the top-down approach, the central government agency (the 
MOF, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) or the Cabinet office) has a primary role in 
developing, implementing and monitoring the reforms (OECD, 2007). With a bottom-up 
approach, the individual departments develop their own approaches and there is less 
enforcement from the top (OECD, 2007). There are risks involved in both extremes. A too 
centralised (top-down) approach can result in PB becoming a compliance exercise with the 
risk of turning into an expensive paper exercise (OECD, 2007). In contrast, with too little 
central involvement, the pressure for change is reduced and in addition, there can be lack of 
consistency in the presentation of PI such that comparisons across government departments 
would be difficult to make (OECD, 2007). 
A further question to answer is whether to adopt a big bang versus an incremental 
implementation approach. An incremental approach (as adopted by Australia) implements 
change on a step-by-step basis, whilst a big bang approach (as adopted by Korea) introduces a 
number of sweeping reforms at the same time (OECD, 2007). A big bang approach is likely to 
be implemented in situations where the drivers for change are strong such as a change in 
government or an economic crisis (OECD, 2007). The drawback of this approach is that it 
requires a high level of political and financial commitment which might be difficult to achieve 
in many countries (OECD, 2007). 




2.9.2 Different types of performance budgeting systems 
Sterck and Scheers (2006) carried out a study covering seven OECD countries, which adopted 
different types of PB (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, and 
the US). Figure 4, below, gives an overview of the types of PB reforms implemented in these 
seven countries. On the x-axis the content of PB reforms is shown, whilst the y-axis shows the 
drivers of the budget reform.  
Figure 4: Drivers and content of PB reform (Source: Sterck and Scheers, 2006: 66) 
 
The study shows two major trends in public budget format change: (a) an evolution toward 
output and outcome budgeting, and (b) a tendency toward accrual budgeting. The most 
advanced budget formats are the accrual-based appropriation budgets that are structured along 
outcomes, which is the case in Australia and the UK. The Netherlands has taken the step 
toward an outcome budget, but the method of charging is still based on cash and 
commitments, except for the executive agencies. The Swedish government has also 




introduced outcome budgeting. The New Zealand public administration has an accrual-based 
output budget in place and makes appropriations for outputs instead of outcomes, while 
explaining the connection between outcomes and outputs in supplementary documents. The 
study also revealed that other countries such as Canada and the US make appropriations for 
outcomes and outputs but use the output and outcome information only to inform the 
budgetary decision-making. The output and outcome information is then reported in the non-
authorised part of the budget (explanatory memorandum) or in separate performance plans. 
The method of charging in these countries is based on cash and commitments.  
The above analysis demonstrates that the implementation of PB does not require an 
accounting basis based on accruals. A number of countries have implemented PB but are still 
operating a budgeting system based on cash and commitments. This ties in with Diamond‟s 
(2002) conclusions which reject the assumption that PB requires accrual accounting.  
Sterck (2007) carried out a study covering four countries which adopted different types of PB: 
Australia, Netherlands, Sweden and Canada. These countries were selected because they are 
forerunners in results-oriented financial management (Sterck and Scheers, 2006). The 
following diagram summarises the PB systems adopted in the countries subject to the study. 








2.9.3 Use of performance information – studies’ results 
In their study of PB reforms in the seven countries identified earlier on, Sterck and Scheers 
(2006) sought to assess the extent to which resource allocation depended on performance. 
Although an evolution toward output and outcome budgeting was observed among these 
countries, Sterck and Scheers (2006) concluded that PI is not extensively used in final 
allocation decisions.  
In his study of PB systems in four countries (Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada), 
Sterck (2007) observed that though the PB reforms had the objective of increasing the 
transparency of the budget, the complexity of budgeting may increase. This complexity is 
augmented when outcome/output budgeting is combined with accrual budgeting. Sterck 
Note a: A majoritarian electoral system is one which is based on single member constituencies. 
Note b: In cash basis accounting, financial events are recorded on the basis of cash flows and cash 
position; in accrual accounting, financial events are based on events that change the net worth. 




(2007) suggests that in order to encourage Members of Parliament (MPs) to find the right 
information and to use it, there is the need for increased communication about reforms and 
rigorous training for MPs. The study concluded that the PB reforms, which were introduced 
with the aim to enhance accountability to Parliament, emphasise the alteration of the budget 
structure and the format of the budget documents, but do not seem very successful in 
changing the budget functions. In fact, Sterck (2007) found little evidence that PI in budgets 
and annual reports is directly used by MPs in their oversight function. 
Empirical literature covering PI use in the public field has been increasing (Willoughby and 
Melkers, 2005; Pollitt, 2006; Askim, 2007; Moynihan and Pandey, 2010; Taylor, 2009 and 
2011; Demaj and Summermatter, 2012; Hammerschmid et al 2013; Kroll, 2014). 
There is supporting evidence showing that politicians are only moderately interested in PI 
(Willoughby and Melkers, 2005; TerBogt, 2006; Jansen, 2008; Montesinos et al, 2013; 
Mimba et al, 2013; Saliterer and Korac, 2013). Raudla‟s (2012) study indicated that members 
of the finance committee of the Estonian Parliament make only limited use of PI for budget 
decision-making; instead they rely on informal networks for collecting the data deemed 
necessary for budget negotiations. Furthermore, the interview data showed that PI is not 
discussed during the meetings of the finance committee and some members never read 
documents containing PI. The study revealed that the main reasons for the lack of use of PI by 
the Estonian finance committee were: documents comprising PI are too long; the budget 
process is constrained by a very limited time-frame; and the parliament‟s input for changing 
the budget is limited. In their research, Ter Bogt et al (2015) observed that, during Council 
and Council committee meetings, councillors of the province of Groningen (Netherlands) 
make very limited use of PI incorporated in the budget for their decision-making and control 
functions. Empirical data gathered through twenty-one interviews with Estonian civil servants 




showed that in specific circumstances of cutbacks in budgets, PI plays a marginal role (Raudla 
and Savi, 2015). Kroll (2013) found that public managers favour non-routine PI, such as ad 
hoc, verbal and qualitative feedback over systematic and formal data set out in performance 
reports.  
Contrary to this, Askim (2007) found that local councillors in Norway use PI actively. 
Similarly, Liguori et al (2012), who studied Italian municipalities, showed that PI played an 
important role in politicians‟ decision-making. A comparable situation was observed by 
Bjornholt and Houlberg (2013) in Danish municipalities; however, the authors also found that 
political actors are generally unable to link PI to budgetary decisions. A survey distributed to 
public sector executives from six European countries found that the availability of PI is 
mostly relevant in influencing the use of such information by public managers 
(Hammerschmid et al 2013). Demaj and Summermatter (2012: 93) suggest that PI is “first 
and foremost meant to provide the basis for performance appraisals by politicians”. 
The results of the OECD 2005 Questionnaire (Curristine, 2005) indicate that the primary 
objectives listed by responding countries for introducing performance measures in budgeting 
include the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of government programmes and the 
provision of more concrete information to government on performance for decision-making 
purposes and for setting future targets and priorities. The secondary aims listed include 
helping to reduce expenditure, providing information to help reallocate resources between 
programmes and providing a mechanism for the MOF to monitor the activities of government 
organisations. There are, of course, challenges that need to be managed. The main challenges 
that the responding countries came across when introducing performance measures comprise 
difficulties in attributing outcomes to specific programmes, difficulties in designing measures 
for specific activities, insufficient political support, unclear objectives and poor quality data. 




This research concludes that the majority of OECD countries have introduced performance-
informed budgeting. These countries make use of performance measures in the budget 
process; however, the performance data is used to provide information but does not determine 
budget allocations.  
A study comparing performance reporting between the UK and Ireland concluded that 
political drive is fundamental for stimulating the use of PI and the development of 
performance targets (McGeough, 2014). If PI is demanded by the political system, it will be 
provided and will then be used as the basis for dialogue between the civil service and the 
politicians (McGeough, 2014). Another element which enhances the value of PI and thus 
increases its use is the quality of such information (Ter Bogt et al, 2015).  
The OECD 2011/2012 Performance Budgeting Survey (von Trapp, 2014), in which thirty-one 
OECD member countries and the Russian Federation participated, found that PB practices are 
widely used but vary considerably between countries. Furthermore, it was revealed that there 
is only a loose/indirect link between PI and funding decisions. In effect, it appears that PI is 
useful for accountability purposes, but not so much for resource allocation. As such, the 
resource allocation process remains a political procedure. The survey results also showed that 
the main institutions responsible for setting performance targets are the line ministries and 
agencies. In addition, there seems to be less reliance on PI in budget negotiations between the 
central budget authority and line ministries than revealed in past surveys; furthermore, in 
some cases PI is not being used.  
According to the results of their study amongst US states, Jordan and Hackbart (1999) 
determine that using performance to impact budget allocations may be implied but is seldom 
used. Jordan and Hackbart (1999: 85) suggest that “performance budgeting may impact 




appearance and preparation of the budget document, but the outcome in terms of funding is 
not significantly (if at all) affected”. This reasoning mirrors the conclusions reached by Sterck 
(2007) as outlined above. A reason for the continued efforts at PB is the need for public 
accountability and taxpayer support of expenditures (King, 1995). Another study of state 
governments in the US (Melkers & Willoughby, 1998) also found little evidence of the use of 
PI to influence funding decisions. A survey carried out by Melkers et al (2002) on behalf of 
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) found that only 7.5% of state budget 
offices considered performance measures as „effective‟ or „very effective‟ in changing budget 
allocations. Research carried out by Ho (2011) also confirmed that the role played by PB in 
determining final budget appropriations is limited; however, PB still adds value to budget 
discussions during the budgetary process. Ho (2011: 393) advised that “modern conceptions 
of PBB [performance-based budgeting] have mostly abandoned any traditional notions that 
appropriation amounts should be solely based on performance”. Using an experimental 
approach to gain insight as to how PI is used, Moynihan (2016) concluded that resource 
allocation is influenced by more than performance data and depends on other variables such 
as the characteristics of the information, the communication skills of those providing the data 
and the context in which the information is presented. 
2.9.4 Lessons learnt 
A study covering six countries in emerging Europe, written by a World Bank team, highlights 
some potentially valuable lessons in the implementation of budget reforms, as detailed in the 
table below. The countries selected for the purposes of this study were Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey (Kąsek and Webber, 2009). 




Table 12: Lessons in the implementation of budget reforms 
 
On a concluding note, a PB system can inform decision-making when such system is properly 
integrated into the budgeting process, its purpose is comprehended and the performance 
measures are reliable (Willoughby, 2011). Furthermore, Willoughby (2011) maintained that 
championing by key people and constant improvement to the system strengthen the 
effectiveness of a PB system.   
Lesson learnt Explanation
Duration of the reform process Countries which undertake budget reforms should expect a long
implementation process, involving a complex and challenging learning
experience and requiring continuous enhancement in systems and procedures. 
To ensure systemic change, key stakeholders have to provide support to all
concerned in solving the difficulties and obstacles encountered along the way
(Kąsek and Webber, 2009).
Leadership Strong leadership, supported by political commitment, are fundamental for
undertaking successful budgetary reform (Ho, 2011). It is valuable to have
key people in ministries who champion the change, both at the outset and for
maintaining the drive for change. There should be general support for the
reforms, on the basis that they are fundamentally important for public sector
efficiency and modernisation. If the reforms are identified with one political
party, there is the risk of abandonment should a different party be in public
office (Kąsek and Webber, 2009).
Relevant skills and capacities It is important to develop the necessary capacity and skills within the MOF
and other entities, such that successful implementation of the budgetary
reform could be achieved. Mimba et al (2013: 16) claim that “a low
institutional capacity is a hindrance for the design and use of adequate
accounting systems, including performance measurement systems ”. Self-
development should be promoted amongst employees working within the
public sector environment, in order to build the required budget management
knowledge, which includes technical abilities, managerial capabilities and
problem solving skills (Kąsek and Webber, 2009).





























This chapter presents the theoretical framework underlying the study. Section 3.2 sets out the 
institutional concepts which explain why the Maltese public administration might transition 
from the existing line-item budgeting system to a performance based system. Subsequently, 
the policy implementation theory, explained in section 3.3, provides insights as to how PB 
should be implemented in Malta and identifies potential issues around implementation. 
3.2 Institutional theory 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Institutional theory is being employed to explain the budgeting system choice in the Maltese 
public sector. The existing conventional budgeting system is a strongly institutionalised 
procedure and has been deeply grounded in the Maltese public administration‟s practices. 
Institutional theory suggests that the Maltese government may eventually be inclined to 
implement a PB system to replace the current traditional budgeting system because of 
institutional pressures. The analysis draws on DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) concept of 
institutional isomorphism to explain these institutional pressures. Greenwood and Hinings‟ 
(1996) framework of organisational change is also being used to explain the type of 
organisational change that may be expected in the Maltese public sector to implement a PB 
system and move away from the currently embedded system.  
The section below sets out an overview of the insights into institutional theory put forward by 
various academics and researchers. This is then followed by a review of the theoretical model 
for understanding change, proposed by Greenwood and Hinings (1996). Subsequently, a 
preliminary application of institutional theory to the Maltese scenario is presented, which 




comprises a discussion of the institutional pressures for change within the local budgeting 
framework, using the concept of institutional isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983); as well as an analysis of the potential expected change in the local budgeting system, 
based on Greenwood and Hinings‟ framework (1996). 
3.2.2 Theoretical overview 
A generally used definition of „institution‟ is: “a way of thought or action of some prevalence 
and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people.” 
(Hamilton, 1932, cited in Burns and Scapens, 2000: 5). 
Institutional theory is concerned with how organisations are influenced by forces outside their 
control (Hoffman, 1999) and is developed on the concept that institutional environments are 
constructed within a society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, the institutional 
environment and the participants therein influence and mould organisational systems and 
behaviours (Munir et al, 2011). From an institutional perspective, organisations are viewed as 
functioning within a framework of values, norms and taken-for-granted assumptions which 
define acceptable and appropriate behaviour (Oliver, 1997). Institutional theory presumes that 
organisations implement management practices and structures which are viewed as legitimate 
by other organisations practising in the same field, irrespective of their real usefulness 
(Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). It assumes that the structure of the organisation is primarily 
determined by the pressure applied by external and internal players on the organisation in 
order for it to follow a set of norms and thus, secure long term survival and access to 
resources and ultimately, achieve legitimacy (Brignall and Modell, 2000). 
The principal works underpinning the new institutional theory are those of Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). New institutionalism presumes that organisations 




respond to pressures from their environment by adopting organisational procedures which are 
considered as appropriate and which are socially accepted (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 344) claim that institutionalised techniques are not based on 
efficiency but are used “to establish an organisation as appropriate, rational and modern. 
Their use displays responsibility and avoids claims of negligence.” 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) describe „new institutionalism‟, as focusing on the ways in 
which order and structured actions are facilitated by shared rules which, on the one hand, 
restrict the ability of groups to optimise and, on the other hand, favour some actors whose 
interests are guarded through existing sanctions and rewards. 
Institutions are often regarded by social theorists as instruments which restrain, prohibit and 
control behaviour; however, it must be appreciated that institutions likewise provide support 
and give power to players and their activities (Scott, 2014). Jepperson (1991: 146) observes 
that “institutions simultaneously empower and control” and Fararo and Skvoretz (1986: 227) 
describe institutions as having “a constraint/freedom duality”. Constraints are laid down by 
institutions because they differentiate between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, by 
delineating „legal, moral and cultural boundaries‟; on the other hand, institutions make 
available resources and set out guidelines for the players within such institutions (Scott, 
2014). Institutions can be passed on through generations (Zucker, 1977) and they can be 
somewhat resistant to change (Jepperson, 1991). Scott (2014) suggests that although 
institutions seek to offer order and stability, they go through change, which could be both 
revolutionary and incremental.  
The sociological perspective of institutional theory is especially relevant when studying 
implementation because questions are raised about the degree to which human actions are 




determined in a structural manner and emphasis is placed on organisational activities which 
are clearly pertinent when assessing implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2014). Institutional 
theory takes into account the conflicting interests and power relationships between the 
different stakeholders (Brignall and Modell, 2000). 
An important influence on institutional theory was the work of Selznick (1957) who 
distinguished between „organisations‟ and „institutions‟ as follows: 
“The term „organisation‟ … suggests a certain bareness, a lean no-nonsense system of 
consciously coordinated activities. It refers to an expendable tool, a rational 
instrument engineered to do a job. An „institution‟, on the other hand, is more nearly a 
natural product of social needs and pressures – a responsive adaptive organism.” 
(Selznick, 1957: 5) 
The distinction illustrated above highlights the fact that organisations function within a social 
domain and are influenced by the external environment surrounding them and the needs and 
networks of the people forming part of the organisations; these, in turn, mould the social 
structures that develop within organisations (Hill and Hupe, 2014). 
Edelman (1992) and Dobbin and Sutton (1998) departed from the notion that organisations 
face common pressures and act in a relatively similar manner; rather, they argued that 
organisations respond to the law in complex and diverse ways and they noted that 
professionals within organisations influenced the drafting of regulations that constituted best 
practice in the area of employment rights and regulations (Powell, 2007). Powell (2007) 
draws on the ideas of DiMaggio (1988) who recognised the fact that institutionalism is a 
political process and that the shape and success of such a process is dependent on the power 
of the individuals who drive this process. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 361) claim that: 




“Organisations which incorporate institutionalised myths are more legitimate, 
successful and likely to survive.” 
The formal structure of an organisation reflects the „myths‟ of its institutional environment, 
rather than the exigencies of the organisation‟s actual work activities (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The formal structure, which incorporates an organisation‟s blueprint and established 
rules and procedures, is distinct and separate from the informal aspect which reflects the 
organisation‟s actual work activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
argue that the inclusion of the „proper‟ formal structures within organisations could enhance 
an organisation‟s reputation and increase its success. For example, organisations which adopt 
external criteria that illustrate their value, are viewed positively by their stakeholders: 
“Ceremonial criteria of worth … are useful to organisations: they legitimate 
organisations with internal participants, stockholders, the public and the state … The 
incorporation of structures with high ceremonial value, such as those reflecting the 
latest expert thinking or those with the most prestige, makes the credit position of an 
organisation more favourable.” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 351) 
Therefore, the implication is that the success of an organisation is not solely dependent on the 
level of efficiency and effectiveness of its productive capabilities, but also on the 
incorporation of structures based on institutionalised rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Though 
the implementation of certain rules may conflict with the sense of efficiency because of the 
additional costs involved for their operation, failure to include the „proper‟ elements of 
structure may lead to negative consequences for the organisation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
It is argued that: 
“Organisations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalised elements in their 
formal structures maximise their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival 
capabilities.” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 352) 




Budget reforms have been explained by examining the shifts in budget formats, procedures 
and function (Van Reeth, 2002). In particular, performance oriented budgeting systems 
highlight the policy planning and decision-making functions. Van Reeth (2002) claims that in 
order for the budget reform to be „real‟, the shift in the budgeting format and procedure has to 
be supported by a shift in the budget function which demonstrates the capacity to use the 
budget tool for better decision-making and policy formulation. In this regard, a study 
undertaken by Mimba et al (2013) covering local government agencies in Indonesia, found 
that managers in such agencies placed more focus on satisfying the formal requirements vis-à-
vis the format and timely delivery of annual performance reports, rather than on the contents 
of such reports. Mimba et al (2013: 15) describe this as indicating “a symbolic rather than 
functional use of performance information”. Budget reforms are sometimes used as a means 
to establish legitimacy: 
“Shifts in the information-content of budget systems can therefore become part of 
strategies of administrative or political stakeholders to create meaning, exercise 
control or establish legitimacy.” (Van Reeth, 2002: 2) 
This is also pointed out by Miller (1991) who states that the development of budgeting 
processes has been shaped by political, administrative and societal players who have 
promoted the implementation of new budgeting systems in search of legitimacy.   
Where the budgetary reform comprises performance oriented formats and procedures, but the 
actual decision-making by the public administration largely ignores performance criteria, “the 
performance procedures and formats are used, at best, to rationalise and legitimise the 
decisions” (Van Reeth, 2002: 12). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that governments with 
unclear goals make use of legitimacy procedures to show economic and social robustness.  




In their research, Carpenter and Feroz (2001) sought to explain the factors which influence the 
choice of the basis of accounting in the public sector. The research showed that the decision 
of governments to adopt generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for external 
financial reporting is highly influenced by the personal values of key people in the 
organisation, organisation culture, pressures to change which emanate from the providers of 
capital and from accounting education courses (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).  
Burns and Scapens (2000: 23) “conceptualise management accounting as organisational 
rules and routines…[which have] the potential to become institutionalised”. From an 
institutional perspective, management accounting change is viewed as a process, in line with 
Selznick‟s (1957: 16) view of institutionalisation as something “that happens to the 
organisation over time”. They claim that the execution of management accounting change 
necessitates a deep understanding of the organisation‟s current environment, in particular „its 
routines and institutions‟. This requires understanding the formal systems, as well as 
obtaining knowledge about the routines and customs of members of the organisation (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). Where the changes conflict with the existing „routines and institutions‟, 
they might meet with resistance from the parties who will be affected by the changes (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). 
Burns and Scapens (2000: 17) describe three elements constituting resistance to change:  
“(1) formal and overt resistance due to competing interests; (2) resistance due to a 
lack of capability (knowledge and experience) to cope with such change; and (3) 
resistance due to a „mental allegiance‟ to established ways of thinking and doing, 
embodied in existing routines and institutions.” 




DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose the idea of institutional „isomorphism‟ (similarity) to 
explain organisational change
4
. Isomorphism is “a constraining process that forces one unit 
in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 149). This concept explains why organisations operating in the 
same spheres are likely to exhibit similar traits. Di Maggio and Powell (1983) mention 
coercive, normative and mimetic processes to explain why organisations are developing into 
more „homogeneous‟ groups. Coercive aspects relate to political pressures and the influence 
of the state who is entrusted with the provision of regulatory control and monitoring; 
normative forces emanate from the role of education and the significant impact of the 
professions; and mimetic factors refer to the expected reactions to situations of uncertainty 
(Powell, 2007). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that organisations are compensated for 
being like other organisations in their area, because this similarity facilitates the recruitment 
of skilled and career-oriented people, the undertaking of transactions with other 
establishments, the qualification for grants and/or contracts and the building of their 
reputation. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) maintain that when dissimilar organisations in the same 
occupation are organised into a tangible discipline, strong influences come into play which 
steer such organisations to resemble one another. The adoption of similar work practices by 
these organisations increases their legitimacy and enhances their social credibility, which in 
turn, leads to improved probability of survival and success (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Isomorphism (or the process of becoming similar) acts as a constraint because it pressures one 
organisation to be similar to other organisations that are subject to the same environmental 
circumstances (Hawley, 1968, cited in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Though organisations 
                                                          
4
 Organisational change refers to “change in formal structure, organisational culture, and goals, programme or 
mission.” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 149) 




try to effect changes on a continuous basis, the extent of diversity is diminished through the 
isomorphism effect and organisational players create an environment which restricts their 
aptitude to change further in the longer term (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Scott (2014) has referred to three foundations underlying institutions, which he termed the 
„three pillars of institutions‟, namely regulative systems, normative systems and 
cultural/cognitive systems.  
“Institutions comprise regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, that 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life.” (Scott, 2014: 56) 
These pillars provide a distinctive basis for legitimacy, either because of legal sanctioning, 
moral obligation or cultural support (Powell, 2007). Each component is important; and 
although at times, one element may dominate, they often work together (Scott, 2014). The 
regulative pillar focuses on the setting of rules and sanctions, the normative aspect comprises 
an obligatory and binding expectation, and the cultural/cognitive element relates to taken-for-
granted or shared understanding of concepts (Powell, 2007). The three components make up a 
continuum ranging “from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the 
taken for granted” (Hoffman, 1997: 36). Table 13 sets out the main dimensions for each 
pillar, whilst table 14 provides further explanation vis-à-vis the said pillars. 




Table 13: Three Pillars of Institutions 
 
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness; 
Shared understanding
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy
Rules; Common beliefs; 
Laws; Shared logics of action; 
Sanctions Isomorphism




Source: Scott (2014: 60)
Indicators Certification; 
Accreditation
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed




Table 14: Explanation of Pillars of Institutions 
 
Pillars of Instutions Description
Regulative 
This emphasises regulatory processes, namely rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning
activities (Scott, 2014). The logic underpinning the regulatory pillar is an instrumental
logic – individuals create laws to further their interests and they abide to these laws to
obtain the ensuing awards or to avoid punishments (Scott, 2014). Though regulation is
perceived as constraining and repressing behaviour, various types of rules actually
empower and confer benefits to some players, such as awarding licences to operate in
the market (Scott, 2014). The primary mechanism of control, using DiMaggio and
Powell‟s (1983) categorisation, is coercion. Where laws are ambiguous and do not lay
down clear directions for behaviour, law interpretation has to rely more on the
normative and cognitive elements, than the coercive component for its effect (Suchman
and Edelman, 1996). The principal features of the regulatory pillar are fear, force,
sanctions and expedience; the stern effects of these components are mitigated by the
existence of rules, both formal and informal, that justify using force (Scott, 2014).
Normative 
Normative systems comprise values (conceptions of what is preferred and the setting of
standard levels) and norms (how things should be done and values achieved); they
define goals and objectives and specify appropriate ways to achieve them (Scott,
2014). Normative systems restrain social behaviour, but at the same time, they
empower and enable social action, by granting rights and responsibilities, licenses and
mandates, and privileges (Scott, 2014). The logic underlying the normative pillar
revolves around „appropriateness‟; rather than seeking self-interest as is the case with
the instrumental logic, it searches for the appropriate behaviour to be carried out (Scott, 
2014). The indicators for the existence of normative institutions comprise certifications
and accreditations bestowed upon the organisation by professional associations.
Infringement of norms causes feelings of shame or disgrace; on the other hand,
exemplary behaviour evokes feelings of honour and respect – these emotions provide
strong inducements to observe established norms (Scott, 2014). 
Cultural-cognitive
The cultural-cognitive perspective of institutions has been given prominence by neo-
institutionalists, who concentrate on the cognitive elements of human existence. “A 
cultural-cognitive conception of institutions stresses the central role played by
the socially mediated construction of a common framework of meaning ” (Scott,
2014: 70). This element emphasises that “internal interpretive processes are shaped
by external cultural frameworks ” (Scott, 2014: 67). Hofstede (1991: 4) suggests
that culture provides “the software of the mind ”, that is, it provides the mental
programmes which shape the ways of thinking, feeling and acting. The underlying logic
is orthodoxy, where actions are justified in view of their soundness and perceived
correctness (Scott, 2014). The feelings evoked by this institutional pillar range from
certitude and confidence to confusion and disorientation; compliance with established
cultural beliefs lead to feelings of competence, whilst contradictory behaviour is
regarded as bizarre (Scott, 2014). 




In some circumstances, one particular pillar will operate on its own to support the social 
order, and in other circumstances, a particular pillar will dominate (Scott, 2014). When the 
three pillars of institutions are aligned, the strength of their combined forces could be 
remarkable (Scott, 2014); conversely, misalignment between the pillars can lead to conflict 
and confusion which in turn, are likely to stimulate institutional change (Dacin et al, 2002). 
Organisations require legitimacy – Scott et al (2000) claim that: 
“Organisations require more than material resources and technical information if 
they are to survive and thrive in their social environments. They also need social 
acceptability and credibility.” Scott et al (2000: 237) 
The concept of legitimacy is a basic element in institutional development. The importance of 
legitimacy becomes instantly apparent if lost, which suggests that legitimacy is a fundamental 
condition of social existence (Scott, 2014). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organisations 
increase their legitimacy and survival potential if they adopt certain work practices, though 
these practices may not necessarily lead to improved performance or efficiency. Brignall and 
Modell (2000) observe that managers may be motivated to use PI within public sector 
performance measurement systems, for legitimacy purposes rather than to maximise 
efficiency. Each of the three institutional pillars puts forward a basis for legitimacy: the 
regulative pillar implies that legitimate organisations are those operating according to legal 
requirements; the normative view suggests that both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provide 
the incentive to conform; the cultural-cognitive perspective rests on taken for granted, 
preconscious understandings (Scott, 2014). 
With respect to the implementation of policy, the sociological work of Scott (2014) adopts a 
different perspective to that employed by political scientists; rather than focusing on how 
public policy develops, it is concerned with how organisations function and how the 




responsibilities to implement public policy are held within organisations (Hill and Hupe, 
2014). This outlook of the institutional theory sheds light on why organisations may not 
cooperate between themselves or may be unwilling to amend their processes and procedures 
(Aldrich, 1976). 
March and Olsen‟s (1984) views of the institutional approach suggest that an analysis of a 
policy implementation process has to be undertaken in an organised framework, where “there 
are established norms, values, relationships, power structures and standard operating 
procedures” (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 37). The institutional perspective is explained by March 
and Olsen (1984) as follows: 
“Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on 
the design of political institutions. The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, 
and the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also 
collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend 
interests. They are political actors in their own right.” (March and Olsen, 1984: 738) 
In her book entitled „How Institutions Think‟, Douglas (1986) notes that an institution is 
characterised by its enabling role in shaping the cognitive processes of individuals, rather than 
by its formal structure and authority. Douglas (1986: 8) seeks to clarify “the extent to which 
[individual] thinking depends on institutions”. Douglas (1986) claims that individuals do not 
make decisions in isolation, but they draw upon shared knowledge and moral standards within 
their communities when making decisions. Societies develop legitimised social groupings (for 
example, family) or social processes (for example, ceremonies or games), on the basis of this 
shared knowledge and standards (Douglas, 1986). The author refers to such legitimised 
groups or processes as „institutions‟. In maintaining that institutions think, Douglas (1986) 
does not imply that institutions have „minds‟ of their own, but the thinking is done by the 
individuals within their institutional commitments. Institutions encode information and as a 




result, they provide individuals with a framework for making routine decisions, solving 
routine problems and doing a great deal of thinking on behalf of individuals (Douglas, 1986: 
47). Thus, institutions act as machines for thinking and decision-making with “the effect of 
turning individual thought over to an automatic pilot” (Douglas, 1986: 63). This saves time 
and energy for individuals when resolving problems (Douglas, 1986).  
The use of institutions in thinking may limit the capacity for independent thought, creating 
“shadowed places” in which nothing can be seen nor any questions asked (Douglas, 1986: 
69). While institutions can save time and energy in decision-making, they also diminish an 
individual‟s creativity in developing new and novel ways to address issues and restrain an 
individual‟s ability to identify potential problems inherent in the solutions proposed by 
institutions (Douglas, 1986). 
Young (1996) applied institutional thinking in her study on accounting reforms in the US, 
focusing on an FASB project on financial instruments. In her study, Young (1996) claimed 
that „financial accounting‟ is an institution. Young (1996) notes how the number and types of 
financial instruments (for example, interest rate options, interest rate swaps and interest rate 
futures) have increased over the last two decades. This had consequences for accounting, in 
particular to ensure that financial statements represent fairly the transactions of an 
organisation. According to Young (1996), the FASB developed an accounting standard which 
highlighted the traditional tasks of disclosure, recognition and measurement, rather than 
developing accounting rules which emphasise the fundamental nature of these new financial 
instruments. Young (1996: 487) discusses how the development of the accounting standard 
was limited by institutional thinking, such that during the standard-setting process, only 
certain types of questions were asked and many important issues were ignored. In addition, 
Young (1996: 491) claims that questions which posed challenges to the existing accounting 




framework were not asked. She argues that the reliance on the conceptual framework limited 
the search for appropriate solutions and although, time and effort were saved, these savings 
came at a cost because some pertinent issues were left unaddressed (Young, 1996: 491). 
Another study applying institutional thinking is that undertaken by Potter (2002), who 
examined financial accounting reforms in the Australian public sector. In his study, Potter 
(2002) maintains that the „conceptual framework‟ is an institution. Potter (2002) explains how 
accounting regulations were developed for the Australian public sector on the basis of the 
concepts outlined in the conceptual framework, which required public sector organisations to 
adopt commercial accounting rules. He claims that the regulations apply the traditional 
accounting concepts of accountability and performance, even though the main objectives of 
the organisations impacted are not financial (Potter, 2002). The study shows how the 
development of the accounting rules was limited by institutional thinking and thus, a number 
of issues related to the regulations were not tackled and only certain questions were asked 
(Potter, 2002). Potter (2002: 73) explains how the conceptual framework represents an 
automatic starting point for addressing issues and the possibility of resolving problems in 
other ways, perhaps non-financial, is rejected. 
3.2.3 Greenwood and Hinings’ framework 
Reasons for using the Greenwood and Hinings’ model 
Various models have been put forward for describing reforms. In this respect, Argento and 
van Helden (2010) referred to the following theoretical frameworks for explaining reform 
processes: Hood (1995); Greenwood and Hinings (1996); Lüder (2002); and Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004). Other frameworks which have been used to conceptualise change processes 




include Argento and van Helden (2009), which builds upon Greenwood and Hinings (1996), 
and Burns and Scapens (2000).  
For the purpose of the research, some of the frameworks mentioned above have been 
considered, but they were not adopted for the reasons discussed below. 
 Lüder‟s (2002) model highlights reform drivers and promoters as factors which trigger a 
reform. It was considered difficult to populate some of the contextual, behavioural and 
instrumental variables incorporated in this framework, in view of the fact that the 
implementation of PB in the Maltese public sector is still a proposed reform. Furthermore, 
a recent study which delved into central government accounting reform in Malta (Jones 
and Caruana, 2014) has adopted Lüder‟s (2002) model – in the context of Malta which is a 
very small country, it is very likely that the reform drivers, political reform promoters and 
stakeholders would be the same individuals/groups for both the accrual accounting reform 
and the PB reform. Thus, the adoption of Lüder‟s (2002) model in this research would 
have potentially been largely repetitive of the Jones and Caruana (2014) study. 
 Pollitt and Bouckaert‟s (2004) framework, which emphasises the elite group‟s perception 
of desired change, was not considered sufficient to explain the type and pace of change 
expected in the Maltese scenario.  
 Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) institutional framework aims to describe analytical concepts 
that can be used for case studies of management accounting. Whilst this model recognises 
that there are both internal and external influences on management accounting change 
processes, it adopts a micro level of analysis, focusing on internal factors. For instance, 
issues of power have not been explored in this model, failing to consider that rules and 




routines can also be kept in place by the use of power, rather than by taken‐for‐granted 
assumptions.  
 In their research, Argento and van Helden (2009) have complemented institutional theory 
with network theory, focusing on collaboration and interactions between the various 
stakeholders as factors which influence the outcome of a change process. In view of the 
potential importance of a powerful decision maker (champion) in leading and pushing the 
successful implementation of the budgetary reform in the Maltese context (Willoughby, 
2011), negotiations and discussions between the stakeholders were considered to be less 
influential in shaping PB reform in Malta. 
The Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model was deemed appropriate for explaining the type 
of organisational change expected in the Maltese budgetary framework (radical versus 
convergent and evolutionary versus revolutionary). It was considered essential to establish 
whether a radical change is possible in the Maltese context and to identify the factors that 
would enable or hinder such a change, with a view to addressing any constraining factors. 
Unless a radical change is envisaged, it might not be worth pursuing a reform which will 
potentially involve significant investment in time, effort and resources. Furthermore, it was 
deemed important to identify the pace by which such change is expected to happen, in order 
to allow for adequate planning to ensure successful adoption of the reform. This model also 
explores power relationships, which are viewed as key facilitators for the implementation of 
change. 
Explaining the Greenwood and Hinings’ model     
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) proposed a framework for understanding organisational 
change from the perspective of neo-institutional theory, since this theory contains insights 




which provide a model of change that links organisational context and intraorganisational 
dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1023).  
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) seek to explain why a radical change takes place and the 
incidence and pace by which such change occurs. In this respect, Greenwood and Hinings‟ 
model (1996) sheds some light as to why some organisations implement radical change 
whereas others do not, even though they all experience the same institutional pressures. The 
authors commence their discussion with a message which is fundamental in institutional 
theory – Greenwood and Hinings (1996) determine that a major source of organisational 
resistance to change originates from the premise that an organisation is normatively 
embedded in its institutional context. Subsequently, they suggest that the incidence and pace 
of radical change vary across institutional sectors because of differences in the structures of 
institutional sectors; they also vary within sectors because of differences in organisations‟ 
internal dynamics (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1023). Therefore, these internal dynamics 
determine whether organisations undergo radical change and, if they do, how quickly 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1024). Focus is placed by the authors upon four aspects of an 
organization's internal dynamics - interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for 
action.  
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) establish two aspects of organisational change: convergent 
versus radical change and revolutionary versus evolutionary change. Radical organisational 
change involves the transformation of the organisation, whilst convergent change refers to the 
fine tuning of the existing orientation; revolutionary change occurs quickly and impacts 
practically all parts of the organisation concurrently, whereas evolutionary change takes place 
slowly and gradually (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1024). 




Institutional theory emphasises convergence around institutionally prescribed templates, such 
that the nature of change is one of constant reinforcement of existing concepts and modes of 
thought, that is, change is convergent (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1027). From this 
perspective, the authors claim that convergent change is the more normal occurrence and 
radical change is problematic because of the fact that an organisation is normatively 
embedded in its institutional context. Argento and van Helden (2010: 793) also observe that 
institutionalisation can be an obstacle to change because rules and practices in an organisation 
become part of the way things are, that is, they become deeply embedded in an organisation. 
However, should institutional change occur, it is more likely that such change will be 
revolutionary (fast pace of change and large scale change) rather than evolutionary 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 29) pose the following question: “If institutions exert such a 
powerful influence over the ways in which people can formulate their desires and work to 
attain them, then how does institutional change occur?” Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 
1032) attempt to explain that the response of the individual organisation to institutional 
pressures is a function of the organisation‟s internal dynamics and therefore, the role of 
intraorganisational dynamics is critical in accepting or rejecting institutionalised practices.  
The framework proposed for understanding organisational change is summarised in Figure 6.  









The model includes exogenous dynamics (market context and institutional context) and 
endogenous dynamics (interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for action). The 
outcome of the model is radical organisational change, which becomes the input to market 
and institutional contexts, demonstrating that successful practices are mimicked and 
institutionalised: 
“An organisation that adopted a new organisational form and achieved competitive 
success in the marketplace would produce pressures on other organisations to adopt 
the same organisational form.” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1033) 
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Letters a to x in the model represent the following: line a denotes that interest dissatisfaction can vary from one 
organisation to another, even if the market context is the same; line b represents the fact that the pattern of value 
commitments will vary between firms given their diverse locations within the institutional context; line c links 
interests and values in view of their potential to exert pressure for change; line d represents the reciprocal 
relationship between power dependencies and value commitments; line e indicates that power dependencies 
enable or hinder radical change; line f denotes the fact that changes in the market context may lead to changes in 
the power relationships within a firm; line g shows that radical change will occur if there is the capacity for 
action; line h demonstrates the link between capacity for action and market context; lines i and j indicate that the 
institutional context influences the power of groups within the organisation and the capacity for action 
respectively; line k shows that groups use favourable power dependencies to promote their interests; and line x 
shows that radical change will arise if interests are complemented with a competitive or reformative pattern of 
value commitment. (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) 




The authors classify the endogenous elements of the model into precipitating dynamics and 
enabling dynamics.  
Precipitating dynamics 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1033-1037) observe that pressures for change within an 
organisation derive from interest dissatisfaction and the pattern of value commitments.  
Therefore, stakeholder dissatisfaction is a significant factor which gives rise to reform: 
“A potential pressure for change…is the extent to which groups are dissatisfied with 
how their interests are accommodated within an organisation.” (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996: 1035) 
“Dissatisfaction, however, does not provide direction for change.” (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996: 1035) 
Therefore, dissatisfaction does not automatically provide an alternative template (Argento and 
van Helden, 2009). Dissatisfaction will only lead to radical change if the dissatisfied 
stakeholders link their position of disadvantage to the existing template (way of doing things), 
and there is the possibility of an alternative template (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
At this stage, the critical factor leading to the possibility of radical change and providing the 
direction for change is the pattern of value commitments within the organisation (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996). The authors identify four patterns of value commitments: status quo, 
indifferent, competitive and reformative.
6
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 Status quo - all stakeholders are committed to the existing institutionalised template-in-use; indifferent - groups 
are neither committed nor opposed to the template-in-use; competitive - some groups support the template-in-
use, others prefer an alternative template; and reformative - all stakeholders are opposed to the template-in-use 
and prefer an alternative. (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) 




Reform is thus only possible if stakeholder dissatisfaction is coupled with a competitive or 
reformative pattern of value commitments: 
“Radical change will only occur if interests become associated with a competitive or 
reformative pattern of value commitment (line x in figure 6) … Otherwise, interest 
dissatisfaction will precipitate convergent change.” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 
1036, 1037) 
As regards the pace of change, Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1037) claim that a reformative 
commitment triggers revolutionary change because of the lack of resistance, whilst a 
competitive commitment will lead to evolutionary change in view of the resistance 
encountered from certain groups. 
Enabling dynamics 
“Radical change … will occur only in conjunction with an appropriate capacity for 
action and supportive power dependencies.” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1037) 
The authors identify capacity for action and power dependencies as the enablers of radical 
change. These conditions are necessary for radical organisational change because they enable 
or constrain it, but, by themselves, they are not sufficient to lead to radical change 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1041). 
Power dependencies either enable or suppress radical change within an organisation – radical 
change takes place where the power dependencies are combined with a reformative or 
competitive pattern of value commitments (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1039). Where the 
pattern of commitment is competitive (and therefore there are divergent views on the 
proposed change), radical change will only happen if the people in positions of power are in 
favour of the proposed change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1038). 




The second enabler for a reform process is capacity for action, that is, the ability of making 
the transition from the existing template to an alternative template – this requires the 
organisation‟s understanding of the new template, having the competencies to function with 
the new template and having the ability to manage the transition to the new destination 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1040). The authors state that capacity for action requires 
leadership skills, which include the carrying out of charismatic, instrumental and institutional 
activities
7
. In the absence of capacity for action, radical change will not happen; furthermore, 
“capacity for action [has to be] combined with either a reformative or competitive pattern of 
value commitments” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1040). The authors further emphasise 
that a good understanding of the new template together with a clear road map to arrive at the 
new destination gives the organisation the sureness to change rapidly. The institutional 
context might impinge on the capacity for action because an organisation which is deeply 
embedded within its institutional context might encounter obstacles to develop the required 
competencies (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1041). 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1047) acknowledge that their framework contains a number 
of concepts which are difficult to measure including power, interests and leadership; 
moreover, such concepts are very sensitive to context in their operation. 
3.2.4 Preliminary perspective on Malta 
Overview 
Van Reeth (2002) observes that budget reforms are sometimes used to attain legitimacy rather 
than for enhancing policy formulation and decision-making. In a hypothetical scenario where 
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 Charismatic - envisioning, energizing, enabling; instrumental - structuring, controlling, rewarding; institutional 
- ensuring changes stick. 




the Maltese government adopts PB, but fails to use the PI to make budgetary allocation 
decisions, it would have implemented a PB system to achieve institutional legitimacy. This 
will be manifested if huge amounts of data are gathered and presented in budget documents, 
but in actual fact the information would have no relevance for planning and decision-making. 
In terms of the institutional thinking perspective put forward by Douglas (1986), the 
traditional budgeting system could be viewed as an „institution‟. Budgeting in the Maltese 
public sector follows the line-item approach which has been in operation for the past years. 
This deeply embedded system („institution‟) may be restraining government‟s ability to 
develop new and creative ways to address the limitations inherent in the traditional system, 
such as the lack of accountability and the failure to measure the performance achieved by the 
line ministries. 
Pressures for change 
The three areas of institutional isomorphic change – coercive, normative and mimetic – 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) manifest themselves in the context of budgetary reform, as 
explained in Table 15 below. These pressures exert influence for promoting change to the new 
budgetary system. 




Table 15: Institutional isomorphic pressures 
 
Institutional pressures Budgetary reform in the Maltese context - Preliminary views
Coercive (legal and 
technical requirements)
Malta‟s EU membership lays down conditions that must be satisfied by the country as a result
of its affiliation and imposes demands for public financial management reform initiatives. The
Maastricht criteria for qualification and participation in the Economic and Monetary Union
specify conditions that need to be satisfied by EU member countries, including the
requirement that government deficit should not exceed 3% of the country‟s GDP. Coercive
pressures are constantly being exerted upon Malta in the form of demands by the EU for
Malta to keep its deficit at or below the 3% threshold. The fiscal deficit issues faced by the
country, coupled with the Maastricht criteria for qualification and participation in the Eurozone
constitute key drivers for the introduction of budgetary reforms. 
Meyer and Scott (1982) suggest that organisations which provide resources to government
entities, such as the credit markets, are in a position to exercise power over the government.
In this respect, the EU provides funds to the Maltese government for the financing of certain
projects, and can, therefore, exert coercive institutional pressures to implement budgetary
reform. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) claim that coercive isomorphism may be the result of




Normative isomorphic change arises from professionalization; if key employees and
management are “filtered on a common set of attributes ”, they are likely to look at issues
in the same manner and tackle decisions consistently (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 153). This
ensures that organisations are led by professional “people with similar values and beliefs
about the purpose and design ” of an organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152).
Normative pressures “describe the effect of professional standards and the influence of
professional communities on organisational characteristics ” (Ashworth et al, 2009:
167). As a result of normative isomorphism, organisations feel compelled to implement
systems and processes which have been endorsed by dominant professional groups (Burns,
2000). This reflects the Maltese context, where government might feel obliged to implement
the budgetary reform systems which have been advocated by other dominant countries.
Andrews (2009) claims that professional persons are more cognisant of good practices,
which results in enabling the transfer of „best practice‟; this, in turn, enriches the mimetic
influences such that the good practices are adapted to the given local contexts.
Ezzamel et al. (2007) describes how normative isomorphic change was weakened when
applying accounting and budgetary reforms in the UK, in particular in relations to the
politicians‟ role. They discovered that “only a small number of politicians … tended to
have either accounting/finances background or extensive experience in the public
sector… ” which constrained their understanding of new accounting and budget systems as
well as their aptitude to apply these new procedures (Ezzamel et al., 2007: 29). Ezzamel et al.
(2007) claimed that this lack of understanding acted as a stumbling block for effective change.
This emphasises the importance of having the right professional people at the top of Maltese
government departments and agencies, in order for the budgetary reform to be successfully
implemented. Andrews (2009) confirms this when he argues that „profession proficiency‟
promotes isomorphic change whilst „profession deficiency‟ weakens isomorphic change by
decreasing normative and mimetic pressures.
In this regard, Greenwood et al (2002: 58) state that: “Professional associations … play an
important role in theorizing change, endorsing local innovations and shaping their
diffusion. ”





Further considerations on isomorphic influences 
It has been argued by Andrews (2009) that the success of reforms might be limited, in view of 
the isomorphic characteristics of reform methods. These limits can, however, be counter-
balanced by shifting towards a rational approach as encouraged by Ashworth et al (2007). 
This approach concentrates on actual problems in an organisation and promotes change as 
tackling such issues (Andrews, 2009). In this respect, budgetary reform in the local context 
should be purposely introduced to improve the allocation of limited public funds amongst 
competing government programmes and to enhance accountability in government spending, 
rather than as a result of institutional pressures. Figure 7 depicts a change continuum between 
rational and isomorphic – it shows that isomorphic change on its own can be limited, but if 
the focus is shifted on the real issues (increasing efficiency and effectiveness), then, the 
limitations will be mitigated (Andrews, 2009).  
Mimetic (modelled on 
good or best practice)
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) observe that when organisations face uncertainty or have
unclear goals, they tend to model themselves on other organisations which they believe to be
more successful. Carpenter and Feroz (2001: 571) suggest that mimetic isomorphism is “a 
response to organisational uncertainty in identifying the best course of action ”. Thus,
“models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or
turnover, or explicitly by organisations such as consulting firms or industry trade
associations ” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 151). Mimetic pressures are also demonstrated
when organisations attempt to replicate desirable practices, even though such practices may
have been unsuccessful (Andrews, 2009).
Andrews (2009) maintains that countries are often willing to reproduce reform plans that are
considered to be 'good international practice'. PB is considered to be „good practice‟ in a
number of countries which have modelled their budgeting system on this basis. In
implementing such budgetary reform, the Maltese public administration will be subject to
mimetic pressures to model its budgeting system on that adopted by other countries. In this
respect, the Minister of Finance has admitted that Malta‟s budgetary system needs to be
reformed, because Malta‟s budget format is significantly out-dated when compared to that
implemented by the majority of the other European countries (Malta Today, 2013b; Times of
Malta, 2014b). 




Figure 7: A continuum of change approaches and challenges for development (Source: 
Andrews, 2009: 32) 
  
Macro-level aspect 
Munir et al (2011) proposed a framework to examine changes in performance management 
systems in banks, drawing from DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Oliver (1991). This 
framework illustrates that banks may implement changes to their performance management 
systems as a result of coercive, mimetic and normative pressures, as well as due to pressures 
from factors in the macro-level environment, including economic conditions, technological 
innovations, socio-cultural and political influences (Munir et al, 2011).  
In terms of the Maltese public administration, this framework implies that both the 
institutional factors and the macro-level aspect are significant catalysts in the change process 
involved to move from a traditional budgeting system to performance based budgeting. The 
adapted framework is shown in Figure 8. The institutional isomorphic pressures have been 
discussed above. With respect to the economic climate, the global financial crisis has 
significantly squeezed government revenues leading to deficit issues and high government 
debt. This necessitates tighter control over government spending and could act as a trigger for 
the implementation of PB, whereby funds are allocated to the programmes which deliver the 
desired results and outcomes. Technological improvements play an important role in the 




advent of a new budgeting system because they facilitate the data gathering and analysis 
processes across the whole of government. As regards the socio-cultural and political aspects, 
citizens are demanding more accountability from government; this is especially important in 
the local context where the change in government has heightened the public‟s expectation that 
the new government will deliver what was promised and will ensure accountability and trust 
in its dealings and in the allocation of public funds. In this respect, immediately after being 
elected, the Prime Minister made the following statement: “We will be restructuring how the 
secretariat [of the Prime Minister] works. It will be more business oriented and utilise 
concepts such as Key Performance Indicators" (Malta Today, 2013b). The Prime Minister 
also stated that the KPIs will establish the level of performance that government departments 
must achieve, will determine communication standards and will enhance transparency in 
government‟s dealings (Malta Today, 2013b).  
The above discussion suggests that the macro-level environment (economic, technological 
innovations, socio-cultural and political) (Munir et al, 2011) may also be a source of „informal 
pressure‟ for the introduction of budgetary reform. Munir et al (2011: 103) argue that 
“organisational responses to macro-level influences are often not spontaneous” and the 
reactions to macro-level aspects may stem from coercive, mimetic and normative pressures.   




Figure 8: Analytical Framework for examining changes in performance measurement 
systems within the banking sector (Source: Munir et al, 2011: 98) (Adapted) 
 
Influences that might prohibit change 
Whilst coercive, normative and mimetic institutional influences together with macro-
economic factors might exert pressure to promote the change to the new budgetary system, 
there could be other influences which act to hinder the reform. These potential issues will be 
delved into during the empirical data collection process. 
Greenwood and Hinings’ model 
Greenwood and Hinings‟ model is relevant for an understanding of the proposed transition 
from conventional input-based budgeting to PB because it sets out situations under which a 
radical versus a convergent organisational change could be expected. 




The existing conventional budgeting system is a strongly institutionalised practice in the 
Maltese public administration. However, there is dissatisfaction with the current system, as 
acknowledged by the Minister for Finance (Malta Today, 2013c; Times of Malta, 2014b). 
Moreover, the budgetary reform is being prompted by institutional pressures which result 
from Malta‟s EU membership. The fiscal deficit issues faced by the country and the EU‟s 
demands to keep the deficit under control, together with the stipulated Maastricht criteria for 
qualification and participation in the Eurozone constitute coercive pressures for the 
implementation of budgetary reforms. Furthermore, other normative and mimetic institutional 
pressures are present including the need to reform the budgetary system and to model it on 
that operated by the majority of other European countries. In addition, macro-economic 
factors may also impose pressures for change to the current budgetary framework. 
The implementation of PB is expected to constitute a radical change because it involves a 
completely new way of allocating funds to the various government ministries, departments 
and public entities – whilst the current system emphasises input performance (not exceeding 
the allocated budgets), the proposed system is mainly interested in outcomes and results. This 
radical change represents an alternative for the current template (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996).  
With respect to dissatisfaction with the existing practices, there might be diverging views 
between stakeholders. On the one hand, some groups might be dissatisfied with the existing 
budgeting system and might have strong reform ambitions, in order to achieve enhanced 
decision-making, improved accountability and superior allocation decisions. In this respect, 
the Minister of Finance has publicly declared that Malta‟s budgetary system needs to be 
reformed. On the other hand, there might be groups including other ministries within 




government and civil servants, who put up resistance against this change because they are 
used to the existing system (status quo) and might view the reform as threatening their current 
position since they have to be more accountable under the new system. This indicates a 
competitive pattern of value commitments. Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1028) claim that 
resistance to change is a result of rigidity and a powerful embeddedness of an organisation 
within its institutional field.  
The diverging views of the different stakeholders might act as a hindrance for a radical 
change to happen. Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1039) observe that where there are 
divergent opinions on the proposed reform, radical change can only occur if the people in 
positions of power are committed to the proposed change.  
The capacity for making the transition from the existing to the new budgeting system requires 
the possession of the necessary competencies and the aptitude to learn how to operate the 
proposed system – this depends on the skills of the human resource complement within the 
MOF, which will potentially manage the transition and implementation of the new system. 
The provision of the required training to staff involved in the budgeting process could 
facilitate the transition to the new system. If the reform is championed by a person in a high 
position of power, the process of mobilising the necessary resources (including human 
resources) would be facilitated. 
Thus, although the diverging opinions of the different stakeholders might be problematic for a 
radical change to take place, the existence of a champion for the reform in a high ranking 
position of power might still stimulate a radical change in the budgeting system. The 
preliminary application of the Greenwood and Hinings‟ framework in the Maltese scenario 
indicates that there is dissatisfaction with the existing system, there is the possibility of an 




alternative template, a competitive pattern of value commitments possibly exists, there are 
people in positions of power who are in favour of the reform, and the capacity to make the 
transition to the new system can be facilitated by the champion of the reform. These factors 
indicate that a radical change in the local budgeting system is possible. 
3.3 Policy implementation theory 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Policy implementation theory is being employed to identify a suitable implementation 
approach and to determine the potential issues around the implementation of PB in Malta. 
The section below describes some key terms and definitions used in the implementation 
literature. This is then followed by an overview of the theoretical considerations underlying 
the top-down implementation approach, the bottom-up perspective and a combination of the 
two views. Subsequently, the implementation success factors are discussed, followed by the 
limitations inherent in the implementation literature. The final section sets out a preliminary 
view of the implementation approach that might be adopted for the operation of PB in Malta. 
3.3.2 Key terms and definitions 
The dictionary definition of implementation is: to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, produce or 
complete a given task. In this respect, what is being implemented is „policy‟. Therefore, 
implementation in the context of public administration presupposes policy (Hill and Hupe, 
2014). 
Anderson (2011: 7) defines „policy‟ as a “purposive course of action followed by an actor or 
set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern…Public policies are those 




policies developed by governmental bodies and officials”. A number of authors have compiled 
models setting out the stages of the policy process, claiming that the stages framework 
provides a systematic approach which captures the diversity of the real context. Anderson 
(2011: 4) puts forward the following policy process framework:  
Figure 9: The Policy Process (Source: Anderson, 2011: 4) (As adapted from Anderson J.E., 
Brady, D.W. and Bullock, C. III, Public Policy and Politics in the United States, 2
nd
 ed. 
Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole 1984) 
 
 
Hill and Hupe (2014) observe that the implementation of public policy (depicted as stage 4 in 
the above diagram) is the result of what has occurred in the earlier stages (stages 1 to 3) of the 
policy process. Anderson (2011) notes that the content of the policy and its effect on the 
parties impacted may be significantly modified during the stage of implementation. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 20-21) define „implementation‟ as follows: 
“Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in 
a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court 
decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates 
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the objective(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, „structures‟ the 
implementation process. The process normally runs through a number of stages 
beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs (decisions) 
of the implementing agencies, the compliance of target groups with those decisions, 
the actual impacts – both intended and unintended – of those outputs, the perceived 
impacts of agency decisions, and finally, important revisions (or attempted revisions) 
in the basic statute.” 
O‟Toole (2000: 266) defines policy implementation as “what develops between the 
establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or stop 
doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action”. Therefore, the main 
question when researching implementation is: “what happens between the establishment of 
policy and its impact in the world of action?” (O‟Toole, 2000: 273). John (1998: 204) 
describes implementation as “the stage in the policy process concerned with turning policy 
intentions into action”. DeLeon (1999: 330) refers to implementation as “little more than a 
comparison of the expected versus the achieved”. 
Linton (2002: 66) suggests that the “implementation of a new process begins when an 
innovation has been adopted and ends when the innovation becomes routine or is 
abandoned”. Klein and Sorra (1996: 1057) define implementation as “the transition period 
during which targeted organisational members ideally become increasingly skilful, 
consistent, and committed in their use of an innovation. Implementation is the critical 
gateway between the decision to adopt the innovation and the routine use of the innovation 
within an organization”. 
When a comparison between what is achieved and what was expected is carried out (DeLeon, 
1999), there is the possibility of observing an „implementation gap‟ or an „implementation 
failure‟ (Hill and Hupe, 2006). Parsons (1995) mentions a number of factors which might lead 
to implementation failure, including difficult human relations, poor information flows, 




learning problems, labour/management conflict, cultural issues or problems with structures, 
amongst others.  
On the other hand, Ingram and Schneider (1990) give a number of definitions for successful 
implementation: agencies comply with statutory prescriptions such that the desired outcomes 
are achieved; holding agencies accountable for reaching stipulated goals which ensures that 
the agencies will carry out their tasks correctly; achievement of local goals; or the political 
climate is improved as a result of the programme. Ripley and Franklin (1982: 200) define 
successful implementation as that which “leads to desired performance and impacts”. 
The policy process illustrated in figure 9 above distinguishes between implementation and 
evaluation as two different stages. Parsons (1995: 461) observes that evaluation explores 
“how public policy and the people who deliver it may be appraised, audited, valued and 
controlled” whilst implementation is concerned with “how policy is put into action and 
practice”.  
Policy implementation research led to the development of two schools of thought for studying 
and analysing implementation: the top-down perspective and the bottom-up perspective. 
Matland (1995: 146) describes these two views as follows: 
“Top-down theorists see policy designers as the central actors and concentrate their 
attention on factors that can be manipulated at the central level. Bottom-up theorists 
emphasize target groups and service deliverers, arguing policy really is made at the 
local level.” 
A number of scholars have attempted to synthesize these two perspectives, arguing that some 
convergence between these two views is necessary to bring together the macrolevel variables 
considered by the top-down proponents and the microlevel variables of the bottom-up models 
(Matland, 1995: 146). 




3.3.3 The top-down perspective 
The founding fathers of implementation studies, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) proposed a 
top-down approach and defined implementation in terms of a relationship to policy as laid 
down in official documents. They observe that “policies normally contain both goals and the 
means for achieving them” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984: xxi). The authors claim that 
successful implementation is dependent on close linkages and a high degree of cooperation 
between different organisations and departments; in the absence of such close links, an 
„implementation deficit‟ will occur (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Policy implementation 
is thus viewed as a process of interaction between setting of goals and actions to achieve them 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984: xxi-xxiii). 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) put forward a model for analysing the implementation 
process (refer to Figure 10 below) – their model contains six variables which are linked to the 
production of an outcome described in the model as „performance‟. Implementation is viewed 
as a process which commences from a policy decision: “policy implementation encompasses 
those actions by public and private individuals or groups that are directed at the achievement 
of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 447). The 
authors emphasise the importance of consensus and compliance over the goals and objectives 
of the policy, suggesting that successful implementation is achieved where goal consensus is 
high and only marginal changes are needed; furthermore, goal consensus is reached if 
„subordinates‟ have participated in policy formation (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 449). 
This argument contrasts with the bottom-up views because the authors are here proposing 
participation at the stage of policy formation. The implementation process set out in Figure 10 




is depicted as a series of stages, with the arrows pointing forward or sideways (not back to the 
policy), indicating a top-down approach (Hill and Hupe, 2014).  
Figure 10: A Model of the Policy-Implementation Process (Source: Van Meter and Van 
Horn, 1975: 463) 
 
 
According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), the starting point of policy implementation is 
the authoritative decision. This suggests centrally located actors, such as politicians and top-
level bureaucrats, who are perceived as the most relevant in the achievement of the desired 
results (Paudel, 2009). The authors distinguish clearly between policy formation and policy 
implementation, recognising the role of the feedback process. The authors identify three types 
of variables which affect the implementation process, namely: tractability of the problem 
being addressed; nonstatutory variables affecting the implementation; and the ability of the 
statute to structure the implementation process. The first two types of variables constitute 
factors that will cause difficulties and the last type comprises factors that are crucial because 




they may be controlled during the implementation process - recognition of such factors 
provides guidance to people at the top as to how to control implementation (Hill and Hupe, 
2014). 
The framework proposed by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) is set out in the diagram below: 
Figure 11: Variables involved in the Implementation Process (Source: Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1983: 22) 
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Hogwood and Gunn (1984 cited in Hill and Hupe, 2014: 52) justify their top-down 
perspective on the basis that the people who design policies are elected in a democratic 
manner.  
The top-down perspective is very prescriptive and seeks to generalise policy advice; it focuses 
on variables which could be controlled at a central level (Matland, 1995). The top-down view 
makes the following suggestions: the goals of the policy should be clear (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975); the degree of change should be limited (Van 
Meter and Van Horn, 1975); the number of players should be minimised (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973); and the responsibility for implementation should be placed under an 
organisation which supports the goals of the policy (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier, 
1986). 
Top-down models face their share of criticism. Firstly, the starting point of such models is the 
statutory language, without taking into account the actions taken earlier in the policy making 
process (Matland, 1995). Matland (1995) observes that if policy is taken as given without 
considering the initial stages of policy formation, the broader public objectives might be 
overlooked. Secondly, implementation has been regarded as an administrative process, 
disregarding the political issues surrounding it – in this respect, the emphasis on establishing 
clear goals is inconsistent with the ambiguous and contradictory goals inherent in the process 
of passing legislation (Matland, 1995). Lastly, the top-down view perceives the policy 
designers as key actors in the implementation process. However, it has been argued that 
service deliverers at a local level have the knowledge of the real problems and the expertise of 
dealing with them; further, service deliverers have great discretion, making it difficult for 
policy makers to control their actions (Matland, 1995). The top-down models view local 




actors as impediments to successful implementation, requiring policy makers to control their 
behaviour (Paudel, 2009). 
3.3.4 The bottom-up perspective 
The starting point of this perspective is a problem in society and in this regard, individuals 
and their behaviour represent the focal point in these models (Paudel, 2009). Lipsky (1980), 
who is considered by many theorists as the founding father of the bottom-up view, put 
forward a theory of „street-level bureaucracy‟, where he analyses the behaviour of front-line 
people in policy delivery organisations. Lipsky (1980) considers street-level bureaucrats as 
having a better understanding of the customers‟ needs because they are in direct contact with 
the people. Lipsky (1980) considers street-level bureaucrats to be the actual policy makers 
and to play a fundamental role in the implementation of public policies. Though the role of 
front-line staff is crucial for policy implementation, Lipsky (1980) argues that they are faced 
with huge time pressures to cater for the numerous needs of the public and as a result, these 
street-level bureaucrats develop techniques which deal with people in a stereotyped manner. 
The author claims that control from the top will result in street-level bureaucrats ignoring the 
needs of their customers and increasing their tendency to stereotype (Lipsky, 1980). 
According to Berman (1978), policy implementation occurs at two levels – macro and micro. 
At macro-implementation level, centrally located planners design a government programme; 
at micro-implementation level, local agencies act in response to the macro-level plans by 
developing their own programmes and implementing them (Berman, 1978). Micro-level 
factors are only influenced indirectly by policy designers and the same implementation policy 
may be implemented differently at the local level (Matland, 1995). Palumbo et al (1984) 
argue that if local deliverers are not free to adapt the policy to local circumstances, the 




programme would probably fail. Hjern (1982) observes that the success of a policy is largely 
dependent on the skill sets of people at the local level who can adjust the programme to suit 
the local circumstances; policy success depends only to a limited extent on central 
intervention. 
Barrett and Fudge (1981, cited in Hill and Hupe, 2014) emphasise the political processes 
occurring during implementation and criticise the top-down view which tends to depoliticize 
the policy-action relationship, arguing that it is difficult to separate policy formation from 
implementation. Oosterwaal and Torenvlied (2012) investigate political conflict at policy 
formation stage, referring to it as „political divergence‟ at the implementation phase. 
Proponents of the bottom-up perspective therefore recommend a flexible strategy which 
allows for adaptation to local circumstances (Maynard-Moody et al, 1990). 
Bottom-up models are also criticised. Firstly, it is argued that in a democratic society, policy 
control should be in the hands of individuals who are accountable to sovereign voters who 
have elected them democratically (Matland, 1995). In this respect, local service deliverers do 
not obtain their authority through a democratic election process. Secondly, the bottom-up 
view overemphasises the level of local autonomy – central policymakers can determine the 
required resources centrally and can significantly influence policy outcomes (Matland, 1995). 
The table below sets out the main differences between top-down and bottom-up 
implementation approaches: 




Table 16: Differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches  
 
3.3.5 Combining the two perspectives  
Clearly, the top-down and bottom-up views of the implementation approach present 
conflicting thoughts and each view tends to disregard the part of the implementation insights 
highlighted by the other. These two views are fundamentally in conflict with respect to what 
is success (consistency versus adaptation), how success is to be reached (clarity versus 
flexibility) and who should be the focal point for implementation (central versus local players) 
(Howard et al, 2010). In this regard, a number of researchers have attempted to synthesise the 
two perspectives, indicating whether the top-down versus the bottom-up approach is more 
appropriate under stipulated conditions.  
Elmore (1979) attempted to combine the top-down and bottom-up views by proposing two 
approaches to implementation analysis - forward and backward mapping. Forward mapping 
consists of setting out clearly the policy objectives, it identifies specific steps which establish 
what is expected of implementers at each level and it specifies what a satisfactory outcome 
would be, in terms of the policy objectives originally stated and against which success or 
failure can be measured (Elmore, 1979: 602-603). Elmore (1979: 603) notes that the 
fundamental flaw of this approach is its assumption that policymakers control the 
Variables Top-down perspective Bottom-up perspective
Policy decision-maker Policymakers Street-level bureaucrats
Starting point Statutory language Social problems
Structure Formal Both formal and informal
Process Purely administrative Networking, including administrative
Authority Centralisation Decentralisation
Output/Outcomes Prescriptive Descriptive
Discretion Top-level bureaucrats Bottom-level bureaucrats
Source: Paudel (2009: 40)




organizational, political and technological processes that affect implementation and thus, 
“reinforces the myth that implementation is controlled from the top”. Backward mapping 
presents an opposite view to forward mapping; it begins with a statement of the precise 
behaviour to be changed at the lowest level of the implementation process which gives rise to 
the need for a policy, it identifies a set of operations required to effect the change and moves 
up through the structure of implementing agencies until the central level is reached (Elmore, 
1979: 604). Although Elmore‟s approach is useful as a tool because it provides valuable 
suggestions for policy designers, as a theory, it lacks explanatory power (Matland, 1995). 
Scharpf (1978: 347) employs network analysis in his study of implementation processes, 
emphasising that “it is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could 
result from the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formulation and policy 
implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate actors 
with separate interests, goals and strategies.” Scharpf (1978) notes that networks may be 
critical for addressing the „implementation deficit‟ referred to by Pressman and Wildavsky. 
The policy network approach was also discussed by Klijn and Koppenjan (2000: 139) who 
stated that “policy is made in complex interaction processes between a large number of actors 
which takes place within networks of interdependent actors”. Cooperation is crucial to 
achieve the desired policy outcome; O‟Toole (1988) observes that network management is 
aimed to improve cooperation between the actors. The government is regarded as an actor in 
policy networks, though it has a special role in view of its unique goals and resources (Hill 
and Hupe, 2006). The government can assume diverse roles in a network situation: it can 
choose to perform tasks in collaboration with private or other public actors; it can take the 
role of process manager, it can act as network builder or it can decide not to participate (Klijn 
and Koppenjan, 2000). 




Berman (1980) states that the adoption of either the top-down or bottom-up approach for an 
implementation plan depends on a number of factors surrounding the policy context, 
including scope of change, goal conflict, technology and environmental stability. The author 
notes that these contextual factors cannot be influenced by the implementation designer. 
Berman (1980) suggests that the implementation plan should follow a top-down approach 
when change is incremental, goal conflict is low, technology is certain and a stable 
environment exists; on the other hand, a bottom-up approach is recommended when major 
policy changes are on the agenda, goal conflicts exist, the technology involved is uncertain 
and the environment is unstable.  
Ripley and Franklin (1982: 9) describe implementation processes as follows, identifying five 
characteristics: 
“Implementation processes involve many important actors holding diffuse and 
competing goals who work within a context of an increasingly large and complex mix 
of government programmes that require participation from numerous layers and units 
of government and who are affected by powerful factors beyond their control.” 
The authors give particular attention to the political nature inherent in the implementation 
process and they also emphasise that the type of policy is relevant for the implementation 
process.  
Sabatier (1986, 1991) moved away from the top-down approach, towards a combined view, 
accepting some of the strengths of the bottom-up perspective. According to Sabatier (1986), 
the way forward for viewing the policy process is to take an „advocacy coalition‟ approach. 
Advocacy coalitions represent “actors from various public and private organizations who 
share a set of beliefs and who seek to realise their common goals over time” (Sabatier, 1986: 
39). The „advocacy coalition‟ approach adopts: 




“the bottom-uppers' unit of analysis – a whole variety of public and private actors 
involved with a policy problem – as well as their concerns with understanding the 
perspectives and strategies of all major categories of actors (not simply programme 
proponents). It then combines this starting point with top-downers' concerns with the 
manner in which socio-economic conditions and legal instruments constrain 
behaviour. It applies this synthesized perspective to the analysis of policy change over 
periods of a decade or more.” (Sabatier, 1986: 39) 
Sabatier‟s approach is closer to the bottom-up view because it includes actors from all levels 
(Hill and Hupe, 2014). 
Lane (1987: 542) distinguishes between responsibility and trust, arguing that „responsibility‟ 
issues concern the “relationship between objectives and outcome”, whilst „trust‟ relates to 
“the process of putting policies into effect”. In this regard, the author notes that the top-down 
approach highlights the „responsibility side‟ whilst the bottom-up view emphasises the „trust 
side‟. Lane (1987: 543) then claims that:  
“An implementation process is a combination of responsibility and trust…Without the 
notion of implementation as policy accomplishment there is no basis for evaluating 
policies and holding politicians, administrators and professionals accountable. On the 
other hand, implementation as policy execution rests upon trust or a certain amount of 
degrees of freedom for politicians and implementers to make choices about alternative 
means for the accomplishment of goals.” 
Goggin et al (1990) propose a „communications model‟ for analysing implementation, which 
emphasises communication issues between layers of government (federal, state and local). 
The model includes elements from the top-down and bottom-up approaches. The authors 
identify three groups of variables which influence state implementation: inducements and 
constraints from the top (federal level); inducements and constraints from the bottom (state 
and local levels); and a state‟s decisional outcomes together with a state‟s capacity to act. The 
communications model acknowledges that distortions happen, signals are interpreted 




differently and contextual circumstances can impact the perception of signals (Matland, 
1995). 
Rather than proposing a model which combines the top-down and bottom-up approaches, 
Matland (1995) developed a model – „the ambiguity/conflict model‟ – which explains when 
the two approaches are most suitable. Matland (1995) noted that the implementation literature 
lacks theoretical structure and therefore, through his model, he sought to put forward a more 
theoretically based approach to implementation. The author observed that implementation 
studies have largely focused on presenting lists of variables which impact implementation, 
without explaining the theoretical relationships between them and without pointing to the 
conditions under which these variables are relevant (Matland, 1995: 153). For these reasons, it 
was considered useful to apply Matland‟s theoretically based approach to the study, with a 
view to assess the robustness of this model and, if applicable, suggest improvements and 
refinements to the model that might come out of the empirical data gathering process. 
The ambiguity/conflict model presents four implementation perspectives, based on a policy‟s 
ambiguity and conflict level, as set out in the following diagram: 




Figure 12: Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix: Policy Implementation Processes (Source: 
Matland, 1995: 160) 
 
 
Matland (1995: 156) claims that policy conflict in implementation arises when a number of 
organisations consider a policy as relevant to their interests and at the same time, these 
organisations have incompatible views either regarding the goals of the policy or the planned 
activities to implement such a policy. When conflict exists, a bargaining process ensues, 
focusing exclusively on achieving an agreement on actions, rather than agreeing on goals 
(Matland, 1995: 156). Whilst top-down proponents believe that a policy‟s level of conflict can 
be manipulated, bottom-up advocates claim that conflict cannot be manipulated (Berman, 
1980). Matland (1995: 157) argues that certain types of conflict can be manipulated; 
conversely “some policies are inevitably controversial and it is not possible to adjust them to 
avoid conflict”. The type of mechanisms employed to resolve conflict depend on whether the 
conflict level is high or low – at low conflict levels, persuasion or problem-solving are 
commonly used; at high conflict levels, bargaining and coercion are more common (Matland, 

























With respect to policy ambiguity, the author identifies two aspects – ambiguity of goals and 
ambiguity of means. Top-down proponents argue that goal ambiguity is one of the reasons for 
implementation failure and therefore, the policy goals should be clearly stated. Matland 
(1995: 158) maintains that this suggestion ignores the positive effects of ambiguity, because 
goal ambiguity could be a way to limit conflict, allowing for different interpretations by 
diverse actors. Ambiguity of means mostly exists where the technology required to achieve 
the goals of a policy is still not available or where the environment is so complex that the 
choice of tools is not straightforward (Matland, 1995: 158). Though top-down approaches 
suggest that policy ambiguity should be eliminated, Matland (1995) notes that it is unclear 
whether ambiguity can be influenced in the policy design process. 
The four implementation perspectives proposed by Matland (1995) are explained in the 
following table: 




Table 17: Implementation perspectives 
  
Process Explanation
Administrative implementation An administrative implementation is characterised by low ambiguity and
low conflict, where goals are clear and the means (technology) for
implementing the policy is known (Matland, 1995). In this type of
implementation, if sufficient resources are allocated to the programme, then the
expected outcome is assured (Matland, 1995). The problems that arise under
conditions of low conflict and low ambiguity are of a technical nature and
include lack of financial and time resources, poor coordination or an ineffective
monitoring system to control deviant behaviour (Matland, 1995). The
administrative implementation process largely reflects the views of a top-down
perspective.
Political implementation The author suggests that a political implementation typically exhibits low
ambiguity and high conflict. In this type of implementation, goals are clearly
defined, but incompatible; furthermore, “outcomes are decided by power ” 
(Matland, 1995: 163). In this situation, resources which are required for the
policy implementation are controlled by actors who are sceptical or opposed
to the policy and therefore, if the implementation is to succeed, the implementer
either needs to have the power to force his/her will on the other actors or has
to have the resources to be in a position to bargain (using coercive and
remunerative methods) for the purpose of reaching agreement on actions
(Matland, 1995). Political implementation is captured by top-down models
which highlight political factors as fundamental in achieving the desired results.
Experimental implementation Experimental implementation is typical of a policy which displays high
ambiguity and low conflict. This implementation process includes policies with
both unclear goals and means, as well as policies with clear and supported
goals but unclear means of implementation (Matland, 1995: 167). In
experimental implementation, technology is uncertain and ambiguity is seen as
an opportunity to learn (Matland, 1995). The bottom-up approach reflects
more closely the circumstances described in this implementation process, since
ambiguity is more acceptable in bottom-up models (Matland, 1995: 167).
Symbolic  implementation Policies exhibiting high levels of ambiguity and high levels of conflict are
described by the author as symbolic implementation processes. Despite the
fact that the policy is vague, this type of implementation exhibits high conflict.
The strength of coalitions determines the outcomes under this process. Matland
(1995) observes that for this type of implementation, both the top-down and
the bottom-up approaches have some relevance. 
Source: Matland (1995)
Policy implementation processes




In relation to Matland‟s model, Hill and Hupe (2006: 76-77) maintain that the model provides 
some valuable suggestions for implementation research; at the same time, they pose the 
following question: “How easy is it to label policies in the way he does?”  
3.3.6 Measures of implementation success and success factors 
Linton (2002) suggests that the benefits of an innovation will be achieved if implementation 
results in a positive outcome. To this effect, the author summarises the measures of 
implementation success (Linton, 2002: 67-69) and the factors that lead to implementation 
success (Linton, 2002: 69-72), as set out below: 








Routinisation occurs when the implementation
phase is completed
Incorporation measures whether an innovation is
utilised to its full capacity
The time taken to implement an innovation is an
indicator of the efficiency of the implementation
process: if an innovation is implemented in a short 
time-frame, its benefits will be reaped sooner
Management satisfaction with the innovation
Goal achievement measures whether the
innovation met its expectations
Payback calculation: the shorter the payback, the






Organisational structure: implementation success
depends on organisational traits including
structure, size and culture
Technology: the complexity of the technology
affects the outcome of an implementation
Project management affects positively the
success of an implementation if it is properly
understood and effectively used by the
implementer
Divisibility of a programme into smaller elements
reduces the risk of an implementation
Social interactions including management buy-in,
technology championing, communication
between implementers and other involved
individuals, personnel training and interactions
with suppliers and consultants, are factors which
positively influence the success of the
implementation process
Source: Linton (2002)
Measures of implementation success Factors that lead to implementation success




3.3.7 Limitations of the implementation literature 
A number of scholars have commented on the shortcomings of the existing implementation 
literature. Goggin et al (1990) observed that implementation, as a separate field of study, is 
still in its infancy. Rothstein (1988 cited in Hill and Hupe, 2006: 79-80) describes 
implementation research as “to a great extent…misery research”; the author identifies three 
issues with implementation research: firstly, the research is largely focused on programmes 
which failed; secondly, programmes with high complexities and ambitions are focused upon; 
and finally, the research took an extremely rationalistic and mechanistic view of the 
implementation process. Matland (1995) claimed that the implementation literature lacks 
theoretical structure, largely focusing on providing lists of variables affecting implementation. 
Similarly, Hill and Hupe (2006: 80) maintain that the result of the implementation research 
has been the “accumulation of checklists of factors that may affect success in the 
implementation process”. Paudel (2009: 50) states that the implementation literature “is 
dominated by the top-down and bottom-up perspectives and their synthesis”; however “the 
concrete theory of policy implementation is still lacking”. Linton (2002) notes that there is 
still the need for theory building in the area of implementation research. 
3.3.8 The implementation of performance budgeting in Malta 
As discussed earlier, the top-down approach involves a more centralised and systematic 
approach for the implementation of budgetary reforms. With this approach, the principal 
responsibility for developing, implementing and monitoring PB initiatives would rest with a 
central governmental agency, possibly the MOF or the OPM (OECD, 2007). The central 
agency is also responsible for issuing rules and guidelines to all ministries and departments. 




In a bottom-up approach, there is less enforcement from the top and the individual agencies 
are allowed to develop their own systems and methods (OECD, 2007). Their participation 
may be on a voluntary basis. The individual ministries and departments are the key players in 
the reform process and central intervention is minimal. This approach is considered to be 
more ad hoc than systematic, because of the lack of central enforcement and its voluntary 
characteristic (OECD, 2007).  
In most OECD countries, the MOF is mainly responsible for the PB reforms, but it is usually 
supported by the OPM (OECD, 2007). The role played by the MOF in developing and 
implementing PB varies across countries: there are countries, such as the UK, which operate a 
centralised top-down approach where the MOF is highly involved in the development and 
implementation of the budgetary reforms; on the other hand, there are countries, such as 
Denmark and Iceland, which have adopted a decentralised bottom-up approach where the 
individual ministries are responsible for the implementation of the reforms and the 
involvement of the MOF is minimal and limited to issuing advice and guidelines (OECD, 
2007). Other countries adopt an approach which lies between these two extremes.  
In their study, the OECD (2007) have identified the benefits and risks involved in a top-down 
versus a bottom-up implementation approach, as illustrated in the table below: 




Table 19: Potential benefits and risks of top-down and bottom-up implementation 
approaches  
 
With the current line-item budgeting system operated in Malta, the individual ministries 
submit their requests for funding to the MOF; this is then followed by rounds of discussions 
between the individual ministries and the MOF. The final decision with respect to the funds to 
be allocated to each ministry is made by the MOF upon recommendations from the OPM.  
If PB is introduced, the individual ministries („street-level bureaucrats‟) would potentially be 
involved in developing performance measures and setting performance targets; however, the 
MOF would still potentially play an active role in the implementation of this budgetary 
reform, holding responsibility for the approval of the final performance measures and targets 
following a negotiation process with the individual ministries. The benefit of involving the 
individual ministries in the development of performance measures and targets is that these 
implementers would feel ownership of the budgetary reforms and would be motivated to 
deliver the results. Cooperation between the parties involved and development of 
Benefits Risks
 Top-down approach Stronger pressure for reform Limiting flexibility to achieve results
Uniformity in approach and framework across 
government
Too rule-bound, and performance becomes 
mere compliance
More information at the centre to make 
decisions
Creating too many reporting requirements and 
becoming an expensive paper exercise
Better coordination and monitoring Failing to gain the support of agencies
Creating perverse incentives and distorting 
behaviour
 Bottom-up approach Greater flexibility Inertia due to lack of pressure to reform
Capacity to tailor reforms to agencies‟ needs Being more difficult and time-consuming to 
implement
Enables greater responsiveness to clients and 
local communities
Lack of coordination of reforms
Encourages ownership of reforms by agencies Lack of information at the centre to make 
decisions
Lack of consistency in reform efforts and 
presentation of data
Source: OECD (2007: 34)




collaborative networks increases the likelihood of successful implementation (Scharpf, 1978). 
Moreover, as has been argued by Lipsky (1980), street-level bureaucrats play an important 
role in implementing policies because of their direct contact and better understanding of the 
needs of the people. This knowledge and experience held by the local implementers will 
translate in the development of performance targets which better reflect the needs of the 
citizens. The top-down models consider street-level implementers as providing obstacles to 
successful implementation (Paudel, 2009) – in the Maltese context, the local implementers 
should be regarded as contributors to the implementation process, rather than as impediments. 
However, central involvement is still required – lack of central involvement might lead to 
non-implementation of the reforms at a departmental level. Furthermore, the involvement of 
the MOF ensures uniformity in the presentation of information which makes possible the 
comparison of performance across ministries and across the whole of government. The MOF 
would also be responsible for providing formal and/or informal rules, guidelines and 
procedures which have to be followed by the individual ministries and departments in the 
operation of the new budgeting system.  
In summary, the above preliminary analysis indicates that the approach which should be 
adopted for the implementation of PB in Malta is a combined approach, with greater emphasis 
on the bottom-up perspective. In this regard, central involvement is considered to be 
extremely important to ensure consistency in the generation of PI and successful 
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This chapter starts off by providing an overview of the trends in Malta‟s key economic 
indicators over the last few years. A summary of the main events which affected the country‟s 
credit rating in recent years is then provided. Next, the functions of the Budget Office and the 
Economic Policy Department (EPD), two units that fall under the portfolio of the MOF, are 
described. This is followed by an outline of Malta‟s existing budgetary process and a 
description of the budget documents being currently compiled. Subsequently, highlights from 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act recently enacted in Malta, are given. The last section then 
presents an analysis of actual and budgeted expenditure in the health and education sectors. 
Based on documentary sources, this chapter seeks to describe the Maltese economic 
environment and the current budgetary framework, paving the way for a better understanding 
of the context in which PB might be implemented and for facilitating the identification of 
recent budgetary reforms, in support of the first and second research objectives respectively
8
. 
An illustration of the budget positions of the education and health ministries is also provided, 
in view of the fact that representatives from these ministries were selected to participate in the 
empirical data collection, for the purpose of obtaining the line ministries‟ viewpoints. 
4.2 Economic trends 
This section highlights Malta‟s economic performance over the period from 2001 to 2014, as 
depicted by trends in key economic variables analysed on an annual basis (illustrated in 
Figures 13 to 18 below). 
                                                          
8
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Malta‟s key strengths are its limestone, a favourable geographic location and a productive 
labour force. The economy is highly dependent on tourism, financial services, foreign trade 
and manufacturing (mainly pharmaceuticals and electronics). Malta‟s main trading partners 
are Europe and Asia, though a substantial amount of goods are exported to the African market 
with the majority bound for Libya (KPMG, 2013). 
Looking forward, Malta must continue to invest in its human resources and in its knowledge 
based industries in order to increase its competitiveness (KPMG, 2013). Malta‟s low labour 
participation rate could be perceived as an impediment to higher economic growth. As a 
result, government is introducing measures and incentives to encourage older workers to 
remain longer in the work force and to encourage females to enter the labour market (Central 
Bank of Malta (CBM), 2007). Furthermore, in order to enhance its growth potential, Malta 
must adopt further policies for safeguarding fiscal sustainability and maintaining 
macroeconomic and financial stability, as suggested in the IMF country report (Malta 
Financial Services Authority, 2013). 















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP growth in Malta (per cent) 2001-14 
Nominal GDP Real GDP
Source: National Statistics Office, Central Bank of Malta  
Notes:  
Over the last 14 years, annual GDP growth in nominal terms averaged around 4.8%, with real GDP 
growth (at 2010 prices) averaging around 2.2% per annum.  
 
After a few years of low growth between 2001 and 2004, which was largely underpinned by a slowdown 
in the tourism and electronics industries, real GDP growth recovered in the years between 2005 and 2008, 
averaging about 3.2% per annum. The recovery in 2005 was mainly attributable to improved productivity 
levels, according to a study compiled by the European Commission (CBM, 2007).  
 
In 2009, Malta‟s economy slipped into recession and real GDP contracted. The country‟s high 
dependency on food and energy imports and on the tourism industry, make the economy particularly 
vulnerable to swings in other countries‟ economies. As tourism declined in 2009 in view of neighbouring 
countries‟ economic difficulties, Malta‟s economy was negatively affected and registered negative 
growth. 
 
During 2010, the country‟s nominal GDP grew by about 7.5% over the previous year whilst real GDP 
registered an increase of 3.5%. Malta‟s GDP grew further in the following two years, reaching an average 
real GDP growth of around 2.3% per annum. This expansion in the economy was driven by significant 
growth emanating mainly from the financial services and Information Technology industries, as well as 
from other service activities (KPMG, 2013). Economic activity in Malta continued to grow during 2013 
and 2014, with real GDP growth reaching 2.6% in 2013 and rising to 3.5% for 2014. This growth was 
mainly driven by domestic demand, with the largest contributor to the increased economic activity being 
investment (CBM, 2015). 
















GDP per capita in Malta (EUR) 2001-14 
Nominal GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (at 2010 prices)
Source: National Statistics Office, Central Bank of Malta   
Notes:  
GDP per capita in nominal terms has increased steadily during the period under consideration, from 
€10,800 in 2001 to €18,700 in 2014. In real terms (at 2010 prices), the growth in GDP per capita over 
2001 to 2014 averaged around 1.5% per annum. 




Figure 15: Annual Growth in Government Revenue and Expenditure, 2001 to 2014 
 
 
Figure 16: Government Revenue and Expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Annual growth in Government Revenue and 
Expenditure (in EUR'000), 2001-14 
Revenue Expenditure
Source: Central Bank of Malta   
Notes:  
Total government revenue and expenditure have grown by an average of around 6.2% and 5.5% 
respectively over the period from 2001 to 2014. During 2014, general government revenue grew by 
10.6%, reflecting higher tax revenue, arising from fiscal measures as well as positive economic 
developments (CBM, 2015). At the same time, expenditure rose by 9.0% in 2014, mainly reflecting 
higher spending on social assistance and retirement pensions, and increased expenditure in the education 










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total Government Revenue and Expenditure     
(as a % of GDP), 2001-14 
Total Revenue Total Expenditure
Source: National Statistics Office, Central Bank of Malta   



















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Government Deficit (as a % of GDP),  2001-14 
Source: National Statistics Office, Central Bank of Malta   
Notes:  
Malta‟s budget has been in deficit throughout the period under consideration. 
 
During the period under consideration, government deficit as a percentage of GDP peaked at just above 
9% in 2003, declined steadily beyond 2003 until 2007 (reaching a level of 2.3%) and went up again to 
around 4.2% in 2008. Subsequent to 2008, it decreased again, falling below the 3% benchmark during 
2011. (The Maastricht criteria for qualification and participation in the Economic and Monetary Union 
specify that the planned or actual government deficit should not exceed 3% of each country‟s GDP at 
market prices.)  However at the end of 2012, the deficit was observed at above the 3% of GDP threshold. 
As a result of this, in June 2013, the EU placed Malta under an excessive deficit procedure. Subsequently, 
Malta ended 2013 with a deficit of 2.8% of the GDP and in 2014, the deficit declined further to 2.1% of 
GDP. This led to the closure of the excessive deficit procedure which had been opened against Malta. 
 
The Maltese government has so far avoided the implementation of any austerity measures by the EU, 
mainly because no extraordinary intervention, such as bailouts to the financial sector, was needed to deal 
with the consequences of the European recession (KPMG, 2013). Government‟s favoured strategy seems 
to be attracting foreign investment to the country which would result in reducing the deficit through 
higher tax revenue rather than through significant cuts in expenditure (KPMG, 2013). Notwithstanding, 
government may have to complement the increase in revenue with a reduction in spending in order to 
keep the deficit below the required threshold.   








4.3 Malta’s credit ratings 
The fiscal deficit issues and high government debt, which Malta has faced in recent years 






2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
General Government Debt (as a % of GDP),  
2001-14 
Source: National Statistics Office, Central Bank of Malta   
Notes:  
All EU member states, including Malta, accumulated debt throughout the years, diverging from the 60% 
benchmark. (The Maastricht criteria stipulate that the government debt is not to exceed 60% of GDP at 
market prices.) As shown below, at the end of 2014, Malta‟s General Government Debt expressed as a 
percentage of GDP stood at around 68%. The international credit rating agencies consistently refer to the 
Maltese government‟s high national debt as a constraint to economic growth, with debt reduction being 
one of the main challenges of the government in Malta. 
 
As an upside, public debt in Malta is primarily composed of locally subscribed debt. In fact, as at the end 
of 2014, over 90% of the total government debt was in the form of Malta Government Stocks which are 
mainly held by Maltese residents and businesses. 
 
The simplest measure to control further growth of government debt is to raise taxation and cut 
government spending (KPMG, 2012). However, these direct measures can have a negative effect on 
economic growth, especially if cuts in government expenditure are directed towards activities which 
promote investment and innovation, such as research and development and if the imposition of higher 
taxation acts as an impediment for investment initiatives (KPMG, 2012). 




by credit rating agencies. The table below highlights the main events which affected the 
country‟s credit rating in recent years.  
Table 20: Changes in credit rating 
 
 
Date Malta’s deficit issues and credit rating
Nov-11 Malta at risk of not meeting its target for deficit reduction to below 3% of GDP by end 2011 –
Government‟s 2012 Budget projects deficit to 2.8% of GDP by end 2011 and to 2.3% in 2012
Jan-12 Government commits to reduce spending by a further €40m 
Jan-12 S&P‟s lowers Malta's credit rating a notch to A-
Feb-12 Malta received one-notch downgrades from Moody‟s; negative outlook maintained; downgrade of the
foreign- and local-currency debt ratings of Malta Freeport from A2 to A3
Sep-12 Moody‟s affirms Malta's A3 rating and negative outlook
Jan-13 S&P‟s downgrades Malta‟s LT sovereign credit rating to BBB+; ST sovereign credit rating kept at A-2;
stable long-term outlook maintained (Government‟s debt burden highlighted, referring esp. to Enemalta)
Mar-13 S&P‟s gives Enemalta a negative outlook: projected to remain loss-making till 2016
May-13 EU projects deficit at 3.7% of GDP by end of 2013 – Government commits to keep the deficit at 2.7%
Jun-13 EU placed Malta under an excessive deficit procedure - fiscal deficit observed at 3.3% of GDP end
2012; Maltese government remains committed to a targeted deficit of 2.7% by end of 2013 
Jul-13 S&P‟s affirmed Malta‟s sovereign credit rating at BBB+/A-2 with a stable outlook
Sep-13 Fitch Ratings downgrades Malta's LT foreign and local currency issuer default ratings from A+ to A
(stable outlook): downgrade reflects fiscal slippage and Malta's EDP issues
Oct-13 Moody's affirmed Malta‟s A3 government bond rating and changed the outlook to stable from negative
Feb-14 S&P's has revised its outlook for Enemalta to stable from negative: government's restructuring plan and
near finalisation of transaction with Chinese company for equity injection
Mar-14 Fitch affirms Malta at 'A' rating; outlook stable acknowledging that the Maltese economy is on the road
to recovery
Apr-14 Figures published by Eurostat indicated that Malta ended 2013 with a deficit of 2.8% of the GDP, down
from 3.3% at the end of 2012 
Jul-14 S&P reaffirms Malta‟s credit rating at 'BBB+/A-2', with a stable outlook
Sep-14 Fitch affirmed its 'A' ratings for Malta and the stable outlook, warning of expenditure slippages
Oct-14 Moody‟s reconfirmed Malta‟s A3 rating with a stable outlook, highlighting the national debt as
government's main challenge
Jan-15 S&P‟s „BBB+‟ rating, with a stable outlook, reaffirmed
Feb-15 Fitch Ratings has affirmed Malta's long-term foreign and local currency issuer default rating (IDRs) at
'A'; the outlooks are stable
Jun-15 The European Commission lifts the excessive deficit procedure against Malta, in view of the deficit
standing at 2.1% at the end of 2014
Jul-15 S&P upgraded the country‟s outlook from stable to positive, affirming the BBB+ rating, based on the
Maltese economy's growth prospects
Aug-15 Fitch has affirmed Malta‟s „A‟ rating, with a stable outlook in August 2015
Jan-16 S&P's has affirmed Malta's ratings at BBB+/A-2 and said the outlook remained positive
Source: Times of Malta; Malta Today 




As illustrated in the above table, at the beginning of 2014, the credit ratings started to show 
some improvements, reflecting the fact that Malta ended 2013 with a deficit of 2.8% of GDP 
(below the 3% threshold) and acknowledging that the country‟s economy was on the road to 
recovery. These improvements subsequently led to the closure of the EDP in 2015. 
The table below sets out the current sovereign ratings assigned to Malta by credit-rating 
agencies: 
Table 21: Malta’s current sovereign ratings 
 
Source: Ministry for Finance (2016) 
Notwithstanding the recent growth in the country‟s economy and the lifting of the EDP, the 
rating agencies warned that government‟s high debt burden was considered as a constraint and 
that government is expected to deal with issues such as health care, energy sector and pension 
reforms in order to avoid slippages in public expenditure. In this context, the implementation 
of PB may assist in directing public funds to programmes which are delivering results and in 
eliminating ineffective expenditure, such that the fiscal deficit will be controlled and the debt 
burden reduced. 




4.4 MOF divisions involved in budgeting 
The Public Administration is the fundamental body within Government which is responsible 
for the management of public programmes. There are fourteen ministries under the current 
administration, including the MOF (Government of Malta website). 
The organisation chart for the MOF is depicted below. Both the Budget Office and the EPD 
form part of the MOF‟s portfolio and are heavily involved in the budgetary process. 
Figure 19: Organisation Chart, MOF (Source: www.http://mfin.gov.mt) 
  
The Budget Office is responsible for the publication of the financial estimates for the next 
fiscal year, as part of the annual budget process. The budgetary process incorporates 
ministries, departments and public entities. The principal functions of the Budget Office 
include the provision of advice to government on the apportionment of the government‟s 
financial resources in reflection of set priorities, as well as the compilation of draft annual and 
medium-term expenditure and revenue projections for ministries, departments and public 
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where issues of expenditure over-runs or revenue shortfalls are expected, as the financial year 
progresses (MOF website). 
The EPD provides government with advice in designing economic policy, managing 
economic activity and formulating international trade policy, for the purpose of achieving the 
country‟s targeted economic growth (MOF website). As part of the budgetary process, this 
department is responsible for economic planning and for estimating the macro-economic 
variables, which then feed into the budget compiled by the Budget Office. 
4.5 Budgetary framework 
4.5.1 Current budgetary process 
Malta currently operates a traditional budgeting system. Expenditures are forecasted for the 
following fiscal year and they are presented in two budgets, one comprising government‟s 
recurrent operations by expenditure categories and the other one setting out capital 
expenditures. Operating expenses include costs for the day-to-day operations such as 
personnel, travel, maintenance, office supplies and utility costs. The capital outlays comprise 
the acquisition of long-lived assets such as land, buildings, equipment and vehicles. 
As part of the budget process, the financial planning process covering the subsequent fiscal 
year is launched in April/May of the current year, by means of a circular issued by the 
Permanent Secretary within the MOF to Permanent Secretaries, Directors General and 
Directors. Ministries are required to submit their budget requirements for the upcoming year. 
Following these submissions, the MOF holds inter-ministerial discussions in two stages. A 
first round of meetings is held between the MOF and the respective Ministry individually, at 
Permanent Secretary level, for the purpose of discussing the submissions received. A second 




round of meetings is subsequently held at Ministerial level, focusing on national priorities 
(MOF website). At the end of the budgetary process, the Budget is approved by a majority 
vote in Parliament. 
In recent years, Government‟s policy was targeted at ensuring reductions in the yearly fiscal 
deficit. For instance, in compiling the financial plans for 2013, government ministries, 
departments and entities were requested to seek expenditure efficiencies. The MOF informed 
the ministries, departments and entities that the assumption to be applied for both recurrent 
and capital expenditure, was that the budgets for the following year would be equivalent to 
the approved budgetary allocations included in the preceding year‟s financial estimates. 
Ministries, departments and entities were instructed to keep requests for additional funding 
(vis-à-vis the previous year‟s allocations) at an absolute minimum, and limited to instances 
where non-provision of funds above the previous year‟s allocations would adversely affect the 
core workings of the ministry, department or entity (MOF website).  
The 2014 Financial Estimates which were presented to Parliament in November 2013 as part 
of the budget process, incorporated, for the first time, three-year revenue and expenditure 
projections for 2014 to 2016, at line ministry level.  
As part of the financial planning process for 2015, the MOF instructed line ministries to refer 
to the 2015 projections (which were published as part of three-year projections incorporated 
in the 2014 Financial Estimates), and to ensure that in the 2015 financial plans submitted to 
the MOF, revenue does not fall below, and expenditure does not exceed, the published 
projections on a ministry basis (MOF website). 
The implementation of PB in the Maltese public administration may provide a useful tool to 
link government spending in various sectors with the targeted results and outcomes. In a 




situation where government is committed to control the fiscal deficit and reduce the debt 
burden, PB potentially assists in making budgetary decisions on the basis of programme goals 
and measured results, as opposed to basing the following year‟s financial projections on the 
previous year‟s budgetary allocations or making budgetary cuts across the board without 
taking into consideration their impact on programme goals and performance (as is the practice 
in the local scenario where a line-item budgeting system is in operation).  
4.5.2 Budget documents 
The most recent annual budget was presented by the MOF during October 2015 and related to 
budget allocations for 2016. The budget documents published as part of the 2016 Budget are 
described in the following table: 
Table 22: 2016 Budget Documents 
 
Document Contents
Budget Speech 2016 Sets out the speech delivered by the Minister for Finance when presenting the
budget to the public (MOF, 2015b).
Budget Document 2016 Provides a macroeconomic review and outlook, together with a fiscal review and
outlook; and highlights the main budget 2016 measures (MOF, 2015a).
Financial Estimates 2016 Incorporate three-year revenue and expenditure projections for 2016 - 2018, at
line ministry level, as well as budget allocations for 2016 for each ministry, on a
line-item basis, covering both recurrent and capital expenditures (MOF, 2015d).
Economic Survey 2015 Sets out details about the economic and financial situation in Malta (MOF,
2015c). 
Budget 2015 Implementation Published for the first time in 2014, the aim of this document is to report on the
implementation of the previous year‟s budget measures (Office of the Prime
Minister, 2015). Each 2015 budget measure is listed in the report under the
ministry which is responsible for its implementation and is then analysed on a
quarterly basis in respect of its implementation status.
2016 Budget Documents




4.6 Fiscal responsibility  
On 8 August 2014, by virtue of Act XXVII of 2014, the Maltese government enacted a Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (referred to below as „the Act‟), with the aim of ensuring sustainable 
public finances and enhancing accountability and transparency in the conduct of its financial 
undertakings. In this respect, the Minister for Finance stated that “this law will provide deeper 
control on government spending, increase efficiency, monitor expenditure ceilings and give 
taxpayers the comfort that the government and entities must control their expenditure” (Malta 
Today, 2014). In line with EU requirements, the Act establishes fiscal rules, an independent 
fiscal council, a medium-term budgetary framework, a fiscal risk statement and a contingency 
reserve (International Monetary Fund, 2014). The enactment of this Act fulfils the 
requirements of Directive 85/2011/EU on budgetary frameworks.  
The Fiscal Responsibility Act lays down the principles of fiscal responsibility, as detailed in 
the following table: 




Table 23: Principles of fiscal responsibility 
 
Some of the salient provisions of this Act, which are pertinent to the budgetary process, are 
highlighted below. 
4.6.1 Fiscal rules 
The budgetary rule is that for each year either the budget condition or the adjustment path 
condition is satisfied. The budget condition is that either the budgetary position of the general 
government is in balance or in surplus; or if this is not met, fiscal sustainability is not 
jeopardised in the medium term and the reason for not meeting such requirement is the result 
of exceptional circumstances. The adjustment path condition is that either the annual 
structural balance of the general government is converging towards the medium term 
budgetary objective; or if this is not met, fiscal sustainability is not endangered in the medium 
Principles Explanation
Principle of transparency In carrying out fiscal and budgetary policies, Government is obliged to publish
all the necessary information to allow assessment of the implementation of such
policies and of the position of central and local finances.
Principle of stability Government is to carry out its fiscal and budgetary policy in a manner that
ensures medium-term predictability and macro-economic stability.
Principle of fiscal responsibility Government is to carry out its fiscal and budgetary policy and manage
budgetary resources in a manner that ensures the sustainability of the fiscal
position in the medium and long term. This avoids the need to introduce
destabilising expenditure or revenue adjustments, in order to manage
unforeseen events in future periods.
Principle of equity In conducting its budgetary and fiscal policies, Government shall consider the
financial impact on current and future generations, as well as the impact on
medium and long term economic development. 
Principle of efficiency Government's fiscal and budgetary policies should be aimed at achieving an
efficient use of scarce public resources.
Effective management of 
personnel spending
Public sector employment and pay policies shall be consistent with the fiscal
and budgetary targets contained in the fiscal strategy.
Principle of effective financial 
and asset management
Government is to implement its fiscal and budgetary policies in accordance with
the best practices for effective financial and asset management.
Principles of fiscal responsibility
Source: Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.3




term and the reason for not meeting such requirement is the result of exceptional 
circumstances (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.8). 
As regards the ratio of general government debt to GDP, the target ratio is of 60%; if this ratio 
exceeds 60%, it must be reduced (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.9). 
If the EU addresses a warning to Malta under Article 6(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1466/97 (in view of significant divergence of the budgetary position from the medium term 
budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards it) or if the government considers that the 
budgetary rule was not adhered to, the government shall lay a plan of what has to be done to 
secure compliance with the budgetary rule, before the House of Representatives (Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2014: s.11). 
4.6.2 Budgetary process 
Business and financial plans 
Every ministry, department and entity which is in receipt of a government subvention is 
required to prepare a three-year rolling business and financial plan, as prescribed, from time 
to time, by the Minister for Finance. The business and financial plans have to be submitted to 
the MOF and they are to be based on the most recently announced Medium Term Fiscal 
Strategy (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.14). 
Medium term fiscal strategy 
In every financial year, the government shall present to the House of Representatives, the 
Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement and the Fiscal Policy Strategy. These documents will 
comprise government‟s fiscal objectives, strategic priorities and a three-year rolling target for 
fiscal management. Amongst a number of items specified in the Act, the macroeconomic 




framework underlying the Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement will contain information on 
the macroeconomic situation and forecasts for the current budget year and at least the next 
three financial years and actual out-turns for the two previous budget years. The Medium 
Term Fiscal Policy Strategy will set out an aggregated level of the government‟s spending 
plans for the forthcoming budget year, the three subsequent years, estimated actual results for 
the current year and actual results for the two previous years. The macroeconomic and fiscal 
forecasts have to be endorsed by the Fiscal Council and made public (Fiscal Responsibility 
Act, 2014: s15). 
Annual draft budget 
The MOF will compile a Draft Budgetary Plan for the forthcoming year, based on the 
Medium Term Fiscal Plan projections. The Draft Budgetary Plan will be submitted to the 
Fiscal Council for endorsement and will thereafter be made public. It will also be submitted 
by the Minister for Finance to Cabinet, where deliberations will be made which shall 
constitute the basis for the presentation of the budget (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s16).   
Annual budget 
An annual budget, which is consistent with the fiscal responsibility principles, the fiscal rules, 
the fiscal strategy and any other requirements in the Act, shall be presented by government to 
the House of Representatives. Allocations of budget funding to a ministry or sector can only 
be made through the annual budget process (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s17).  
In the presentation of the annual budget, the MOF is required to publish a detailed annual 
programme for revenue collection, including quarterly targets for revenue collection in 
respect of each revenue source, quarterly targets for recovering revenue arrears and planned 
measures to combat tax evasion and tax fraud (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s29). 




The submission to the MOF of programme initiatives which involve new or increased public 
expenditure have to be accompanied by a detailed description of the proposed project, its 
objectives and likely outcomes, together with a detailed financial statement including 
underlying assumptions. Unless expressly approved by the Minister for Finance, in the course 
of the budget year, no new or additional expenditures can be made or committed to in excess 
of the relevant budgetary allocation (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.18). 
Monitoring of budget execution 
In the course of the budget execution, the MOF shall monitor and evaluate regularly the 
implementation of the approved budget. The MOF will publish monthly schedules of 
revenues and expenditures, desegregated by source and economic function. The ministries, 
departments and government entities are responsible for keeping proper books of accounts,  
they are to follow accounting policies and methodologies as prescribed by the MOF, and they 
have to ensure the reliability and timeliness in reporting financial data to the MOF, the 
Treasury and the National Statistics Office (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.39). 
In July of each year, the Minister for Finance will present to the House of Representatives a 
half-yearly report on the economic and budgetary situation (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: 
s.39).  
Government annual report 
By the end of June of each year, the Minister for Finance is required to compile and make 
public an annual report on the previous fiscal year. The annual report will provide information 
on the execution of the previous budget, comparing its outcome with the strategic objectives 
in the fiscal strategy and the fiscal targets announced in the previous annual budget (Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2014: s.41). 




4.6.3 Fiscal Council 
The Fiscal Council is responsible for examining government‟s decisions and endorsing every 
report required in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Amongst its numerous 
obligations, the Fiscal Council will “endorse, as it considers appropriate, the macroeconomic 
and fiscal forecasts prepared by the Ministry for Finance and provide an assessment of the 
official forecasts; … assess the Government‟s budgetary performance against the fiscal 
targets and policies specified in the fiscal strategy ….; analyse and issue an opinion and any 
recommendations pursuant to the Government‟s publication of the half-yearly and the annual 
report on the execution of the budget” (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.13 (3)). 
The Fiscal Council will be composed of three members and may appoint persons to be 
members of the staff of the Fiscal Council. The Fiscal Council is required to prepare a report 
of its activities after the end of each year (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.47,52,58). 
The Chairperson of the Fiscal Council shall give evidence in relation to matters affecting the 
Fiscal Council and its operations, to the Public Accounts Committee, when requested to do so 
by the Chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014: s.57).  
4.7 Public expenditure in the Education and Health sectors  
To obtain the viewpoint of the line ministries for the purpose of this study, focus is being 
placed upon the education and health sectors, which constitute two very significant elements 
of government spending within the Maltese budgetary framework. Education and health are 
the two largest spenders in the Maltese economy – the investment in education is of extreme 
importance because Malta does not have any natural resources and its economy growth is 




largely dependent on the quality and skills of its human resources, whilst health spending is 
continuously growing in view of Malta‟s ageing population. 
The following table sets out an analysis of capital expenditure within the public sector, by 
Ministry. The figures shown represent the actual expenditure for 2014, the revised estimated 
expenditure for 2015 and the budgetary estimate for 2016. 
Table 24: Capital Expenditure by Ministry, 2014 to 2016 
 
The above analysis shows that the estimated capital expenditure in the education sector for 
2016 represents circa 8.4% of total estimated public capital expenditure (15.2% in 2014 and 






2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
€'000 €'000 €'000 % % %
Office of the President 188 122 217 0.00       0.0% 0.1%
Office of the Prime Minister 12,412 15,646 10,945 2.8% 2.9% 2.8%
23,481 39,634 70,551 0.05       7.3% 18.0%
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1,291 3,276 1,582 0.3% 0.6% 0.4%
Ministry for Tourism 17,797 1,656 6,707 4.0% 0.3% 1.7%
Ministry for Education and Employment 68,283 61,640 33,051 15.2% 11.3% 8.4%
47,046 78,732 40,722 10.5% 14.4% 10.4%
Ministry for Transport and Infrastructure 83,921 87,351 75,335 18.7% 16.0% 19.3%
Ministry for Gozo 9,552 15,308 6,364 2.1% 2.8% 1.6%
2,326 2,451 1,671 0.01       0.4% 0.4%
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business 46,839 46,377 32,579 10.4% 8.5% 8.3%
Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity 4,689 5,868 5,358 1.0% 1.1% 1.4%
Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government -              17,806 10,162 -        0.03       2.6%
Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security 11,933 23,252 23,540 2.7% 4.3% 6.0%
Ministry for Finance 53,221 65,833 44,392 11.9% 12.1% 11.3%
Ministry for Energy and the Conservation of Water 24,931 -           -           5.6% 0.0% -        
Ministry for Health 41,192 -           -           9.2% 0.0% -        
Ministry for Energy and Health -              80,241 28,164 -        14.7% 7.2%
449,104 545,193 391,340 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-Budget]
Note 1:  The Ministry for Health has recently been amalgamated with the Ministry for Energy and the Conservation of Water, becoming the 
Ministry for Energy and Health. 
Note 2:  The reduction in estimated capital expenditure between 2015 and 2016 is mainly a result of lower EU fund allocations.
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comprises circa 7.2% of total estimated capital expenditure (Health: 9.2% in 2014 and Health 
and energy: 14.7% in 2015). (Refer to figure below). 
Figure 20: Budgeted Capital Expenditure for 2016 
 
An analysis of public sector recurrent expenditure, by Ministry, is set out in the table below. 
The figures show the actual recurrent expenditure for 2014, the revised estimated expenditure 
for 2015, the budgetary estimate for 2016 and projections for 2017 and 2018. 
Source:  Analysis based on Information from Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016.
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Table 25: Recurrent Expenditure by Ministry, 2014 to 2018 
 
The estimated 2016 recurrent expenditure in the education sector makes up 14.3% of the total 
estimated public recurrent expenditure (14.0% for both 2014 and 2015). The proportion of 
total recurrent expenditure voted for the education sector for 2017 and 2018 is expected to 
remain approximately at the 2016 level (14.4% in 2017 and 14.5% in 2018). In the health 
sector, the estimated recurrent expenditure for 2016 represents 16.8% of total recurrent 
expenditure (16.1% in 2014 and 16.6% in 2015). Going forward, it is projected that the 
proportion of total recurrent expenditure allocated to the health sector for 2017 and 2018 will 
be of 17.1% and 17.4% respectively. The figure below shows the significance of the 2016 





Estimate Estimate Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
€'000 €'000 €'000 €'000 €'000 % % % % %
Office of the President 3,388            3,880        3,868       4,008         4,115         0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Office of the Prime Minister 47,861          49,893      38,040      36,090       41,639        1.7% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 1.2%
10,575          12,946      32,867      32,978       13,209        0.00   0.4% 1.0% 1.0% 0.4%
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 22,699          25,966      30,326      31,687       33,032        0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Ministry for Tourism 66,068          48,738      50,791      51,843       52,915        2.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5%
Ministry for Education and Employment 400,655       428,243   458,423  477,908    496,991    14.0% 14.0% 14.3% 14.4% 14.5%
47,214          50,255      66,303      59,074       60,990        1.7% 1.6% 2.1% 1.8% 1.8%
Ministry for Transport and Infrastructure 90,604          87,826      95,149      96,164       97,714        3.2% 2.9% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9%
Ministry for Gozo 27,186          27,892      29,759      30,295       30,901        1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
10,943          14,855      13,462      13,747       13,991        0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business 33,420          39,061      36,449      35,584       35,561        1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0%
Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity 1,217,211      1,274,105  1,317,699 1,369,912   1,428,786   42.6% 41.7% 41.0% 41.4% 41.8%
Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government 50,092          79,844      92,148      93,960       96,504        1.8% 2.6% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8%
Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security 142,087        138,436    139,502    140,860     143,146      5.0% 4.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.2%
Ministry for Finance 218,628        258,767    251,550    256,334     264,493      7.7% 8.5% 7.8% 7.7% 7.7%
Ministry for Energy and Health 460,887       508,600   540,643  567,222    593,760    16.1% 16.6% 16.8% 17.1% 17.4%
House of Representatives, Office of the Ombudsman, NAO 7,533            9,211        13,119      13,392       13,651        0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
2,857,050 3,058,518 3,210,098 3,311,058 3,421,398 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-Budget]
Note 1:  The Ministry for Health has recently been amalgamated with the Ministry for Energy and the Conservation of Water, becoming the Ministry for Energy and Health.
Note 2:  The expenditure within the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity includes social security benefits. These make up around 90% of total expenditure within this 
Ministry during the period under consideration.
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Figure 21: Budgeted Recurrent Expenditure for 2016 
 
The recurrent expenditure table illustrated above shows that the largest portion of recurrent 
expenditure relates to the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity (41.0% of total 
recurrent expenditure in 2016). These expenditure figures comprise government spending on 
social security, which represents around 36% of total estimated recurrent expenditure in 2016. 
If spending on social security is excluded from total recurrent expenditure (refer to table and 
figure below), estimated recurrent expenditure on education and health in 2016 make up 
22.5% and 26.5% of total recurrent expenditure respectively. These figures indicate that these 
two sectors are highly significant within the Maltese public administration. 
Source:  Analysis based on Information from Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016.
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Table 26: Recurrent Expenditure excluding social security benefits, 2014 to 2018 
 





Estimate Estimate Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
€'000 €'000 €'000 €'000 €'000 % % % % %
Office of the President 3,388            3,880        3,868       4,008         4,115         0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Office of the Prime Minister 47,861          49,893      38,040      36,090       41,639        2.7% 2.6% 1.9% 1.7% 1.9%
10,575          12,946      32,867      32,978       13,209        0.6% 0.7% 1.6% 1.6% 0.6%
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 22,699          25,966      30,326      31,687       33,032        1.3% 1.3% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
Ministry for Tourism 66,068          48,738      50,791      51,843       52,915        3.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Ministry for Education and Employment 400,655       428,243   458,423  477,908    496,991    22.7% 22.2% 22.5% 22.8% 23.1%
47,214          50,255      66,303      59,074       60,990        2.7% 2.6% 3.2% 2.8% 2.8%
Ministry for Transport and Infrastructure 90,604          87,826      95,149      96,164       97,714        5.1% 4.5% 4.7% 4.6% 4.5%
Ministry for Gozo 27,186          27,892      29,759      30,295       30,901        1.5% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4%
10,943          14,855      13,462      13,747       13,991        0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6%
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business 33,420          39,061      36,449      35,584       35,561        1.9% 2.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7%
Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity 125,224        147,478    149,174    155,085     161,750      7.1% 7.6% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5%
Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government 50,092          79,844      92,148      93,960       96,504        2.8% 4.1% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security 142,087        138,436    139,502    140,860     143,146      8.0% 7.2% 6.8% 6.7% 6.6%
Ministry for Finance 218,628        258,767    251,550    256,334     264,493      12.4% 13.4% 12.3% 12.2% 12.3%
Ministry for Energy and Health 460,887       508,600   540,643  567,222    593,760    26.1% 26.3% 26.5% 27.1% 27.6%
House of Representatives, Office of the Ombudsman, NAO 7,533            9,211        13,119      13,392       13,651        0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
1,765,062 1,931,891 2,041,573 2,096,231 2,154,362 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-Budget]
Note:  Social security benefits amounting to €1,091,988k, €1,126,627k, €1,168,525k, €1,214,827k and €1,267,036k during 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively, 
have been excluded from this analysis.
Ministry for European Affairs & Implementation of 
the Electoral Manifesto
Ministry for Sustainable Development, the 
Environment and Climate Change
Ministry for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and 
Civil Liberties
Recurrent expenditure - excluding social security 
benefits from the Ministry for the Family and Social 
Solidarity
   Source:  Analysis based on Information from Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016.




2016 Budget - Recurrent Expenditure 
excl. social security benefits 
Ministry for Education
and Employment
Ministry for Energy and
Health
All other Ministries




Line-item budgeting – Citing Education and Health 
As mentioned above, the existing budgetary system is based on line-item budgeting which 
presents estimated expenditures by inputs or resources purchased. Two budgets are presented 
for every ministry, one setting out estimated recurrent expenditures and the other 
incorporating estimated capital expenditures.  
The following table displays extracts from the 2016 budgetary estimates (recurrent and 
capital) for the education and health sectors, analysed by line-item expenditure.  
Table 27: 2016 Budgetary estimates – Education and Health 
   
 
Ministry for Energy and Health - RECURRENT Estimate
2016
€'000
Ministry for Energy and Health (Vote 31)
Personal Emoluments 3,134      
Operational and Maintenance Expenses 775         
Programmes and Initiatives 40,695     
Contribution to Government Entities 29,150     
Total Vote 73,754     
Health (Vote 32)
Personal Emoluments 235,892   
Operational and Maintenance Expenses 57,788     
Programmes and Initiatives 125,322   
Contribution to Government Entities 47,887     
Total Vote 466,889   
540,643 
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt]
Total Recurrent Expenditure - Ministry for 
Energy and Health
Ministry for Education and Employment - RECURRENT Estimate
2016
€'000
Ministry for Education and Employment (Vote 13)
Personal Emoluments 4,243      
Operational and Maintenance Expenses 1,864      
Programmes and Initiatives 114,797   
Contribution to Government Entities 121,460   
Total Vote 242,364   
Education (Vote 14)
Personal Emoluments 196,080   
Operational and Maintenance Expenses 16,973     
Programmes and Initiatives 3,006      
Contribution to Government Entities -         
Total Vote 216,059   
458,423 
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt]
Total Recurrent Expenditure - Ministry for 
Education and Employment





As clearly illustrated in the above table, the budgetary estimates presented by the Maltese 
government do not include any pre-established targets, performance information or output or 
outcome expectations, but are solely based on expected input consumption. The main 
objective for each individual ministry is to operate within the expenditure limit set in the 
budget, rather than to achieve some pre-determined results, outputs or outcomes.  
This section has demonstrated the significance of the budgetary allocations directed towards 
the education and health sectors, seeking to justify why representatives from these two sectors 
were targeted for the empirical data collection.  
Ministry for Energy and Health - CAPITAL Estimate
2016
€'000
Ministry for Energy and Health (Vote XII)
ICT 3,826      
EU Structural Funds 2007-2013 Malta funds 2,350      
EU Cohesion Funds 2007-2013 Malta funds 3,000      
Intelligent Energy Europe 53           
Directly Managed Funds 20           
EEA/Norwegian Financial Mechanisms 2009-2014 1,768      
7th Framework Programme - EU funds 119         
Improvements to property & Regeneration works 2,350      
Drainage - Gozo 200         
Integrated Health Information System 5,000      
Pharmacy of Your Choice 60           
Infectious Disease Units 200         
Permanent Secretary's Office - refurbishment 10           
Central Procurement & Supplies Unit 500         
Institutional Health Care - Malta
Mater Dei Hospital - works and equipment 3,300      
Equipment at Mater Dei Hospital re ERDF 314 1,600      
Mount Carmel Hospital - upgrading works 300         
National Blood Transfusion Centre 200         
Oncology Hospital 2,718      
Primary Health Care
Improvements at Health Care Centres 500         
Public Health 80           
Public Health Regulation 10           
Total Capital Expenditure - Ministry for 
Energy and Health 28,164   
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt]
Ministry for Education and Employment - CAPITAL Estimate
2016
€'000
Ministry for Education and Employment (Vote V)
ICT 1,200      
e-Learning 900         
EU Structural Funds 2007-2013 Malta funds 5,700      
EU Structural Funds 2014-2020 EU funds 1,040      
EU Structural Funds 2014-2020 Malta funds 260         
Improvements to buildings 30           
University of Malta and Junior College 7,000      
Malta College of Arts, Science and Technology 400         
Examinations Department 5            
Foundation for Tomorrow's Schools - Capital Program 10,431     
Malta Council for Science and Technology 1,000      
Malta Libraries 50           
National Archives 120         
Sport 2,870      
Total Vote 31,006     
Education (Vote V)
Equipment for Government Schools - Malta 400         
IT in Government Schools - Malta 1,470      
Equipment for Education Support Services - Malta 25           
Equipment for Government Schools - Gozo 50           
Construction and maintenance works in schools - Gozo 100         
Total Vote 2,045      
33,051   
Source:  Ministry for Finance, Financial Estimates 2016. [https://mfin.gov.mt]
































This chapter explains the research methodology adopted for the purpose of achieving the 
objectives of the study. The next section refers to the initial contacts made for the purpose of 
the research. Section 5.3 then presents the data collection methods selected, whilst section 5.4 
looks into the research instrument used. This is followed by section 5.5, which focuses on the 
research participants selected for the study. The analytical approach used is then explained in 
section 5.6. Subsequently, section 5.7 discusses the limitations encountered and section 5.8 
concludes the chapter. 
The methodology was specifically designed for addressing the research objectives
9
 
underpinning the study. Data was gathered using documentary sources and interviews. 
Documentary sources provided the background information necessary for obtaining an in-
depth understanding of the topic under consideration. Documentary research was fundamental 
for ascertaining the economic environment prevailing in Malta and the country‟s existing 
budgetary framework, in support of the first and second research objectives, which involve 
gaining an understanding of why budgetary reforms might be implemented in Malta and 
identifying the recent reforms in the budgetary framework. To address the first and second 
objectives, the collection of empirical evidence from interviews complemented the 
documentary research. Interviews were also used to tackle the third and fourth objectives, 
namely, assessing the implications of including PI in budget documents and of holding public 
officials responsible for their performance, and suggesting a suitable implementation 
approach for PB. 
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5.2 Making initial contacts 
Prior to embarking on the study, a meeting was held with an economist and academic (in 
February 2012) for the purpose of discussing the feasibility of the topic selected and the need 
for the study in the Maltese context. In preparation for this meeting, an initial literature review 
was carried out and a short document, setting out an overview of the topic proposed, was 
compiled.  
Subsequently, a meeting was held with the supervisors during October 2012 in order to 
discuss the research proposal. This discussion led to the narrowing down of the focus of the 
research topic to specific research objectives. 
In April 2013, a month after the general election and the change in government, an email was 
sent to the newly elected Prime Minister, in order to inform him of the study being carried out 
and to ask his opinion as to whether the research project would be useful and beneficial for 
Malta. A very positive reply was received, encouraging the conduct of the research and 
proposing a meeting at the OPM to further discuss the study. 
This was followed by a meeting with the Principal Permanent Secretary within the OPM, held 
during May 2013. During this meeting, a presentation was delivered giving background 
information on the topic being studied and highlighting the main objectives of the research. 
The Principal Permanent Secretary‟s response was very positive, and he promised his support 
for the study, if needed. 
Another preliminary meeting was held with the Permanent Secretary within the MOF during 
July 2013, with the purpose of obtaining an understanding of the current budgetary system 
and the main players involved in the budget process. Following this meeting, an initial list of 




the potential interviewees was compiled. The possibility of subsequently modifying this list 
was envisaged, since it was expected that during the conduct of the interviews, respondents 
would suggest other potential participants.   
For the purpose of conducting the interviews, it was considered important to target senior 
politicians, being policy makers, as well as senior civil servants who influence the policy 
makers and are responsible for implementing policies. These interviewees can be termed an 
„elite population‟, in view of their closeness to power and policy making (Lilleker, 2003). 
Policy implementation is being addressed in the first and fourth research objectives
10
.  
5.3 Data collection 
A detailed analysis of the topic under study was made possible by gathering data from both 
secondary and primary sources, as explained in sub-sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.  
The research follows a qualitative approach, using data gathered from documentary sources 
(secondary data), corroborated with empirical evidence collected from in-depth, semi-
structured interviews (primary data). The triangulation of documentary sources against oral 
sources provides a more reliable account of an event or situation (Gidley, 2004), since the use 
of multiple independent sources of data collection provides corroborative evidence for the 
research findings (Saunders et al, 2009). Furthermore, “all methods have inherent biases and 
limitations, so use of only one method to assess a given phenomenon will inevitably yield 
biased and limited results” (Greene et al, 1989: 256). Qualitative research attempts to 
understand the behaviour, viewpoints and interactions of the subjects involved in the study 
(Flick, 2009). Spicer (2004) mentions that qualitative methods can capture complexity, 
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diversity and contradiction in the social and human world. The qualitative approach is 
embedded in an „interpretivist‟ research philosophy, since it seeks to delve into how the social 
context is understood, experienced and interpreted (Mason, 2002).  
5.3.1 Collection of secondary data 
The review of existing literature was considered necessary for obtaining a detailed 
understanding of the subject matter being tackled and for guiding the compilation of the 
contents of the research instrument used to gather primary data. Furthermore, secondary data 
collection facilitated the formulation of the theoretical framework underpinning the study. 
As mentioned above, secondary data was mainly obtained from documentary sources, as 
detailed in the table below:   
Table 28: Documentary sources used for research 
 
Documentary source Purpose
EU law: Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) To review fiscal deficit and debt provisions
Maltese government website
- To download the latest budget documents and financial estimates
Maltese law To  obtain an understanding of the relevant legal provisions
Newspaper articles To gather information on the Maltese economic and fiscal climate,
as reported by major credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor‟s,
Fitch Ratings and Moody‟s)
Academic and professional journals; research papers and 
books
- To obtain circulars issued by the Finance Ministry regarding
financial plans and the budget process 
Central Bank of Malta and National Statistics Office
websites
To obtain historical financial and statistical data for the purpose of
identifying trends in government‟s fiscal deficit and debt position
To gain in-depth knowledge of the current thinking and theoretical
underpinnings of the subject being researched
Publications and reports by international organisations
(e.g. OECD, World Bank and EU) and by the Big 4
accounting firms
To identify budgetary reform experiences across a number of
countries
Websites of foreign governments (including Australia,
Canada, US and UK)
To obtain documents containing performance budgets and reports
of the respective government
- To gather information on the structure and functions of the
Finance Ministry, in particular the Budget Office




Webb et al (1984) mention that an advantage in using documentary data is its „non-reactivity‟, 
which means that the researcher is not in a position to bias records and subjects. Another 
benefit is that the researcher can collect the data without being present during the data 
collection process (Appleton and Cowley, 1997). Furthermore, Gidley (2004) claims that 
documentary sources may be the only means to access the data relating to the research 
question. 
Despite the strengths of documentary sources, there are limits to the usability of data collected 
by someone else, because the researcher‟s background would differ from that of the 
fieldworker who interprets the data on the basis of first-hand experience, as pointed out by 
Hammersley (1997). In addition, Denscombe (1998) notes that when relying on documentary 
sources, researchers use data which has been manufactured for purposes other than the aims 
of their study. Furthermore, the researcher can be biased in choosing particular documents 
(Denscombe, 1998). These weaknesses highlight the importance of complementing the 
documentary data with the collection of empirical evidence specifically tailored to addressing 
the research objectives. 
5.3.2 Collection of primary data 
Primary data was gathered using semi-structured in-depth interviews, carried out on a face-to-
face basis. The use of interviews facilitated the collection of data that was relevant to the 
research objectives. In this respect, a list of themes and questions supporting the research 
objectives and taking into account the literature and theory reviewed, was developed for use 
during the interviews. Qualitative interviews were considered appropriate for the research in 
order to seek to understand the reasons underlying the participants‟ opinions and attitudes 
(Saunders et al, 2009). The interviews were conducted as a set of open-ended questions, 




providing the participants with the opportunity to discuss the subject matter according to their 
knowledge and interests. 
Interviews were carried out with twenty-eight respondents, who were categorised into five 
groups – senior politicians and economists; MOF representatives; Ministries for Education 
and Health representatives; stakeholders; and reform promoters. A detailed breakdown of the 
categories of interviewees is presented in Figure 24 (vide section 5.5.1). The selection of the 
research participants was made on the basis of their present or past involvement in the annual 
budgetary process and/or on the basis of their experience in public financial management. As 
mentioned earlier, an initial list of interview participants was compiled following a 
preliminary meeting with the MOF Permanent Secretary, which meeting was held to obtain an 
understanding of the current budgetary process. This list was slightly augmented during the 
empirical data gathering process, whereby a few initial respondents suggested other potential 
participants for the research, a technique referred to as „snowball sampling‟ (Saunders et al, 
2009).  
Access has been obtained to discuss relevant issues with senior politicians from the 
government and the opposition, including former ministers and Prime Ministers. In line with 
the definitions proposed by Lilleker (2003) and Mikecz (2012), the participants represent an 
„elite‟ population, since they occupy positions of power and can potentially influence policy 
making. Lilleker (2003: 207) observed that “elites can be loosely defined as those with close 
proximity to power or policy making”, whilst more recently, Mikecz (2012) referred to an 
elite population as authority-bearing persons holding positions of power. 




5.4 Research instrument 
This section deals with the research instrument used for gathering empirical evidence, 
explaining the rationale for the use of semi-structured interviews, outlining the design of the 
interview schedule and describing how the research instrument was applied. 
5.4.1 Semi-structured interviews 
The research objectives listed in Chapter 1
11
 were principally achieved through the conduct of 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. This technique is appropriate when the study is 
explanatory in nature and the data gathered is used to test theories (Saunders et al, 2009). 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews are also valuable for conducting exploratory research, 
where the researcher wishes to discover what is happening and to pursue new insights 
(Robson, 2011).  
An interview guide comprising themes and open-ended questions was developed in order to 
ensure that all the topics relevant to the research objectives would be covered; however the 
wording and the order of the questions were often modified during the interview, depending 
on the flow of the conversation (Robson, 2011). Furthermore, through the use of the semi-
structured approach, additional unplanned questions were at times asked to follow up on what 
the respondent said (Robson, 2011), whilst some questions were occasionally omitted 
(Saunders et al, 2009) if it was felt that the interviewees were either uneasy or lacked 
knowledge in respect of a particular topic.  
As suggested by Saunders et al (2009), the use of semi-structured interviews provides the 
possibility to „probe‟ responses, where the researcher wishes that the respondent explains in 
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further detail or builds upon his/her answers. For instance, where a particular topic of interest 
was being discussed and the researcher felt that an example could enrich the interviewee‟s 
explanation, the respondent was asked to illustrate his/her point further by citing an example. 
Through the use of in-depth interviews, the researcher was also provided with the opportunity 
to discuss areas which had not previously been considered, but which then enhanced the 
researcher‟s understanding of relevant issues that were important for tackling the research 
objectives or for formulating a further objective (Saunders et al, 2009). Indeed, the second 
research objective, which relates to the identification of reforms in the budgetary framework 
that occurred since the change in government in March 2013, was formulated as a result of the 
interviewing process.  
In view of the high profile of the research participants selected, the use of personal, face-to-
face interviews was considered important for achieving a high response rate (twenty-eight out 
of thirty people contacted agreed to participate in the study). This is because respondents 
might feel more comfortable providing confidential information in a face-to-face meeting; 
they might want to ensure that the information will be used appropriately and solely for the 
purpose of the research; and given their very busy schedules, they might be reluctant to spend 
time providing written answers (Saunders et al, 2009). Furthermore, the only possible way to 
get the undivided attention of a very busy person is to set up a face-to-face meeting for a 
specific date and time.  
5.4.2 Design of the interview schedule 
Following the conduct of the documentary research and the thorough review of the literature 
and theory underpinning the study, an interview schedule was prepared in line with the 




research objectives. This comprised five sections, as summarised in Figure 23 below. The 











Figure 23: Summary of the format and content of the research instrument 
 
 
The first section sought to identify the need for budgetary reform in the Maltese 
public administration. In this regard, pressures which might trigger the 
implementation of reform were discussed, including the country‟s high fiscal deficit 
and high government debt issues, credit rating downgrades and being placed under 
an excessive deficit procedure. 









This part was divided into four sections and dealt with potentially enhanced 
expenditure prioritisation and accountability, should performance budgeting be 
introduced, as follows: 
 Use of performance information to hold public officials responsible for the 
actual performance of their department; 
 Mechanisms to motivate performance; 
 Improvement of government‟s expenditure prioritisation; 
 Implications of a department under spending its budget under the current line-








The participants were asked whether government should move towards accrual 







This part was divided into four sections and tackled the following matters: 
 Whether resistance to change is envisaged if government decides to transition 
to a performance budgeting system; 
 The reasons underlying the resistance to change; 
 Steps that can be taken to mitigate such resistance; 
 Skills required for successfully implementing the reform; 
 Whether anyone, at the top politically, is expected to champion this reform. 
  
Part C: 
Context of the Reform 
  
The following issues were dealt with in this section: 
 Whether the existing budgeting system operated in Malta is based on the top-
down or bottom-up principle; 
 The role that should be assumed by the central agency (MOF and/or OPM) in 
the implementation and operation of performance budgeting; 
 Whether the budgeting reform should be enacted in law or through policy 
guidelines; 
 The challenges that government will face if it decides to implement 
performance budgeting; 
 A reasonable timeframe for the successful implementation of the reform; 








5.4.3 Conducting the interviews 
The draft interview schedule was thoroughly reviewed by the supervisors, whereby 
suggestions for improvements were made and some rewording was carried out to ensure that 
leading questions would be avoided in order to prevent bias. 
The first five interviews were deliberately targeted to initially avoid dealing with elite people 
in current posts. This was considered sensible in order to obtain personal confidence as an 
interviewer and to ensure that the questions were understandable, clear and unambiguous. 
Following the first five interviews, a few minor amendments were made to the interview 
questions. This process also helped to assess the approximate length of time taken to conduct 
the interview and to identify any questions which the interviewees felt uncomfortable 
answering or lacked knowledge about. This latter issue helped the researcher to be sensitive 
when asking these particular questions to the other respondents. 
The interviews were held between August 2014 and April 2015, at the offices of the 
participants. The interviews varied in length from half an hour to two hours. This is because 
the interviews followed a semi-structured approach and comprised open-ended questions, 
whereby interviewees were encouraged to talk about a particular topic or issue, depending on 
their individual expertise and experience.  
Mikecz (2012: 482) suggests that “the success of interviewing elites hinges on the 
researcher‟s knowledgeability of the interviewee‟s life history and background”. Because of 
the researcher‟s knowledge of Malta and of the elites participating in the study, there was no 
need to carry out detailed research on the background of the respondents before conducting 
the interviews. 




Prior to the interviews, some of the participants were sent a copy of the interview questions. 
In the case of a few interviewees, namely, the Ministers currently in office, it was considered 
unwise to send them a copy of the questions in advance, because given their tight time 
schedules, it was highly probable that they would either not consult the questions prior to the 
interview or they would opt out of the meeting because they might consider the number of 
questions to be excessive. 
At the start of the interview, the participants were asked to sign and date a prepared consent 
form. Before commencing, the participants were advised that should they feel uncomfortable 
answering certain questions, such questions would be skipped. Furthermore, depending on the 
expertise and experience of the person being interviewed, some questions were delved into 
more deeply whilst others were tackled more generally. 
Permission was asked to voice-record the interviews. This allowed the interviewer to engage 
more actively with the participants during the interview. Furthermore, the audio recording 
provided an accurate and full record of the interview which could be referred to later on. All 
the participants, except one, accepted to be recorded. In the case of the interviewee who asked 
not to be recorded, manual notes were taken during the interview. 
The interviews which were digitally recorded, were then carefully transcribed. The interviews 
were mainly conducted in English; however, where the Maltese language was used in a few 
instances, careful translation and, then, transcription was done. Riessman (1993: 56-58) 
emphasises the importance of taping and transcribing interviews and observes that “…By 
transcribing at this level, interpretive categories emerge, ambiguities in language are heard 
on the tape, and the oral record – the way the story is told – provides clues about meaning.” 
Though transcribing is an extremely time-consuming task, the researcher did not delegate the 




transcription process, in order to ensure that all key moments in the interview were captured 
in the transcript and also to ensure the security and anonymity of the interviewees, especially 
in the case of very senior politicians and civil servants. 
Five respondents, including the Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance, the Minister for 
Education, the Permanent Secretary for Education and the Accountant General, are 
identifiable in the dissertation findings and analysis. It was considered important to identify 
these interviewees in view of their influence in policy making. In this respect, a copy of the 
text in which their position in office appears in the dissertation was sent to them for their 
review (even though all these respondents had consented to the use of the interview data in 
the research project and had waived their right to remain anonymous). Another interviewee 
was selected to remain identifiable in the dissertation, but he insisted that the interview could 
be used for research but not for publication purposes; thus, reference to his position was 
removed from the thesis. 
5.5 Research participants 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence has been collected from interviews conducted 
with twenty-eight participants, during the period from August 2014 to April 2015. The 
interviews were held with politicians, senior public officials and economists who are active in 
the public sector. In addition, two preliminary meetings were organised: one was held with 
the Principal Permanent Secretary within the OPM during May 2013 and the second one was 
held with the Permanent Secretary within the MOF during July 2013.  
Another two potential participants, a politician and a senior civil servant, were contacted but 
they did not participate in the study.  




5.5.1 Profile of participants 
The research participants selected (excluding the two preliminary meetings) were sub-divided 
into five categories, as detailed in Figure 24: (i) senior politicians (including former Prime 
Ministers and former Ministers for Finance) and economists, (ii) representatives from the 
MOF, (iii) representatives from the Education and Health Ministries, (iv) stakeholders which 
may affect the reform process and (v) potential reform promoters. A detailed description of 
these categories is set out in the table below. 




Table 29: Categorisation of research participants 
 
Categories of participants Commentary
During their term in office, both former Prime Ministers had taken the MOF under
their responsibility for a period of time, because it was felt at the time that public
finances were under considerable strain and had to be overseen by the Prime Minister 
himself. 
The two former Ministers for Finance were responsible for the implementation of a
number of reforms in the Maltese public financial management scene, including the
introduction of the VAT system in Malta, the initiation of the accrual accounting
reform and entry into the Eurozone.
The two economists have a very high profile in Malta and they are frequently invited
to discuss economic, financial and political matters in the local media. They both lead
consultancy businesses in the local market. One of these economists is also an
academic who lectures at the University of Malta and the second one is an advisor to
government. 
The participants within this category are considered to be very experienced and
knowledgeable in matters relating to the Maltese public administration, through their
involvement in the country's financial management including the budgetary
framework.
Second category consisted of 
representatives from the MOF
This category included the Minister for Finance, top public officials who are involved
in the budgetary process and a Professor of Public Policy who is advising the MOF
and who is currently carrying out spending reviews across all the ministries.
Third category comprised 
representatives from the 
Education and Health Ministries
Whilst the views of the central agency were obtained through interviews with
politicians and senior public officials within the OPM and within the MOF, it was
considered important to also take into account the perspectives of the line ministries.
This was achieved through discussions with top civil servants and a politician from the
Education and Health Ministries. These ministries were chosen because they
represent the two largest spenders in the Maltese economy and spending within such
ministries is expected to keep growing. The investment in education is of extreme
importance because Malta does not have any natural resources and its economy
growth is largely dependent on the quality and skills of its human resources; whilst
health spending is continuously growing in view of Malta's ageing population.
Fourth category represented 
stakeholders who may 
potentially affect the budgetary 
reform process
This category was made up of representatives from the National Audit Office, the
National Statistics Office and the Central Bank of Malta; a public official who was
heavily involved in the Comprehensive Spending Review process carried out by the
MOF in parallel with the 2015 budget preparation process; and a public official who
lectures at the University of Malta in 'Public Sector Performance Measurement'.
Fifth category included the 
Prime Minister of Malta and the 
Permanent Secretary within the 
OPM
These participants are considered to have the power to initiate, implement and
enforce the reform. The Minister for Finance, who was included under the second
category described above, could also be considered as a potential reform promoter.
First category included two 
former Prime Ministers, two 
former Ministers for Finance, 
two economists and a former 
Director General at the Budget 
Office








1. Former Prime Minister (2004-2013), Former Minister for Social Policy (1998-2004) 
2. Former Prime Minister (1996-1998), presently a Member of the European Parliament  
3. Former Minister for Finance (2008-2013), Former Parliamentary Secretary in the 
Ministry for Finance (2004-2008), presently Member of Parliament and Chairman of 
the Public Accounts Committee 
4. Former Minister for Finance (1992–1996, 1998–2004), Former Minister of Economic 
Affairs (1990–92), Former Minister for Social Policy including the Health portfolio 
(2008-2010), European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy (2010–2012) 
5. Economist and Academic  
6. Economist and Advisor to Government 
7. Former Director General at the Budget Office 
  
Mr Saviour Gauci, Former Director General at the Budget Office 
Senior politicians and 
economists: 
Possess a wealth of 
knowledge and experience 
through their involvement 
in the Maltese public 
administration, in 
particular the country‟s 
financial management 







8. The Minister for Finance (2013 to date); Professor of Economics 
9. A senior civil servant at the Ministry for Finance 
10. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Hull; Advisor to the Ministry for 
Finance in Malta 
11. The Budget Office 
12. A Director at the Economic Policy Department 
13. The Accountant General 
  
  
Ministry for Finance: 
Responsible for leading the 
budgetary preparation and 
execution process 
Ministries for Education 
and Health:  
Represent the largest two 
spending ministries; 
involved in the compilation 
of business plans which 
feed into government‟s 
annual budget 
 
20. Manager at the National Statistics Office 
21. The Auditor General 
22. The Deputy Auditor General 
23. The Assistant Auditor General 
24. The Permanent Secretary within the Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local 
Government; Lecturer at the University of Malta in Higher Diploma in Public Sector 
Accounting and Finance  
25. A Director General at the Central Bank of Malta 
26. A Director, Corporate Services at the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity 
  
Stakeholders: 
Actors which may affect 
the reform process  
 
27. The Prime Minister  
28. The Permanent Secretary within the Office of the Prime Minister 
  
Reform promoters: 
Have the power to initiate 




14. The Minister for Education 
15. The Permanent Secretary at the Ministry for Education 
16. A Director, Corporate Services at the Ministry for Education 
17. A Director for Finance and Administration at the Ministry for Health 
18. A Director for the Directorate for Health Information and Research 
19. The Quality Systems Coordinator at the Ministry for Health 
  
  




5.5.2 Establishing contact with the participants 
Gaining access to elites can be challenging and time-consuming (Mikecz, 2012). 
The email addresses of politicians currently in office and of public officials were readily 
available from the Government of Malta‟s website. These participants were contacted by 
email and were sent a participant information sheet. 
Contact information of two of the former Prime Ministers and a former Minister for Finance 
was not readily available on the internet. The two former Prime Ministers were located on an 
online social networking medium and messages were sent to them, informing them of the 
study being carried out and asking them to provide the researcher with their email addresses. 
Both former Prime Ministers replied within a few days, providing their email addresses. They 
were subsequently sent an email attaching a participant information sheet. One of the former 
Prime Ministers replied to the email, giving his mobile number and asking the researcher to 
contact him. During the phone call which followed, an interview meeting was scheduled. The 
other former Prime Minister replied to the email, suggesting a date and time for the interview, 
which was accepted by the researcher. The email address of the former Minister for Finance 
was obtained through a friend of the researcher, who is also a relative of the former Minister. 
An email was sent to the potential participant, to which a reply was received asking the 
researcher to call, in order to set up an appointment for an interview.  
Given that the two economists interviewed lead consultancy firms in Malta, their contact 
details were obtained from their businesses‟ websites. They were both contacted by email, 
attaching the participant information sheet. One of the participants replied to the email, asking 
the researcher to contact him on his mobile phone. During the telephone conversation which 
followed, the participant sought further information on the scope of the interview, in order to 




better understand how he can contribute to the study. The other participant replied to the 
email, suggesting a date and time for the interview, which was accepted by the researcher. 
The former Director General at the Budget Office and the Professor of Public Policy who is 
advising the Maltese Finance Ministry were contacted by email, on behalf of the researcher, 
by a representative of the National Audit Office, who had been previously interviewed by the 
researcher. Both participants accepted the invitation to participate in the study and suggested a 
tentative date for a meeting, which was accepted by the researcher. The Director General at 
the Central Bank of Malta was contacted, on behalf of the researcher, by the Head of the 
Department of Accountancy at the University of Malta. This initial contact was followed by a 
phone call from the researcher and a meeting was scheduled accordingly.  
5.5.3 Challenges encountered 
Obtaining access to some of the participants proved to be quite challenging, in view of their 
high profile. This issue was, to some extent, mitigated by the fact that Malta is a very small 
country where everybody knows everyone else. As a result of this, when the researcher was 
unable to obtain the contact details of a potential participant, assistance was sought from 
someone who knew or had a professional relationship with the potential participant. The small 
country size factor proved also useful in reaching and meeting face-to-face all the participants 
who could possibly contribute to the study. 
Another difficulty that the researcher came across as a result of some of the participants‟ high 
position was the limited time allowed by the participant for the conduct of the interview. This 
limitation was mainly encountered in the case of interviews held with Ministers (including the 
Prime Minister) who are currently in office. To address this limitation, prior to the interviews, 
the researcher highlighted the most important questions to be asked, in order to ensure that if 




time runs out during the interview, the critical topics would have been covered. Furthermore, 
the researcher was very well conversant with the questions comprised in the interview 
schedule, such that the questions could be posed to the interviewee without the researcher 
having to consult the papers in front of her. The interviews with the Ministers currently in 
office were held towards the end of the interviewing process; this explains the familiarity of 
the researcher with the interview schedule. Prior to entering the meetings with the said 
participants, the researcher was advised by the Ministers‟ secretaries of the time slot allotted – 
this enabled the researcher to assess the approximate number of questions that could be 
discussed in the time frame available. In view of this, it was important for the researcher to be 
totally focused in order to obtain as much data and information as possible and to make the 
most of the opportunity granted, during the allocated time slot. Audio recording was 
fundamental in these circumstances, in order for the researcher to keep concentrated on what 
was being said during the interview and to avoid wasting time taking written notes. 
 A further challenge encountered, as a result of the elite interviewees selected, was the 
postponement of meeting dates, due to the participants‟ busy and tight schedules. Some of the 
meetings were postponed more than once and up to four times. In one circumstance, a few 
minutes after the interview commenced, the researcher got the feeling that the participant was 
not focused and seemed distracted. At that point, the researcher asked the participant whether 
she would prefer to postpone the meeting; the interviewee was relieved and extremely 
grateful, explaining that something urgent had cropped up unexpectedly. As a result, the 
interview was postponed and held at a future date. 
Given the profile of the participants selected for gathering empirical evidence and their 
consequent tight schedules, it was important for the researcher to make herself available for 




interviews, when and as requested. This called for total flexibility and commitment from the 
researcher during the period when the interviews were being conducted. 
It was fundamental for the researcher to thoroughly plan the interview beforehand, since it 
was considered very difficult, if not impossible, to be granted a second interview, given the 
elites involved in the research. Furthermore, the researcher made it a point to arrive early for 
the interviews, in order not to feel rushed and not to lose out on the allocated time. To ensure 
this, the researcher visited the address given for the interview beforehand, in order to be 
familiar with the place and avoid getting lost and arriving late on the day of the interview. 
5.6 Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out using a thematic approach. Whilst undertaking the activity of 
analysing qualitative data, the researcher brings to data the inherent skills of critical thinking 
(Bazeley, 2013). According to Fetterman (1998, cited in Robson 2011), analysis involves 
processing information in a useful and meaningful way. Bazeley (2013: 3) further observes 
that qualitative analysis is “potentially productive of fresh insights and deep understanding”. 
By understanding the complexities surrounding human behaviour, the qualitative researcher 
moves beyond description to theory building (Harper, 1992 cited in Bazeley, 2013). 
The first phase of the thematic analysis undertaken was to develop familiarity with the data. 
In this regard, „analysis‟ has been referred to as developing a close engagement with the data 
gathered (Bazeley, 2013). The fact that the interviews were transcribed by the researcher 
herself facilitated the attainment of this familiarity. Upon completion of the transcription 
process, the documented text was read repeatedly and thoroughly, in order for the researcher 




to immerse herself in the data. During this process, the initial thoughts and ideas about codes 
and themes were noted and recorded. 
The next phase involved generating initial codes for the purpose of categorising the data 
comprised in the transcripts. Subsequently themes were identified. Bazeley (2013: 191) 
advises that “the development of themes depends on data having been coded already”. The 
themes identified were both „theory-driven‟ and „data-driven‟. The „umbrella‟ themes, which 
encapsulate the main points in the data set, were determined on the basis of the research 
questions and the theoretical underpinnings. However, the sub-themes emerged from a review 
of the data gathered. The entire data was then reread, in order to ascertain whether the themes 
capture appropriately what is in the data and to assess the need for re-coding some data 
extracts, where necessary. 
This was then followed by an exploration of the themes, in order to interpret the data and 
understand what is being revealed. The analysis sought to integrate the empirical data with the 
theoretical framework proposed and the literature reviewed at the start of the study (Wertz et 
al, 2011). This helped to determine what is significant about the study and what new 
contributions the study makes towards the existing literature. In this respect, Wertz et al 
(2011: 255) suggest that “at the end of the study, the researcher returns to the literature 
review prior to data collection and reevaluates prior research in light of the study‟s findings”.  
5.7 Limitations 
A limitation encountered was the issue of being unable to widen the population selected for 
empirical evidence collection, to embrace public officials at lower levels in government‟s 
employment hierarchy. The reason for this was the lack of knowledge held by lower level 




civil servants in the subject matter being explored. It was considered appropriate to stop at the 
level of Director, Corporate Services since this person is responsible for overseeing the 
finance function within the ministries, which includes aggregating the individual budget 
proposals of the departments into one ministerial budget submission. 
As mentioned earlier, some of the participants were provided with a copy of the interview 
questions prior to the interview. The majority of these respondents were thoroughly prepared 
and had notes written down next to the questions. However, a few of the interviewees did not 
prepare their responses beforehand; though this could have impacted the accuracy and level of 
detail of the responses provided, it is believed that this lack of preparation was considerably 
mitigated in view of the wide experience and knowledge of the people interviewed. 
As maintained by Mikecz (2012: 484), “elites are used to being in charge and being asked 
about their opinion; they have the ability to converse easily, „just talk‟ and get into 
monologues instead of answering the hard questions…It is not uncommon for researchers to 
hear the „public relations‟ version of events instead of their personal account of events”. 
Given the elite population targeted for the interviews, the researcher prepared herself in 
advance to ensure that this issue would be dealt with effectively. The best tool for dealing 
with this challenge was to be fully conversant and comfortable with the interview questions. 
In addition, in the first few minutes of the interview, the researcher sought to put the 
respondents at ease by giving them the option to skip any questions that they might feel 
uncomfortable with. At the same time, the researcher emphasised the value of their 
contribution to the study in order for them to feel flattered – this tended to have the effect of 
the interviewees opening up. Furthermore, the interview schedule proved to be a very useful 
guide for ensuring that the conversation remained focused on the research and on the 
objectives underlying the study – thus, where the researcher felt that the interviewee was 




going off at a tangent, intervention was made to bring the discussion back to the subject under 
study. 
A further limitation relates to the timing of the study, which is such that one cannot comment 
on the effectiveness of PB introduction, because such reform has not yet been implemented.  
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the research methodology adopted for the purposes of the study. 
The findings emanating from the empirical data collection are set out in chapter six and 































6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the empirical evidence collected from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews, conducted with twenty-eight participants, during the period from August 2014 to 
April 2015. 
The research findings are presented in nine further sections. These sections set out the views 
of the interviewees on the subjects presented. Section 6.2 provides some background 
information on the involvement of a number of units/entities in the budgetary process. Section 
6.3 looks into the need for budgetary reform in the Maltese public sector, exploring some of 
the pressures which might support the implementation of performance budgeting (PB). Next, 
a review of the recent reforms of the budgetary framework which have occurred since the 
change in government, in March 2013, is presented in section 6.4. The chapter proceeds with 
a discussion in section 6.5, of whether the compilation and publication of performance 
information (PI) would increase public officials‟ accountability and enhance government‟s 
expenditure prioritisation. Subsequently, section 6.6 investigates the pressures which might 
inhibit the implementation of PB. This is followed by section 6.7, which studies the 
implementation strategy for the introduction of PB in the local context. Afterwards, the 
accrual basis of accounting, in the context of budgeting, is discussed in section 6.8. This is 
followed by section 6.9 which sets out an overview of the key performance indicators for the 
education and health sectors, as proposed by the respondents. Section 6.10 then concludes this 
chapter. 
The findings seek to address the research objectives
12
 underpinning the study. The first 
research objective, which involves an analysis of the pressures supporting and inhibiting the 
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implementation of PB, is tackled in sections 6.3 and 6.6 respectively. The second objective 
relates to the identification of reforms in the budgetary framework which have occurred since 
the change in government in March 2013 and is addressed in section 6.4. A third objective of 
the study is to ascertain the implications of including PI in budget documents and holding 
public officials responsible for their actual performance – this is dealt with in section 6.5. The 
last research objective, which is concerned with the implementation approach to be adopted 
for PB, is addressed in section 6.7. The remaining sections (6.2, 6.8 and 6.9) set out further 
data gathered from the interviewing process and seek to complement the findings relating to 
the main research objectives. 
6.2 Contributors to the budgetary process   
The MOF, in particular the Budget Office
13
, has the main responsibility for the budget 
preparation process and for monitoring actual expenditure against the budget on a monthly 
basis. There are, however, other units which contribute significantly to the budgetary process, 
as discussed hereunder. The information set out in this section has been extracted from 
interview data. 
The Economic Policy Department (EPD)
14
 – within the MOF 
The EPD, which is a department under the MOF, focuses on economic planning and on the 
estimation of the macro-economic variables, which underpin the annual budget (fiscal 
projections) prepared by the Budget Office. The main responsibility of the EPD is to prepare 
the macro-economic forecast and to ensure that the fiscal projections are consistent with the 
macro-economic variables. 
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The EPD‟s process for macro-economic forecasting starts off with discussions with other 
institutions, including the EU Commission and the Central Bank of Malta, who both compile 
their own forecast. The Central Bank‟s involvement in the budget process is limited to a 
comparison of their macro-economic forecast with the EPD‟s forecast. Where the Central 
Bank has further insights or information than the EPD has, the latter will update its forecast 
accordingly. 
The EPD compiles forecasts for the main components of government‟s revenue, including 
VAT, income tax, national insurance, customs and licences. As regards expenditure, the EPD 
is mainly involved in the area of pensions and social security, as well as in the salaries‟ 
projection.  
The process for ensuring consistency between the macro-economic forecast and the fiscal 
projections is as follows: the Budget Office and the EPD each compile their own projections 
independently, covering the items identified above. Representatives from the two departments 
then meet up to discuss the differences between the two sets of projections. The main 
differences usually emanate from the different methodologies used – the EPD works at a 
macro-level, whilst the Budget Office relies on micro data. For example, for projecting the 
expected income from VAT, the EPD looks at expected consumption and spending by 
tourists, amongst other things; whilst the Budget Office reviews the data available within the 
VAT department. The differences between the two sets of projections are then analysed in the 
light of information held by the two departments, ensuring that all relevant information is 
reflected. This process is quite long and time-consuming, involving a lot of going to and fro 
between the two departments. It is, however, doable in view of the small country size, where 
holding physical meetings between the two departments is very easy. There is also the added 
complication that the EPD works with ESA10 data which is based on accruals, whilst the 




Budget Office‟s main variables are based on cash. In this respect, the National Statistics 
Office (NSO) supports the process, by converting the cash figures to ESA compliant figures. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) 
During the budget compilation process, the NAO‟s role is to endorse the macro-economic 
forecasts/assumptions underlying government‟s budget which would have been formulated by 
the EPD, and to issue an independent opinion on their reasonableness. This endorsement is 
required by EU legislation and by the Maltese Fiscal Responsibility Act, and has been carried 
out since 2013. The NAO is also currently responsible for endorsing the fiscal projections, as 
mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Though the NAO cannot question government‟s 
policies and budgetary measures, it can look into and comment upon the inputs underlying the 
policies and their potential economic and social effects. These roles are expected to be taken 
up by the Fiscal Council
15
. 
Subsequently, when expenditure is incurred, the NAO looks into the records kept by the 
ministries/departments, in order to assess whether the expenditure made is justified and under 
control. This expenditure audit is carried out on a rotational basis, such that over a number of 
years, all departments would have been subject to an audit. In addition, in the case of sensitive 
issues, the NAO is requested by the Public Accounts Committee to investigate specific 
aspects of certain transactions – this work is performed by the Special Audits and 
Investigation Unit within the NAO.  
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The National Statistics Office (NSO) 
The NSO is responsible for compiling, on a historical basis, the country‟s debt and deficit 
figures, together with the indicators relating to government‟s operations. The data reported on 
a historical basis is then used as a starting point for the estimation of the macro-economic 
forecasts by the EPD, including the projection of economic growth and GDP figures. 
The NSO is also responsible for converting government‟s annual budget figures in order to 
ensure compliance with the ESA10 methodology, for onward submission to the EU 
Commission. Thus, once the budget allocations are completed from the Budget Office‟s end, 
the figures are passed on to the NSO, in order to be presented in the format requested by the 
EU. 
6.3 The need for budgetary reform 
Reference was made by the researcher to some of the issues faced by Malta in the last couple 
of years, namely, fiscal deficit issues, high government debt, credit rating downgrades and 
being placed under an excessive deficit procedure (EDP)
16
. The participants were asked 
whether these issues, coupled with the country‟s requirement to satisfy the Maastricht criteria 
for qualification and participation in the Eurozone, could trigger government‟s response for 
the implementation of budgetary reform. The majority of the participants opined that the 
existing budgetary system/process needs to be reinvented. There were, however, diverging 
views as to whether the desired reforms are necessarily prompted by the issues mentioned 
above.  
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The table below highlights some of the issues mentioned by the research participants, which 
give rise to the need for a budgetary reform. These matters are then discussed in further detail 
in this section. 




Table 30: Need for budgetary reform 
 
An academic and advisor to the MOF (who has recently been involved in carrying out 
Comprehensive Spending Reviews within the ministries), argued that:  
Need for budgetary reform
The existing budgetary system/process needs to be reinvented as detailed below:
The deficit issues (including the requirement to meet the 3% of GDP deficit target) faced by Malta are
triggers for reform - in these circumstances, performance becomes very important.
Malta is behind some other countries with respect to the budget process.
Value for money concepts are not taken into consideration in the budget, because the budgeting is input-
based and no analysis is carried out vis-à-vis the expected outcomes.
The line ministries make requests for funds which are exaggerated - thus, the MOF has to limit the budget
allocation by going through each line item and adjusting some of them downwards.
The process to request a budget for a particular programme and to get the budget allocation is quite arbitrary.
There is scope for budgetary reform to ensure that priority is given to those expenditures which are really
needed.
The budget is compiled by looking at the previous year's expenditure and adding on a percentage in order to
arrive at the following year's allocation.
The current system of compiling the budget and of, subsequently, analysing budgetary measures implemented
in the previous year, is not good enough to act as a tool for decision makers to enable them to design the right
policies.
Modernising the budgetary system would potentially lead to better informed decion-making vis-à-vis required
expenditure cuts.
The strategic decisions underlying the budget should be taken by the OPM rather than by the MOF, to
ensure that a more holistic view is taken vis-à-vis the various policies adopted in the different sectors.
It is questionable whether government has control over the figures included in the budget; it was found that
the civil service has a huge influence on the budget allocations.
The MOF makes decisions on the budget allocations without consulting the Heads of departments who would 
have worked hard to compile their business plans, in order to furnish the requested information to the MOF.
There is not enough time and resources to permit a detailed analysis by the MOF of the reports and business
plans submitted by the line ministries.
The line ministries would only know what funds have been allocated to their ministries, a few days before the
budget is presented to the public.
A reform is required in terms of continuous monitoring of the government departments with regard to how
the budget is being executed.
Ministries approach the MOF on a regular basis during the year to ask for additional funds, claiming that they
do not have enough money to continue with a particular project.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015




“The deficit issues and the EDP that the country is subject to at the moment, are 
triggers for reform… in these circumstances, performance becomes very important. 
The compilation of PI would enable the ministries to review their performance and to 
identify ways on how to achieve better results with the available funds. It is difficult to 
accept the ministries‟ claims that every Euro allocated to them has been perfectly 
spent and that there is no room for improvement. The reason for these claims is that 
there is a vested interest to hold on to the previous year‟s budget and to ask for 
more.” 
The Accountant General observed that Malta is still behind other countries in so far as the 
budgetary process is concerned, adding that the EDP and the requirement to meet the 3% 
deficit target, are definitely triggers for reform. 
It was mentioned by the respondent that the Fiscal Responsibility Act which has been recently 
approved by Parliament, forms part of the overall fiscal reform and fiscal discipline process 
being carried out by the public administration. Furthermore, there are other aspects which are 
being worked upon, including the accrual accounting reform; in this respect, the interviewee 
pointed out that a reform in accounting without a budgetary reform could, however, be an 
issue. The participant believes that a total reform is required in terms of budgeting and the 
budgetary process, as well as in respect of budgetary execution. As regards budgeting, value 
for money concepts are often not taken into consideration because the budgeting is regarded 
by many as being an input-based exercise; thus no analysis is carried out as to why funds are 
being spent on particular items and on what the expected outcomes are. It would be beneficial 
to assess what an activity/programme is costing, in order to try to improve the performance of 
that particular activity. The interviewee does not think that these types of assessments are 
being carried out (especially at ministry/departmental levels); if they are performed, they are 
only done centrally (by the MOF) without the ministries being aware of them.  
In the opinion of an economist and advisor to government, government feels the need for 
budgetary reform, independently of the fiscal deficit issues and of pressures exerted by the EU 




to meet the fiscal targets, because there is wide consensus (it has been experienced by the 
party which was in government in the recent past and by the present administration) that the 
way the budget is handled, which is line-item, expenditure based, is colonial and out-dated. 
The interviewee claimed that:  
“There is no measure of efficiency and furthermore, there is no time for such 
considerations because the budget is prepared and finalised in a short timeframe. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the budget is prepared by government or by the civil 
servants – though the strategic policies are set by government, beyond these policies, 
it is questionable whether government has control over the figures which are 
ultimately included in the budget. Very close to the budget date, the civil service first 
allocates the required resources for the implementation of government‟s policies and 
priorities and then, the remaining funds are spread between the ministries (giving 
them a small portion of what was initially requested by them) – the latter allocation is 
done irrespective of value for money concepts.” 
The interviewee explained that the MOF makes the decisions on the budget allocations in the 
last week before the budget, without consulting with the Heads of the departments who would 
have worked on their business plans for weeks, in order to furnish the requested information 
to the MOF. Furthermore, the Ministers, who would have held discussions with the MOF 
Permanent Secretary and delivered presentations on their proposals, thinking that they made 
their case for obtaining the requested funds, would only know what funds have actually been 
allocated to their ministries, a few days before the budget presentation to the public. 
Following this process, the budget is then subject to approval by Parliament, by means of a 
majority vote.  
The respondent expressed his wish to see a different approach to the budget process – ideally, 
the budget should pass through Cabinet very early on in the year (during the first quarter of 
the year); the Cabinet makes the required decisions; then, within that framework of decision-
making, the civil service would implement Cabinet‟s decisions and incorporate them within 
the budget (rather than having the civil service implementing mathematical decisions). The 




involvement of the Ministers at an early stage in the budget process would ensure that they 
understand the nature of government‟s constraints, refraining from making unrealistic 
demands for funds. Furthermore, it was mentioned that an IMF delegation has visited Malta 
during 2014, giving their opinion on how the budgetary process could be changed. The 
interviewee observed that the IMF did not state anything that was not known by the Maltese 
MOF, but the fact that the statement came from the IMF could perhaps have a stronger 
influence on the civil service. According to the interviewee, there is a commitment from 
government for the politicians and the civil service to look at what could be implemented 
following this IMF process. 
An economist and academic observed that, as regards Malta‟s deficit and credit rating issues, 
high government debt and being under an EDP, the country‟s problems are not worse than 
those of other countries, from a short-term perspective. However, from a long-run outlook, the 
country will be worse off in view of its ageing population and the fact that this issue is not 
being addressed. According to the respondent, there is no efficiency motive in the public 
sector, in contrast with the private sector; thus, management systems are created within the 
former sector to operate the price mechanism. The implementation of PB would be a tool for 
informing budget and fiscal performance, in the context of the objectives and targets of the 
public sector. The respondent declared that he strongly believes in long-term forecasting 
(rolling budgets) and ring fencing (hard budget constraint) – the implementation of these two 
strategic approaches can be better achieved through such a management system.  
A former Prime Minister opined that:   
“The current system of compiling the budget and of subsequently, monitoring and 
analysing budgetary measures which have been implemented in the previous year and 
the results and outcomes (economic, social and political) of those decisions, is not 
good enough to act as a tool for decision makers to enable them to design the right 




policies. A radical change in Malta‟s budgetary system is required, because the 
process of how Parliament approves the budget is not efficient and it does not function 
properly. Thus, a transition to a performance based budgeting system is required, 
though this has to be complemented by a radical change in culture which is not an 
easy task.” 
The interviewee explained that with the current system, the MOF takes the lead in the design 
of the budget and the allocation decisions to the respective ministries, though it has a clear 
direction from the OPM. The Minister for Finance meets the individual ministers, takes on 
board their feedback on the previous year‟s performance, listens to their initiatives, 
programmes and priorities and then allocates funds (usually a fraction of what they would 
have requested). The respondent compared the current negotiation process with “haggling in a 
bazaar or market”. It was also mentioned that there is not enough time and resources to 
permit a detailed analysis by the MOF of the reports and business plans submitted by the line 
ministries. According to the interviewee, if the strategic decisions are taken by the OPM, 
rather than by the MOF, a more holistic view would be taken, embracing policies relating to 
health, education, competition, investment, social policy and the overall performance of the 
economy.  
A Permanent Secretary argued that there is scope for budgetary reform, such that priority 
would be given to those expenditures that are really needed, rather than carrying out 
expenditures simply because they have been done in the past. It was stated that expenditures 
which have been budgeted for in the past are not questioned. According to the respondent, the 
process to request the budget and to get a budget allocation is quite arbitrary and not at all 
scientific. Innovation is lacking, because the current system does not encourage public 
officials to be creative. The Permanent Secretary believes that if PI is incorporated in budgets, 
better allocation decisions could be made. 




Another Permanent Secretary claimed that “the existing budget needs to be reinvented”, in 
order to give a clearer picture of the country‟s financial performance and position. Currently, 
government focuses on the budget expenditure, without providing information on the results 
achieved with the public funds spent. The participant mentioned the statistics for 2014, which 
registered a large increase in government employment, with a corresponding increase in 
payroll spending by government. In this respect, it was stated that one should not look at what 
is being inputted into the system, but rather on the expected productivity/output of these 
employees. Contrary to politicians, the Permanent Secretary, as an administrator, is more 
concerned with the input-output relationship and the objectives being reached through the 
budget allocations. By way of an example, the interviewee referred to the capital outlays 
being expended by government for building new schools; whilst politicians publicise these 
investments to gain political points, administrators look beyond and ask: “if the country‟s 
birth rate is on the decline, why are we building more schools which would eventually lead to 
higher maintenance costs?” 
A representative from the NAO declared that he is in favour of the implementation of PB in 
the local context; however, he qualified his statement stating that the introduction of PB by 
itself, without the application of fiscal discipline, will not improve the country‟s financial 
situation and bring the deficit down. The participant believes that there is the need for fiscal 
discipline in two main areas: spending and revenue generation. As regards spending, the MOF 
is currently carrying out spending reviews to identify measures for cost cutting. The other area 
that should be emphasised further is the revenue side of the equation, because in the 
respondent‟s view, government is not getting its dues in terms of taxes. The participant stated 
that the implementation of PB had already featured in government‟s agenda, a few years back 
– Malta had committed to introduce PB in the IMF Report of 2008: “The authorities are 




reinforcing the fiscal framework with a medium-term orientation. They are pursuing more 
structured multiyear fiscal planning and the introduction of performance budgeting methods” 
(IMF, 2008: 12). The interviewee observed that planning is one thing, but implementing is 
another! 
A public official from the EPD explained that Malta‟s economy grows at roughly 4.5% in 
nominal terms; in revenue terms, if elasticity is assumed at 1.2, the increase would be of 
5.4%. The majority of the large public expenditure such as social benefits, health and 
education grow at this rate; however if all expenditure increases at this rate, it would mean 
that the deficit will never be reduced. Therefore, to reduce the deficit, the other expenses 
(which are not related to health, education, pensions and other social benefits) cannot increase 
by more than the inflation rate of roughly 2%. Notwithstanding this, many of the expenses 
involved, such as salaries, increase by more than inflation. Thus, it is not easy to reach the 
established deficit target, unless efficiency gains are achieved. The respondent claimed that 
Malta needs to target a balanced budget in structural terms, which is no easy feat; thus 
emphasising the need for budgetary reform. 
A former Minister for Finance stated that this budgetary reform is very important, because the 
way the budget process is carried out, is not very efficient. The current process puts a lot of 
onus on what to allocate, on the MOF. In his experience, the interviewee claimed that the line 
ministries come forward with their plans which are not measured in terms of the objectives 
they are trying to achieve. The fundamental problem with the current budgetary system is that 
the civil service does not look at what the actual funding needs are, but rather on how to extort 
additional funds from the MOF. The respondent claimed that if a PB system is implemented, 
then the funding requested would have to be justified in terms of quantifiable outputs. In the 
absence of PB, the „haggling‟ that currently takes place during the budget preparation process, 




will persist, with the MOF having to go through the budget line items of each line ministry 
and to adjust some of them downwards.  
Another former Minister for Finance declared that he is absolutely in favour of the 
implementation of PB in the local context, adding that every form of financial management, 
fiscal discipline and accountability structure, is desirable. The respondent mentioned that 
during his term as Minister for Finance, the budget used to be compiled by looking at the 
previous year‟s expenditure and adding on a percentage in order to arrive at the following 
year‟s allocated expenditure. This is still, more or less, the practice currently adopted during 
the budget compilation process. The interviewee explained how he tried to change this 
practice during his two-year term within a particular ministry. At that time, this ministry 
prepared a budget based on deliverables for the first time – the services that were being 
offered were costed and then priority listings were made. The interviewee noted that the 
budget compilation took around six months. However, it was well worth the effort, because 
when the MOF and the Prime Minister in office at the time, were pushing for a budget 
reduction for the said ministry, the participant asked them to review the priority listings and 
identify the services which will not be offered to the public; in truth, no services were 
eliminated and the ministry was awarded the requested budget in full. The interviewee 
emphasised that this would only be possible when PI and targets are presented in the budget 
documents. Unfortunately, the budget process that he had introduced when he was politically 
responsible for this particular ministry, was discontinued after his term as Minister ended.  
The Minister for Finance mentioned that the business plans presented by the line ministries do 
not contain any output indicators, to back up their requests for funds. It was confirmed by the 
Minister that the budget is currently compiled on an incremental basis, such that from one 
year to the next, a percentage increase in non-discretionary expenditure is effected. The 




Minister mentioned instances where the ministries request a 15% increase over the previous 
year‟s allocation, knowing well that the increase cannot exceed, say, 5%. In view of this, the 
MOF would have to limit the budget allocation – this is usually not done in the line ministers‟ 
presence, but after they leave the negotiation table, in order to avoid clashes between the 
MOF and the line ministries. As a result, the line ministries would not know whether the item 
requested has been voted for; they would usually be informed of their budget allocation a few 
days before the budget is presented to the public. Notwithstanding the MOF‟s effort to limit 
the ministries‟ fund allocations at budget preparation stage (in order to reach the deficit 
reduction target), ministries approach the MOF on a regular basis during the year to ask for 
additional funds, claiming that they do not have enough money to continue with a particular 
project. The ministries argue that even though allocated funds have been limited by the MOF, 
the line ministry is still politically committed to the people and it cannot go back on its word. 
Thus, the line ministry would make pressure on the MOF, stating that if the latter will not 
allocate additional funds to a particular capital project, the line ministry would have to tell the 
public that Finance did not provide the required funds and thus, the project has to be 
abandoned. The Minister pointed out that this also happens with recurrent expenditure. For 
example in the case of the free breakfast scheme for schoolchildren in government schools 
and the free child care initiative, the responsible ministry approached the MOF for additional 
funds; when the MOF queried why the actual cost shot up compared to the budgeted figures, 
the responsible ministry replied that this was the result of the initiatives‟ success. The MOF 
had to shift funds from other programmes to cover the additional costs of these initiatives. 
The Minister for Finance argued that the line ministries should be responsible for their budget 
and they should stick to what has been provided for in the budget, unless exceptional or 
unexpected expenditures crop up during the year. 




When asked whether there is the need for reform in the budgetary process, a public official 
from the Budget Office stated that there have been budget reforms recently – not a huge 
reform, but small improvements. As an example, the respondent referred to the enactment of 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which lays down a number of responsibilities on the MOF and 
on the other ministries and departments.  
In contrast with the majority of the respondents, a senior civil servant within the MOF 
claimed that the reform required is not within the budgetary framework, but in the policies 
being employed in the various sectors which constitute the real drivers of government 
expenditure. The respondent explained that the government‟s budget is, in the main, 
consumed by social welfare (including pensions), education, health and the care of old people. 
When these sectors are factored out of recurrent expenditure, the remaining items are 
insignificant. Therefore, according to the respondent: 
“It is not the way the budget process is carried out which is driving the expenditure; it 
is the policies that government is employing in these policy areas which are affecting 
the spending. The issue is that in these sectors, as long as the same policy stances 
remain, there is not much latitude for expenditure cutting, because the pensions, 
social benefits and salaries have to be paid, and free healthcare and education have to 
be provided.” 
The senior civil servant added that if, for instance, the issues in the social welfare and the 
dependencies that have been created are not tackled, or if the pension system is not reformed, 
government spending in this area will continue to rise. As regards education, one of the issues 
which is driving costs is the lack of economies of scale and the inefficient use of resources, 
whereby there are a number of nearly empty schools in the country with complements of 
teachers teaching a handful of students. Unless there is a policy change whereby these schools 
would be closed down and consolidation takes place, costs will not decline, because the 
school infrastructure will have to be maintained and the teachers‟ salaries will have to be paid. 




The respondent also mentioned the provision of free healthcare which is creating a huge strain 
on the budget. Unfortunately, nobody wants to make tough decisions because of the risk of 
political fallout. The interviewee mentioned that the expenditure increase, year on year, in the 
above-mentioned high spending sectors is consuming and sometimes, even exceeding, the 
increase in revenue generation. As a result, other much needed expenditure, such as 
expenditure on aspects of infrastructure, is being crowded out. Thus, unless alternative policy 
stances are taken to address the challenges, changing the budgetary process will not solve the 
fundamental problems in the Maltese public finance, according to the respondent. 
6.4 Recent reforms in the budgetary framework 
This section highlights the research findings relating to the changes that have taken place in 
the budgetary framework, in the past couple of years since the change in the public 
administration which occurred in March 2013.  
6.4.1 Comprehensive spending review (CSR) 
In parallel with the process for compiling the 2015 budget, the MOF has, during 2014, 
launched a Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) exercise to review expenditure on budget 
line items. The review exercise was carried out in relation to recurrent expenditure on 
„programmes and initiatives‟ under each ministry, which had been included in the 2014 
financial estimates. (Expenditure on personal emoluments and operational and maintenance 
expenses were excluded from the scope of the CSR).  
The line ministries were asked to provide information on the budget line items included under 
„programmes and initiatives‟, within recurrent expenditure. Some of the questions comprised 
in the template that each line ministry had to fill in, are listed in the table below: 




Table 31: Questions included in the CSR template 
 
The academic and advisor to the MOF, who led the CSR process, explained that the CSR 
involves reviewing line items in public spending, determining what output is being produced 
for a line item and assessing whether the line item is still relevant, such that resources within 
public spending can then be reprioritised without increasing public spending and without 
increasing taxes. 
The interviewee mentioned that the concept of the CSR was launched in England during 
1997, adding that he had been involved in such a process. According to the interviewee, the 
CSR was a huge success in England and led to a significant reduction in the country‟s deficit 
and to a release of resources which could then be spent on government‟s priorities. The 
Maltese MOF, with the respondent‟s support and advice, is seeking to replicate the CSR 
approach in Malta‟s public spending, in its attempt to reduce the deficit. 
CSR Questions
Information on the present outputs for each line item was requested. In this respect, the ministries had
to specify what is being achieved, in terms of the improvement to the quality of life, as a result of the
said line item expenditure. Furthermore, explanations as to what is currently being done with the said
expenditure were required.
The ministries had to reflect and provide information as to whether the line item expenditure has
brought about improvements to the service in the last three years (2012, 2013 and 2014).
The CSR required management in the ministries to consider a number of hypothetical scenarios with
respect to budget allocation and ascertain the impact of such scenarios on the results achieved and on
the people benefitting from the service. Amongst other things, the ministries had to consider the
consequences of the following: funds being discontinued, a budget reduction of 5% and no change in
the budget allocation vis-à-vis the previous year.
The ministries were asked whether there are any line items that can be consolidated through the
discontinuity of another line item. They were also asked to consider whether there are any services
which may be discontinued, in order to reallocate the respective funds to other initiatives.
The MOF also sought an explanation of the growth of each line item from 2012 to 2014. Ministries
were encouraged to reflect as to whether the service has developed or not, as to whether the line
item is a product of history and as to whether the service is still relevant to today‟s requirements.




Though all ministries were covered in the CSR process and they were all required to provide 
the information referred to above, during the first CSR exercise (carried out in 2014), focus 
was placed on social security benefits, where a complete reform was proposed which 
eventually featured in the 2015 budget. The expenditure review covering social security was 
triggered following the issue of a damning report by the Auditor General (National Audit 
Office, 2014), highlighting the abuses in social security benefits. Measures included in the 
2015 budget sought to address the existing social fraud, by changing policies with the aim of 
encouraging employment and ensuring that the social benefits are given to the deserving. 
With the exception of social security, the results of the CSR exercise were not fed into the 
2015 budget. This was also confirmed by a Permanent Secretary, who stated that:  
“The results emanating from the CSR exercise were not given enough consideration in 
the 2015 budgetary allocation – this could be due to the country‟s fiscal situation 
where government cannot afford to lose control over its expenditure, where the 
resources have to be allocated carefully and where focus has to be placed on the 
areas of priority.”  
The Prime Minister observed that the CSR exercise being carried out by the MOF will take 
quite some time to be introduced from an operational aspect; but at least the public officials‟ 
mind set will start to change. In truth, the majority of politicians, especially those who are 
lawyers or doctors by profession (with no accounting/finance background), would never have 
been involved in these types of processes and systems.  
The Education Ministry’s perspective 
Calculation of unit cost per student  
As a starting point to the CSR process, the ministry was requested to calculate the annual cost 
of a student in education. This was estimated for scholastic year 2012/2013, in relation to all 




schools, from kindergarten to higher education. In commencing the exercise for the 
calculation of the annual unit cost per student, a Director within the Education Ministry 
obtained a list of all the schools and colleges in Malta and Gozo and started identifying the 
expenses attributable to each school/college. The Director remarked that the resulting unit 
cost per student was not an accurate figure since the exercise required a number of 
approximations, including transport and textbook cost allocations.  
Comprehensive Spending Review 
The Director was of the view that the MOF was not fully satisfied with the outcome of the 
CSR process. This viewpoint was shared by some other respondents. Firstly, the public 
officials in the Education Ministry had never been exposed to such a process and secondly, it 
was seen as a waste of time by some civil servants, especially since year after year, planning 
is undertaken but then the funds requested are not given in full because of lack of available 
funds. As mentioned earlier, the CSR exercise involved three questions: what would be the 
outcome of a zero budget, what would be the outcome of a 5% budget reduction and what 
happens if there is no change in budget allocation. For the „zero budget‟ scenario, the civil 
servants involved in the exercise stated that “they would close the door and go home”. The 
MOF had hoped that the scenarios would be studied in depth by the civil servants, in order to 
come up with ideas of what could be done in such circumstances. The Director stated that, 
prior to the launch of the CSR, the MOF tried to convince education officials that less should 
be spent on education, mentioning in particular salary costs, in order to reduce the deficit. 
Though government‟s motto has become to „do more with less‟, the Director claimed that it is 
not always possible to achieve this objective. 




As regards salary costs, there is disagreement between the MOF and the Education Ministry, 
with the MOF claiming that the academic staff complement in schools is excessive and the 
Education Ministry arguing that there is no scope for reduction in the number of teachers and 
Learning Support Assistants. In this respect, the academic and advisor to the MOF 
commented that there is a paradox in Malta: a calculation of the pupil-teacher ratio for Malta 
indicates that it is the lowest when compared to the rest of Europe; yet the failure rate of 
students is one of the highest in Europe. According to the Permanent Secretary for the 
Education Ministry, given that the salary bill represents the greatest portion in the budget 
allocation for education, there is little flexibility for cost cutting. Furthermore, a number of 
expenditure items within the Education Ministry are structured and subject to a collective 
agreement which comprises stipulated allowances.  
The Director, Corporate Services stated that during the preparation of the 2015 budget, the 
Education Ministry tried to take into account what was learnt from the CSR exercise. In this 
respect, the Directors of each section were asked to identify the outcomes and performance 
indicators for budgeted line items under „programmes and initiatives‟. For example, in respect 
of the „tablets project‟ (provision of free tablets to every student in primary school from Year 
4 onwards), the ministry tried to ascertain the number of students that will be benefitting from 
the programme, together with the learning outcomes from the project. (This project is 
currently being pilot tested).  
The Health Ministry’s views 
Referring to the CSR exercise carried out in 2014, a Director within the Health Ministry 
explained that for each programme and initiative comprised in the 2014 financial estimates, 
the Health Ministry had to identify the need for the project and the consequences/damages 




should the project not be carried out. The interviewee acknowledged that it was not easy to fill 
in the template provided by the MOF, because it was not always possible to identify the 
requested information.  
6.4.2 Three-year projections 
An initiative taken by the new public administration was the preparation of a three-year 
financial plan, covering the fourteen government ministries. The three-year revenue and 
expenditure projections were presented for the first time in the 2014 Financial Estimates. The 
first year of the plan represents the budget year, with the following two years comprising 
forward estimates of revenue and capital and recurrent expenditure, per line ministry. 
Subsequent to the introduction of this practice, the requirement for the preparation of three-
year projections was mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility Act (enacted in August 2014).  
A Director within the Education Ministry opined that the education sector is so dynamic that 
one can only plan ahead for a year because keeping flexibility is important. It was mentioned 
that the MOF are pushing for the compilation of three-year plans, but the Education Ministry 
believe that the compilation of projected information is only feasible for one year. These 
comments indicate that the revenue and expenditure projections for the two years following 
the budget year, have been prepared centrally, by the MOF. This was confirmed by the 
Permanent Secretary within the Education Ministry. 
A former Prime Minister mentioned that when he was Deputy Prime Minister, there was a 
system in place, whereby each ministry had to submit a three-year business plan – this 
encouraged civil servants to think on a long term basis. Unfortunately, this practice was 
discontinued in 2004. Notwithstanding this, the interviewee believes that planning ahead for a 




minimum of three years, is of utmost importance. Medium-term financial planning would 
potentially result in achieving more effective results with the allocated funds.  
6.4.3 Implementation of the Electoral Manifesto 
Another initiative undertaken by the new public administration was to appoint a „Minister for 
European Affairs and the Implementation of the Electoral Manifesto'. In this respect, the 
Minister for Education explained that government is using a system whereby the electoral 
manifesto and the commitments made therein, on which it was elected in government, have 
been translated into a five-year strategy, setting out when the measures will be implemented 
year by year. The Minister added that the yearly budget would, in turn, reflect the priorities 
and needs listed in government‟s strategy. According to the Education Minister, the 
publication of this document keeps ministries „on their toes‟, such that what is requested by 
the line ministries would be in line with the electoral mandate. When implementing new 
initiatives, the question that should be asked is whether there are available resources for such 
initiatives, and whether the said initiatives are according to government‟s priorities. The 
Education Minister commented that, in his opinion, this process is very healthy. 
When launching the budget process for 2014 and 2015, guidelines were issued by the 
Principal Permanent Secretary to the Permanent Secretaries responsible for the respective 
ministries, stating that there should be a strong effort to ensure that the outcomes/indicators 
targeted in the budget would be linked to the promises contained in the electoral manifesto. 
As a result, during the budget compilation exercise, the line ministries had to analyse budget 
line items and the corresponding expected outcomes in terms of what is stipulated in the 
manifesto about the respective item.  




This was confirmed by a Director within the Education Ministry, who pointed out that during 
the preliminary meetings leading to the budget preparation process, the interviewee and the 
Director General briefed the Directors of the respective cost centres, explaining that the 
budget plans had to be in line with the electoral manifesto. It was emphasised that if a project 
in the cost centres‟ budget plan was not linked to an objective of the manifesto, there was the 
risk that funds would not be allocated for such project.  
6.4.4 Publication of the ‘Implementation of the Budget’ document 
In November 2014, government has published, for the first time, a document entitled „The 
Implementation of the Budget‟ (Office of the Prime Minister, 2014), setting out the 
implementation status of the budgetary measures which had been included in the previous 
year‟s budget (for 2014). This document details, on a quarterly basis, how the government 
ministries are implementing each budgetary measure and indicates whether the measure has 
been completed as at the date of publication of the document or whether it is still in the 
process of being undertaken. 
The Prime Minister of Malta affirmed that the purpose of compiling a report detailing the 
implementation of budgetary measures, is to enhance transparency and to introduce the idea 
of comparing budgets with actual results. The respondent explained that:  
“Government is taking a benchmark, being the electoral manifesto of the party which 
has been elected to government, and then measuring the progress for each objective in 
the manifesto on a quarterly basis. This is a way of measuring government‟s success, 
with success referring to the implementation of the electoral promises. A drawback of 
this practice is that it is not necessarily measuring the correct implementation of 
government‟s objectives; but at least, there is a programme of work to be done, there 
are milestones to be reached and if such milestones are achieved, government would 
be considered as performing.” 




A Director General from the Central Bank of Malta also opined that this document is a 
powerful tool of accountability and transparency, which exerts more pressure to implement 
the budgetary measures. 
6.4.5 Performance appraisals 
A further change initiated by government during 2014 was to establish clear and specific 
indicators against which the Permanent Secretaries responsible for each ministry were 
appraised, for the purpose of awarding performance bonuses. These performance indicators 
comprised the implementation of budgetary measures, simplification of procedures and other 
subjective measures such as team work, leadership and communication skills.   
The performance appraisals of the Permanent Secretaries are being carried out by the 
Principal Permanent Secretary, whilst the latter is, in turn, being appraised by the Prime 
Minister. Performance assessments are being done twice a year, in June and in December; the 
June assessment helps to identify situations where performance is not on track, such that 
adjustments could then be made in time to ensure that the targeted deliverables are reached by 
year end.  
As from 2015, this performance appraisal system will be cascaded down to Directors General 
and Directors, who will be appraised by Permanent Secretaries. A Permanent Secretary 
explained that once the budget is approved by Parliament and the planned initiatives and 
projects would be known, every ministry will receive a template setting out the expected 
deliverables for each ministry. The respective ministry would then plan the implementation of 
the initiatives and the responsibility for the implementation would be cascaded downwards. 
Thus, if a Director General is responsible for one of the deliverables, such measure would be 
included in his/her performance record.  




This initiative emanates from government‟s pledge to enhance accountability of its public 
officers. The Prime Minister observed that:  
“Though there were already some practices which were performance related within 
the public sector, including the award of performance bonuses to certain civil 
servants, in reality the performance bonus has been regarded as a supplement or as 
part of the basic salary.”  
The Prime Minister claimed that, when launching this new initiative in 2014, it was made 
clear to the Permanent Secretaries, that it will be very difficult for a person to be awarded the 
full bonus allowance. The Prime Minister remarked that a number of people did not take this 
very well, adding that he did not even give the full bonus to his Principal Permanent 
Secretary, for 2014. According to the Prime Minister, this is the beginning of a new culture, 
mentioning that in his opinion, the existing system is ingrained in secrecy and it assumes that 
not all the checks and balances are in place, not necessarily with the intention of wrong-doing, 
but for the purpose of not disclosing information.  
6.4.6 Enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
In fulfilment of Directive 85/2011/EU on budgetary frameworks, a Fiscal Responsibility Act 
was enacted by the Maltese government in 2014, to ensure sustainable public finances and to 
enhance accountability and transparency in conducting financial activities. The Act was 
unanimously approved by Parliament; thus, from a political viewpoint, this reform has been 
endorsed.  
The law provides for the establishment of a Fiscal Council, with the responsibility to carry out 
oversight duties. One of the functions of the Fiscal Council is to review the macro-economic 
forecasts published by government biannually (in April and October) and to give its views on 
their reasonableness; prior to the setup of the Fiscal Council, this role was carried out by the 




NAO. In addition, the Fiscal Council is responsible for monitoring what government is doing 
and for providing recommendations in relation to areas where government is not on track. In 
particular, the Council will assess whether government will reach its financial targets vis-à-vis 
deficit and government borrowing thresholds. 
In terms of the law, the Fiscal Council is a functionally independent institution – it cannot 
receive instructions; recruitment has to take place independently; and its budget is fixed by 
the Act and indexed to inflation. A former Finance Minister explained that the Chairman of 
the Council is appointed by the Minister for Finance, following consultation with the Shadow 
Minister for Finance. Then, the Chairman, in consultation with the Minister for Finance and 
the Shadow Minister, appoints the other two members of the Council. The Fiscal Council is 
composed of economists or experts in fiscal matters. 
A Director from the EPD, who was involved in the drafting of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
mentioned that the law was based on the Irish Act, with respect to the provisions required to 
satisfy EU requirements, mainly the fiscal rules and the Fiscal Council set up. The reasons for 
adopting the Irish model were the following: Ireland is a small country as is Malta; it has an 
open economy and it has English traditions like Malta; it was going through a crisis and was 
therefore setting up strong institutions with the help of the IMF and Troika; and it is a model 
which has been accepted by the EU Commission.  
According to the interviewee from the EPD, the Maltese Act went beyond the Irish Act and 
also beyond EU requirements. Firstly, unlike the Irish Act, the Maltese law starts by laying 
down the principles of fiscal responsibility
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, which help in the interpretation of the Act. 
Secondly, in view of the fact that financial sophistication in Malta is lower than that of 
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Ireland, a provision has been included in the Maltese Act which requires the Fiscal Council to 
explain the budgetary fiscal process in a way which is accessible to everyone including non-
experts. Thirdly, as regards medium term budgeting, EU obligations stipulate that a medium 
term budget framework is required, without providing further guidance. The EPD believes 
that it is useless having fiscal rules and a fiscal institution, and then having a weak MOF. 
Thus, provisions have been included in the law to strengthen the powers of the MOF; such 
provisions relate to the establishment of spending ceilings and ensure that the ceilings are 
consistent with the fiscal rules.  
The Act has given certain powers and commensurate responsibilities for expenditure, with the 
purpose of strengthening the MOF. Thus, if a public official exceeds the budget allocated by 
the MOF, without the approval of the Finance Minister, he/she could be personally liable. 
This obligation does not come out of the EU framework. For example, collective agreements 
need the MOF‟s approval, in contrast to what used to happen before the passing of this 
legislation; if the Ministry‟s approval is not obtained, such agreements could be declared null 
and void for the purposes of the law. 
The EPD official believes that:  
“The reform has been carried out on paper and in a strong way. The Act incorporates 
reporting requirements which are sufficiently onerous to satisfy the reporting needs 
for a country which is constantly under an EDP – amongst others, there are 
requirements for the preparation of a mid-year report and a full-year report; every 
report has to be endorsed by the Fiscal Council; the medium term plan has to be 
endorsed; and every institution which plays a role in government‟s revenue has to 
compile its forecast. The issue is how ministries and departments will manage all 
these reporting requirements.” 
According to a Central Bank representative, the budget process will be much more under 
scrutiny, as a result of this law. According to the respondent:  




“Until recently, the budget was viewed as an annual exercise where the same issues 
were discussed year after year, including the cost of living increase, the prices of 
petrol and cigarettes and similar matters. However, with the enactment of this law, the 
type of analysis required has to go beyond what was being done in the past – the 
sustainability of the debt has to be ascertained, the impact of the deficit has to be 
considered and the identification of measures to address any structural deficiencies is 
required.” 
During an interview held in April 2015, a senior civil servant within the MOF was asked 
whether this law has led to any improvement since its enactment in August of the previous 
year. The respondent replied that to date, nothing has changed because whoever used to try to 
exceed the budget allocations, is still trying to do so. The interviewee added that “we still 
have the same challenges – cultures cannot be legislated and they cannot be changed 
overnight.”  
6.5 Accountability and expenditure prioritisation 
The research participants were asked whether PI should be incorporated in budget documents 
and whether such information could be used by government to hold public officials 
responsible for the actual performance of their department/programmes. Some of the 
respondents also expressed their opinion on the mechanisms that could be applied to motivate 
performance.  
Reference was then made to the current line-item budgeting system which promotes across-
the-board expenditure cuts, in situations where government seeks to reduce its expenditure. 
Such practice could harm effective, value-for-money programmes. In this respect, the 
participants were invited to give their views as to whether PB could improve government‟s 
expenditure prioritisation. The discussion then turned to the implications of a department 
underspending its budget, under the current line-item budgeting system. 




6.5.1 Inclusion of performance information in budgets  
The majority of the respondents claimed that PI should be included in budget documents, but 
were cautious when giving their views as to whether such information could be used to hold 
public officials responsible for their performance. A number of suggestions were put forward 
as regards the use of mechanisms to motivate performance, with the most commonly 
mentioned being the award of a performance bonus and the adjustment of the department‟s 
budget allocation for the following year.  
An economist and academic believes that:  
“The inclusion of PI in budgets would be useful, provided it is used in the proper way 
to allow for better performance in the future, rather than to blindly find scapegoats for 
past underperformance. If the target was not reached, should the budget be increased 
to achieve it or should the budget be decreased because there was inefficiency? 
Moreover, if the target was not reached, was the target appropriately set in the first 
place or were there other factors which influenced the attainment of the target 
irrespective of efficiency levels?”  
The interviewee advised that the perspective that should be adopted is that public officials are 
to be accountable for the public money being spent; however, emphasis should be put on 
analysing why a target was not reached and deriving corrective action for the future, rather 
than looking at the past and taking automatic decisions which could perhaps be based on lack 
of information. The interviewee suggested that rewards and sanctions for the achievement and 
non-achievement of performance targets respectively should be applied as a last resort, 
reiterating that focus should rather be placed on what could be done better in the future. 
An academic and advisor to the MOF agrees with the incorporation of PI in budget 
documents; however, in his opinion, rewards and sanctions should not be applied in relation 
to performance, because these mechanisms could result in the manipulation of data by civil 




servants. Instead, a report should be compiled which shows whether ministries/departments 
are meeting their performance indicators.  
A Director within the Education Ministry is of the opinion that rewards and sanctions should 
not be linked to performance indicators, since there are a number of factors which affect the 
achievement of performance that are beyond the public officials‟ control. An example 
mentioned related to the number of „early school leavers‟, where government is aiming to 
reduce this figure. In this respect, if the student does not have the aptitude to continue 
studying (perhaps because of his/her home environment), is it just the teacher in the classroom 
who is responsible? The respondent claimed that the deficit cannot be viewed solely from a 
monetary point of view because the social aspect is fundamental in education. It was 
mentioned that the Education Ministry is pushing for the increase in staff complement for the 
provision of psycho-social services, in view of the high demand for such services arising from 
the increasing number of broken families in Malta. Though the additional expenditure on 
these salaries might not result in better academic results, there is a moral obligation to support 
students passing through family or other problems. Another point noted related to the low 
pupil-teacher ratio in the Maltese education system. Though this ratio has to be considered, 
the respondent claimed that when the system is based on inclusive education as is the case in 
Malta, no child can be ignored in class and Learning Support Assistants are brought in to 
support children with learning difficulties. The interviewee acknowledged that, at the same 
time, attainment of examination results cannot be ignored because, if achievement in a school 
deteriorates, the school would end up in the newspapers.  
A Permanent Secretary expressed agreement with the inclusion of PI in the budget, given that 
public officials are dealing with public funds, and thus they are not just accountable to their 
employer but also to the citizens. However, holding public officials responsible on the basis 




of PI could be problematic, in view of the fact that some matters might be beyond the control 
of a public official because of political interference. 
The incorporation of PI in budgets clearly makes sense from a sustainability point of view, 
according to a Director within the Health Ministry. As regards linking the PI to rewards and 
sanctions, the respondent opined that rewards should be set at entity level, rather than at a 
personal level. A suggestion made was to allow the savings made by a department/ministry 
during a particular year to be carried forward to the next year for use on a specific project 
which would have been approved centrally. According to the respondent: 
“Giving rewards at a personal level could be risky, because monetary rewards could 
lead to lack of social responsibility and to greedy behaviour. This could, in turn, lead 
to irresponsible decisions that give quick gains at the expense of longer term benefits. 
Going for personal gain is especially dangerous in the health sector. Where monetary 
rewards are at stake, there is a higher probability of manipulation of figures.”  
Currently, public accountability is based on expenditure, rather than on production, according 
to an economist and advisor to government. In this respect, more information should be 
available to provide accountability on the funds voted and on what deliverables were 
achieved. The respondent suggested that the best reward or sanction that could be used would 
be the adjustment of the following year‟s budget, that is, if a ministry/department did well, it 
could be rewarded by the allocation of a higher budget in the subsequent year.  
A former Minister for Finance explained that the contracts covering government‟s 
management structure are renewable every three years; thus it was suggested that should the 
pre-established targets not be reached by a public official during the said three years, 
consideration for terminating his/her contract should be made. 
A former Prime Minister and a former Minister for Finance mentioned that there is already a 
performance bonus system in place. The former Prime Minister suggested that:  




“If the mechanism adopted to motivate performance in a PB system is tied to the 
performance bonus awarded to public officials, it should be ensured that the 
assessment as to whether a civil servant achieved the established targets or otherwise, 
would not be taken by that civil servant‟s direct superior, but by an independent unit 
which can make an objective assessment. Currently, there are two main issues with 
the performance bonus system; firstly civil servants consider the bonus as an 
extension of the basic salary rather than a reflection of their performance; and 
secondly, the bonus amount is established by the superior of the public official being 
appraised, which creates difficulties in view of the human element involved, with the 
superior wanting to maintain a good relationship with his subordinate and therefore 
awarding a higher bonus than possibly deserved.” 
The Accountant General agrees that PI could definitely be used to hold public officials 
responsible for their actual performance. It was explained that actual outcomes might be 
beyond the control of the civil servants in view of unexpected expenditures which crop up 
during the year and which have to be provided for, or due to deteriorating economic 
conditions which may result in government going off-target in its revenue and expenditure 
figures. Nevertheless, as long as there are reasons and justifications as to why certain outputs 
and outcomes were not reached, there should not be any issue in gauging performance. 
The Education Ministry Permanent Secretary agreed that accountability should be linked to 
results obtained by the public officials. In this respect, monetary awards such as bonuses 
could be awarded to civil servants, in order to motivate performance. Other mechanisms that 
could be considered by the public administration for encouraging the achievement of 
performance targets relate to a person‟s career development opportunities. 
The Minister for Education advised that performance targets should be realistic and 
achievable, and at the same time, they should be ambitious and challenging. If the targets are 
then not reached, one would still have the satisfaction of saying that everything possible was 
done to achieve them. The respondent cautioned that:  




“Though performance measures are a very useful tool, one has to keep in mind that 
behind the statistics, there are people, and thus, the KPIs should be used to achieve 
the ultimate objective, mainly to better the lives of humans. For example, if the 
Education Ministry aims that in a few years‟ time, the number of youths aged between 
18 and 24 would have achieved some basic skills, government would be pleased to 
report to the EU that the early school leaving rate has decreased; however, the 
number in itself or satisfying the EU is much less important than the persons 
themselves, who might become dependent should they fail to achieve some basic 
academic skills.” 
6.5.2 The current line-item budgeting system 
Expenditure prioritisation  
The majority of the respondents confirmed that currently, if government needs to effect a cut 
in its expenditure during the year, such cut would be carried out across all ministries. 
Furthermore, the majority of the interviewees agreed that the introduction of PB would 
enhance government‟s expenditure prioritisation, such that expenditure on ineffective 
programmes is reduced and the taxpayers‟ money is directed towards initiatives which lead to 
tangible results.   
Confirming that presently, when government needs to carry out expenditure cuts, they are 
effected across the board, a Permanent Secretary claimed that PB could certainly improve 
government‟s expenditure prioritisation. However, certain government programmes have to 
be continued irrespective of their effectiveness, because of social and political considerations. 
It was argued that comparison with the private sector can only be done up to a certain extent, 
because the private sector is after profits and when profits decline, drastic measures are taken, 
whilst in the public sector, other factors come into the equation.  
Another Permanent Secretary stated that: “expenditure cuts during the year are carried out, in 
the main, in an arbitrary manner”. The respondent is of the view that the implementation of 




PB would serve two purposes; firstly, the MOF would be in a better position to take decisions 
which would not be potentially harmful, whilst, at the same time, effecting the required 
budget cuts; and secondly, the line ministries would be able to make a case for additional 
funding towards programmes which are delivering results. 
A Director, Corporate Services, within a line ministry, stated that “budget cuts by the MOF 
during the year, are a regular occurrence”. The interviewee explained that when government 
comes across an issue during the year which requires funding that was not planned for in the 
budget estimates, such as problems with the public transport system, the MOF cuts 
expenditure across the board to provide for the additional funding required.  
An NAO representative claimed that when expenditure cuts are carried out across the board, it 
could be counter-productive because a one-size-fits-all solution may not be the most 
appropriate. For instance, in certain departments, additional funds might be needed to enhance 
their effectiveness, whilst in others, expenditure cuts could be appropriate to eliminate waste 
of resources. The interviewee opined that there is such an intimate relationship between 
public funds and the economy that government has to be very careful as to how to make 
expenditure cuts, because such reductions could impact the economy negatively.  
In contrast, a representative from the Budget Office stated that when government needs to 
effect an expenditure cut during the year, the MOF looks at the expenditure that has been 
made by each ministry till that month (by line item), reviews the commitments till the end of 
the year and targets those areas where an expenditure reduction would not adversely affect the 
departments‟ operations as regards the delivery of public services. Nevertheless, the 
respondent acknowledged that when a ministry/department has its funds reduced during the 
year, its plans could be disrupted, especially where the public officials within such department 




were diligent and cautious on spending at the beginning of the year, in order to save for a 
particular activity or to transfer funds to another line item (because of a shortfall). 
A senior civil servant within the MOF argued that a budget cut across the board is totally 
illogical and it is, therefore, not done. He explained that the MOF monitors very closely what 
is happening in each area; it would know which funds are being used and for what; and it 
would be aware of the sensitivities in the different sectors. Moreover, the MOF keeps a 
history of virements (shifting of funds by ministries between line items), noting that a pattern 
can usually be observed in these virements – this implies that in some line items, there is an 
amount of funds which can be liberally reallocated. It follows that if the funds attributable to 
such line items can be reallocated, they can be equally cut since the programme attached to 
the line items will not be affected. Thus, for the purpose of budget cuts, the MOF targets line 
items which are the least sensitive and which, according to the MOF, contain an element of 
excess allocated funds. In contrast with the comments made by some of the interview 
participants, the respondent stated that budget cuts in salaries, education, health, social 
welfare and the ageing sector are never effected during the year. 
A Director within the Health Ministry agreed that PB would improve government‟s 
expenditure prioritisation by highlighting programmes which are not delivering the desired 
results. However, the interviewee cautioned that the areas which are not giving the expected 
results would still require a discretionary look, because the under-achievement could mean 
one of two things – either that not enough resources were dedicated for the capital investment 
required to start reaping benefits from the programme or that the programme is a non-starter 
which is not having the expected effect. The point made is that lower achievement does not 
necessarily equate to a cut in expenditure; there has to be context analysis such that lower 
achievement could require either a cut in expenditure or further investment. Furthermore, the 




respondent advised that one has to be careful with regard to the selection of performance 
indicators for the health sector, ensuring that the targets specified would not cause more harm 
than benefit. In this respect, the interviewee mentioned an example where one of the key 
performance indicators that the UK National Health Service had introduced was that the 
patient should not take more than a pre-determined number of hours from registration at the 
Accident and Emergency Unit till he/she is visited by a doctor – some managers within 
hospitals circumvented this indicator by asking the ambulance driver to keep driving round 
the block. 
A Health Ministry official (within Finance and Administration) also mentioned the 
importance of a prioritisation exercise in respect of government expenditure, which is 
presently lacking. Though a budget is passed by government before the commencement of the 
year, the respondent spoke of his experience where throughout the year, civil servants make 
additional requests for funding. The respondent mentioned that unfortunately, such requests 
are often triggered by the politicians who „dream‟ of new initiatives during the year. The 
interviewee claimed that:  
“The way resources are being allocated to the different sectors and the way the 
prioritisation of the budget is determined, are inefficient and ineffective. These issues 
stem from problems related to the current budgeting system, problems arising from 
the lack of an accrual accounting system and other problems including behavioural 
issues. There is no protocol on what one should do and on how one should act.”   
Another problem mentioned by the Health Ministry official is the fact that new programmes 
are introduced in the ministries‟ budget under „programmes and initiatives‟ (within recurrent 
expenditure); however, the old programmes are not terminated. Though expenditure reduction 
is a must for the Maltese government, in order to reduce the deficit, yet there is no discipline 




or no political guts to terminate certain programmes. This then results in expenditure cuts 
being effected across the board.  
When asked about this, the senior civil servant within the MOF explained that when the MOF 
tries to decrease the allocation attributable to a line item or when it tries to remove a line item 
(because it is an „old‟ programme and initiative), some of the politicians do not accept this 
because of the public perception that the line item has been reduced or removed, even in cases 
where the funds are allocated to another line item. 
 The Prime Minister confirmed that:  
“Expenditure cuts are done during the year and they are carried out across the board. 
In truth, everyone has delivered, notwithstanding the expenditure cuts, which implies 
that there is a lot of „fat‟ or waste in the system.”  
Implications of underspending the budget  
All participants agreed that, currently, if a department/ministry underspends its budget, the 
assumption is that less funds were required than those allocated and thus, the excess funds are 
clawed back by the MOF. The majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that this 
practice is wrong because it does not incentivise line ministries to implement cost savings. In 
contrast, some interviewees who were/are involved in the MOF stated that it is only logical 
that if a department/ministry needs an amount of funds which is less than was allocated 
through the budget process, then the excess funds should be returned to the MOF to be used 
where required.  
From his experience as Prime Minister, an interview participant noted that:  
“Where a department underspent its budget, the approach taken was to use the 
remaining funds quickly, such that the allocated budget for the following year would 
not be reduced. Where there is underspending on certain budget line items during the 




year, that underspending is not reported but kept in mind to compensate overspending 
on items, later on during the year.” 
A Permanent Secretary mentioned that the ministries are not allowed to carry forward the 
balance of unspent funds from the previous year. As a result, in October/November of each 
year, the country goes through a „shopping spree‟, where each ministry spends the remaining 
funds which would have been allocated as part of the budget process. The respondent advised 
that if a ministry would be allowed to carry forward to the following year a certain percentage 
of the unspent funds, to be used in a flexible manner by the said ministry, public officials 
would naturally be more inclined to spend wisely and save on expenditure. According to the 
interviewee: 
“The current system is penalising public officials who carry out cost savings. 
Furthermore, with the present system, ministries are „encouraged‟ to spend all the 
allocated funds, firstly, in order not to lose the current year‟s allocation and, 
secondly, not to have the following year‟s budget reduced. This system could thus be 
leading to suboptimal spending decisions.” 
Another Permanent Secretary agreed that the practice of clawing back the savings made by 
ministries through the implementation of efficiency measures, is demotivating. It was 
confirmed that this system is leading to last minute spending sprees, where the expenditure 
might perhaps have been postponed since spending may not always be on items representing 
priorities. The respondent advised that savings on the previous year‟s budget allocation 
arising from efficiencies (rather than from work not carried out) should be incentivised, with 
the savings being carried forward to the following year, for use by the ministry in question. 
A Director, Corporate Services, within a line ministry confirmed that towards the end of the 
year, an exercise is undertaken to ascertain how unspent funds under certain line items are 
going to be spent, in order not to have the budget allocation for the following year reduced. 




The respondent pointed out that unspent funds are not spent carelessly, but they are 
channelled towards programmes which are short of funds. 
The Director from the Health Ministry also stated that the current practice whereby funds 
„expire‟ at the end of the year is counter-productive. According to the respondent, the general 
opinion is the following: “Why should I work so hard and improve efficiency if this would 
result in a lower budget for next year where I would have to deliver with less funds and at the 
same time I would be expected to reduce spending further?” The respondent claimed that this 
practice is also applied in the case where the funds relate to strategic projects which span over 
a longer time-frame, say five or seven years. It was stated that it is unfortunate that the funds 
not spent in a particular year in respect of such projects, are lost. The respondent stated that 
although the framework for asking the MOF‟s approval to carry forward the unspent funds, 
exists, the success rate of such discussions is close to zero.  
Though there are instances of underspending in certain areas within the health sector, 
according to the respondent, this is not the case in the big health budgets, where in some 
cases, departments/entities start running into funding problems even by mid-year. With an 
ageing population and with a market which is pushing towards very expensive drugs in 
particular in relation to cancer treatment, the country has chronic under-funding situations in 
healthcare, where even if waste is reduced, the gap between what the Health Ministry requests 
by way of funding and what it is actually given, is huge. 
A former Finance Minister stated that:  
“If a ministry underspends its budget, not only does it have to return the unspent funds 
to the central agency, but the following year‟s allocated funds would be reduced 
accordingly. As a result, all ministries spend the excess funds carelessly, in order to 
ensure that all funds are used – this leads to an exorbitant waste of public money. This 




practice is completely wrong – unspent funds should be carried forward to the 
following year.” 
A representative from the NAO also agreed that:  
“As things stand, a department which underspends its budget is penalised twice – it 
loses the saved funds in the current year and in all probability, the allocation for the 
following year would also be decreased. In the past, there have been discussions for 
considering the carrying forward of a proportion of the unspent funds in order to 
motivate departments to save on expenditure, but follow-up action never 
materialised.” 
The Permanent Secretary within the Education Ministry mentioned that this practice is also 
affecting negatively revenue generation, since some departments argue that it is not worth 
coming up with ideas to generate revenue because this income will go to Finance. This 
emphasises the need for PI, in order to decrease the dependence on the inputs and focus more 
on outputs and outcomes. 
In agreement, an academic and advisor to the MOF stated that some ministries have got real 
potential for income generation, but they are reluctant to do it, because if they generate 
income/savings, such income would go to the MOF. The respondent suggested that if 
ministries underspend their budget allocation, they should be able to carry forward the 
unspent funds to the following year. Nevertheless, the respondent stated that this cannot be 
done at the moment, because Malta is under an EDP; thus, in view of this external constraint, 
if there are savings within the line ministries, they have to be clawed back by the MOF since 
government‟s focus is presently the deficit reduction. According to the respondent, 
government wants to move towards the concept of envelope budgeting (instead of going into 
every line item), whereby each ministry is allocated an amount of funds (according to its 
requirements) to be used as determined by the said ministry, provided the funds voted are not 
exceeded. For this concept to operate successfully, there has to be a commensurate element of 




scrutiny of the results achieved; such accountability could be facilitated through the 
implementation of PB. At present, it is difficult to make budget allocations on this basis, 
because of the lack of capacity and financial expertise within the ministries, coupled with the 
existing deficit situation where tight control over spending has to be exercised by the MOF.  
On the system of envelope budgeting, the senior civil servant within the MOF had somewhat 
different views. He argued that if the MOF had to give the line ministries an envelope and 
then leave fund allocation amongst the various line items in their hands without exerting 
control, the MOF would have an enormous unpleasant surprise within three months from the 
commencement of the year.  
With respect to envelope budgeting, the Permanent Secretary for Education opined that this 
model could be a double-edged sword. As things currently stand, if the funds allocated for, 
say, salaries did not suffice, the line ministry would request the MOF to cover the additional 
expenditure; with a system of envelope budgeting, asking for additional funds would be more 
difficult because each ministry would be responsible for allocating the funds to its different 
requirements, provided that the allocated budget is not exceeded. 
A former Prime Minister believes that the current practice of taking back unspent funds could 
be penalising those ministries which have been effective. The respondent recalled a case of 
rampant abuse in the social benefit system, way back in 1999-2000. The interviewee had 
introduced a computerised system whereby the ministry could connect with the banking 
system and verify whether a person held a bank account. It was found that 25% of the people 
who were benefitting from the children‟s allowance scheme (which was means tested), were 
abusing the system. The curbing of this abuse resulted in savings in government spending, 
running into millions of Euros. The respondent told the then Finance Minister that he 




expected to have those savings allocated to his ministry for investment in other projects 
including the building of social housing, pointing out that the control he was going to 
implement was going to make him a large number of enemies which would cost him votes in 
the election. After lengthy negotiations, the then Finance Minister agreed to vote half of those 
funds to be invested in social policy initiatives. The experience recounted by the respondent 
implies that although the MOF has never practised the policy of allowing ministries to carry 
forward the amount saved in a given year or a percentage thereof, it can still happen in an 
informal way.  
In agreement with the above comments, the Prime Minister stated that:  
“The present practice of clawing back unspent funds by the MOF, is one of the things 
that the government wishes to change, because savings should be encouraged rather 
than discouraged. The current practice is rewarding expenditure rather than savings. 
An output driven system, such as PB, would help in this regard, because at the end of 
the day, the most important thing is to achieve the output by year end, rather than to 
save funds at the expense of deliverables.” 
In contrast, a former Finance Minister stated that from his experience, underspending by a 
department/ministry is not a common occurrence, adding that if a particular amount of funds 
is allocated to an entity, such entity would spend the entire amount and probably, a bit more.  
A representative from the Budget Office agreed that the budget allocated to departments is so 
tight, that nearly all the funds are necessarily spent by the departments. The respondent 
clarified that sometimes line ministries transfer unspent funds relating to a line item onto 
another item with a shortfall. Having said this, the interviewee is aware of the end of year 
„spending sprees‟ by ministries, but it was stated that the MOF tries to identify such issues in 
order to claw back the funds before they are wasted. The respondent remarked that the 




carrying forward of unspent funds by the ministries to the following year, “is discouraged by 
the MOF”. 
In line with what was stated by the Budget Office official, the senior civil servant within the 
MOF confirmed that Finance monitors very carefully what is being spent and on what during 
the last three to four months of the year. Where the MOF realises that a department/ministry is 
trying to use unspent funds recklessly, Finance intervenes to control the situation. Having said 
this, the respondent noted that the majority of the allocations do not contain much waste, 
because a number of line items have been kept constant for a number of years, irrespective of 
inflationary pressures, which means that the funds allocated are being reduced in real terms. It 
was emphasised that should an expenditure review be carried out, only a few millions of 
Euros would be saved, since the majority of the budget is consumed by health, education, 
social welfare and the care of old people, as well as salaries. The respondent added that 
though a few millions could be substantial for a department, in the context of a national 
budget, it is a small amount and it will not solve anything. 
A former Budget Office official likened the budget allocation given to line ministries to a loan 
facility, stating that if the allocated funds are not fully used by a line ministry, then the 
ministry would have „borrowed‟ a lower amount from the MOF. The respondent argued that 
the budget comprises forecasted figures and thus, underspending is a result of the fact that the 
MOF cannot determine precisely what amount of funds would be needed for a particular 
ministry‟s operations. In the event that the funds used are less than the budget allocation, 
returning the excess funds to the MOF should not be considered a punishment; it represents 
shifting unused funds of one ministry onto another ministry which genuinely requires 
additional funds to those allocated through the budget process. This is important in order not 
to upset the target deficit. 




6.6 Pressures which inhibit the implementation of performance 
budgeting 
During the empirical data gathering process, a number of factors which might prohibit the 
change from the current budgeting system to a performance based system, were identified, as 
discussed below. 
Former Prime Minister Alfred Sant concluded that the difficulties of modernising the public 
administration in Malta have persisted. “Overmanning, structural imbalances in the technical 
competence of staff, weak leadership, excessive red tape, political interference…remain 
phenomena which it would be ill-advised to ignore in any worthwhile overview of the 
challenges facing the civil service today” (Sant, 2012: 109-110). 
6.6.1 Resistance to change 
All the research participants, without exception, envisage resistance to change from public 
officials, should government decide to transition to a PB system. 
During an interview with former Prime Minister Dr Sant, it was claimed that change is not 
admired in the public sector, adding that even if there is the political will to effect change, 
bureaucracy might impede the process. The interviewee opined that fire fighting is usually 
done, with strategic change lagging behind. 
According to another former Prime Minister, a PB system would highlight weaknesses in the 
performance of public officials and thus, implementation of such a system would be strongly 
resisted.  




A former Finance Minister believes that should government decide to implement PB, 
resistance to change would be encountered “from the first minute to the last”.  
Another former Finance Minister agreed that the reform would be resisted, stating that life for 
the ministries is far easier with the status quo, where money can be spent without anyone 
pinpointing that a particular measure has not been reached. PB would serve as a control 
system, highlighting weaknesses in the performance of ministries/departments; and “nobody 
likes to be controlled”. 
The Minister for Education believes that resistance is unavoidable, because one would be 
going against a culture of inertia
18
. 
An economist and advisor to government observed that resistance is to be expected, 
explaining that there is a hidden conflict between the politician and the civil service. Civil 
servants are sceptical of the politicians and resist changes to the systems, because from the 
perspective of civil servants, politicians would be in office for a limited period of time 
whereas the civil servants will be in office for a long time. Furthermore, when the general 
election is approaching, the politicians concentrate their efforts on getting elected, leaving the 
civil servants to carry on with the public administration duties. Civil servants are also 
concerned that if change is effected, it would be questionable whether they could keep the 
same control which they have on the present system.  
A Permanent Secretary stated that from experience with previous reforms, resistance stems 
from a number of reasons including the following:  
“...people do not understand the new system; they are kept in the dark as to what the 
system involves and they have to accept a fait accompli situation with no previous 
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consultation; and lastly, people are already working to tight schedules and view the 
changes as an additional burden.” 
The Accountant General claimed that resistance to change is to be expected within a large 
organisation such as government – the reform will bring about a change in the processes, a 
change in people‟s mind-set, a change in legislation and a change in controls; naturally no one 
will be too willing to embrace these changes.  
According to a Director from the Education Ministry, resistance could stem from the potential 
consequences of not reaching the pre-established performance targets, especially if the reason 
for not achieving the targets was of an economic or political nature and thus it was beyond the 
public official‟s control.  
The senior civil servant within the MOF remarked that “there would be resistance from 
stakeholders because statistics could threaten certain segments”. For example, if the 
indicators on absenteeism in schools were published, negative performance could be a 
reflection of the school management and of the country‟s educational system.   
Mitigating resistance to change 
The need to provide training to civil servants and to have an effective communication strategy 
in place were identified as ways to limit the resistance to the implementation of budgetary 
reform, by the majority of the interviewees. Bringing in external consultants to facilitate the 
process, to design the system and to assist in its implementation, was also a common 
suggestion made by a number of respondents.  
A former Prime Minister claimed that the provision of training to public officials as well as 
introducing new blood is important for the implementation of change. He further commented 
that organisational change has to be managed through people and in his opinion, consultants 




should be brought in to assist in the reform process, emphasising that the consultants have to 
be part of the team and the change process.  
Another former Prime Minister advised that the system should be designed in such a way that 
the weaknesses and underperformance are highlighted earlier on in the year, such that 
corrective action could be taken in good time.  
According to a Permanent Secretary and an economist and advisor to government, to achieve 
change, political leadership is needed. These political leaders should take the civil servants 
into their confidence and propose to implement the change together, because the politicians 
cannot do it on their own and the civil servants have no interest to change since they are 
comfortable with the status quo. Although the politician can have good intentions, ultimately 
the implementation is in the hands of the civil servants who are very resistant to change; and 
thus, unless the politician „carries‟ them with him/her, the policies will be shelved. 
A representative from the NAO agreed that an effective communication strategy is 
fundamental, adding that the provision of training is also crucial. The citizen is in favour of 
enhanced accountability – knowing how taxpayers‟ money is being spent. Thus, if the public 
administration emphasises that through the introduction of PB, accountability and public 
resources management will be improved, this reform would enjoy the support of the general 
public. 
A Director from the Education Ministry stated that:  
“One way to mitigate resistance is to have the possibility of revising the goals during 
the course of the year, should circumstances change. For example, if a budget cut is 
effected by the MOF during the year, the performance targets would need to be 
revised downwards accordingly.” 




According to a Budget Office representative, though resistance to change is inevitable in the 
public sector, if the departments appreciate the usefulness of the new budgeting system, they 
would show more willingness to implement it. If civil servants perceive the system as being in 
their interest, it might be „sold‟ to them; otherwise, there will be resistance as the system 
would be viewed as an additional control and as a tool to increase accountability for their 
performance.  
A former Finance Minister believes that notwithstanding the resistance, the implementation of 
PB is possible, if government decides to implement it and dedicates the necessary resources 
for its implementation, including recruiting the right people in the ministries. The respondent 
mentioned that when government had decided to modernise its IT system, it had placed an IT 
chief officer in each ministry. In the same way, in order to carry out the budgetary reform, 
there should be a chief accountant with the appropriate competences in each ministry, 
responsible for the implementation and on-going operation of the system. It was also 
mentioned that, realistically, external consultants would have to be involved for the 
implementation of PB – ideally, these consultants would have implemented the system and 
seen it working somewhere else, thus having the required experience to design the Maltese 
budgetary reform. 
The Prime Minister‟s view is that: 
“Resistance could be addressed if there are rewards which are linked to the 
achievement of targets (carrot and stick approach). Furthermore, if the 
implementation of the budgetary reform is to succeed, people have to be convinced 
that the gauge being used to measure an individual‟s performance is just. If the system 
is to be accepted, civil servants have to be comfortable that the system is fair and the 
performance targets established are realistic.”  
According to another former Finance Minister:  




“There is no way to mitigate such resistance; in order for this fiscal discipline tool to 
be introduced, there have to be powerful people at the top who impose the new system. 
It is important to understand that when these types of processes are introduced, one 
would be introducing control points throughout, including control over the line 
ministers; and not everyone appreciates controls. Thus, the implementation of PB 
requires strong political commitment from the top such that the system would be 
imposed on the politicians and on the civil servants. These two groups of people will 
resist these types of controls because everyone prefers to have a free hand in 
spending, with absolutely no accountability. This reform is definitely needed and 
should be implemented in the local context; however, if it is to happen, there has to be 
the will to „bulldoze‟ over people.” 
6.6.2 Personnel issues and organisational structures 
People 
There was general agreement amongst the respondents that there is a lack of suitably qualified 
civil servants within the ministries. It was claimed that unless government employs more 
qualified staff, including accountants and economists, it would be difficult to embark on a 
budgetary reform.  
Human resource capability 
A Permanent Secretary claimed that government lacks the human resource capability, unlike 
the private sector which can recruit the best people to get the required results.  
A former Minister for Finance opined that the biggest challenge for the implementation of PB 
is not the availability of an accounting and IT system (as the general opinion seems to be, in 
the respondent‟s view), because this can be procured and implemented; but it is the people – 
the knowledge and the culture. As regards knowledge, the „accountant‟ in the 
ministries/departments, who is referred to as the Director, Corporate Services, does not 
necessarily have an accounting qualification. Though, by time, these people would acquire the 
experience, they would still lack the theoretical foundation. The participant opined that the 




Director, Corporate Services should be a qualified accountant, mentioning that when he had 
made this proposition (when he was in office), he had always found resistance from the civil 
servants and from those around him. In reality, it is very difficult for government to attract 
accountants; though in the previous legislature, government reformed the salary structures 
such that accountants would get a better remuneration package, it is still impossible to 
compete with the private sector, even because in Malta, there is already a shortage of 
accountants in the private sector. The interviewee claimed that if “one pays peanuts, then one 
cannot expect to employ high calibre people”. Unfortunately, there are union issues, such that 
if the disparity between civil servants‟ salaries is substantial, pressure would be exerted upon 
government, by the unions, to increase salaries throughout, creating a ripple effect on 
government salaries. Thus, in the interviewee‟s opinion, the lack of knowledge has always 
hampered the possibility of introducing PB.  
In agreement, the Budget Office official stated that the main challenge for augmenting the 
staff complement and enhancing the accounting expertise within government is the fact that 
people, especially accountants, are paid more attractive salaries in the private sector. 
The senior civil servant within the MOF stated that though every ministry has a Director, 
Corporate Services who oversees the finance function, this function is not very strong within 
some of the ministries. However, according to the respondent, even if government employs 
the best people and the best accountants, though there will be improvement, there will not be 
structural changes in the makeup of the national budget, because structural changes in the 
budget will only happen if policy stances in the high spending sectors are changed.  





A Permanent Secretary mentioned that given that the people in the Budget Office have been 
in the division for a long time, it would be more difficult to change the embedded culture and 
implement changes.  
According to a former Finance Minister, the cultural aspect might inhibit change because 
people, naturally, do not like to have their performance measured. Therefore, a huge political 
commitment is required in order to overcome the various excuses put forward by civil 
servants, as to why budgetary reform should not be undertaken. 
In this respect, an academic and advisor to the MOF commented that it will take time for 
people to accept a new way of doing things. With the current budgeting system, an 
incremental approach is adopted, such that if a ministry was given an amount in a particular 
year, they would expect the same amount plus something extra to cover for inflation in the 
following year. According to the participant, the incremental approach assumes that 
everything is perfect and it does not allow for review or measurement of performance. 
The Director within the Ministry for Education noted that when attempts to introduce some 
changes are made, there would be civil servants who „accuse‟ the change implementer that 
he/she does not know what he/she is doing, given that a particular practice had been in place 
for a number of years, adding that if a change is effected, there could be negative 
consequences. The interviewee mentioned how difficult it is to get people to attend courses, 
even if such courses are organised during office hours and they are free of charge for the 
employees. This was confirmed by another Director, Corporate Services within another 
ministry who also mentioned the lack of interest and motivation on the part of certain civil 




servants, adding that the attendance at certain courses should be linked to the career 
progression of the individual. 
A Health Ministry official spoke about certain cultures being strongly ingrained, mentioning 
healthcare professionals who are not used to measuring outputs. This was also confirmed by 
the Director from the Health Ministry, who stated that the culture of data capture or record 
keeping is not always in place, in the case of a healthcare professional because for him/her, if, 
for example, a patient needs to be vaccinated and a form to this effect has to be filled in, the 
vaccination will get priority and not the form filling. Many times, the healthcare professional 
does not realise that if the form is not filled in, it may appear that the work was not carried 
out, or in a worse scenario, if the vaccination given is not captured and the patient gets 
another one, there may be serious repercussions. 
Low salaries for top civil servants  
The academic and advisor to the MOF spoke about the issue of low salaries for top civil 
servants in Malta, drawing comparisons with salaries paid in the UK and with the salaries 
paid within the Maltese private sector. The Permanent Secretary in Malta, who is the highest 
ranking civil servant, is paid a salary of about €42k
19
; in the UK, the Permanent Secretaries 
receive a salary of about £180k (equivalent to around €250k). In addition, whilst people at a 
lower salary level (in the private sector) have comparable salaries with employees in the 
public sector in Malta, there are huge divergences in salaries in the case of people in high 
ranks. This makes it very difficult to recruit the best people for top positions in the civil 
service. 
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A Permanent Secretary also mentioned the tension between the private sector and the public 
sector vis-à-vis the employment of accountants and financial controllers, referring to the fact 
that the package offered by the private sector is very high compared with that offered by the 
public sector. It was explained that the public administration has looked at innovative ways 
which avoid skewing government salaries. For example, the Health Ministry had found a way 
out by recruiting financial controllers through the Foundation for Medical Services (which is a 
public entity responsible for delivering healthcare infrastructure) and then placing such people 
within the ministry‟s other entities. As a result, the Health Ministry has a network of financial 
controllers who receive a package that is more generous than that paid to accountants 
employed directly by government. The interviewee opined that if this was the way to try to 
make healthcare more sustainable, then it was worth the investment. Unfortunately, it was 
stated that there is a high turnover of these people. 
Career prospects and training in the public sector 
Former Prime Minister Dr Sant refers to career development issues for employees in the 
public sector. He states that “it is difficult to find an ex-colonial country anywhere in the 
world with a consistent record of meritocracy in its public sector recruitment and promotion. 
The public sector provides the scope for a spoils system that helps parties to cement their 
political ties with supporters” (Sant, 2012: 112). Furthermore, he observes that “advancement 
in the ranks of the public service, even when meritocratic criteria are observed, has been 
extremely traditional in scope. To achieve a relatively high executive position in the service, 
one must expect to be much older than for comparable posts of responsibility in the private 
sector” (Sant, 2012: 113). These issues highlight the challenge of finding the right people 
with the right skills and expertise to spearhead the budgetary reform. 




The Minister for Education observed that training to people in different ranks within the civil 
service has not been adequately provided. He stated that though some civil servants have been 
exposed to some form of training in management, leadership and administration, such training 
has not been continuous and there are a lot of self-taught elements. For example, in the 
education sector, a person could be a good teacher or a good Head of School, but then when 
he/she moves up the ranks, he/she would come across tasks that are not strictly of an 
educational nature, but which constitute administrative, managerial, leadership or financial 
administration tasks. The Minister observed that in the education sector, the country has not 
invested in education planners or in education administrators. The Minister pointed out that 
this does not mean that there are not competent civil servants, but such people are competent 
“not because of the system, but in spite of the system”. It was also stated that these constraints 
are a common issue for all small countries, where people have to wear different hats. 
Notwithstanding, the Minister believes that there should be a better plan for human resource 
development. 
Structures 
According to the Accountant General, when it comes to budgeting and budget execution, the 
proper set-up is lacking, both within the MOF and also within the individual ministries. 
Referring to accounting, the respondent remarked that some of the line ministries do not even 
have a proper finance set-up – they are too much inclined to push projects, but in respect of 
the finance side, planning is lacking and reliance is made on the central agency. It was also 
mentioned that a number of ministries do not employ a single accountant! Thus, unless the 
public administration acknowledges this issue and strengthens the finance function within the 
line ministries and centrally, it would be very difficult to implement the desired reform. 




In agreement with the above comments, the academic and advisor to the MOF mentioned that 
a number of line ministries do not even have a finance officer or a budget team, thus the 
budget process is very much centralised because the MOF is the strongest ministry in respect 
of financial expertise. The respondent also remarked that unless there is a budget team within 
each line ministry whose members talk in an integrated way to each other, each 
department/division within the ministry would look after its interest, making a demand for a 
higher budget allocation. As a result, each Permanent Secretary would then aggregate all the 
requests and send the business plan to the MOF, who would then have to make the necessary 
downward adjustments to the figures requested. 
6.6.3 Lack of resources (IT systems, time and financial resources) and 
bureaucracy 
The Accountant General remarked that the implementation of reform takes a lot of time and 
resources; considering that government is currently in the process of moving towards accrual 
accounting, implementing budgetary reform on top of that, could be difficult. 
Investment in an accounting and IT system is required if government decides to transition to a 
performance based budgeting system, according to a Finance and Administration official 
within the Health Ministry. The respondent explained that different entities within health use 
different accounting systems (such as Access Dimensions and Shireburn), leading to problems 
of interfacing. Some of the departments within health still rely on Excel, even for producing 
reports, which is rudimentary, in the interviewee‟s opinion. In agreement, a former Finance 
Minister stated that the existing accounting and information system, which is a modified 
version of SAGE, is not adequate to support a move towards PB. A Permanent Secretary 
remarked that the existing accounting system is an old system, which is not user-friendly, 




which does not produce enough reports and which makes it difficult to manipulate 
information for the purpose of producing ad hoc reports as required. It was noted that there 
are, however, plans under way to change the current system. 
Coming from the private sector, the Health Ministry respondent noted that one of the odd 
things that he has witnessed within government is the slowness of the pace to move in terms 
of decision-making, claiming that things move at a much faster pace in the private sector, 
once approval from the Board of Directors is obtained. One of the reasons for this could be 
that a number of roles are spread across diverse departments, and thus decision-making 
inevitably takes longer. 
6.6.4 Political factors 
According to a Permanent Secretary, using PI to hold public officials responsible for the 
actual performance of their department, could be an issue, in view of inherent political forces. 
The interviewee argued that:  
“A public officer cannot be held completely responsible, because in order to hold 
someone responsible, he/she needs to have everything in his/her control. For example, 
does a public officer have a free hand to transfer people around if he/she believes that 
better results could be obtained from such a transfer? Or are there other forces which 
disallow the transfer of people around to improve performance?” 
An Education Ministry representative mentioned the frustration felt when after spending a 
number of months compiling tables and figures as part of the annual budget process, this work 
is overridden by a political decision. An example mentioned was the summer school initiative 
launched by the Education Ministry, where it was decided to open 29 centres till 5pm for five 
days a week – because of the huge demand for such services from the public, this decision 
gave rise to a substantial increase in salary bills and a significant investment in resources 




required to occupy the kids during the summer months. Once the expenditure is committed, 
the finance section would then have to find the funds by decreasing expenditure on another 
item.  
An NAO representative observed that in Malta, it is difficult to cut the staff complement 
within government because the unions would turn against government, and therefore, the 
politicians have their hands tied. This issue was also mentioned by a Health Ministry 
representative who stated that there is a strongly unionised environment within the Health 
Ministry, including doctors‟ union and midwives‟ and nurses‟ union. The same problem was 
referred to by the Director within the Education Ministry, who mentioned the issue of the 
extremely low pupil-teacher ratio in Malta and argued that there is not much that one can do 
in the public sector, if there is surplus or untrained staff. The pressure exerted by the Malta 
Union of Teachers is tremendous, with the union getting involved even if the ministry takes 
too long to pay a person, let alone if that person is made redundant.  
The Permanent Secretary within the Ministry for Education noted that personal emoluments 
make up the largest percentage of recurrent expenditure in the Education Ministry. 
Unfortunately, politicians are hesitant to change certain practices because of potential political 
damage; such practices could be costing government a substantial amount of yearly 
expenditure. The interviewee claimed that unless there is a plan on how to utilise human 
resources more effectively, the expenditure cuts that can be carried out are very limited. 
Former Prime Minister Dr Sant (2012: 112) confirmed that at times, instead of shedding its 
excess load of personnel, the state “retained its former load of personnel and financial 
obligations, while assuming additional ones to cope with the tasks of supervision and 
regulation”. 




Another former Prime Minister argued that there could be huge political issues, should 
government decide to publish the actual results or outcomes achieved. If the actual 
performance is good when compared to the budgeted targets, then no issue arises; however, if 
the funds being voted for the various programmes are not giving the best possible results, then 
government‟s effectiveness might be put into question. In the respondent‟s opinion, a massive 
culture and mentality change is required if performance budgets are to be introduced. 
Furthermore, there is the issue of the use of this PI by the Opposition party. Though, in 
principle, one could argue that government should not shy away from a performance based 
report because such report could pinpoint where corrective action is required, in reality, this 
tool could serve as a very powerful tool in the hands of the political adversary for criticising 
government. The interviewee mentioned that in spite of Malta having made significant 
political and economic progress, issues are still very much politicised. Thus, though from a 
purely technical point of view, there is no doubt that the best budgeting system is one which is 
performance based, from a political perspective, if the potential negative political fall-out is 
not addressed, the reform will not go through. It was suggested that parts of the reports could 
remain internal and not be published, though it is difficult to withhold information, especially 
in a small island like Malta, where everyone knows everybody else. 
A Permanent Secretary agreed that there is an element of political sensitivity and risk, should 
actual PI be made public. However, she referred to the present government‟s commitment to 
enhance transparency in government‟s financial undertakings and to ensure that things are 
being delivered. If government publishes information on performance targets, which are then 
not achieved, and an explanation is given as to why the pre-established targets were not 
reached, there is no shame in that. The Permanent Secretary added that the public 
administration would surely appreciate having its efforts acknowledged, through the 




publication of PI. Above all, government is using public funds, and accountability and 
transparency are the salient principles in public expenditure. 
6.6.5 Other issues 
Why has performance budgeting not been implemented?  
In view of the fact that both a former Finance Minister and a former Prime Minister 
pronounced themselves in favour of the implementation of PB during the respective 
interviews, they were asked why this system had not been implemented during their term in 
office.  
The interviewees replied that during one of the legislatures, the primary project was the 
adoption of the Euro, which necessitated meeting the fiscal targets stipulated by the EU. This 
was a huge project and absorbed all the energy of the MOF. Thus, it was definitely not the 
right time to reform the budgetary system. In 2008, the financial crisis hit the world and the 
MOF had to focus on mitigating the effects of the global crisis. The financial and economic 
crisis brought about huge risks, including risks that some of the factories in Malta might close 
down. At that point, the circumstances did not allow government to experiment with a new 
budgeting system, when the country was trying to adjust to the adoption of the Euro; it was 
trying to adjust to the fact that the Eurozone was in crisis; and it was adjusting for the 
liberalisation and reform issues in various sectors.  
The former Finance Minister also mentioned that the staff complement within the MOF at the 
time, required a drastic change. Though the Permanent Secretary within the MOF had started 
to change some people and recruit new staff, at the time, government was not seeing the 
urgency to reform the budgetary system. The respondent observed that to implement PB, there 




is the need for will power and having key people in place; it was implied that government at 
the time was not willing to recruit a chief finance officer in each ministry and thus, the reform 
could not have happened. 
Should a budgeting system which has served the country for years be changed? 
It was stated by the Prime Minister that the current budgeting system, with all its inherent 
weaknesses, works; thus, one of the greatest fears of changing the system is that something 
which has served the country for years, is destroyed. The argument of those who want to 
maintain the existing system is that with the current system, the people in charge of the 
process know exactly how to pull the „right strings‟ if immediate action is needed. These 
people argue that if a new budgeting system is introduced, it might be more difficult to take 
immediate corrective action if an unexpected event crops up. 
The Prime Minister explained that: 
“The existing system is totally people centred, in the sense that there is a very small 
hard core group of people (not more than ten public officials) spread across the 
ministries, who know the system inside out and who are capable of manoeuvring it. 
This knowledge and experience has saved the situation a number of times, both within 
the present government and also in the previous administration. The current system is 
flexible and can adapt without involving a lot of people. Through their long-standing 
experience in the budgeting process, this group of people would know which 
ministries are asking for more funds than required and would take action accordingly. 
On the downside, this also means that the existing system is extremely vulnerable, 
because it is not a system, but it is a group of people. Thus, if something happens to 
this group of people, the system will collapse, because the system does not exist.” 
6.7 Implementation strategy for performance budgeting 
This section starts off by considering whether the existing line-item budgeting system follows 
the top-down or the bottom-up approach, from the viewpoint of the interview respondents. 
Subsequently, it sets out the opinions of the research participants regarding the 




implementation approach to be adopted for PB in the local context. Next, it seeks to highlight 
the potential salient issues surrounding the implementation of PB in Malta. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the „top‟ represents the central agency, namely the OPM 
and the MOF; whilst the „bottom‟ consists of the line ministries including the departments and 
agencies falling under their responsibility.  
6.7.1 Is the existing budgeting system top-down or bottom-up?  
When asked whether they consider the existing line-item budgeting system to be based on the 
top-down or on the bottom-up principle, different views were put forward by the respondents 
(as detailed in Table 32). The majority of the respondents stated that the existing system is 
based on the top-down approach, with priorities being politically set from the top and fund 
allocation being determined centrally. A number of interviewees tended to disagree, opining 
that the system embraces both the bottom-up and the top-down perspectives. In contrast, a 
couple of participants view the current system as being based on the bottom-up approach. 




Table 32: Respondents’ views on the existing implementation approach 
 
Top-down views
According to a Permanent Secretary, the current budgeting process largely follows a top-down
approach. In agreement, the Accountant General observed that the budget process starts off with
the ministries/departments submitting their business and financial plans along with budgetary
estimates based on their ministry‟s programme. This is then followed by discussions between the
MOF and the line ministries, in order to determine the priorities for the listed initiatives. The budget
allocation is, in the end, determined by the MOF taking into consideration the overall fiscal targets.
Another Permanent Secretary added that “finally, the decisions are taken centrally and the line
ministries do not really have a say in the budget allocation ”.
A representative from the NAO stated that though there are bottom-up inputs (the line ministries
providing their suggested figures), at the end of the day, the budget process is basically top-down, as
it should be, with the final allocation decisions lying with the MOF. It is imperative that the MOF
prioritises the ministries‟ expenditure; otherwise the fiscal deficit would shoot up.
In the opinion of the Director at the EPD, the current budgeting process follows a top-down
approach, with a spending ceiling being stipulated. The Fiscal Responsibility Act mandated this fiscal
discipline tool, laying down consequences where a ceiling set by the MOF is exceeded by the line
ministries.
According to a former Prime Minister, the adoption of the top-down approach could be a result of
the country‟s EU membership, whereby government has to operate within the parameters laid down
by the EU, including the targets stipulated for the fiscal deficit. The “tug of war ” between the line
ministries for obtaining additional funds necessitates the involvement of the central agency such that
an optimal decision on programme prioritisation would be arrived at.
A representative from the Health Ministry explained that in view of the fact that the country‟s
budget is subject to the EU Commission‟s scrutiny, central intervention becomes fundamental to
ensure that the country‟s priorities are being addressed.
Another public official from the Health Ministry observed that although the line ministries compile
their own financial plans, the decisions are ultimately taken centrally. It was claimed that much of the 
results of the bottom-up process are rejected. According to the respondent, this approach is
necessitated by the requirement for meeting the fiscal deficit threshold.
The Permanent Secretary for the Education Ministry remarked that the budget compilation is a two-
way process; however, at the end of the day, the decisions are taken at the top. The respondent
understands the circumstances and constraints faced by the MOF, adding that at the end of the day,
someone has to decide for the whole country. It was claimed that sometimes the proposals made by
a line ministry might not make sense and thus, the central agency has to adjust the figures.






In the opinion of an economist and advisor to government, the existing budgeting system is
“completely bottom-up ” and it should be top-down, because the government has been
democratically elected, it has a programme to accomplish, it is accountable to the electorate, and the
budget is one of the major measures for the implementation of the pledges made to the electorate.
Agreeing with this view, a former Finance Minister stated that although the final decision on the
budget allocation is centralised, the individual amounts expected to be spent by each
ministry/department are determined by the line ministries, whose focus is on what funds could be
obtained for their spending, rather than on what results will be delivered through the expenditure
made. Within this scenario, the MOF then negotiates with each line ministry the actual percentage
increases over the previous year‟s budget that will be assigned to the respective ministry.
According to an academic and advisor to the MOF, the current budgeting system is incremental and
bottom-up, with the line ministers requesting the same budget allocation as was given the previous
year, plus something extra to cover for inflation.
Combined perspectives
The senior civil servant within the MOF considers the current budgeting system to be based on a mix
of the top-down and bottom-up approaches, whereby the line ministries compile their business plans
and the MOF establishes the spending ceiling. Having said that, when the MOF detects situations of
misallocation of funds by the ministries, it intervenes, in order to avoid the risk of having the
ministries shifting funds allocated to salaries onto other programmes and then requesting additional
funds from the MOF to cover the salaries, which have to be paid in any case. 
The Director within the Education Ministry opined that, to a certain extent, the line ministries have
some decision-making roles in the budget process, because the financial plans submitted by the
ministries are taken into account by the Budget Office, when making the budget allocations. The
process is as follows: the line ministry requests an amount of funds and submits the plans of how that
money would be utilised; then the MOF would usually allocate a portion of the requested amount.
The respondent emphasised that the final decision on the fund allocation rests with the MOF.
However, it was stated that where the funding allocated was too tight for implementing a particular
programme, the Education Ministry had the opportunity to highlight this issue and the MOF did listen
to them.
Referring to the 2015 budget compilation process, the Education Minister stated that he felt it was
more of a partnership between the Education Ministry and the MOF. The Minister mentioned his
involvement in a number of meetings and discussions and stated that a week before the budget was
publicly presented, he was given a draft of the budget allocation earmarked for his ministry, which
remained unchanged in the final version of the budget.
In the Prime Minister‟s view, the system combines both the top-down and bottom-up approaches: the 
MOF is fed the requests for funds from the line ministries, but then, at the end of the day, if there is
the need to cut expenditure, the decision lies with the central agency.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015





An interviewee, who used to work in the Budget Office for a number of years and who used 
to be present during the budget negotiation meetings between the Minister for Finance and the 
respective line ministers, recounted his experience, stating that when the MOF is allocating 
funds to the respective ministers, the human factor plays a very important role. Whilst some 
of the line ministers would accept their share of the budget allocation without further 
discussion, there were cases where a lot of friction and tension was felt during the 
negotiations, with ministers walking out of the meeting with the MOF. The respondent 
mentioned a former minister (who practised the profession of a lawyer) who used to be very 
well-prepared for the budget meetings and who could make a case for additional funding even 
if in reality his arguments were inadequate. The interviewee, who has worked under the 
responsibility of four former Finance Ministers, added that the personality of the Minister for 
Finance also plays an important role – when the Finance Minister has a strong character, it is 
easier to put his foot down when additional funding is requested by the line ministers.  
6.7.2 Top-down versus bottom-up approach for performance budgeting  
The respondents were asked whether they advocate a top-down or a bottom-up approach for 
the implementation of PB in the local scenario. In the main, respondents were of the view that 
the implementation approach should embrace a mix of both perspectives, perhaps tending 
towards the bottom-up approach. It was, however, noted that central involvement is still 
required, especially within the existing cultural framework of the country.  
The economist and advisor to government opined that the implementation approach for PB 
should embrace both the top-down and bottom-up perspectives. From a top-down view, the 
budgetary framework should be approved by a Cabinet decision which would then be 




cascaded down to the MOF and to the line ministries, providing a framework within which 
financial plans would be subsequently developed. The line ministers would then develop 
performance targets and measures for their ministries/departments (bottom-up). In turn, the 
MOF has to be armed with sufficient information, in the form of international benchmarks 
and sources, in order to be in a position to challenge certain assumptions made by the line 
ministries. 
Agreeing with a combined approach for the implementation of PB, the Budget Office 
representative maintained that the ministries/departments should be responsible for compiling 
their business plans and for developing their performance measures and targets, in order to 
ensure ownership from their end. Subsequently, the central agency would assess whether the 
targets are reasonable, giving its approval or proposing adjustments.  
A representative from the EPD added that whilst the top-down view is fundamentally 
important because the spending ceiling has to remain, the bottom-up perspective (at the line 
ministry level) ensures that the established spending ceiling is credible and realistic. Thus, if 
after implementing all possible efficiency gains, the spending ceiling is exceeded, this would 
indicate that there is a problem which has to be financed, either through a revenue measure, 
an expenditure measure or through the reduction of spending by another ministry.  
According to a former Prime Minister, the ideas should emanate at the level of the line 
ministry (bottom-up). For example, in social policy, it is the social workers who can indicate 
to their superiors what the social priorities are. In turn, the top public officials will design 
programmes which embrace the social priorities identified. Such programmes are then 
translated into financial plans and performance measures and submitted to the minister in 
charge. The minister (with a packet of initiatives which is expected to cost, say, €100 million, 




but with only €50 million available for spending) would have to prioritise the programmes – 
these decisions should then be made hand in hand with the Finance Minister and the OPM. 
The involvement of the latter would ensure that the decisions taken are based on 
government‟s priorities.  
According to the Accountant General, if PB is to be implemented, the existing top-down 
approach would have to change. The MOF would have to engage more with the line 
ministries. It should perhaps allow line ministries to manage their budgets but be in a position 
to apply sanctions if the pre-established performance targets are not reached (unless there is 
justification for not delivering what was expected). The MOF should determine the amount of 
funds to be allocated to each line ministry and then the ministries would use their discretion 
for distributing the money amongst the projects, ensuring that the envelope given is not 
exceeded. The role of the central agency should be focused on issuing budget guidelines and 
monitoring what the ministries are doing, rather than going into detailed analysis of every line 
item in the budget.  
According to a former Finance Minister, the proposed PB system has to follow the bottom-up 
approach, because, ultimately, the budgets and performance targets have to be compiled by 
the respective department/ministry (as is the practice in the private sector) and then 
consolidated into one overall budget. The respondent clarified that the policies and projects 
would still be determined centrally. An academic and advisor to the MOF added that the 
ministries will subsequently be judged by the central agency on the attainment of the 
performance measures that they would originally have come up with. 
A representative from the NAO cautioned that given the culture in the local context, the 
implementation of a PB system would still require central intervention. Though the ministries 




would be responsible for compiling both the draft financial plans and the performance targets, 
the MOF should have the final say in budget allocation. Another NAO official referred to a 
process of decentralisation which was undertaken in the past, whereby line ministries were 
allowed to shift funds between certain line items without getting approval from the central 
agency. The respondent claimed that the result was not very positive, because decentralisation 
was implemented without a corresponding amount of accountability. Another issue raised was 
that given the fiscal deficit problems faced by the country, the top-down approach could be 
more appropriate for exerting control. A third representative from the NAO mentioned that, in 
the past, there have been attempts to move the recruitment away from the control of the OPM; 
however, when the central agency relaxed its control, the departments/ministries got carried 
away and then, once new recruits were employed, they remained on the government‟s payroll. 
The respondent claimed that if there is a move towards decentralisation, proper structures 
would have to be created in order to regulate and to monitor; otherwise, chaos will reign. 
In conclusion, with the implementation of a performance based system and the corresponding 
inclusion of PI in budgets, the shift from the current top-down approach to a combined 
approach (tending towards the bottom-up view) appears to be possible. This is because if pre-
established performance targets are set, which are then compared to actual PI, it would be 
easier for the central agency to exert control and to ensure increased accountability on the part 
of the ministries and departments.  
6.7.3 Championing and project leadership  
The interview participants were asked whether they expect anyone, at the top politically, to 
champion this reform. A further question posed sought to identify who should act as project 
manager/leader for PB implementation. 




As regards championing of the reform, there was general agreement between the respondents 
that it is fundamentally important to have the people at the top supporting the vision to move 
towards PB. It was claimed that political ownership will push the reform to happen and will 
ensure that it is carried out faster from a timing point of view. The majority of the respondents 
stated that if the reform is to happen, the Prime Minister has to act as champion for it. In this 
respect, a former Prime Minister stated that from his experience, when an initiative is backed 
by the OPM, the line ministries will cooperate much more. As an example, during the period 
between 2004 and 2008, government was striving to meet the Eurozone targets and it was 
decided that the Prime Minister should take up the role as Minister for Finance. This resulted 
in much more coordination and cooperation from the line ministries and departments. At the 
end of the day, the OPM has the power to nominate or remove a person from a ministerial role 
and thus, when instructions are issued from the OPM, they are followed more diligently.  
Another view put forward was that the MOF should champion the reform, but with clear and 
full support from the Prime Minister. 
With respect to project leadership for the implementation of the budgetary reform, the MOF 
was identified by all respondents as the most appropriate candidate to manage the transition. 
This is because the MOF is responsible for the budget preparation, with the budget being the 
main reason why the MOF exists. Furthermore, the MOF has the experience, expertise and 
institutional knowledge of the ministries and the budget process. It was mentioned that the 
MOF should have the overall management role, and then there should be a project leader 
within each ministry to coordinate with the central agency. At ministerial level, the project 
leaders should be the Permanent Secretaries, guided by a technical person (an accountant) and 
then, at a lower level, the Heads of the Departments should also be involved in the project 
management for the system implementation. It was, however, stressed that unless there is the 




strategic backing and drive from the OPM, the reform will not work. Clear support is also 
required from Cabinet, in view of the many competing claims for funds between the 
ministries. 
6.7.4 Reporting  
Budgeted versus actual performance information 
The responsibility for carrying out a comparison of the actual results with the budgeted PI and 
for checking whether the performance targets have been reached, should vest within every 
ministry, according to the interviewees. Following that, the MOF would then request such 
information from the ministries in order to analyse whether the allocated expenditure is 
delivering value. It was suggested that the reporting of the actual performance targets reached 
should be disclosed with the following year‟s financial estimates.  
Performance audit reports 
In the main, respondents opined that the carrying out of performance audits in relation to the 
quality and coverage of PI should be under the responsibility of the NAO, which is an 
independent body and which is the external auditor of the civil service. Alternatively, a 
Quality Assurance Unit could be set up, possibly under the NAO‟s remit, to oversee this 
process. It was proposed that each ministry would be reviewed, say, every four years. With 
fourteen ministries, three or four ministries would be audited every year. To facilitate the 
audit process, it is important for the ministries to have good documentation on performance 
and to fill in various forms, which are then submitted to the NAO for its scrutiny. This body 
could also provide guidelines to the ministries on how they will be inspected in order to 
ensure transparency. 




A respondent was of the view that the NAO‟s oversight will not suffice for exerting control 
on a regular basis. In this regard, it was suggested that each ministry should have an internal 
audit function (currently, the only internal audit function is within the OPM and it is more 
related to EU fund issues) for compiling performance audit reports and for reporting on other 
matters including risk factors surrounding the department and its internal control systems. The 
internal audit function within each ministry should ultimately be responsible to the MOF, 
rather than to the respective minister (as is the case in a private company where internal audit 
is responsible to the Board of Directors and not to management).  
An alternative idea put forward by another interviewee was that the review should take the 
form of a management audit (assessing whether the procedures in place are leading to the 
achievement of the deliverables) and it should be carried out by the MOF or the OPM. 
According to this respondent, the NAO, which is responsible for scrutinising governance, is to 
be kept separate from this. 
Some respondents suggested that another body which could take up this audit role is the 
Fiscal Council. 
6.7.5 Other matters 
Type of performance budgeting 
When asked about the type of PB which is most appropriate for the local context 
(presentational, performance-informed or direct), the majority of the participants claimed that 
it is best to start off with presentational PB. Given that the introduction of PB necessitates a 
culture change in the way public officials think and operate, government should start with the 
first level of PB in order for the civil service to transition to this system in an incremental 




manner, and then build up confidence and cooperation before implementing performance-
informed budgeting. The interviewees observed that the presentation of more information in 
budget documents is always better than providing less information, as long as it is good and 
non-biased information. Furthermore, from a political perspective, the presentation of 
performance and outcome information justifies government‟s expenditure and informs the 
public as to what has been achieved with the taxpayers‟ money.  
Another argument put forward for adopting presentational PB was that there should not be a 
tight link between performance and allocations, because if a department sets a target which is 
then not reached, it does not follow that the budget for that department should be reduced, in 
view of the fact that the said function could still be an important public service and a priority 
for government. It was also argued that quality should not be sacrificed, in order to achieve 
the targets/measures. 
Reform enacted in law or through policy guidelines  
There were diverging views from the respondents with respect to whether the budgetary 
reform should be enacted in law or by means of policy guidelines issued by the central 
agency.  
A few respondents were of the opinion that the reform should be enacted in law, stating that 
though there is no difference between enactment in law and through policy guidelines as 
regards the operational aspect of the system, the difference becomes important when it comes 
to monitoring and the consequences if the law/policy is not adhered to. The deterrent of the 
consequences if one breaks a law rather than a policy is stronger; thus, the probability is that 
if the reform is enacted in law, a better result will be achieved with less monitoring. 




The other viewpoint which was supported by the majority of the interviewees was that it is 
not necessary to legislate in respect of the budgetary reform. Instead, the reform should be 
implemented through policy guidelines issued by the MOF. A respondent added that:  
“Things are not changed by simply legislating and it is mistaken to assume that 
because the law has been changed, the reforms will be implemented. In truth, it is the 
people and the policies, and the people implementing those policies who can bring 
about the real change.” 
In agreement, another interviewee stated that:  
“The reform will not succeed just because it is enforced in law, but it will only 
succeed if government believes in the system, if there is cooperation at line ministry 
level, if the reporting is genuine and if there is objectivity – these fundamental 
elements for the success of the system will not come about if there is a law, but if a 
cultural change happens.” 
According to another interview participant, the main challenge for implementing PB is in 
terms of resources, because the majority of the ministries do not have the expertise required 
for the operation of this system – this is possibly why it is taking time for this reform to 
materialise. Thus, it would be premature to legislate at this stage, because the worst thing that 
could happen is to legislate when the required resources are not available since this would 
undermine the whole process. 
Asked whether legislating would ensure permanence of the budgetary reform, it was claimed 
that if there is a change in government and the new administration sees that the system is 
working, there would be no benefit in dismantling it. The new politician would change the 
priorities, but within the existing tool.  




Timeframe for implementation  
The views of the interview participants were sought with respect to the suggestion of a 
reasonable timeframe for the successful implementation of PB across central government. 
There were mainly two views in this respect; some respondents suggested that a long 
timeframe, in the region of ten to fifteen years, is required, whilst other interviewees 
mentioned that implementation is possible within a three to five year timeframe.  
A number of respondents opined that the implementation could take a considerable number of 
years (possibly 10 to 15 years), because substantial effort is needed prior to implementation in 
order to prepare the system and then, more importantly, to educate and train the people 
involved. This suggested long timeframe stems from the fact that the reform will affect all 
government ministries and departments and furthermore, ministerial portfolios and people 
change over time making implementation more complicated. In agreement with this, the 
Accountant General compared a possible budgetary reform with the current accrual 
accounting reform, which is still on-going
20
. Thus, using the same measure, the 
implementation of PB might take decades, according to the Accountant General.  
In contrast, some respondents mentioned that a three to five year period could be reasonable 
for the implementation of PB. It was stated that if government is serious about the reform, it 
should not take longer than this to implement; otherwise complacency will set in, with the 
people being satisfied with what has been accomplished up to a certain point and failing to put 
in extra effort to achieve the next milestone. Furthermore, if the momentum is not kept, 
people‟s morale would suffer and there would be changes in the ministries and their 
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the first dry run (compilation of consolidated accounts) in 2019 or 2020. 




portfolios, making the whole project more complex. Thus, it is important to have a project 
with a clear road map and clear timelines for implementation. Another point mentioned was 
that the timeline of the project would also depend on the quality of the people involved in the 
implementation.  
In agreement with this, an interviewee suggested that government has to start the budgetary 
reform implementation at the beginning of its legislature, such that the peak is reached by the 
fourth year of a legislature. In the opinion of the respondent, the reform cannot be commenced 
in the middle of a legislature because, politically, this change could be a „minefield‟. The 
interviewee opined that a period of five years is required, as a minimum, because there are 
logistics issues, including the need to recruit a number of accountants who are willing to work 
in the public sector.   
Changes to the legislative framework  
Information was sought during the interviews regarding the changes required to the legislative 
framework for the implementation of the budgetary reform. 
A former Finance Minister stated that the current Financial Administration and Audit Act 
would have to be amended in order to provide for the required checks and balances in the law, 
reflecting the consequences of not reaching the pre-established targets and measures. The law 
should also give administrative power to the people involved in the process. 
It was also suggested that a manual containing guidelines be developed and issued by the 
MOF – such manual would then be amended from time to time to take into account new 
developments. 




Parties involved at policy formation stage  
There was consensus amongst the respondents that the key stakeholders who should be 
involved at policy formation stage are the OPM, the line ministers, the Permanent Secretaries 
and the top civil servants (Heads of government departments).  
It was also stated that consensus from the opposition party is also desirable, though according 
to the interviewees, this should not be a problem given the importance of the reform for the 
country. The implementation of this system has to result from an unanimous 
effort/commitment in the country, because the implementation would probably have to go 
through different legislatures (the government which will commence the development of this 
system will probably not be the one to launch its operation). 
Implementation challenges  
The challenges that government will potentially face if it decides to implement PB have been 
summed up by one of the respondents as follows:  
“A number of public officials will not understand what the system entails; some 
people would question why another change is necessary; some are comfortable with 
the status quo; others will be retiring shortly and will not want to face any new 
challenges; and financial resources, including IT support and training, have to be 
dedicated for the implementation.” 
Furthermore, another respondent mentioned that good political leadership is fundamental, 
such that there is consensus amongst all the ministers to make the transition. It is also 
important for government to have the civil servants on its side. However, to have the 
ministers on board and to obtain the civil servants‟ support is no small task. 




Given that the reform is necessarily a long process, there is the risk that people will lose 
interest along the way – thus, it is important to have a team which is driving the reform and 
keeping the momentum. 
Another challenge is the limited human resources available, both as regards quantity and also 
quality (in terms of skills). 
An interviewee observed that: 
“For the implementation of PB, there is the need for a mind-set to quantify what is to 
be achieved; there is the need of having the required technical competence to 
quantify; and finally, there is the need of having the competence and capacity to 
deliver.” 
6.8 Accrual basis  
As mentioned earlier, the Maltese central government uses a cash-based accounting system 
for its government ministries and departments. The cash-based system is then supplemented 
by accrual-based data collected manually from the government departments – this is mainly 
done to satisfy Eurostat reporting requirements.
21
 
As regards budgeting, Malta also operates a cash-based system. 
6.8.1 Budgeting  
A further question sought to obtain the respondents‟ opinion as to whether the accrual basis 
should also be extended to budgeting. 
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standards. According to the Accountant General, government is still at the beginning of this implementation 
process. The Treasury is aiming for 2019/2020 to have the first dry run, consisting of the compilation of 
consolidated accounts. 




Whilst some participants were of the view that the accrual basis should also be adopted for 
budgeting, other interviewees were unsure as to the benefits that could be gained from the 
effort that has to be made to budget on an accruals basis.  
According to the Accountant General, it is premature to introduce accrual budgeting in the 
local scenario and there are currently no plans for its adoption, since government is 
concentrating its efforts on implementing accrual accounting for historical reporting. It was 
mentioned that in many countries which make use of accrual budgeting, they had first adopted 
accrual accounting for historical purposes and then eventually moved towards accrual based 
budgeting. Thus, accrual budgeting might be introduced in the future, but, first, public 
officials have to get used to accrual accounting for historical reporting (which is still in the 
process of being implemented). Another issue highlighted was that it would be very difficult 
for the decision makers (including politicians) to grasp and use accrual based budgeting and 
to vote funds on that basis. If government decided to adopt accrual budgeting, a cash budget 
would invariably have to be prepared, alongside the accrual based budget. 
6.8.2 Is accrual budgeting required for implementing performance budgeting?  
A number of interviewees argued that in order to implement PB, an accrual accounting system 
is essential. According to a former Finance Minister, if government does not have a real 
reading of what the actual costs are (expenditure is hidden between one year and the next), PB 
will not work. Therefore, a good accounting system is the basis for the implementation of PB. 
This view was shared by a number of participants, including a former Prime Minister. 
Conversely, some interviewees argued that accrual budgeting is not necessary for the 
implementation of PB. An economist and academic stated that the school of thought which 
states that accrual accounting is a prerequisite for PB, emanates from the premise that accrual 




accounting is the correct way to present financial information, and therefore, from this 
perspective, PB would be of no use if there is not a correct way of presenting information. 
However, according to the respondent, accrual accounting is not necessarily the correct way 
of presenting information. It was mentioned that in 2009/10, most of the governments were in 
financial crisis, with the problem being a liquidity issue rather than a solvency issue. In that 
scenario, the cash based system was more indicative of the true financial position, according 
to the interviewee. 
6.9 Education and health KPIs 
The opinion of the interview participants was sought with regard to the key performance 
indicators (KPIs) in the local health and education sectors. According to the respondents, 
health is a delicate sector – if anything goes wrong, it is not just a question of 
underperformance, because people‟s lives are at stake. Thus, the KPIs should show that the 
health and quality of life of people are improving. In education, the country has to think of the 
future of the children; thus, the outcomes have to be linked to the success of the children 
which, is in turn, the result of the educational system in operation. 
6.9.1 Education 
The following table sets out the KPIs that have been listed by the respondents in respect of the 
education sector: 




Table 33: Education KPIs 
 
Further comments 
According to a former Prime Minister, the country is completely off track in the education 
sector: there is the government school system, the church school system (whereby 
government is funding the teachers‟ salaries) and the private school system (whereby 
government is giving tax deductions on school fees). Through this education set up, the 
country is losing out on economies of scale. Though this structure does not make sense, it is 
still being publicly funded. In the respondent‟s opinion, the starting point would be to merge 
these three systems; however, this is impossible from a political perspective. Unless this is 
done, the performance targets are going to be sub-optimal, in any case. The interviewee also 
referred to the stipends paid by government to students. Though the spending per capita on 
the education system is at the same level as that of other European countries, when the 
expenditure dedicated to stipends is factored out, the figures plummet. Thus, government 
prefers to subsidise the living costs of students at the expense of the advancement of the 
KPIs - Education sector
Number of „early school leavers‟ – „early school leavers‟ refer to young people who finish school at
the age of 16 without a proper school leaving certificate which would allow them to continue with
their studies. Decreasing this indicator is important such that more people would continue with their
development in order to increase their employability.
Lifelong learning (from the cradle to the grave)
Attendance and absenteeism
Pupil-teacher ratio
Time taken to find employment after leaving the education system
Achievement in academic results
Number of courses offered
Measures of attainment, such as the number of students who entered into the tertiary education
system or the number of students who found employment
Measurement of the success of programmes (For example, the present government has introduced
free childcare – has an improved female participation rate been registered in the labour market?)
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015




country‟s education system. But any government who brings up this issue would be “shot 
down politically”. Unfortunately, when one looks at performance on sciences, literacy and 
duration at school, amongst other things, it is abysmally down the line compared to other EU 
countries. Thus, notwithstanding all the spending on education, the outcomes are not very 
promising. Furthermore, though a number of students achieve high performance levels, there 
are 30-40% of the students who lag behind. 
An economist and advisor to government stated that the budget dedicated to the education 
sector should reflect the fact that the number of school children is reducing. Thus, decisions 
should be taken to close off primary schools in certain villages, centralise and build new 
schools which are modern and appropriate for today‟s realities. Centralisation would, in turn, 
lead to a decline in the cost per student. Government would also have vacant properties in 
villages which could then be used for other purposes. In agreement, the Finance Minister 
argued in favour of amalgamating schools, stating that this will not affect the services 
provided to students. The Minister added that this waste is not contributing to better results 
because the academic achievement of Maltese students is inferior in comparison with other 
EU countries. Thus, the focus should be on achieving better results.  
Following the completion of the interviews, a performance audit was undertaken by the NAO 
in June 2015, having the objective of assessing whether there is cost efficiency in the use of 
resources for the operation of state primary schools. The report concluded that (National 
Audit Office, 2015: 42): 
 The decrease in the student population, together with the expected decline in child birth, 
questions the need for a primary school in almost every locality in the country. The 




additional resources being utilised by small schools could be dedicated to other pressing 
needs within the education sector. 
 The financial feasibility of class sizes with a relatively small number of students is being 
questioned. It is stated that “maintaining primary schools with a significantly low student 
population is an uneconomic endeavour, particularly since a number of reputable studies 
conclude that there are no advantages to be reaped in terms of social and academic 
development from small class sizes”. 
The Minister for Finance referred to the ratio of teachers and Learning Support Assistants to 
students, stating that it is unbelievably low in Malta compared to other EU countries, which 
highlights the excessive waste in the education system. The respondent suggested that the 
number of teachers should be reduced through attrition (non-replacement of leavers and 
retirees). Unfortunately, there is a commitment from government to employ all the graduate 
teachers. However, if people are employed for political reasons and not because they are 
needed, then government has a „problem‟ which has to be financed. 
6.9.2 Health 
As regards health, the KPIs identified were the following: 




Table 34: Health KPIs 
 
It was mentioned that the following three pillars – access, quality and sustainability – have to 
be reflected in any indicator data set used for monitoring a health system. 
Further comments 
A representative from the Health Ministry noted that one has to be careful when establishing 
KPIs and subsequently, when interpreting the statistics. For example, waiting time beyond a 
certain extent is clearly wrong, but if waiting time falls below a certain threshold, it could 
actually mean that there is an oversupply of doctors and nurses, resulting in an element of idle 
time. A further example relates to the case of a disease which was previously not being 
detected. If the number of persons suffering from the disease, subsequently, increases, it 
would actually be a good sign because it means that the capturing systems have improved. 
A former Prime Minister remarked that during the 1990s and 2000s, the public investment 
figures on health were quite high, reflecting the development of the new public hospital. 
Although it boasts of state-of-the-art technology, the cost over-runs on this hospital have 
absorbed so many funds, that in the meantime, growing problems such as dementia, mental 
KPIs - Health sector
Waiting lists
Waiting time in hospital and in healthcare centres
Number of operations carried out in the different areas
Number of medicines which are out of stock in the hospital
Appropriate use of the stock of medicines including shelf life
Turnaround of patients in hospital
Measurement of the success of government‟s investment in preventive campaigns (For example,
as regards a campaign against smoking, did the number of people who required medical attention
for respiratory reasons decrease? Or did the government collect more revenue from cigarettes? If
the latter case has materialised, then, the campaign is a waste of public funds).
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015




illness and old age problems, have not been addressed. Though performance in certain areas 
(such as cancer) is good, in certain other areas, such as primary health care, the country is 
lagging because of lack of funding. 
According to an economist and advisor to government, in reality, no one knows where to start 
off from, in the local health sector. The expenditure is going up, the technology is advancing 
(requiring further investment) and people‟s expectations are growing. The higher the success, 
the higher the expenditure and the more pressure on the budget, because when a person‟s life 
is extended, his/her demands for healthcare will increase with every year extended. In the 
interviewee‟s opinion, there should not be free healthcare for all, but only for those who 
cannot pay. The respondent claimed that the provision of free healthcare for all is 
unsustainable, especially in view of the fact that numbers are increasing given the country‟s 
ageing population. Thus, costs are increasing whilst resources are limited – these two issues 
are brought together by rationing, resulting in issues such as long waiting lists, overcrowding 
and bed shortage. A system of rationing is very unsocial, because the lower level of society do 
not have contacts so they are last in the queue; the top end of society have contacts so they go 
first in the queue. Therefore, according to the respondent, although free healthcare is aimed at 
providing fair and equitable healthcare to all, this purpose is not being served. 
In agreement, the senior civil servant within the MOF stated that the purpose of free 
healthcare is to ensure accessibility and equity. In view of the fact that resources are limited 
which is giving rise to long waiting lists, this „free‟ system is creating obstacles for 
accessibility to those persons who need healthcare. This is because healthcare is accessible to 
whoever has contacts or money (because if a person is financially comfortable, he/she could 
use private services), but inaccessible to those who do not have contacts or money. 




In contrast, another former Prime Minister disagrees with the statement that free healthcare is 
not sustainable, claiming that if government is careful with its expenditure, then it can 
continue to sustain the existing health system. According to the respondent, the claim that 
healthcare is totally free in Malta is false, because primary healthcare includes a system of 
family doctors for which the public pays. Therefore, the most significant part of healthcare 
services is against payment, whatever the financial situation of the individual using this 
service. The remaining issue is then the public hospital. The interviewee noted that investment 
has to be made by government in health clinics, to encourage people who do not need to go to 
hospital to avoid going there. It was mentioned that whilst other countries allocate 10-15% of 
their budget to military services (armies of soldiers, weapons, bombs and planes), Malta does 
not incur such expenditure since the country‟s army is only used to take care of illegal 
immigrants. In fact, the percentage budget allocation for this purpose is insignificant. 
Therefore, Malta has an advantage over other countries in this respect, and as such, 
government can make decisions to offer the best possible health service. The million dollar 
question which has remained unsolved by the former Prime Minister is the following: how 
can government integrate private health insurance policies with the free healthcare system? In 
Malta, a person takes a private health policy; then if the need arises, the insurance company 
advises the individual to use the public hospital (because it‟s free) and then he/she will get a 
sum of money in cash from the insurance company. If this issue is solved and government 
manages to obtain the insurance companies‟ cooperation, such that people are incentivised to 
pay for private health insurance and then use private health services when the need arises, 
then the issue of public healthcare sustainability will be alleviated. There is another thing that 
could be done: today people pay national insurance of 10% of their salaries – this covers 
pensions, health and other benefits. This 10% is capped and the reason for the capping is 




because the pension is capped; however, health services are not capped. Therefore, the 
respondent suggested that the 10% should be split, such that 8% [say] of the salary would 
cover the pension and would be capped (because the pension is capped) and the other 2% 
would cover health, but it should not be capped because there is no capping on health 
services. Theoretically, if the national insurance covering health is capped, health services 
offered should also be capped. 
6.10 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, all the interview participants were in favour of the implementation of PB in the 
local scenario. It was stated that PB enhances accountability and increases the information 
available to the public, giving explanations of the purpose of the budget allocations. 
When asked whether, in their opinion, this budgetary reform should be introduced, some 
respondents replied as follows: “Yes, absolutely”; “PB is the only way forward, even because 
the EU Commission is pressing us to go that way”; “this is a vital tool for the country”; “yes, 
an unqualified yes”; “at the end of the day, it is not the amount invested, but the results 
obtained that count”. 
There were, however, some reservations with respect to the timing for the implementation of 
this reform. A respondent opined that “this reform is way down the line”. In agreement, 
another interviewee stated that “we are a bit far away from the implementation of PB; first, 
the accrual accounting reform has to be implemented.” 
When asked whether PB should be implemented, the senior civil servant within the MOF 
replied: 




“Yes, why not! As long as it is complemented with good policies! On its own, PB will 
improve the public finance situation slightly, but there won‟t be a revolutionary 
change or a radical transformation. In public finance, the real issues are not the lack 
of PB; the real issues are not weak structures here and there; the real issues are not 
accrual accounting; the real issues are not multi-year budgeting – in public finance 
the real issues are the structural problems we have in the different policy areas which 
need addressing in order to improve sustainability. Unless we do that, we are skirting 
the problem – we‟ve been doing it for quite a number of years and we‟re still at it.” 
According to the Minister for Education: 
“PB is important for the credibility of politics and public institutions. The people in 
public service (including the politicians) are using the taxpayers‟ money for their 
work; and the citizens make a lot of sacrifices to earn their wage, part of which is paid 
as taxes to government. Therefore, the government has the obligation to use the 
resources efficiently, to curb theft, corruption and bad leadership, such that the money 































7.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the main findings which were documented in the previous chapter.  
This chapter presents the discussion in eleven further sections. Section 7.2 analyses the 
pressures which support the implementation of performance budgeting (PB) in Malta.  Next, 
section 7.3 sets out a critical analysis of the current line-item budgeting system, while section 
7.4 delves into the inclusion of performance information (PI) in the budget for accountability 
and expenditure prioritisation purposes. This is followed by section 7.5 which discusses the 
pressures inhibiting the implementation of budgetary reform. Subsequently, section 7.6 
explores the type of organisational change expected in the Maltese scenario vis-à-vis 
budgetary reform, drawing upon Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model. Section 7.7 then 
discusses implementation strategies and surrounding issues. Section 7.8 integrates 
institutional theory, change theory and policy implementation theory, seeking to address gaps 
identified in the individual theoretical frameworks. Section 7.9 considers whether the accrual 
basis is a requisite for the operation of PB and explores other institutional reforms needed in 
the Maltese public sector. Section 7.10 then provides some further reflections on the 
education and health sectors, whilst section 7.11 explores whether the concept of small 
country size impacts the budgetary reform. Section 7.12 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Pressures for change in the budgetary framework   
7.2.1 Institutional pressures 
The current line-item budgeting system could be viewed as a set of „organisational rules and 
routines‟ which have become institutionalised (Burns and Scapens, 2000). The institutional 
thinking approach proposed by Douglas (1986) also suggests that the current system is an 




„institution‟. This budgeting system has served the country for years and has become deeply 
embedded in the country‟s processes. This thinking was confirmed by the Prime Minister, 
who voiced the concern of those people or groups who are frightened of changing a system 
which has worked for a number of years, notwithstanding its weaknesses
22
. Likewise, a 
Director within the Education Ministry mentioned how civil servants fear negative 
consequences where a practice which has been in place for several years, is changed.
23
 In line 
with Douglas‟ (1986) viewpoint, the existing system saves time in decision-making, 
particularly in circumstances where immediate action is needed to address unexpected events 
which crop up from time to time, as mentioned by the Prime Minister. However, the creativity 
in developing new ways/solutions to deal with arising matters may be limited by institutional 
thinking, such that important issues might be ignored and certain types of questions might not 
be asked (as found by the studies carried out by Young, 1996 and Potter, 2002). In this 
respect, the outputs and outcomes being delivered as a result of the budget allocations to the 
Maltese ministries and departments are neither being assessed nor questioned, as revealed by 
the interviews.  
For instance, a Permanent Secretary mentioned the large increase in government employment 
in 2014 and emphasised the need to look at the expected productivity of these employees 
rather than focusing on the inputs, as is being presently done.
24
 The Accountant General also 
expressed concern on the fact that value for money concepts are not being considered during 
the budgeting process because the budgeting is input-based and does not analyse the 
outcomes expected from the funds dedicated to activities/programmes. Similarly, a former 
Minister for Finance referred to the fact that the funding requested by line ministries is not 
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justified in terms of quantifiable outputs, an observation which was also confirmed by the 
Minister for Finance presently in office.
25
  
A very contentious issue which was mentioned by a number of interview participants and 
which demonstrates a situation where certain questions are not being asked as suggested by 
Young (1996) and Potter‟s (2002) analyses, relates to the concerns in the education sector, 
where the birth rate in Malta is decreasing and yet, the number of schools and teaching staff is 
on the increase. Having said this, institutional thinking explains only one aspect of this 
situation, because there are huge political considerations which are hindering government 
from taking corrective action in this respect, as shall be discussed later on in this chapter. 
Notwithstanding the deep embeddedness of the existing system, institutional pressures come 
into play (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) which drive and trigger change to the existing 
„routines and institutions‟ (Burns and Scapens, 2000). As discussed below, the three areas of 
institutional isomorphic pressures proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), namely 
coercive, mimetic and normative influences, manifest themselves in the proposed budgetary 





A key driver for the implementation of budgetary reform consists of coercive pressure being 
exerted upon Malta by the IMF. In this respect, an interviewee mentioned that an IMF 
delegation visited Malta during 2014, advising on how the budgetary process could be 
changed. As observed by the respondent, suggestions and recommendations coming from the 
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A further aspect of coercive influence for the introduction of budgetary reform stems from 
Malta‟s affiliation with the EU, in particular its Eurozone membership. Though the EU has 
not „forced‟ Malta to reform its budgetary framework, compliance with the Eurozone rules 
implies a need to introduce changes to the country‟s budgeting system, as explained below. 
Malta has to comply with the Maastricht criteria for qualification and participation in the 
Economic and Monetary Union, which stipulate a number of conditions that have to be met 
by member countries, including the requirement that government‟s fiscal deficit should not 
exceed 3% of the country‟s GDP and government debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Non-
compliance with these criteria leads to consequences and sanctions instituted by the EU 
against the country which is in breach of the stipulated conditions, in line with the regulative 
pillar proposed by Scott (2014). In this regard, Malta was placed under an EDP during the 
period from June 2013 to June 2015, in view of the fact that the deficit was above the 3% 
threshold. During this period, the public administration took a number of corrective actions in 
order to exit the EDP; however, some of the actions might have constituted quick-fix 
decisions which did not consider the medium and long-term implications. For example, the 
MOF‟s practice of carrying out expenditure cuts across the line ministries during the year, in 
order to reach the deficit target
28
, could be considered as a temporary solution which is 
leading to under-investment in certain areas (such as in aspects of infrastructure) and to 
interruption of certain programmes where allocated funds are subsequently reduced or 
withdrawn.  
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Notwithstanding the closure of the EDP in June 2015, Malta still has to exert tight control 
over government spending in order to ensure that the deficit remains under the 3% threshold. 
Prior to being placed under an EDP, Malta had received warnings from the European 
Commission to take measures to correct its deficit. In this respect, the EU had emphasised the 
need for ensuring sustainable public finances and for implementing corrective measures in the 
areas of healthcare, energy and pensions, amongst others. Government is still in the process of 
undertaking such reforms. 
The fiscal deficit issues recently faced by Malta and the demands imposed by the EU for 




This view was put forward by a Permanent Secretary and an academic and advisor to the 
MOF. The latter added that budgetary reform should emphasise performance, which assumes 
fundamental importance in circumstances of fiscal deficit issues. The interviewee explained 
that the compilation of PI by line ministries helps to identify ways of achieving better results 
with the funds available.  
The Accountant General also referred to the coercive influence for introducing budgetary 
reform: 
“The fact that the country is under an EDP
30
, the pressures being exerted by the 
European Commission for fiscal consolidation and the requirement to meet the 3% 
deficit target, are definitely triggers for reform.” 
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Eurozone membership, therefore, represents a strong form of coercive isomorphic pressure. In 
this respect, it is pertinent to note that prior to Malta‟s entry into the Eurozone, the deficit was 
considerably higher than 3% of GDP. It was just under 10% in 2003 and was brought down to 
3% at the end of 2007 to qualify for entry in the Eurozone on 1 January 2008
31
. 
It is to be noted that an EU Council Recommendation delivered to Cyprus following an 
examination of the country‟s 2012 national reform programme and stability programme 
advised Cyprus to take additional measures to achieve a durable correction of its excessive 
deficit. In this regard, one of the recommendations proposed was to “take measures to keep 
tight control over expenditure and implement programme and performance budgeting as soon 
as possible” (European Commission, 2012).  
Coercive pressure for the introduction of reforms also arises from the pressures applied by 
credit rating agencies, through the downgrades effected in Malta‟s sovereign rating
32
. Similar 
to the EU, these agencies highlighted the requirement for fiscal consolidation, referring to 
government‟s requirement to implement a reform programme in order to boost growth and at 
the same time avoid fiscal deficit slippages and avoid increasing further its debt burden. 
Mimetic isomorphism 
The introduction of budgetary reform is also driven by mimetic pressure placed upon the 
public administration to strive for the effectiveness levels reached by private organisations. 
PB, with its focus on performance measurement, seeks to enhance effectiveness and 
efficiency in the allocation of public funds by directing such allocation to programmes which 
are delivering the desired outputs and outcomes.  
                                                          
31
 Vide section 4.2 
32
 Vide section 4.3 




However, reaching the effectiveness levels achieved in the private sector could be problematic 
in the Maltese scenario for a number of reasons. A Permanent Secretary remarked that whilst 
the private sector can take drastic measures should profits decline, this might not be possible 
within government since other social and political factors come into play.
33
 Another issue 
mentioned by a few respondents is the fact that private organisations, unlike government, can 
recruit the best people to achieve the desired results, by offering remuneration packages 
commensurate with the employees‟ responsibilities.
34
 A Health Ministry representative 
mentioned that the decision-making process is slow within government, in comparison with 
the private sector
35
 – this might lead to complacency and failure to get things done on time in 
the public sector. Furthermore, according to an economist and academic, there is the 
perception, worldwide, that government borrows carelessly, unlike private organisations 
which are more diligent when it comes to gearing up their companies. This presumption is, in 
fact, supported by the Maastricht criteria, which, according to the interviewee, have been 
introduced to control governments‟ actions.  
Mimetic isomorphism is also manifested if the Maltese government is willing to follow „good 
international practice‟, modelling the new budgeting system on that adopted by other 
countries (Burns, 2000). Following best practice ensures that actions are justified in view of 
their perceived soundness, as suggested by the cultural-cognitive pillar (Scott, 2014). In this 
regard, the Minister for Finance has opined that the existing budgeting system is out-dated 
when compared to that adopted by other European countries, and it needs to be reformed 
(Malta Today, 2013c), implying that the willingness by the current public administration to 
implement budgetary reform, exists. 
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The introduction by the Maltese government of an appropriate and exemplary budget system 
which observes norms established by dominant countries supports the normative pillar put 
forward by Scott (2014).  
Referring to accounting and budgetary reforms in the UK, Ezzamel et al (2007) claimed that 
normative isomorphic change was weakened where politicians lacked accounting and finance 
experience. In this respect, the Prime Minister noted that the majority of Maltese politicians 
have no accounting or finance background and would never have been involved in 
management accounting systems and processes.
36
 This „profession deficiency‟ weakens 
change by decreasing normative pressures (Andrews, 2009) and might act as a stumbling 
block for the introduction of PB.  
Furthermore, a number of interviewees questioned the human resource capability within the 
public sector.
37
 It was mentioned that the finance function within some line ministries is 
weak, with the Director, Corporate Services (who is in charge of the accounting/budgeting of 
the ministry) not necessarily having an accounting qualification. This financial illiteracy could 
seriously weaken isomorphic change. A number of reasons have been cited by the 
respondents for this situation, including the shortage of accountants in Malta, the unattractive 
remuneration packages for accountants and top civil servants in government employment and 
the dismal career prospects in the public sector. „Profession proficiency‟ is important for 
promoting normative isomorphic change (Andrews, 2009) and thus to take forward the 
budgetary reform, the recruitment of experienced staff with an accounting/finance background 
in every ministry, assumes significant importance.  
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7.2.2 Macro-level factors 
The implementation of PB is also being driven by forces in the macro-level environment 
(Oliver, 1991 and Munir et al, 2011), as shown by the research findings.  
From an economic perspective, the budgetary reform seems to be critically required in the 
Maltese context
38
. In this respect, an economist and advisor to government commented that 
the budget process is not embracing efficiency measurement. An economist and academic 
voiced his concern that in the long term, Malta will be economically worse off compared to 
other countries, because of the country‟s ageing population and the fact that this problem has 
not been tackled. A former Prime Minister remarked that a radical change in the budgetary 
system is needed, since the current system is not good enough to act as a tool for decision 
makers to enable them to design the right economic and social policies. A representative from 
the EPD opined that the budgetary reform is necessary in view of Malta‟s requirement to 
target a balanced budget in structural terms. He added that:  
“When there are pressures to increase certain expenditures at the same rate as 
revenue, to increase other expenditure items (including salaries) by more than 
inflation and at the same time, reduce the deficit, it is very obvious that there is the 
need to move towards PB.” 
There are also strong political pressures for implementing the budgetary reform, as indicated 
by the commentary below. The findings reveal that the final decisions on the budget 
allocations are made by the MOF, possibly by civil servants, without consultation with the 
line ministries, notwithstanding the effort made by the latter to compile their business plans
39
. 
An economist and advisor to government remarked that: 
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“Given that the budget is such a serious matter, with huge political ramifications, the 
control of the final decisions should be in the hands of government who is ultimately 
responsible for the budget.”   
A former Prime Minister advised that when the final allocation decisions are determined by 
the MOF, there is the risk of failing to embrace a holistic view of the diverse sectors and to 
make sub-optimal decisions which do not properly address the needs of the country.   
Though the budget is subject to approval by Parliament, it appears that this is just a routine 
procedure, which is not functioning properly since the decisions being taken by the MOF with 
respect to budget allocations, are considered final
40
. According to Raudla (2012), Parliament‟s 
limited input for changing the budget is one of the reasons for the lack of use of PI. These 
findings imply that the MOF have greater influence than the OPM or the legislature in the 
determination of the budget allocations. 
It appears that one of the fundamental problems of the current budgetary system is that the 
line ministries focus on extorting the maximum amount of funds possible from the MOF 
during the budget process, without analysing carefully their actual funding needs
41
. This 
viewpoint was shared by a number of respondents who are or have, in the past, been part of 
the MOF. In this regard, there are pressures, from a socio-cultural perspective, to reform the 
current system, such that a culture of delivery and reaching performance targets is instilled in 
the civil service. A culture change is not an easy task, as mentioned by some interviewees, 
and it takes time and perseverance, together with championing from the top, possibly the 
OPM. 
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7.2.3 Were the recent reforms in the budgetary framework a result of 
isomorphic pressures? 
As detailed in the previous chapter
42
 and as summarised in Figure 25, the new government, 
which was elected to power in March 2013, introduced a number of changes to the budgetary 
framework. 
Figure 25: Recent reforms of the budgetary framework 
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Three months after the new public administration came into office (in June 2013), Malta was 
placed under an EDP by the EU, since the fiscal deficit was observed at 3.3% of GDP at the 
end of 2012 (MaltaToday, 2013a). This followed previous warnings by the EU for Malta to 
regularise its deficit position, as well as downgrades in the country‟s sovereign rating effected 
by a number of credit rating agencies
43
. As a result, the new public administration was 
„forced‟ to take corrective action, which included the introduction of reforms to the budgetary 
framework, as revealed during the interviews (summarised in Figure 25).  
An analysis of the recent reforms introduced (refer to Table 35 below) shows that isomorphic 
influences were manifested in the case of the launch of the Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR) exercise, the decision to start preparing Three-year Projections and the enactment of 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
With regard to the other reforms (Publication of „Implementation of the Budget‟ document, 
linking the Annual Budget to the Electoral Manifesto and carrying out Performance 
Appraisals for Permanent Secretaries), it could be argued that the newly elected government 
sought to communicate the message, both to the civil service and to the public in general, that 
transparency and delivery of promises made, are being prioritised by the new administration. 
Moreover, managerial, public and political accountability, as proposed by Sinclair (1995), are 
being emphasised in these three reform initiatives (discussed in Table 35). 
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The initiation of the CSR exercise (note a) was primarily a result of coercive
isomorphic pressure, since the main objective of this process was to decrease the
fiscal deficit and exit the EDP which the country was subject to, in order to comply
with the Eurozone‟s requirements. The CSR approach was also driven by mimetic
and normative forces, where the Maltese MOF is seeking to replicate a process
which had been successfully undertaken in the UK and which had led to a
significant reduction in the deficit.
The exercise embarked on by the Maltese MOF involved the review of expenditure
on selected budget line items included in the 2014 Financial Estimates, in order to
identify areas of expenditure which could be reduced or eliminated. 
It is unfortunate that with the exception of social security spending, the results of the 
CSR exercise “were not given enough consideration in the 2015 budgetary
allocation ”, as mentioned by a Permanent Secretary. There could be a number of
reasons for this, including the fact that the CSR exercise carried out in 2014 was the 
first trial which served as an opportunity for civil servants to familiarise themselves
with the process. Another reason could have been the limited time available from
the conclusion of the CSR exercise till the date established for finalising the annual
budget. The findings reveal that the CSR exercise was not taken as seriously by the
line ministries as it was hoped for, and thus, the MOF might have decided to
incorporate only limited aspects of the CSR process in the 2015 budget. In this
respect, an interviewee from the Education Ministry showed considerable
scepticism regarding the CSR, stating that the education civil servants were not, in
any way, convinced that there is scope for reducing spending on education. There
might also have been an issue of lack of capable human resources within the line
ministries for taking responsibility for the exercise – in effect, the lack of knowledge
within a number of line ministries was highlighted by a number of interview
respondents. The Prime Minister also confirmed that it may take some time to
incorporate the CSR process into the budgetary process, since this might require a
change in culture and in public officials‟ mind-set. The lack of accounting and
finance background of the majority of the Maltese politicians was also highlighted.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned obstacles, coercive pressures to implement
the CSR reform are very strong since government is obliged to meet the EU
requirements for fiscal deficit control, if it is to avoid sanctioning (Scott, 2014). In
fact, the findings revealed that the CSR process will be repeated and its scope will
be widened to cover other spending areas. Mimetic and normative isomorphic
influences might be weakened if the CSR exercise is not taken seriously and where
lack of knowledge, referred to as „profession deficiency‟ by Andrews (2009),
prevails.







As stated in the previous chapter, three-year revenue and expenditure projections
(note b), covering all ministries, were first presented in the 2014 Financial Estimates
(published in 2013). The preparation of three-year projections was subsequently
mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which came into force in 2014. It could
be argued that government took this initiative in 2013, in anticipation of the
obligations that were to be imposed by the new law a few months down the line.
Thus, this reform could have been driven by coercive influences arising from legally
enforced requirements.
The findings show that projections for the two years following the budget year, are
being prepared by the MOF, rather than by the respective line ministries. In this
respect, a public official from the Education Ministry stated that it is only possible to
plan ahead for one year because the education sector is very dynamic. This line of
thought could be the reason why the MOF had to shoulder responsibility for the
compilation of forward estimates. Unfortunately, this central involvement could
weaken the effectiveness of these forward estimates, since the line ministries do not 
feel ownership for such financial plans and thus, commitment to adhere to these
plans is weak. During an interview with the Minister for Finance, it was evident that
a feeling of frustration is felt where line ministries, which should be responsible for
their budget, exceed their budget allocations. The preparation of forward estimates
by the central agency augments this problem, since line ministries may not feel any
responsibility for sticking to financial plans which were not prepared by them.
Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (FRA)
The enactment of the FRA in August 2014 (note c) is clearly driven by coercive
isomorphic pressures, due to the fact that the law was passed to fulfil the EU
directive on budgetary frameworks. Mimetic and normative influences are also
manifested in this reform. As a result of mimetic forces, the law was largely
modelled on the Irish Act, according to a Director from the EPD, in view of the
similarities between Malta and Ireland. The setting up of institutions in Ireland,
following its economic and banking crisis, was influenced by dominant institutions,
including the IMF and Troika; furthermore, the Irish Act was accepted by the EU
Commission. The influence of these professional and dominant organisations
constitutes normative pressure for the implementation of this reform in Malta.
The EPD official has mentioned that “the reform has been carried out on paper
and in a strong way ”, in view of the law‟s onerous reporting requirements.
Similarly, a Central Bank representative mentioned the increased and in-depth
scrutiny required vis-a-vis the budget process, as a result of the Act. In contrast, a
few months after the enactment of the law, the senior civil servant within the MOF
maintained that he has not seen any tangible changes/improvements as regards
fiscal discipline and sticking to the budget allocations by the line ministries. This
leads one to ask whether this reform has been carried out 'on paper' only, for the
purpose of meeting the EU obligations, or whether the interviewee is being overly
pessimistic. Alternatively, it could be argued that it is still early days to assess the
impact of this reform.





Publication of the 
„Implementation 
of the Budget‟ 
document
The publication of the document which sets out the implementation status of the
previous year‟s budgetary measures (note d), seeks to ensure that each ministry is
being transparent and accountable to the public, vis-à-vis the allocation of public
funds for the various programmes and activities included in the previous year‟s
budget plans. This document serves to publicly recognise or criticise the ministries‟
performance. During the interview, the Prime Minister explained that the electoral
manifesto is being used as a benchmark for gauging government‟s performance – if
the electoral programme is being implemented, then government is considered to be
achieving the desired results. Though presently this document does not contain cost
information or performance measures, it could eventually pave the way for PB by
being adapted to incorporate a comparison between performance targets and actual
results.
Implementation 
of the Electoral 
Manifesto
The requirement to ensure that the yearly budget is reflecting the promises set out in 
the electoral manifesto (note e) is an attempt by government to deliver on the
promises made to the electorate prior to the general election – by placing the
responsibility for the implementation of the electoral manifesto directly under a
Minister, government is conveying a message to the public that it is taking promise
delivery seriously. As remarked by the Education Minister, the process of linking the 
annual budget to the electoral manifesto ensures that the funds requested by the line
ministries are directed towards government‟s priorities, rather than running the risk




The establishment of specific guidelines against which to appraise Permanent
Secretaries for the purpose of awarding performance bonuses (note f) appears to
show government‟s commitment to enhance political and managerial accountability
(Sinclair, 1995). At the same time, this initiative seeks to ensure that the top civil
servants responsible for the line ministries are working hard to achieve results and
to deliver the services expected by the citizens. This reform was referred to by the
Prime Minister as an attempt to “begin a new culture ” which encourages the
disclosure of information and “to have checks and balances in place ”. The
practice of carrying out these evaluations twice yearly is healthy, since the mid-year
assessment serves to check whether the targeted performance is expected to be
reached by end of year and to take corrective action where necessary – this gives
confidence and peace of mind to the appraisees, that the system is fair and just and
is aimed at motivating performance rather than at punishing non-achievement.
Note (a): Vide section 6.4.1
Note (b): Vide section 6.4.2
Note (c): Vide section 6.4.6
Note (d): Vide section 6.4.4
Note (e): Vide section 6.4.3
Note (f): Vide section 6.4.5




Did macro-economic forces play a role in the launch of the recent reforms? 
Some of the recent reforms discussed above have been driven by forces other than isomorphic 
pressures. The influence of factors in the macro-level environment (Oliver, 1991 and Munir et 
al, 2011) may have played a significant role in triggering a few of these reforms.  
The publication of the „Implementation of the Budget‟ document and the initiative of linking 
the annual budget to the electoral manifesto could have been driven by political factors. 
Government, following its election to power, wanted to prove its effectiveness and to 
demonstrate its enthusiasm and commitment to effect changes in public financial 
management, with the purpose of enhancing accountability, transparency and delivering on 
what was promised. As remarked by the Prime Minister, if it is shown that the previous year‟s 
budgetary measures were achieved, “government would be considered as performing”
44
. 
Having said that, this practice does not necessarily measure the correct implementation of 
government‟s objectives. By operationalising the strategies included in the electoral manifesto 
through the annual budget, government is attempting to „guarantee‟ delivery of its electoral 
plans. If the electoral promises are delivered within the current five-year legislature, this 
attainment would be a powerful political tool in government‟s hands which would probably 
be used as propaganda in the next general election‟s campaign. 
Socio-cultural influences can also be observed – the specification of guidelines for appraising 
the Permanent Secretaries‟ performance could be an attempt by the public administration to 
change the attitudes and behaviours of civil servants, in order to instil a culture of 
accountability. It is planned that this practice will be extended to other civil servants. The 
findings show that, presently, there is lack of accountability for the public funds allocated to 
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the government departments. It was stated by the Prime Minister that the existing system is 
ingrained in secrecy, and lacks checks and balances
45
. Moreover the Minister for Finance 
mentioned how line ministries approach the MOF for additional funds during the year, 
because the funds allocated through the budget would not have sufficed
46
 – this shows lack of 
cooperation by the line ministries especially in view of the country‟s fiscal deficit situation 
and government‟s attempt to bring down the deficit. 
As discussed above, institutional pressures were a key element in the launch of the CSR 
exercise. Economic and socio-cultural pressures are, however, also evident in the initiation of 
this process. From an economic perspective, the findings show that there are issues of 
wasteful spending in certain areas and at the same time, there is the problem of the country‟s 
fiscal sustainability. The „waste of public money‟ which is prevalent in the current system was 
referred to by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance, an academic and advisor to the 
MOF, and a former Minister for Finance. The need to tackle fiscal sustainability and reduce 
the deficit was mentioned by the majority of the interview respondents. Some of the 
interviewees expressed their concern over the lack of investment in certain areas, such as 
infrastructure, in order to make ends meet and to avoid increasing the deficit and the debt. The 
reduction of waste, which is one of the objectives of the CSR, is expected to help government 
to direct funds to its priorities, without augmenting the deficit issue or increasing taxes. The 
socio-cultural element is manifested, since the launch of the CSR is also aimed at starting a 
process of changing the public officials‟ mind-set, as expressed by the Prime Minister. It is 
hoped that civil servants would start thinking on the outputs/outcomes being delivered 
through public funds and would identify circumstances where spending patterns could be 
improved and waste controlled. 
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7.2.4 Legitimisation  
Institutional theory suggests that organisations respond to pressures from their environment 
by adopting procedures and systems which are considered as appropriate (Carpenter and 
Feroz, 2001), thus securing the organisations‟ long term survival and ultimately, achieving 
legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Brignall and Modell, 2000). Budget reforms are 
sometimes used to establish legitimacy (Van Reeth, 2002). Mimba et al‟s (2013) study 
indicated a symbolic rather than functional use of PI, in view of the focus placed on the 
format of performance reports rather than on their contents. 
Will a transition by the Maltese government to a performance based system be used as an 
attempt to attain legitimacy, rather than for bettering budgetary allocation decisions? The 
implementation of PB will potentially take a lot of time and resources, as remarked by a 
number of respondents. The risk that the PI gathered will not be used for planning and 
decision-making (Van Reeth, 2002) exists; however, if the right effort and resources 
(including training) are dedicated to the development of the system, the line ministries are 
involved in such development, the establishment of performance targets and their subsequent 
attainment is linked to rewards and sanctions and the reform is championed by the OPM, the 
civil service will get used to the system and will appreciate its benefits for enhancing 
allocative efficiency in public expenditure. Through the operation of a performance based 
system, line ministries can even increase their budget on certain programmes/activities if 
outputs and outcomes justify such expenditure.  
With respect to the introduction of some of the recent reforms in the budgetary framework, 
legitimacy purposes may have been taken into consideration. With reference to the enactment 
of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which was aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances and 




enhancing public accountability and transparency in government‟s financial dealings, the 
MOF senior civil servant claimed that this law has, so far, not led to any improvements in the 
budgetary framework. As regards the compilation of a three-year financial plan, the findings 
show that the projections for the two years following the budget year are being prepared by 
the MOF. The issue of lack of ownership of such figures by the line ministries is exacerbated 
by the attitude of civil servants who believe that projections beyond one year are unfeasible, 
as indicated during the interviews. The findings also show that the MOF was not totally 
satisfied with the results emanating from the CSR process, in view of the scepticism shown 
and the lack of in-depth analysis undertaken by some of the line ministries. Are these issues 
teething problems or have these reforms been carried out only on paper, in order to establish 
legitimacy through the introduction of acceptable work practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977)? 
It is difficult to answer this question at this stage; however, it could be argued that it will take 
some time before the civil service gets used to these practices, firstly, because things have 
been done differently for a considerable number of years and, secondly, because some of 
these reforms require a culture change. Nevertheless, as regards the CSR, the findings show 
that, though the results of the CSR exercise were not incorporated in the 2015 budget (with 
some exceptions), the line ministries made an effort to take into account what was learnt from 
the CSR process during the 2015 budget preparation. This implies that even though the first 
CSR undertaken might not have had a huge impact on the budgetary framework, it served as a 
catalyst for kicking off a change in the public officials‟ approach to the budget process.  
7.2.5 Summary 
As discussed above, the current line-item budgeting system is deeply embedded in 
government‟s existing practices and routines. There are, however, both institutional pressures 
and influences at macro-level, which might trigger a budgetary reform. This observation is 




further substantiated by the fact that a number of recent reforms have been launched to the 
budgetary framework as part of the overall fiscal discipline process being carried out by the 
public administration, in an attempt to control the deficit and bring down government‟s debt. 
The pressures for change in the budgeting system are summarised in Figure 26 (Source: 
Munir et al, 2011: 98) (Adapted)  
Figure 26: Pressures for change in the budgetary framework 
 
Coercive isomorphic pressures appear to be strong: the IMF‟s advice vis-à-vis the budgetary 
process, the influence of Malta‟s membership in the Eurozone as well as the country‟s regular 
monitoring by credit rating agencies are significant forces for change. Mimetic and normative 
pressures also drive the introduction of PB – replicating the effectiveness levels of private 
organisations by shifting the focus on performance and modelling the new budgeting system 


























weaken mimetic and normative pressures. These include social and political factors which 
assume significant importance in the public sector; the slowness of the pace of decision-
making in the civil service; the lack of accounting and finance background of a number of 
Maltese politicians; and the challenges encountered to recruit high-calibre people to work for 
the public sector which leads to financial illiteracy within government.  
There are also strong economic and political pressures and moderately strong socio-cultural 
influences for the implementation of PB. The fact that interviewees are claiming that the 
current budgetary system needs a radical change because it is not serving the purpose of 
effective economic decision-making is a very strong stimulus for change. In addition, political 
considerations are highly significant, since the current practice of having civil servants within 
the MOF finalising the budget allocations may be leading to sub-optimal results. 
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that the institutional pressures coupled with the macro-
level influences should lead to action by government for implementing budgetary reform, 
notwithstanding the stumbling blocks highlighted above. Nevertheless, the consideration as to 
whether these pressures will, in effect, trigger changes to the budgetary system has to be made 
in the light of an analysis of the opposing pressures which inhibit change (refer to section 
7.5).  
7.3 The current line-item budgeting system 
7.3.1 Are budget cuts being carried out across the board? 
The findings reveal that, in view of Malta‟s need to keep the fiscal deficit under tight control, 
it has become normal practice for the MOF to effect budgetary cuts during the year, in order 
to shift funds to expenditure items which were not planned for in the budget estimates 




approved before the commencement of the fiscal year
47
. In line with this, Murray and 
Efendioglu (2011) maintained that, in times of fiscal turbulence, budgetary cuts may be 
required in order to ensure fiscal consolidation.  
A representative from the Budget Office (who is usually involved in identifying the items 
which will be subject to an expenditure cut) acknowledged that this practice could disrupt the 
plans of a ministry/department, particularly where diligence and caution were applied towards 
the beginning of the year in order to save funds for a particular activity. The Budget Office 
official and the senior civil servant within the MOF stated that, for the purpose of budget cuts, 
the line items selected are believed to include an element of surplus allocated funds - this 
judgement is formed on the basis of close monitoring of the line ministries‟ spending patterns 
by the MOF. The latter interviewee strongly argued that the MOF does not make budget cuts 
across the board. 
The majority of the other interviewees disagreed with the statements made by these two 
respondents. In this respect, the majority claimed that when government effects expenditure 
cuts during the year, they are carried out across the board. The Prime Minister stated that 
reduction in expenditure during the year is carried out across the board. This seems to be 
inevitable in order to keep the deficit under control. A Permanent Secretary added that 
expenditure cuts are mainly carried out arbitrarily.  
According to Murray and Efendioglu (2011), the reduction of expenditure across the board, 
rather than decreasing resources for ineffective programmes, is, in reality, one of the 
limitations of a conventional line-item budgeting system. Van Reeth (2002) maintained that in 
traditional budgeting systems, budgetary cuts are made across the board in order to minimise 
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political conflict. However, as claimed by an interviewee, this „one-size-fits-all‟ solution 
might not be the most appropriate, since the impact on programme performance should be 
fully assessed prior to carrying out a budget cut. 
Though the two respondents from the MOF (mentioned above) are claiming that this 
assessment is being made, the findings indicate that it is not as effective as it should be, since 
a number of interviewees maintained that the budget cuts during the course of the year are 
upsetting the plans of the ministries/departments. Notwithstanding the MOF‟s efforts to target 
areas which are the least sensitive for expenditure reduction, in the absence of information on 
performance and information on whether the programmes are delivering the desired results, it 
is very difficult to take decisions which are not potentially harmful from an economic and 
social perspective.  
With a PB system which provides information on the outputs and outcomes expected from the 
budget allocations, the MOF would be in a better position to identify ineffective or lower 
priority programmes, such that the required budgetary cuts could be better targeted. The 
findings suggest that there is an element of waste in government spending; at the same time, 
expenditure in certain sectors such as health and infrastructure is tight. It can be argued that, 
firstly, expenditure cuts across the board are definitely inappropriate because they might be 
harming sensitive sectors which are already operating under tight funding conditions. 
Secondly, there appears to be scope for expenditure reduction in view of the wastage referred 
to by the respondents; however, such reduction has to be targeted at those 
programmes/activities which are ineffective. Allocative efficiency in public expenditure could 
be enhanced through the introduction of PB (Robinson and Brumby, 2005).  




7.3.2 Underspending the budget  
All the interview participants confirmed that where a department/ministry spends less than the 
amount allocated through the budget, the excess funds are returned to the MOF
48
. Ministries 
are currently not allowed to carry forward any unspent funds to the next fiscal year. 
Furthermore, the department‟s budget is usually reduced for the following year, in line with 
what was stated by Murray and Efendioglu (2011).  
As suggested by the findings, this practice is leading to „shopping sprees‟ by the line 
ministries towards the end of the year, such that any remaining funds would be fully utilised, 
in order not to „lose‟ unspent funds and not to have the following year‟s budget reduced. In 
this regard, there is the risk that this last-minute expenditure would not be applied to address 
government‟s priorities. A former Finance Minister maintained that excess funds are being 
spent carelessly and public money is being wasted. Representatives from the MOF counter 
argued that the budget allocation made to some departments is so tight that the funds are 
necessarily fully utilised. Nevertheless, the Budget Office official and the senior civil servant 
within the MOF claimed that, during the last few months of the year, the MOF monitors 
closely what is being spent by the ministries and on what, in order to try to identify any 
reckless spending. It was stated that where such issues are discovered, the MOF intervenes to 
claw back the funds. The issue, however, remains that where such situations are not identified 
in time by the MOF, there is the danger that public funds will not be applied to the country‟s 
most pressing needs. 
The findings also show that this practice is discouraging cost-savings (Kong, 2005) and it is 
demotivating ministries who seek to implement efficiency measures. Furthermore, a 
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Permanent Secretary and an advisor to the MOF mentioned that some departments, which 
have the potential for revenue generation, do not feel that it is worth the effort to do so since 
all the income generated will go to Finance. In summary, the majority of the interviewees feel 
that this practice is penalising those ministries/departments who have been effective (McNab 
and Melese, 2003).  
Some respondents who were or are involved in the MOF justified this system by stating that it 
is only logical that if a department/ministry needs less funds than what was allocated through 
the budget, such funds should be clawed back by Finance to be used elsewhere. Though this 
reasoning might seem „logical‟, it is certainly having undesirable consequences. For instance, 
ministries which have been diligent in their spending during the year „lose‟ unspent funds and 
receive a lower budget allocation during the next year, whilst ministries which spend more 
freely potentially receive a higher allocation in the following year because their budget did 
not suffice. As stated by the Prime Minister, the current practice is rewarding expenditure 
rather than savings.  
A way forward could be to consider allowing line ministries to carry forward a percentage of 
the unspent funds for use by the ministry. This has, in fact, happened in the past as mentioned 
by a former Prime Minister who had previously held the position of a Minister for Social 
Policy. After lengthy negotiations with the MOF, the then Minister for Social Policy managed 
to obtain half of the funds saved for use in the following year. However, this was a one-off 
occurrence and it was the result of informal budget negotiations, since there is no formal 
structure/policy for carrying forward unspent amounts. 
The possibility of carrying forward a portion of the saved funds would act as an incentive 
mechanism for motivating public officials to identify cost saving opportunities and to spend 




more wisely. If ministries carry forward a portion of the remaining funds (which has to be 
significant, say 40-60%), it would be a win-win situation for both the line ministries and the 
central agency, since the former will have funds at their disposal to be applied to the 
departments‟ activities, whilst government, as a whole, would also be benefitting from the 
savings made and could, as a result, undertake, new initiatives. It is important that the 
projects/programmes on which the funds carried forward are applied, would be approved by 
the MOF, in order to maintain control on public expenditure and ensure that value for money 
projects are being embarked on. This incentive mechanism will not, however, get rid of the 
budget game (where line ministries request excess funds from the MOF). This risk is 
mitigated if PI is available to support government‟s decision making, as advised by Joyce 
(2011) and Hammerschmid et al (2013). 
7.3.3 Closing remark 
Whilst the current line-item budgeting system has a number of strengths, including its relative 
simplicity and the potential control on public spending through the thorough specification of 
inputs (Shah and Shen, 2007), the findings show that there are a number of issues with this 
system, which need to be addressed. 
Firstly, though it is understandable that government may need to effect expenditure cuts 
during the year in order to shift funds to unexpected expenditure which was not planned for in 
the financial estimates, such expenditure cuts should be carefully targeted towards allocations 
which contain an element of waste or towards ineffective programmes. However, in order to 
be able to identify wastage and/or ineffectiveness, a budgeting system incorporating 
performance measurement has to be in operation.  




Secondly, it is very important to encourage cost saving and revenue generating initiatives by 
ministries/departments, especially in Malta‟s context, where tight control on the deficit is a 
top government priority. It follows, therefore, that practices which discourage such initiatives 
should be avoided. The findings show that where ministries underspend their budget, the 
excess funds are returned to the central agency and the following year‟s budget for the said 
ministry is reduced accordingly. It has been revealed that this practice is considered as unfair. 
Thus, it is suggested that a significant percentage of the unspent funds would be available to 
the ministry in question during the following year, to be used on projects which are approved 
by the MOF. This encourages cost savings and revenue generation by the ministries, it 
benefits the whole of government through the availability of additional funds and it 
potentially leads to fiscal deficit reduction. 
The findings also show that the current budgeting system adopts a short-term perspective, 
focusing on year-to-year changes in expense categories (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). It 
was stated by a Permanent Secretary that where a ministry requests the same level of funds of 
the previous year for an expenditure item, such funds are granted with no questions asked. It 
was confirmed by a number of respondents within the MOF, including the Minister for 
Finance, that the current budgeting system adopts an incremental approach, such that line 
ministries expect the same budget allocation of the previous year plus something extra to 
cover for inflation. The senior civil servant within the MOF also confirmed that a number of 
budget line items have been kept constant for a number of years. A Health Ministry official 
referred to the fact that whilst new programmes are introduced under „programmes and 
initiatives‟, there is no discipline to terminate old programmes. The reason for this is political, 
since it was found that politicians do not accept that a line item is removed. As stated by an 
academic and advisor to the MOF, the incremental basis does not allow for a review of 




performance, because it assumes that everything is perfect. In view of the lack of performance 
measurement, the funding of existing programmes is renewed in each budget without 
analysing the success of such programmes. As a result, elements of waste are neither 
identified nor eliminated, because they are inbuilt into the system. In addition, potentially 
ineffective programmes continue to be funded year after year, because there is no public 
accountability for the results attained. By shifting the focus from inputs to outcomes and 
results, PB will potentially address this situation, directing any elements of waste to more 
pressing needs.  
7.4 Performance information in budget documents  
7.4.1 Will the inclusion of PI in budgets enhance accountability? 
King (1995) maintains that continued efforts for the implementation of PB stem from the need 
for public accountability. In line with this, the majority of the interviewees agree that the 
inclusion of PI in budget documents would enhance accountability and transparency
49
. The 
compilation of PI would be useful for measuring the outputs/outcomes expected to be 
delivered with the budgeted expenditure. According to a former Minister for Finance:  
“The approach to the budget preparation is wrong because the budget is not being 
compiled on the basis of what a ministry/department could deliver in terms of outputs, 
but on what that ministry/department is going to spend, irrespective of 
outputs/outcomes.” 
It was stated that performance measurement is fundamentally important in view of the fact 
that public officials are dealing with public funds and thus, they are accountable for the results 
obtained, to the citizens. In this regard, a performance budget facilitates the citizens‟ 
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understanding of government‟s achievement vis-a-vis the programmes being undertaken 
(Shah and Shen, 2007 and McGeough, 2014). The respondents highlighted the constant 
pressure being exerted upon government to deliver more services with less funding, especially 
in the current fiscal and economic environment – this emphasises the indivisibility of policy 
results, budgeting and performance, as suggested by Lu et al (2015). Furthermore, the 
availability of PI enhances allocative efficiency in public spending (Robinson and Brumby, 
2005 and Shah and Shen, 2007). Though research has shown that PB plays a limited role in 
determining final budget allocations, it still adds value to discussions and negotiations during 
the budgetary process (Ho, 2011). 
There was also general agreement that PI should be used to hold public officials responsible 
for the actual performance of their department/programmes
50
. According to Young (2003), the 
inclusion of PI in budgets serves to hold public officials accountable for service quality, cost-
efficiency, and programme effectiveness. Demaj and Summermatter (2012) maintain that PI 
provides the basis for performance appraisals by politicians. 
Though public officials should be held accountable for the public money being spent, a few 
respondents maintained that where a target is not reached, emphasis should be placed on 
analysing the reasons for the underperformance in order to derive corrective action. Thus, the 
appropriate way to use PI would be to allow for better future performance, rather than to 
punish public officials for past underperformance. It was explained that it could be 
problematic to hold public officials responsible on the basis of PI, since there may be factors 
which affect the achievement of performance targets that are beyond the civil servants‟ 
control. In this respect, the Accountant General mentioned the unexpected expenditures which 
arise during the year, and which have to be provided for by reducing the allocated funds on 
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other programmes. This, in turn, results in under achievement of the originally established 
targets for the programmes which suffer a budget cut. A public official from the Education 
Ministry referred to the measurement of the number of „early school leavers‟, which is an 
important KPI in the education sector. It was explained that though considerable effort is 
made to reduce this figure, there are factors which affect this indicator that are outside the 
control of the classroom teacher or the school administration, including the child‟s home 
environment. Another problem mentioned by a Permanent Secretary is political interference 
in the work of the civil service, which might result in a programme/activity going off track 
vis-à-vis the expected deliverables. 
Nevertheless, unless public officials are made accountable for their performance, it would be 
difficult to obtain their commitment for reaching the stipulated targets. Having said that, 
where the outputs and outcomes are not reached, an analysis of the reasons and justifications 
for such underperformance has to be carried out for the sake of fairness, before holding any 
persons accountable for the under achievement. Furthermore, if the target is not attained, a 
key question that should be asked is whether the target was achievable and realistic in the first 
place. Therefore, any decision to increase or decrease the budget for a programme/activity and 
to hold a public official accountable for his/her performance has to be taken after careful 
analysis of all the factors which might have influenced the achievement of the pre-established 
target. 
7.4.2 Should rewards and sanctions be established?  
If PB is used to hold public officials accountable for their actual performance, a system of 
rewards and sanctions has to be established in order to reward civil servants who deliver the 
targeted results and to penalise public officials who perform poorly, as suggested by Hou et al 




(2011). The table below summarises the suggestions made by the interview respondents vis-à-
vis the reward and sanction mechanisms that could be applied
51
: 
Table 36: Rewards and sanctions 
 
With respect to the award of performance bonuses, there is already such a system in place in 
the public service‟s management structure; however, it was claimed by a number of 
respondents that the bonus is presently being considered as an extension of the basic salary 
and not as a reward for performance. If the performance bonus is to be used as a means for 
motivating performance, it is important that the bonus amount would be based on the 
measurement of the actual results attained by the civil servants, vis-à-vis the pre-established 
targets. This would only be possible if PI is compiled. Furthermore, an assessment of 
performance by the direct superior of the public official being appraised may pose a 
familiarity threat, because of the direct and close working relationship between the appraiser 
and appraisee. The appraiser may be too sympathetic to the appraisee‟s interests; he/she may 
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Reward and sanction mechanisms suggested by interviewees
The award of performance bonuses to civil servants at the end of the year could be linked to the
achievement of stated objectives.
Where the targets are reached, a department/ministry could be allowed to carry forward any savings
made during a particular year to the following year, for use on a specific project.
Where a ministry/department achieves its targets, it would be allocated a higher budget in the
subsequent year.
Given that government employees in managerial positions are subject to contracts that are renewable
every three years, consideration for renewing or terminating a manager‟s contract could be based on
his/her performance.
The achievement of performance targets could be one of the factors affecting a person‟s career
development opportunities.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015




wish to avoid any friction with his/her subordinate in order to preserve the relationship; or the 
evaluator may be too accepting of the appraisee‟s work. This would lead to the award of a 
higher bonus than that which the appraisee actually deserves. Thus, if performance bonuses 
are used as a means for rewarding achievement of targets, it is suggested that an independent 
body would be responsible for carrying out these appraisals, in order to ensure objectivity, 
accountability and transparency. 
A few respondents expressed concern regarding the establishment of mechanisms to reward 
or sanction public officials for the achievement and non-achievement of performance targets 
respectively, in view of the risk of data manipulation by civil servants in order to show a 
positive picture of the results attained. Although this risk exists, the lack of a reward/sanction 
mechanism would not motivate public officials to strive to achieve the stated objectives. In 
order to mitigate this risk, it may be advisable to set rewards/sanctions at an entity level, 
rather than at a personal level, as suggested by a Health Ministry representative and in line 
with what was proposed by Burgess and Ratto (2003). Thus, it is suggested that adjusting a 
ministry/department‟s budget upwards in the following year or allowing such 
ministry/department to carry forward a portion of its savings to the next year, would be 
preferable than awarding performance bonuses or linking the achievement of targets to one‟s 
career development or employment contract. 
7.4.3 Way forward 
In summary, the findings reveal that it is believed that the inclusion of PI in budget 
documents would enhance managerial and public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) and 
transparency and would enrich the decision-making process covering the allocation of 
resources (Shah and Shen, 2007). Furthermore, the data gathered shows that such PI should 




be used to hold public officials responsible for the actual performance of their department. 
Where the actual performance is short of the pre-established targets, justification should be 
sought for such underperformance, in order to determine whether there were any factors 
impinging on performance that were beyond the control of public officials, and also, to 
implement corrective action. Additionally, it was determined that reward/sanction 
mechanisms have to be established, in order to be able to hold public officials accountable for 
their performance. It is suggested that such mechanisms would be set at an entity level, rather 
than at a personal level, in order to avoid data manipulation, lack of social responsibility, 
greedy behaviour and possibly focusing on short term results at the expense of longer term 
gains. 
7.5 Influences prohibiting the implementation of performance budgeting 
and potential mitigating factors 
The assessment set out in section 7.2 above concludes that the institutional and macro-level 
pressures, which manifest themselves in the Maltese context, should potentially trigger the 
implementation of budgetary reform. Subsequently, section 7.3 discusses a number of 
shortcomings of the current line-item budgeting system, reinforcing the need for reform. 
Section 7.4 then establishes that it is desirable to start including PI in budget documents both 
for accountability and transparency purposes, as well as to enhance allocative decision-
making in public expenditure. This analysis suggests that there are a number of factors which 
are pointing towards the need for the Maltese government to introduce a performance-based 
budgeting system.   




Nevertheless, the findings also reveal that there are opposing forces which might inhibit the 
implementation of PB, as discussed hereunder. 
7.5.1 Resistance to change 
As discussed earlier, the current line-item budgeting system is deeply embedded in the 
Maltese government‟s existing practices and routines. Jepperson (1991) and Burns and 
Scapens (2000) suggest that changes to an embedded system or to existing „routines and 
institutions‟ might come up against resistance from the parties who will be affected by the 
changes. Similarly, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) maintain that resistance to change could 
be a result of an organisation‟s embeddedness in its institutional context. In line with these 
observations, all the interview participants claimed that should government decide to 
introduce a PB system, there would certainly be resistance to change from public officials
52
. 
A number of respondents attributed this resistance to the fact that a PB system would tighten 
the control on government spending and clearly, “nobody likes to be controlled”.  
Though the empirical data is suggesting that stricter control might be undesired, there might 
be some line ministries that are delivering results, who would welcome these additional 
controls. In this regard, the establishment of reward mechanisms for motivating those public 
officials who are achieving the desired results
53
, assumes significant importance. If, as a result 
of the budgetary reform, civil servants who achieve the performance targets get rewarded, 
they would perceive the new system as being in their interest and would willingly collaborate 
in its implementation.  
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A former Prime Minister summed up the views of a number of interviewees in the following 
statement:  
“Resistance would be unavoidable, because a performance based budgeting system 
will shed light on the performance of public officials, inevitably highlighting 
weaknesses. Though the positive performance would be disclosed together with the 
negative performance, it is the negative performance which would be given the most 
prominence. Thus, if only one out of ten items shows negative performance, it is that 
item which will feature in the front page of a newspaper, with nobody mentioning the 
remaining nine positive achievements. Both the civil servants and the responsible 
minister would not be too happy to be in the limelight for negative performance 
issues.” 
The implication of this statement is that the budgetary reform is expected to come up against 
resistance from both the civil service and the politicians, who would then have to justify their 
department‟s or ministry‟s spending in terms of outputs and outcomes.  
The findings imply that the reform would be going against a deeply established culture, where 
the civil servants and the politicians are not used to performance measurement. In this regard, 
Burns and Scapens (2000) have referred to „mental allegiance‟ to established ways of thinking 
and doing, which is an element that gives rise to resistance to change. Both the civil service 
and politicians might, in fact, perceive the practice of performance measurement as 
threatening their positions because weaknesses would be highlighted and responsibility would 
have to be assumed for such weaknesses. These concerns might stem from an unwillingness 
of public officials to be fully committed to delivering results; however, they might also arise 
from a genuine fear that the pre-established targets might not be reached due to political 
interference or economic factors, which are beyond the civil servant‟s control. In the former 
case, in order to mitigate the resistance of going against a culture of inertia, the reform has to 
be championed by a person/s who is/are in a high position of power, presumably the Prime 




Minister, the Minister for Finance and/or the Permanent Secretary within the MOF
54
. Kasek 
and Webber (2009), Ho (2011) and Willoughby (2011) mention that strong leadership and 
championing by key people are fundamental elements for successful budgetary reform. 
According to Shields and Young (1989), a champion is a manager who comes from the higher 
level of the hierarchy within the organisation, guides the implementation team and raises 
resources for the implementation of the system. The existence of a powerful champion is also 
critical for ensuring the cooperation of the line ministers in the implementation of the reform. 
The most effective champion would be the Prime Minister, who has the power to appoint or 
remove from office, the ministers. In order to address the genuine fear of not reaching targets 
which are uncontrollable by the public officials, the budgeting process should include a 
procedure (such as the compilation of a report) which carries out a variance analysis with 
justifications, in situations where the actual performance falls short of the stipulated targets. 
Resistance to change is also shown where the parties affected by the change are uncertain as 
to what the reform involves and whether it will impact their work load, financial situation 
and/or career opportunities. This issue could be addressed through the communication of 
adequate information to the parties that will impacted by the change. Furthermore, the 
importance of the provision of training to public officials, both at development stage and on 
an on-going basis, cannot be underestimated.  
In addition to the mitigating factors discussed above, some other suggestions put forward by 
the interviewees are summarised in the following table: 
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Table 37: Factors mitigating resistance 
 
In summary, the findings show that should government decide to implement PB, resistance 
will be high and it will be encountered from all parties involved, possibly including the line 
ministers. The overarching reason for this is that the reform will have to bring about a change 
in culture and in people‟s mind-set. As discussed above, there are a number of steps that could 
be taken to mitigate the resistance to change. Nevertheless, the fundamental element for 
overcoming the resistance and making the change happen is to have strong political 
commitment from the top, that is, the reform has to be championed by a powerful person/s at 
the top. 
Factors identified by interviewees for mitigating resistance to change
External consultants, with adequate experience in the implementation of PB systems in other
countries, should be brought in to assist in the reform process.
The PB system should be designed in such a way that underperformance is highlighted earlier on in
the year, in order to allow for corrective action. Where circumstances change during the year, such
as reducing the budget for a ministry/department, there should be the possibility of revising the
performance targets.
Civil servants should be consulted and involved during the system development stage. In this respect,
a communication and training strategy should be in place.
The necessary resources should be dedicated for the implementation of the budgetary reform. This
includes recruiting people with the required expertise in the ministries.
It has to be ensured that the established performance targets are realistic and that the system for
measuring public officials‟ performance is fair.
Obtaining the support of the general public for the implementation of PB would certainly facilitate the
reform process, since the citizens are naturally in favour of enhanced accountability and
transparency. This could be achieved through feeding the local media with information on the
objectives of the budgetary reform.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015




7.5.2 Personnel issues 
The findings reveal that there is lack of adequately qualified public officials in government 
employment, which might act as a stumbling block for the implementation of PB
55
. Burns and 
Scapens (2000) claim that this factor could constitute an element of resistance to change. 
This situation is a result of a number of factors, as explained hereunder:  
 The person holding the position of an „accountant‟ in the ministries, referred to as the 
„Director, Corporate Services‟, is not required to have an accounting qualification. Such 
position could be held by a civil servant of any background, who would have moved up 
the civil service ranks. It was stated by the senior civil servant within the MOF that the 
finance function within the ministries, which is overseen by the Director, Corporate 
Services, is presently not very strong. One of the reasons for this could be that the person 
heading this function does not have the appropriate competences. In addition, a number of 
ministries do not employ an accountant, as observed by the Accountant General. As 
mentioned by an academic and advisor to the MOF, the weak finance function within the 
ministries is resulting in the line ministries placing heavy reliance on the MOF, for 
budgeting and other financially related matters. Unless the required human resource 
complement is recruited, this reliance on the central agency would be augmented with the 
implementation of PB, in view of the requirement to quantify performance measures and 
in view of the increased reporting obligations.  
 
 It is very difficult for government to compete with the private sector for the employment 
of accountants, in view of the significantly higher remuneration packages paid by private 
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employers. It is also difficult to change this situation, because if government increases 
substantially the salaries of a certain category of its employees, such that a significant 
disparity would be created between civil servants‟ salaries, unions would put pressure 
upon government to increase salaries across all the civil service, which would lead to 
higher government spending on salaries, resulting in a higher deficit.  
 
 Low salaries are also an issue in the case of Maltese top civil servants, who are paid a 
considerably lower salary, compared to remuneration packages awarded to people in 
similar ranks within the Maltese private sector and compared to salaries paid to top civil 
servants in some other countries. This constrains the recruitment of high-calibre people for 
top positions with government.  
 
 In order to achieve a high executive position in the civil service, a person has to be 
considerably older than for similar positions in the private sector, according to a former 
Prime Minister. 
 
 There is lack of interest and motivation on the part of certain civil servants to learn, thus 
hindering staff development – a couple of respondents mentioned how difficult they find 
it to persuade people under their responsibility to attend courses. This finding ties in with 
what was discussed above regarding the need to go against a culture of inertia, in order to 
make the reform happen
56
. 
Some of the above issues were highlighted by a Budget Office official, who observed that:  
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“Finding the right people to champion PB in the line ministries could be quite 
challenging. This is due to the existing limited human resources in the public sector; 
the employee turnover within the ministries/departments; and the fact that people, in 
particular, accountants, prefer the private sector for employment, both because of 
more attractive remuneration packages and also because of the perception that jobs in 
the private sector are more prestigious. There is the need to increase the staff 
complement and upgrade existing skills to have more accounting competences, in the 
ministries and departments, including within the Budget Office.” 
Overcoming the above obstacles is undoubtedly challenging; however, there are a few steps 
that could be taken to counterbalance these issues.  
It is clear that the finance function within the line ministries lacks the appropriate human 
resources which are required to embark upon a budgetary reform. Therefore, if the reform is 
to happen, the finance function within the line ministries has to be strengthened, through the 
employment of suitably qualified staff. An increase in professional staff complement seems 
also to be required within some departments, including the Budget Office. Admittedly, as 
revealed by the findings, there are a number of challenges to recruit accountants and other 
professionals to work for the public sector; however, such challenges might potentially be 
overcome if government is truly committed to implement PB. As mentioned by a former 
Minister for Finance, government had, in the past, been successful in recruiting people with 
the appropriate IT expertise, when a decision was taken to modernise the IT system. In the 
same way, it could dedicate the necessary effort to employ people with the right competences, 
in order to enhance the ministries‟ finance function and possibly to lead the reform 
implementation process. It was also explained by a Permanent Secretary how the Health 
Ministry has managed to recruit a network of financial controllers by finding creative ways of 
offering a more generous package than that paid to accountants employed directly by 
government, whilst at the same time avoiding the distortion of government salaries. 




As regards the lack of motivation shown by public officials to enhance their knowledge base 
through their participation in training courses, it is suggested that a minimum number of hours 
of training (say, 20 to 30 hours per annum) would be made mandatory for civil servants in 
certain grades, especially for those who hold managerial posts. This could also link to 
continuing professional education requirements of some professional bodies. In addition, the 
public administration organises and holds a number of courses, free of charge for employees, 
which are targeted at filling knowledge gaps within government departments. The fulfilment 
of the minimum mandatory training requirement by public officials could be linked to the 
award of their performance bonus and also to their career progression prospects. 
As a recap, the findings indicate that the lack of suitably qualified personnel within the 
ministries and departments might prohibit the implementation of PB. As discussed above, 
there are possible solutions to these concerns, some of which have been successfully applied 
by the public administration in the past. Thus, personnel issues are being considered as having 
a medium influence on the prohibition of budgetary reform. 
7.5.3 Political factors  
The findings demonstrate that the political dimension is a very important consideration in the 
local context, which could seriously constrain the implementation of PB
57
. In this respect, a 
number of politically-related issues have been identified during the empirical data gathering 
process, as outlined in the table below. 
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Table 38: Political issues 
 
a) There could be an issue with holding public officials accountable for the actual performance of their
division, in view of political interference. A Permanent Secretary claimed that public officers are not free to 
shift people around, even if they believe that such transfer could lead to better results.
b) The financial plans compiled by a line ministry are sometimes superseded by a political decision. This was
explained in detail by a public official from the Education Ministry, who stated that during the course of the
year, certain political decisions are taken which increase the ministry‟s spending and which, thus, send the
ministry off track vis-à-vis the financial estimates that would have been prepared as part of the annual
budget process.
c) It appears that government has no leeway, whatsoever, when it comes to reducing the staff complement of
the public sector, in view of a heavily unionised environment. If a PB system is implemented, the
ministries/departments would have to specify the human resources necessarily required for the
programmes they plan to undertake, in order to link inputs to deliverables. It would be a problem to justify
the salaries of those staff who are not contributing towards the outputs/outcomes of projects and activities;
at the same time, government has its hands tied when it comes to making its employees redundant.
d) Government is also reluctant to decrease its staff complement, in view of the political damage that would
be caused. In Malta, this has, in fact, never happened. Thus, certain practices, which are inefficient and
which are absorbing a significant amount of public funds on a yearly basis, remain. For instance, as was
mentioned by a number of respondents and as was determined by the National Audit Office (2015), there
are a number of government schools with very small class sizes. Such schools are incurring an amount of
fixed costs per annum, including teachers‟ and administrative staff salaries, maintenance costs and
administrative expenses, amongst others. This practice and the exorbitant costs being incurred questions the 
need for a primary school in every locality in Malta, considering that the country is so small and commuting
from one locality to another takes just a few minutes. However, government seems to be dragging its feet
in taking action, because of potential political consequences. Another example of inefficiency identified
during the interviews was the salaries paid to watchmen in schools which run into millions of Euros per
annum – it would be much more cost effective to install CCTV cameras in schools than to pay these
annual salaries. Again, reluctance to take action stems from the fear of political damage. Should
government decide to take action in respect of the above-mentioned situations, teachers, administrative
staff and watchmen, to name just a few categories, would have to be laid off, which will not happen in
Malta. Alternatively, they have to be shifted to other jobs, increasing the salary cost of other government
departments.
e) There is the political risk that government‟s effectiveness would be questioned should the actual
performance fall short of the pre-established targets. Furthermore, PI which is below the expected targets
could be used by the Opposition party to criticise government and hence gain political advantage.
According to a former Prime Minister, though PB is undoubtedly the best budgeting system from a
technical perspective, unless the potential negative political fall-out is addressed, the reform will not go
through from a political perspective.
f) In circumstances where the set performance targets are not attained, there is the risk of data manipulation
by civil servants in the performance reports that set out the actual results vis-à-vis the targets. To
overcome this challenge, a culture and mentality change is needed, if PB is to be effective, according to a
former Prime Minister.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015
Political issues that might hinder PB implementation, as identified by interviewees




The above summary shows that issues are still very much politicised in Malta, despite the 
significant political and economic progress that the country has made. Could these political 
influences be mitigated? 
With respect to the potential reduction in government‟s staff complement (discussed under 
points (c) and (d) above), this is very unlikely to be put into practice in Malta, in view of the 
strongly unionised environment and the political damage that would be caused to the party in 
government, as explained above. Having said that, employee reduction in the public sector 
could be carried out through natural attrition, by not replacing civil servants who leave 
employment, retire or die. It is appreciated that it will take time for the public sector to shed 
the excess personnel in government employment. In addition, government might need to fill 
certain posts which require specific skills and experience by recruiting employees externally; 
and it might not be able to transfer its excess employees to such posts. Where staff mobility 
across government is appropriate for removing excess staff from certain jobs and filling other 
posts, this practice should be put into operation. 
There is certainly an element of political sensitivity, should actual PI be published, as 
mentioned under point (e) above. Nevertheless, the present government is committed to 
enhance accountability and transparency in its financial dealings, as revealed by the findings. 
Furthermore, as part of the budgetary reform, a performance report would be prepared after 
year end, comparing the performance targets with the actual results. If the reason for under 
performance in certain programmes is justified in view of unexpected circumstances or 
constraints which cropped up during the year, then the public would still appreciate 
government‟s efforts to deliver results. This view is also shared by the Prime Minister who 
stated that:  




“The publication of PI which highlights what has been successfully achieved and what 
needs improvement, would gain the public‟s appreciation. The purpose of the 
publication of information has to be to encourage public officials, rather than to 
demotivate people who are delivering.” 
There is the risk that other more important/urgent issues will take precedence over budgetary 
reform implementation. For instance, will the Maltese government lose interest in PB if 
affected by issues such as mass immigration? This risk can be mitigated if the reform is 
pushed forward by a person/s at the top. 
In summary, the findings show that the implementation of PB could be hindered by the high 
political influences discussed above, coupled with the limited mitigating factors that could be 
applied. 
7.5.4 Summary 
The elements constituting resistance to change as outlined by Burns and Scapens (2000), 
namely resistance due to competing interests, resistance due to lack of knowledge and 
experience and resistance due to a „mental allegiance‟ to established ways of thinking, are all 
substantiated by the interview findings. In addition, the data demonstrates that resistance is 
also envisaged in view of the fact that PB is believed to tighten the control on spending by 
public officials and to highlight weaknesses in performance; thus, it may be perceived as 
threatening the positions of civil servants and of politicians. Resistance might also stem from 
a genuine uncertainty as to what the reform will consist of and how it will impact the work of 
the public officials involved in the budgetary process. 
The political aspect is a very significant influence in the Maltese scenario. The reason for this 
could be that in Malta, there are two main political parties, and the party that wins the general 
election usually surpasses the other party by a small margin, typically by a few thousand 




votes. As a result, the political impact of decisions is weighed very carefully before any action 
is taken by government, in view of the fact that a politically unpopular decision could tilt the 
balance in favour of the opposing party.  
The discussion set out in this section necessitates an update to Figure 26
58
, which had 
incorporated the pressures supporting change in the budgetary framework. The revised figure, 
set out below, now takes into consideration the pressures prohibiting the implementation of 
PB.  
Figure 27: Pressures supporting and inhibiting change in the budgetary framework 
 
The analysis shows that there are medium to high pressures supporting a budgetary reform 
and opposing medium to high influences against change. The successful implementation of 
PB depends on whether the pressures inhibiting change can be effectively mitigated. The 
discussion has outlined a number of steps that could be taken in this respect. The most 
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important element for successfully reforming the budgetary system is strong political support 
from a powerful person/s at the top, who has/have the power to overcome the obstacles 
hindering change. 
7.6 Type of organisational change expected 
The discussion so far has established that there are both institutional and macro-level 
pressures that support change in the Maltese budgetary framework. In addition, the current 
line-item budgeting system exhibits a number of weaknesses which further emphasise the 
need for change. Furthermore, the incorporation of PI in budget documents is considered as a 
desirable practice for enhancing accountability and transparency and bettering budget 
allocation decisions. In contrast, the analysis has shown that there are influences which might 
prohibit the implementation of PB and which, therefore, need to be controlled, in order for the 
reform to go through. 
In light of this, this section seeks to determine the type of change expected in the local 
context, if any, using as a basis for analysis the Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model
59
. This 
model has been used by Argento and van Helden (2009) for explaining reform processes. The 
internal dynamics of an organisation, namely, stakeholders‟ dissatisfaction, value 
commitments, power dependencies and capacity for action, determine whether it undergoes 
radical change as against convergent change
60
 (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). According to 
the authors, radical change could be problematic where a practice/system is deeply embedded 
in its institutional context, as is the case with the existing Maltese line-item budgeting system. 
The response of the Maltese public administration to the institutional pressures for change 
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 Radical organisational change involves the transformation of the organisation, whilst convergent change refers 
to the fine tuning of the existing orientation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 




will be analysed through an examination of the internal dynamics surrounding the budgetary 
framework. The endogenous or internal dynamics of the model have been classified by 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) as precipitating dynamics (stakeholders‟ dissatisfaction and 
value commitments) and enabling dynamics (power dependencies and capacity for action). 
7.6.1 Diverging levels of stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with the current system 
The interview data shows that there are, mainly, two groups of stakeholders which can be 
distinguished with respect to their diverging level of dissatisfaction with the existing 
budgeting system.  
The first group, which consists of the majority of the research participants, believe that the 
existing budgetary system needs to undergo a total reform.  
It was claimed by an economist and advisor to government that the existing line-item, 
expenditure based budget, is out-dated. Furthermore, a few respondents stated that budget 
allocation decisions are largely in the hands of civil servants within the MOF. The line 
ministers, who would have been involved in discussions with the MOF vis-à-vis their 
business plans and corresponding request for funds, would be informed on the actual amount 
of funds voted to their ministries a few days before the budget is laid before Parliament for 
approval. This was also confirmed by a representative from the MOF who added that 
allocations to the respective line ministries (which are usually lower than the funds originally 
requested) are not done in the line ministers‟ presence, in order to avoid disagreements 
between the MOF and the line ministers. This lack of confrontation between the ministries 
and the MOF on the finalised budget allocation is frustrating and demotivating for the line 
ministries, who do not have the opportunity to contest or, at least, understand the rationale 
behind the MOF‟s actions. 




Another issue that came up during the interviews and which clearly shows dissatisfaction with 
the current budgeting process is the lack of performance measurement within the system. A 
few participants mentioned that budget allocations are done irrespective of value for money 
concepts, since no analysis is carried out as to what an activity is costing in terms of its 
expected outcomes. In this regard, two former Finance Ministers and the Minister for Finance 
presently in office mentioned that the business plans presented by the line ministries are not 
measured in terms of the objectives and outputs expected to be achieved. The Minister for 
Finance stated that:  
“When line ministries submit their business plans in support of their funding requests, 
they do not present any output indicators. Unfortunately, the ministries expect that the 
MOF will accept all the requests for funding, without having carried out a detailed 
analysis of the outputs and outcomes to be delivered through the inputs, without 
having ascertained what their priorities are and without having identified where 
efficiency gains can be made.”  
This concern was substantiated with examples brought up during the interviews – a case in 
point is the issue in the education sector where recurrent expenditure and capital outlays are 
always on the increase, notwithstanding the decline in the country‟s birth rate. It was 
mentioned that the results being attained in the education sector are not commensurate with 
the spending dedicated to this sector. This situation signals the need for radical change in the 
budgeting system such that the allocated funds would be better justified in terms of the 
outcomes/results obtained. 
The incremental approach presently adopted was heavily criticised by a Permanent Secretary 
who stated that priority should be given to expenditures that are genuinely needed, rather than 
allocating funds to programmes simply because such expenditure had featured in previous 
years‟ budgets. This issue could be addressed with the inclusion of PI and targets in budgets.  




Another issue mentioned during the interviews was the short timeframe allowed for the 
preparation of the budget. This is resulting in the line ministries not having enough time to 
consider any measures of efficiency during the budget compilation process and the MOF 
lacking the time to analyse in detail the business plans submitted by the line ministries. 
The second group of stakeholders, consisting of a Budget Office official and the MOF senior 
civil servant, demonstrated a much lower level of dissatisfaction with the current budgeting 
system itself. The former mentioned that some budget reforms have already been 
implemented recently, adding that there might be the need for further small improvements. 
This implies that the respondent does not envisage the need for a radical change in the 
Maltese budgetary system, but is more in favour of convergent change. 
The senior civil servant within the MOF attributes the problems in the country‟s public 
finance to the policies being employed by government in the high spending sectors, including 
education, health, social welfare (inclusive of pensions), and the care of old people. 
Communicating a feeling of frustration, the respondent claimed that changes are required in 
respect of policy stances in these areas, rather than vis-à-vis the budgetary framework. 
Though the interviewee is clearly dissatisfied and concerned with the constantly increasing 
government expenditure which is not always being adequately compensated by the increase in 
revenue generation, the statements made imply that this participant does not see the need for a 
reform in the budgeting process since such reform will not be enough to address the fiscal 
deficit issues being faced by the country.  
Care has to be exercised when analysing the comments made by the second group of 
stakeholders – these respondents are public officials from the MOF who are heavily involved 
in the decision-making underlying the budgetary process. Therefore, it is understandable that 




they might be reluctant to criticise the current budgeting system, of which they form an 
integral part and to which they are significant contributors.  
Thus, the views expressed by the first group of stakeholders, representing the majority of the 
interviewees, are potentially more objective than those expressed by the second group, given 
that the respondents from the second group have a vested interest to preserve the current 
system in order to avoid self-criticism. The strong dissatisfaction with the current budgeting 
system, expressed by the first group of stakeholders, can be considered a stimulus for radical 
change according to Greenwood and Hinings (1996). Nevertheless, given the influential 
position of the MOF representatives, their diverging views can give rise to an element of 
resistance to change. This can possibly be managed and controlled, depending on the 
significance of the other intraorganisational dynamics comprised in the Greenwood and 
Hinings‟ (1996) framework, as discussed below. 
7.6.2 Preference for the existing versus the alternative system 
Argento and van Helden (2009) advise that dissatisfaction does not automatically provide an 
alternative option. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) maintain that radical change will only 
occur if the dissatisfied stakeholders link the problems being faced to the existing system, and 
there is the possibility of an alternative template. The above discussion shows that the first 
group of stakeholders is linking government‟s position of disadvantage in designing the right 
policies and making optimal budget allocation decisions to the existing budgeting system. 
These stakeholders firmly believe that the current system needs to be reinvented, since it is 
not adequately serving its purpose as a tool for decision makers to make the best budget 
allocation choices in the country‟s economic interest. The findings demonstrate that there is 
the possibility of an alternative system – in this regard, a large number of participants from 




the first group of stakeholders referred to the usefulness of moving towards a PB system, 
which would allow for the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness in government‟s 
programmes and initiatives. In addition to the need for performance measurement, there are 
other issues which have to be addressed if the reform goes through. To recap on the above 
discussion, it is recommended that ultimate responsibility for budget allocation decisions 
should lie with government, rather than with civil servants within the MOF. Additionally, the 
actual amount of funds voted to the ministries should, ideally, be carried out in the line 
ministers‟ presence in order to ensure transparency; if this is not practical in view of the 
possible clashes and difficulty to reach agreement, the vote (which is usually lower than what 
the ministries had originally requested) should be communicated to the ministries as soon as it 
is decided, in order to allow for adequate adaptation by the ministries and departments. 
Finally, the time frame allowed for budget compilation should be lengthened in order to 
provide enough time for detailed planning. 
In accordance with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), a significant factor which may give rise 
to reform is the pattern of value commitments. Radical change is only possible if stakeholder 
dissatisfaction is complemented by a competitive or reformative pattern of value 
commitments (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The findings and the foregoing discussion 
suggest a competitive commitment, whereby the first group of stakeholders expressed their 
wish to see an alternative system, whilst the second group were not against the template-in-
use. Though the second group of stakeholders did not criticise the existing system, they are 
certainly aware of the country‟s fiscal deficit issues and the need to control government 
spending by being more effective and efficient. However, one of the respondents is attributing 
these issues to government‟s policies rather than to the budgeting system, stating that PB will 
only improve the public finance situation slightly. Thus, the effectiveness of the budgetary 




reform in solving the country‟s public finance issues is being questioned by this top civil 
servant, even though the interviewee did not voice his opposition to the implementation of 
PB.  
7.6.3 Does the budgetary reform have support at the top? 
Power dependencies have been identified by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) as enablers of 
radical change. Where there are divergent views on the proposed reform (competitive pattern 
of value commitment) as is the case with the implementation of PB in the Maltese scenario, 
radical change will be possible if the people in positions of power support the proposed 
change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). This observation was substantiated by the 
interviewees, who claimed that political support will push the reform to happen and will 
ensure that it is carried out faster from a timing perspective. McGeough (2014) suggests that 
when PB is in operation, political drive is also fundamental to stimulate the use of PI and the 
development of performance targets. 
A number of interview respondents who hold powerful positions appeared to be supportive of 
budgetary reform implementation. Some of the powerful people interviewed who are in 
favour of PB include an economist and advisor to government, an academic and advisor to the 
MOF, the Minister for Finance and the Accountant General. As shown by the findings, there 
were other respondents who strongly support the implementation of PB; however, they are not 
considered key people in strategic positions, even though they could still influence the reform 
process. 
The Prime Minister, who is the head of the public service and who arguably holds the most 
powerful position in the public administration, stated the following when asked whether PB 
should be introduced: “yes, an unqualified yes…” Nevertheless, the findings also show that 




the respondent is very cautious of changing the current system, given that this system is an 
institutionalised practice which has worked and served the country for years. This fear could 
be a result of the fact that the new administration has been in office for a relatively short time 
(since 2013) and it is still in the process of gaining in-depth understanding of how the 
budgeting system is working. This has been implied by the comment made by the Prime 
Minister, stating that the existing system is presently controlled by a handful of civil servants 
spread across a number of ministries. This statement also reinforces the claims made by some 
respondents who maintained that the budget allocation process is largely in the hands of 
public officials, rather than in the hands of government who is ultimately responsible for the 
budget
61
.   
Another person in a key position is the senior civil servant within the MOF. As discussed 
earlier on, this stakeholder has reservations vis-à-vis the implementation of PB. Although it is 
acknowledged that a budgetary reform which shifts the focus from inputs to results “will 
improve the public finance situation slightly”, the real issue that needs to be addressed if 
financial sustainability is to be improved is the change in policies that has to be effected in the 
high spending sectors, according to the interviewee. 
The preceding analysis suggests that the key people holding positions of power have 
diverging views with respect to the implementation of the reform, with some of them being 
strongly in favour of the change and others having some reservations. The occurrence of 
radical change depends on whether those powerful people in favour of the budgetary reform 
are in a position to exert enough influence on government to ensure that the change is 
embarked on. The support and championing of the reform by the Prime Minister is, 
nevertheless, fundamental for the change to happen. It is pertinent to mention that there are 
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both institutional and macro-level pressures (including high coercive isomorphic pressures 
and high economic and political influences) for changing the current budgeting system
62
, 
which could possibly push government to implement the budgetary reform. 
7.6.4 Capacity for action 
Another enabler of radical change is capacity for action, which is the ability of transitioning 
from the existing system to the alternative system, according to Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996). The Greenwood and Hinings‟ framework (1996) proposes that if capacity for action is 
supported by a competitive pattern of value commitments (as is the case in the Maltese 
scenario), radical change would be possible.  
The findings indicate that the competencies required to operate within the new system might 
be lacking, in view of the limited number of adequately qualified public officials in 
government employment
63
. The analysis carried out earlier on indicated that personnel issues 
could act as a deterrent for the implementation of PB. It was, however, argued that a number 
of solutions could possibly be applied to overcome this barrier; thus, personnel issues were 
considered as having a medium influence on the prohibition of budgetary reform
64
. 
The interview data also showed that investment in an accounting and IT system is required if 
government decides to implement a performance based budgeting system
65
, since the existing 
accounting and information system is old, it is not user-friendly and it is incapable of allowing 
data manipulation for producing reports as required. In this regard, government is presently in 
the process of changing the current accounting system in view of its plans to implement 
accrual accounting. Thus, this hurdle is presently being addressed.  
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In accordance with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), a further important element for 
facilitating the transition to the alternative template is to have a good understanding of the 
new system and a clear road map to ensure that the design of the system captures the pre-
established objectives and addresses the weaknesses of the template-in-use. This emphasises 
the importance of bringing in external consultants who have the appropriate experience in 
budgetary reform implementation, as well as having in place, a communication and training 
plan for civil servants. 
7.6.5 Political ability  
The findings suggest that within the Maltese scenario, there is a third enabler of radical 
change, being the political ability required to make the reform happen. As a result, an 
adjustment to the Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) framework is suggested in respect of the 
intraorganisational dynamics of the model, as set out below. 
Figure 28: Model for understanding organisational change (Adapted) (Source: 
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The interview participants mentioned a number of political issues which could constrain the 
implementation of PB
66
, as summarised in the table below. 
Table 39: Political concerns constraining PB 
 
In terms of the first three issues, former Prime Minister Dr Sant (2012: 112) observes that:  
“The public sector provides the scope for a spoils system that helps parties to cement 
their political ties with supporters”. 
A PB system embraces the measurement of performance and linking the expenditure to the 
planned results and outcomes. This requires shifting staff around activities, if necessary, and 
may also necessitate reducing the staff complement for certain programmes, in order to better 
the allocation of resources with the purpose of improving outputs. Additionally, expenditures 
                                                          
66
 Vide section 7.5.3 
a) Political interference in the running of government departments does not allow civil servants the
freedom to restructure operations and work processes for the purpose of enhancing efficiency and
effectiveness. In this respect, it was mentioned that top civil servants do not have a free hand to
transfer people around even if it is believed that performance would be improved as a result of such
transfer.
b) It is extremely difficult for government to shed any excess staff, in view of the heavily unionised
environment in public sector employment and because of the political damage that government would
suffer. This problem is very relevant, given that wages and salaries of government employees
represent a significant portion of the ministries‟ recurrent expenditure.
c) The financial plans and estimates prepared by the ministries as part of the budget process are
sometimes overridden during the course of the year by a political decision. An example was cited in
this regard of a programme which had been adequately provided for in the financial estimates, but
which subsequently suffered a huge cost overrun, because of a decision taken by the Minister to
open the programme to a much wider audience.
d) There is the political risk of putting government‟s effectiveness into question, should actual
performance not reach the pre-set targets. This could also be used by the party in opposition to gain
political advantage.
Source: Interview data collected between August 2014 and April 2015
Political issues which could constrain the implementation of PB




on programmes should be justified in terms of the expected results and should also not exceed 
the budget allocation, unless unexpected events crop up. 
In this respect, transferring people around or making staff redundant would definitely be 
politically unpopular actions which would result in the loss of political points (translated into 
loss of votes during a general election) for the party in government. Conversely, widening the 
scope of an activity or programme, as mentioned above, would win votes for the governing 
party.  
In view of the above discussion, the following question needs to be answered: can the 
political forces prevalent in the Maltese context be addressed in order to enable radical 
change? 
The analysis carried out earlier established that the political factors are considered as having a 
high influence on the prohibition of PB implementation in the Maltese public sector. In order 
to address the issue of political interference, the problem of budget plans being overridden by 
political decisions and the issue of political sensitivity when actual results falling short of 
targets are made public, a culture change is required throughout the civil service and amongst 
the politicians. The findings reveal that this is far from an easy task in the local scenario. Such 
culture change requires time and extensive education and training. In order to start 
introducing this culture change, support from the people at the top is fundamental. Thus, 
radical change would only be possible if the people in positions of power support the new 
way of doing things and dedicate the required resources to drive the reform. Furthermore, 
better planning is called for to tackle the issue of plans being superseded by certain political 
decisions – there has to be the willpower from the top to turn down line ministries‟ requests 
for funding which would not have been planned for in the budget (unless it is a matter of 




national or strategic importance). Such initiatives/programmes could be postponed and 
subsequently included in the following year‟s budget. 
The reduction in staff complement within government is highly unlikely in Malta, and thus, as 
discussed earlier on, this problem has to be mitigated through the application of the concept of 
natural attrition, where employees who leave employment, retire or die, would not be 
replaced. This is applicable, for instance, in the education sector where government might end 
up with an excess number of teachers and other administrative staff, should it decide to close 
down schools with a small number of students and transfer such students to other schools. In 
other situations, staff mobility should be put into practice, whereby excess employees in 
certain posts could be shifted to other roles which have a shortage of staff, if the skill set of 
such employees is compatible with the new role.  
Therefore, the political forces within the Maltese context could, to a certain extent, be 
controlled, thus, making radical change possible. This is a challenging endeavour, which 
requires effort, resources and championing from the top. If political ability is supported by a 
competitive (as is the case in Malta) or reformative pattern of value commitments, then 
radical change would be possible.  
7.6.6 Recapitulation 
Institutionalisation can obstruct change because practices in an organisation become deeply 
embedded within that organisation, according to Argento and van Helden (2010). In line with 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996), a radical change to the existing Maltese budgeting system 
could be problematic, due to the fact that the system is an institutionalised practice and thus, 
change could be resisted from the parties affected by the reform. Nevertheless, as discussed 




earlier, there are a number of institutional and macro-level pressures which might trigger the 
implementation of PB. 
In summary, two main groups of stakeholders can be distinguished with respect to their 
differing degrees of dissatisfaction with the current budgeting system. The first group, 
consisting of the majority of the interviewees, opined that the budgetary system needs to be 
reinvented. The second group, consisting of two top civil servants from the MOF, 
demonstrated a considerably lower degree of dissatisfaction with the existing system. The 
findings show that the first group of stakeholders is attributing the difficulties faced by 
government in making optimal budget allocation decisions to the existing budgeting system. 
A number of participants suggested that government should embrace a PB system as an 
alternative template. As a result, a competitive pattern of value commitments prevails, 
whereby the first group of stakeholders have expressed their wish for the implementation of 
an alternative budgeting system, whilst the second group did not criticise the template-in-use. 
(It is pertinent to note that the second group did not openly oppose the alternative template). 
In line with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), in the case of a competitive commitment, radical 
change is possible if powerful people are supportive of the reform. The analysis concludes 
that there are diverging views vis-à-vis the reform, amidst the people holding positions of 
power in the Maltese public administration, with some of them being strongly in favour of the 
change and a few having some reservations. As regards the ability of moving from the current 
to the alternative template, there are some deficiencies in the competencies required to operate 
within the new system, which could be addressed through the recruitment of qualified 
personnel and through the engagement of consultants who have already been involved in the 
implementation of PB systems in other countries. The findings have revealed a further 
enabling dynamic for radical change in the Maltese context, being the political ability to 




embark on the reform. It has been shown that this requires overcoming a number of barriers of 
a political nature. The analysis shows that this is not an easy feat, and requires considerable 
time, effort and resources, and above all, championing from the people at the top.  
In conclusion, it is suggested that the most significant impediment to radical change in the 
Maltese context is the political dimension. As stated above, if the reform is to go through, it 
has to be championed at the top, possibly by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Finance. 
It has been mentioned that the Prime Minister is, in principle, in favour of the implementation 
of PB, but has some reservations about changing a system which has served the country for 
years. There are, however, a number of key persons in positions of power (as stated above) 
who strongly advocate PB. Furthermore, it is important to restate that there are significant 
isomorphic influences and macro-level pressures for changing the budgeting system, which 
coupled with the internal dynamics discussed above, could lead to a radical change. In respect 
of coercive forces, an interviewee stated that: 
“PB is the only way forward, even because the EU Commission is pressing us to go 
that way.” 
7.7 Implementation strategy and underlying issues 
Hill and Hupe (2014) discuss the extent to which an implementation process should be 
positioned in its institutional context. The authors observe that: 
“…an examination of a policy process – and accordingly of an implementation 
process – needs to be seen as occurring in organised contexts where there are 
established norms, values, relationships, power structures and „standard operating 
procedures‟ (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 37).” 
As established earlier, the existing line-item budgeting system is an „institution‟ (Douglas, 
1986) which has become deeply embedded in the country‟s processes. In this respect, the 




implementation of the budgetary reform has to occur within the existing organised context 
and thus, institutional theory is particularly pertinent and complementary to the study of 
policy implementation. 
7.7.1 Top-down versus bottom-up perspective for budgeting 
The interview findings show that the existing budgeting system is largely based on the top-
down approach
67
. It has also been suggested by the interview participants that should 
government decide to introduce a PB system, a more bottom-up approach should be followed 
in respect of the budgetary process
68
. For the purpose of the analysis, the „top‟ represents the 
central agency, namely the OPM and the MOF, and the „bottom‟ stands for the line ministries 
and the departments and agencies falling under their responsibility.  
This proposed change in approach from top-down to bottom-up might be reflecting the need 
for more involvement of the line ministries in the preparation of the budget figures. This 
higher level of involvement of line ministries assumes greater importance if performance 
targets covering the ministries‟ programmes and activities are introduced as part of the budget 
process, since the ministries and departments would have to assume ownership and 
responsibility for the achievement of such targets. Furthermore, a more bottom-up approach 
could serve to facilitate acceptance of the change to the existing deeply embedded system by 
the line ministries; thus, reducing resistance to the budgetary reform.   
The existing budgeting system 
The current budgeting process mainly follows a top-down approach, according to the majority 
of the respondents. This was indicated by some of the comments made (see table below): 
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Table 40: Interviewees’ comments on the existing budgeting process 
 
Though the line ministries are requested to compile financial plans covering their expected 
operations, such submissions are not analysed in detail by the MOF, according to the findings. 
It was stated that line ministries sometimes complain that it was useless preparing financial 
plans to back up their requests for funding, since the final allocation decisions were then 
determined by the MOF, with no consultation with the line ministries. 
A number of interviewees attribute the adoption of the top-down approach for the budgeting 
process, to government‟s need to conduct its financial business within the parameters 
stipulated by the EU. In justification of the top-down approach, a few respondents stated that 
the MOF is responsible for supporting government in achieving its priorities and in carrying 
out its electoral promises; and thus it has to allocate funds to reflect such priorities. It was 
added that, in the absence of control by the MOF, the fiscal deficit would shoot up. The 
current system suggests a centrally located actor – the MOF – which is perceived as being the 
most relevant for achieving government‟s goals, in line with what was proposed by Paudel 
(2009). The top-down perspective has been justified by Hogwood and Gunn (1984 cited in 
Interviewees' opinions on the approach followed by the existing budgetary process 
“…ultimately the budget allocation is decided by the MOF, with the ministries having to manage
their projects within the allocated envelope of funds. ”
“…the budget process is strongly top-down…with the final allocation decisions lying with the
MOF. ”
“The current budgeting system is very much top-down…the involvement of the central agency [is
necessary] in order to arrive at a mature decision as to which programme should be prioritised. ”
“…the [allocation] decisions are taken centrally and the line ministries do not really have a say
in the budget allocation. ”
“Although the system could be viewed as bottom-up because the line ministries are asked to make 
their budget submissions, the decisions are then taken from the top; and the decisions are
final…much of the results of the bottom-up process are discarded. ”
Source: Quotes from interviews conducted between August 2014 and April 2015




Hill and Hupe, 2014) on the basis that those who design policies are elected in a democratic 
way. The findings indicate that the budget allocation is very much in the hands of top civil 
servants within the MOF. In this respect, it should be noted that such civil servants were not 
democratically elected and therefore, it is important that the budget process, which has huge 
economic, political and social implications, should be revisited by government to ensure that 
the final allocation decisions are under government‟s control. 
A performance budgeting system 
According to the interviews, the implementation approach for PB should embrace a mix of the 
top-down and bottom-up perspectives, with a tendency towards the bottom-up approach. This 
is in line with what was suggested by Berman (1980), who stated that when major policy 
changes are envisaged, as in the case of the Maltese budgetary framework, a bottom-up 
approach is recommended. Nevertheless, central intervention (through the involvement of the 
OPM and the MOF) is still required to ensure that government‟s priorities are being addressed 
and that this is done within the available funding.  
With a PB system, the business plans of the line ministries have to incorporate performance 
measures and targets covering their planned programmes and activities. In order to ensure 
ownership and responsibility for the attainment of performance targets, the line ministries 
should be involved in their development – this suggests that a more bottom-up approach 
should be embraced, as suggested by the OECD (2007). Subsequently, the line ministries 
would be judged by the central agency on the achievement of the performance measures that 
they would have developed themselves. Cooperation between the parties involved, namely the 
central agency and the line ministries, increases the likelihood of successful implementation, 
according to Scharpf (1978). 




Furthermore, according to the respondents, tending towards the bottom-up approach is 
advisable such that the ideas for programmes and initiatives would emanate from the people 
on the ground, who are more in contact with the needs of the public, in line with the idea of 
the street-level bureaucrats proposed by Lipsky (1980). In this respect, a former Prime 
Minister observed that: 
“The priorities should be set at OPM level, but then the programmes should be born 
from those people with experience on the ground. Government‟s priorities and the 
ideas on the ground will then have to come together.”      
In their discussion of the variables involved in the implementation process, Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1983) claim that successful implementation is more difficult to achieve where the 
extent of the behavioural change required is greater. The authors argue that if the group whose 
behaviour is subject to change is large, then it would be more challenging to achieve the 
stipulated objectives of the policy. In the local context, both the degree of behavioural change 
and the target group are significant and this implies that the top-down model may not be the 
most appropriate approach, because more involvement and participation by street-level 
implementers is required during the implementation stage to obtain their support and 
commitment to a PB system. 
The local implementers should hold the relevant skills to operate the new system, if 
successful implementation is to be achieved, as observed by Hjern (1982). This emphasises 
the need for providing the required training to the individual ministries and departments prior 
to the implementation stage – in this respect, Greenwood and Hinings‟ framework (1996) 
highlighted the importance of having the capacity for making the transition to the new system, 
which includes having implementers who have been trained and who have acquired the 
necessary skills. 




It is envisaged that the role of the central agency would still be of fundamental importance. 
Firstly, government‟s strategies and priorities and the resulting policies have to originate from 
the OPM. As argued by Matland (1995), policy control should be in the hands of people who 
have been elected democratically and who are, thus, accountable to their voters. The 
programmes and initiatives proposed by the line ministries, together with the corresponding 
performance measures, have to reflect government‟s priorities and to take into consideration 
the spending ceiling set by the MOF. In this respect, the initiative recently introduced by 
government which requires that line ministries link their budget plans to the promises 
contained in the electoral manifesto, is a step forward for ensuring that government‟s 
priorities are being addressed. Secondly, with regard to the development of the performance 
targets by line ministries, the central agency would be responsible for ensuring that the targets 
stipulated are reasonable and appropriately benchmarked against international key 
performance indicators. In addition, the role of the central agency should involve issuing 
budget guidelines and monitoring how the line ministries are performing vis-à-vis the pre-
established performance measures, on an on-going basis.  
A former Finance Minister summarised his views as follows:  
“The bottom-up process would ensure commitment by the ministries/departments for 
achieving the pre-established performance targets. In addition, the role of the central 
agency would consist of the following: to coordinate the whole exercise; to monitor 
that the process is being carried out properly; to reconcile the available funds with the 
spending; and to negotiate with the ministries, if over-spending is envisaged, as to 
which projects would be given priority on a national basis.” 
The suitability of adopting the top-down versus the bottom-up approach for the 
implementation of PB in the Maltese scenario is further discussed hereunder, using Matland‟s 
(1995) ambiguity/conflict framework. 




Matland’s (1995) Ambiguity/Conflict model  
Matland‟s (1995) ambiguity/conflict model
69
 seeks to explain when it is appropriate to apply 
either the top-down or the bottom-up approach for policy implementation.  
The findings show that a number of stakeholders consider PB as being the best system to 
adopt, from a technical point of view. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, there are a number of 
influences potentially prohibiting the implementation of PB
70
, which might give rise to high 
policy conflict. Furthermore, there are divergent views as regards the planned activities and 
schedule for implementation. For instance, there are different opinions as regards the 
timeframe indicated for the successful implementation of PB, with some stakeholders 
proposing a timeframe ranging from ten to fifteen years, and others suggesting a shorter time 
period of between three to five years. The interviews also revealed diverging views with 
respect to whether the budgetary reform should be enacted in law or by means of policy 
guidelines. For the purpose of mitigating the potential conflict arising from the reform, it is 
advisable to involve key stakeholders at policy formation stage (including the OPM, line 
ministers, Permanent Secretaries and the Heads of government departments). This is in line 
with what was suggested by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), who stated that the 
participation of involved parties at the policy formation stage facilitates goal consensus, 
which in turn increases the probability of successful implementation. Furthermore, the 
provision of training to involved personnel on their new responsibilities is fundamental to 
obtain their support for the new policy, according to the study carried out by Howard et al 
(2010) utilising Matland‟s model. 
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In terms of policy ambiguity, the goals of the policy have been reasonably well defined during 
the interviews and include: better allocation of public funds, improving value for money 
obtained from government‟s programmes and enhancing the accountability and transparency 
of government‟s dealings. In addition, the means for achieving the policy objectives have also 
been identified during the empirical data collection process, though they may not yet be in 
place. It has been determined that the budgetary reform requires investment in an accounting 
and IT system – in this respect, plans are under way to change the existing accounting system. 
There is also the issue of lack of adequately qualified personnel to operate the new system – a 
number of solutions were proposed for tackling this issue
71
.  
In accordance with Matland‟s (1995) model, the implementation of PB in Malta might be 
viewed as a political implementation, characterised by high conflict and low ambiguity. 
Matland (1995: 163) maintains that in this type of implementation, “outcomes are decided by 
power”, that is, the implementer needs to have the power to force his/her will on the parties 
involved in order to reach agreement on actions. Similarly, Howard et al (2010: 940, 937) 
note that “the central variable for successful implementation with political implementation is 
power”, that is, successful implementation is dependent on “the power of the leadership to 
force compliance with the policy”. This substantiates the analysis coming out of the 
Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model, which concluded that if the implementation of PB is 
to go through, it has to be championed at the top, possibly by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Finance. 
Matland‟s (1995) model suggests that a political implementation process reflects more closely 
the orientations of a top-down perspective. This suggestion is in conflict with the conclusions 
coming out of the interview findings. Though the interviewees have suggested that a PB 
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system should comprise a mix of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches, it has been 
advised that the latter approach should be emphasised in order to enable successful 
implementation in the local context. In this regard, the line ministries should be allowed to 
come up with their own performance indicators within the priorities established by 
government, on which they would subsequently be judged by the central agency. As such, the 
model proposed by Matland (1995) might be inadequate to describe the budgetary reform 
implementation in Malta, even because it might be impractical to label policies in such a rigid 
manner (Hill and Hupe, 2006).  
Though no attempt is being made to make a new contribution to the typologies proposed by 
Matland (1995), the findings demonstrate that the proposed implementation in the local 
scenario cannot be analysed through a neat policy type. In this respect, it might be 
problematic to transfer policy learning across international boundaries, since such policies 
might undergo a transformation in a new institutional context. As regards the proposed 
budgetary reform in the Maltese scenario, the existing budgetary system is deeply embedded 
in its institutional context and as a result, policy implementation has to occur within this 
organised context. In these circumstances, a more bottom-up approach could be a better 
solution for facilitating the change from the existing institutionalised process to a performance 
based system and for mitigating the resistance that is expected to be put up by the parties 
involved. 
Way forward 
In view of the fact that the existing budgetary system is deeply embedded in its institutional 
context and in view of the major policy changes involved in order to implement a PB system, 
a combined approach, with more emphasis on the bottom-up perspective, is recommended. 




The shift from the current top-down approach to a more bottom-up approach is potentially 
possible if a performance based system is adopted, since such a system allows for better 
control by the central agency. This is because the results obtained by the line ministries can be 
better assessed by comparing actual PI against the pre-established targets.  
Nevertheless, central intervention is still fundamental in the local scenario, in order to ensure 
that government‟s priorities are being addressed and that this is being done within the 
established spending ceiling. This is important to ensure that government‟s objectives for the 
country are being met and also to observe the parameters laid down by the EU, including the 
targets stipulated for the fiscal deficit. 
It is proposed that the top-down and bottom-up approaches are brought together as follows in 
the implementation of PB: from a top-down perspective, government‟s strategies and 
priorities and the resulting policies should originate from the OPM, in order to ensure that the 
objectives set by government for the country are being addressed. Subsequently, the 
budgetary framework setting out government‟s priorities and policies, should be approved by 
a Cabinet decision. This approval should happen early in the year, say in March, in order to 
allow ample time for the budgetary process. If the budget is to include PI, sufficient time 
should be allowed for a detailed analysis of such information as advised by Raudla (2012) 
who found that one of the reasons for the lack of use of PI by the Estonian finance committee 
was time constraints during the budget process. Approval by Cabinet ensures that politicians 
who have been democratically elected and who are, therefore, accountable to their voters, 
assume responsibility for the policies pursued, in line with what was argued by Matland 
(1995). The Minister for Finance would have the role of ensuring that government‟s strategic 
framework is achievable with the funding available.  




The Cabinet decision would then be communicated to the MOF and to the line ministries, 
such that the financial plans that would be developed would reflect government‟s strategies 
and priorities. The responsibility for developing performance measures and targets would then 
lie with the line ministries, reflecting a bottom-up perspective. The request for funding by the 
line ministries should reflect the targeted performance. In view of the fact that line ministers 
are members of the Cabinet, they would have been part of the team approving the budgetary 
framework and thus, the programmes and corresponding demands for funds should be within 
government‟s strategic framework. Subsequently, the MOF would be responsible for 
reviewing the financial plans together with the performance measures that would have been 
developed by the line ministries in support of the funds requested to carry out the planned 
programmes.  
The final budget allocation for the line ministries has to be determined by the MOF, who is 
responsible for overseeing the whole budget process. However, in contrast to what is 
presently being done, the budget allocation proposed by the MOF should be discussed with 
the line ministries before it is finalised, to ensure that any concerns that line ministries have 
vis-à-vis the planned activities and the corresponding funding are being addressed. The 
availability of PI could provide the basis for dialogue between the MOF and the politicians, as 
suggested by McGeough (2014) and Ho (2011). This dialogue would potentially reduce the 
existing problem of ministries regularly approaching the MOF during the year, to request 
additional funds. Another concern which was raised during the interviews was the fact that 
budget allocations are largely in the hands of civil servants from the MOF – the findings 
imply that a higher level of involvement of the Minister for Finance is desirable in the budget 
allocation process. In addition, if line ministers are involved in the discussions leading to the 
final budget allocations, this concern would be further mitigated.  




7.7.2 Other implementation issues 
Performance audit reports 
For the purpose of carrying out audits with respect to the quality and coverage of PI, the 
interviewees identified the following units as potential candidates for taking on this role
72
: 
 the National Audit Office; 
 a Quality Assurance Unit to be set up, possibly reporting to the NAO; 
 an Internal Audit function to be set up under each ministry, reporting to the MOF; or 
 the Fiscal Council. 
In a number of countries, such as Canada, Australia and the UK, the Auditor-General audits 
the quality and coverage of departmental performance reports, on a sample basis (OECD, 
2007). It is pertinent to point out that the Auditor-General does not audit budget material 
(OECD, 2007), as is the case in Malta. 
In Malta, there are currently fourteen ministries – if each ministry, including the departments 
falling under that ministry, is audited every four years, three to four ministries would be 
audited every year. 
The unit selected for this audit role could also assume responsibility for issuing principles of 
good practice for PI. This would ensure that performance reports compiled by the line 
ministries adhere to such principles and in turn, facilitate, the auditor‟s scrutiny process.  
Type of performance budgeting 
There was general agreement amongst the respondents that it is best to start off with 
presentational PB
73
, where PI is included in budget documents as background information for 
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the purposes of accountability and it does not play a role in decision-making (OECD, 2008). 
It has also been suggested that once the civil service and the politicians build up confidence in 
the new budgeting system, it would be advisable to move to performance-informed budgeting, 
where the compiled PI is used for budget decision-making, but it does not determine the 
amount of resources allocated (OECD, 2008). There might be certain areas or sectors where it 
would be appropriate to introduce direct budgeting, such that the funding allocated would 
reflect the results attained – the feasibility of this has to be assessed during the system design 
stage. 
The discussion which follows explores the different type of PB systems (presentational, 
performance-informed and direct) and their bearing on the different levels of changes (radical 
versus convergent change and evolutionary versus revolutionary change). 
Presentational PB provides no linkage between PI and funding (OECD, 2007), with the 
purpose of this type of PB being to enhance accountability rather than to influence the 
allocation of resources. As such, it can be argued that the adoption of presentational PB does 
not constitute a radical change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) from the existing system, 
since PI is provided as background information in budget documents and decision-making is 
not affected. Should the reform process stop with the introduction of this type of PB, there is 
the risk of fostering a symbolic rather than functional use of PI (Mimba et al, 2013), in view 
of the focus placed on presenting PI in budget documents rather than on utilising such 
information to inform and affect allocative decision-making. 
Conversely, a performance-informed budgeting system makes use of PI in the budget 
decision-making process, even though the link between PI and funding is loose or indirect 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
73
 Vide section 6.7.5 




(OECD, 2007). In view of the fact that allocative decision-making is affected with this type of 
PB, it is argued that the adoption of such a reform would represent a radical change 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) from the existing line-item budgeting system. Clearly, direct 
PB which involves allocating resources based on results achieved, would constitute a radical 
change from the existing line-item budgeting system. However, this PB type cannot be 
introduced across the board, since in certain sectors, it might be unfeasible to link 
underperformance to a reduction in the budget allocation in view of political, economic and 
social considerations, amongst others. Thus, it is advisable that direct PB would only be 
considered for selected areas, after careful consideration of the ensuing implications. 
Radical change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) can be both evolutionary and revolutionary, 
depending on the pace of change. As mentioned above, the empirical evidence has indicated 
the respondents‟ preference to kick off the budgetary reform with presentational PB and then, 
once the parties affected by the reform build up confidence in a performance measurement 
system, performance-informed budgeting would be introduced. This suggests an evolutionary 
(gradual) rather than a revolutionary change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), starting off with 
presentational PB (which does not constitute a radical change), but then moving on to a 
performance-informed budgeting system and perhaps direct PB in selected cases (both of 
which represent a radical change from the existing system). This proposed course of action 
also makes sense in view of the cultural change required in the civil service to embrace a 
performance based system and in view of the challenges that have to be addressed
74
 for the 
successful implementation of PB.  
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Reform enacted in law or through policy 
The Maltese public administration has to consider whether the budgetary reform should be 
enacted in law or by means of policy guidelines. Countries, which have implemented PB, 
have taken diverse routes in this respect - some (US) have introduced the reforms through 
legislation, others (Canada) have a mixture of policy guidelines and legislation, whilst other 
countries (UK) have not enacted the reforms in legislation but the central agency issues 
formal requirements (OECD, 2007). 
The findings show diverging views on this issue, with some respondents arguing that if the 
reform is enacted in law, less monitoring might be required, and others stating that legislating 
the reform will not make a difference to successful implementation
75
. In the Maltese context, 
where it appears to be difficult to introduce change, as suggested by the findings, it might be 
advisable to introduce the reform through legislation. Though this will not guarantee 
successful implementation, the potential consequences of breaking a law might secure the 
ministries‟ and departments‟ cooperation in introducing the new system.    
According to the OECD (2007), introducing the reforms through legislation ensures 
permanence if there is a change in government – the interview respondents did not attribute 
much importance to this, stating that if the system is working well, a new government will 
certainly not abandon the reform.  
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Timeframe for introducing performance budgeting  
As regards the indication of a reasonable timeframe for the successful implementation of PB, 
some respondents suggested a time period ranging from ten to fifteen years, whilst others 
proposed a shorter timeframe of between three to five years.  
In this respect, it is advisable to dedicate sufficient time for the introduction of the reform, in 
view of the significant work and effort involved to establish PB, including design of the 
system, change in accounting and IT system, recruitment of adequately qualified personnel 
and training of staff, amongst others. Having said that, a time period of, say, three to five 
years should be reasonable. A longer timeframe would influence negatively the morale of the 
project team leading the implementation, the civil service and the politicians, since the 
absence of tangible results in the form of improvements in input-output relationships, would 
lead to complacency. In this respect, it is important to have a clear road map for the project, 
with clear milestones and timelines for achieving them. It is pertinent to note that the CSR 
exercise launched during 2014 could potentially be considered as a useful intermediary for 
embarking onto this budgetary reform, thus saving on the time required for introducing the 
reform. Through the CSR process, ministries were asked to determine what output was 
produced for each budget line item under „programmes and initiatives‟. In contrast to the 
proposed reform, the CSR focused on selected past expenditure; furthermore, the results 
emanating from the exercise were not fed into the budget.  
Successful implementation within the stipulated timeframe requires high calibre people 
overseeing the whole project, possibly including representatives from the MOF working hand 
in hand with external consultants. In addition, a project leader from each line ministry should 
hold responsibility for coordinating with the central agency. 




7.8 Synthesising Institutional Theory, Change Theory and Policy 
Implementation Theory 
The foregoing discussion has established that the current line-item budgeting system has 
become deeply embedded within government‟s existing practices. Indeed, in accordance with 
institutional thinking (Douglas, 1986), the current system could be considered an „institution‟. 
Nevertheless, the empirical data has revealed institutional isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) and macro-level forces (Munir et al, 2011) which might trigger a change in 
the Maltese budgetary framework. At the same time, there are potential impediments which 
might hinder PB implementation, including the envisaged strong resistance to change (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000), the lack of capability (knowledge and experience) to cope with such 
change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and the political influences and interference prevalent in 
the Maltese scenario.  
A review of Change Theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) in combination with the 
gathered empirical data has shown that two groups of stakeholders can be distinguished with 
respect to their diverging degrees of dissatisfaction with the current budgeting system. The 
first group, comprising the majority of the interview participants, strongly believe that the 
existing system needs to be radically changed since it is not serving the purpose of effective 
and efficient allocative decision-making. Conversely, the second group which consists of two 
top civil servants within the MOF, showed a lower degree of dissatisfaction with the existing 
system, demonstrated some cynicism vis-à-vis PB implementation and were more inclined 
towards the implementation of convergent change. This analysis reveals a competitive pattern 
of value commitment (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), whereby the first group prefers an 
alternative system whereas the second group is not overly critical of the existing system. It 




has been determined that radical change in the Maltese budgetary framework is possible if 
this competitive pattern of value commitment is combined with: (i) the availability of 
resources and competencies required to operate the new system (capacity for action); (ii) 
championing of the reform from the people at the top (power dependencies); and (iii) the 
political ability to embark on the reform. In this regard, the empirical data suggests that the 
Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model lacks an intraorganisational enabling dynamic which 
has been found to be significant in the Maltese context (being the political ability to embrace 
the reform). In accordance with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), a competitive commitment 
will lead to evolutionary (rather than revolutionary) change in view of the resistance 
encountered from certain groups.  
This assertion is supported by the empirical data, which shows the interviewees‟ preference 
for a slow and gradual (evolutionary) change. Indeed, there was general agreement amongst 
the respondents that reform implementation should kick off with presentational PB and then, 
move towards performance-informed budgeting, once the civil servants and politicians build 
up confidence in the new system.  
The findings point towards a combined (emphasising the bottom-up) approach for the 
implementation of PB. In accordance with Matland‟s (1995) ambiguity/conflict model, PB 
implementation in Malta is characterised by high conflict and low ambiguity, potentially 
leading to a political implementation. Matland (1995) suggests that a political implementation 
process contemplates a top-down approach, which assertion conflicts with the research 
findings.  
By integrating institutional theory, change theory and policy implementation theory, this 
study seeks to address gaps identified in the individual theoretical frameworks.  




Institutional theory has contributed towards the understanding of the institutional context 
surrounding a budgetary reform in the Maltese context and towards the identification of 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and macro-level influences (Munir et al, 
2011) which might trigger such a reform. At the same time, change theory (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996) was valuable for determining the type of organisational change expected in the 
budgetary framework, for understanding the envisaged pace of change (evolutionary versus 
revolutionary), and for identifying the enabling dynamics (institutional capacities, power 
dependencies and political ability) required for a radical change to occur. Nevertheless, it was 
felt that these theories lacked the potential to indicate the implementation approach that 
should be followed for the introduction of PB in Malta. As a result, it was considered useful 
to complement institutional and change theories with policy implementation theory, in 
particular Matland‟s (1995) model which puts forward a theoretically based approach to 
implementation.  
In this respect, it is suggested that Matland‟s (1995) existing implementation model be 
augmented to embrace other variables that affect the implementation process as revealed by 
the theoretical review and the empirical evidence. When determining the type of 
implementation which is most relevant for a policy process (top-down versus bottom-up 
view), in addition to the conflict and ambiguity levels surrounding the policy, it is proposed 
that the institutional context within which the implementation is occurring should be 
examined and taken into consideration. Where the policy being implemented represents a 
departure from an existing deeply embedded system, the literature review (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000) corroborated by the empirical data, indicates that the implementation would 
come up against strong resistance to change, which has to be addressed and mitigated. 
Furthermore, the application of change theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) has 




demonstrated a competitive pattern of value commitment where some parties fully support PB 
implementation, whilst others are not against the system currently used. Such value interests 
also point towards the expectation of change resistance coupled with the preference for an 
evolutionary change, as demonstrated by the empirical data. The findings show that a 
combined implementation approach (tending towards the bottom-up perspective) is the most 
appropriate within this organised context – this approach leads to a higher level of 
involvement of street-level implementers (Lipsky, 1980), thus obtaining their support and 
commitment to the new policy, which would in turn potentially reduce the envisaged 
resistance to change. 
In summary, when seeking to establish the appropriate policy implementation approach (top-
down versus bottom-up), it is suggested that Matland‟s (1995) model which is based on a 
policy‟s ambiguity and conflict level, should also consider other variables surrounding the 
implementation. Such variables comprise the institutional context within which the new 
policy is being implemented including the level of embeddedness of an existing system; the 
envisaged resistance to change; the pattern of value commitments; and whether a 
revolutionary versus an evolutionary change is expected. For instance, if an existing system is 
deeply embedded within its institutional context, such that a new policy would be expected to 
give rise to change resistance, then a combined (emphasising the bottom-up) approach would 
be more appropriate in order to obtain the street-level implementers‟ support (Lipsky, 1980) 
and ensure their ownership of the new system, thus mitigating the resistance to change. 
Furthermore, where a competitive pattern of value commitments prevails, whereby some of 
the people that will be affected by the reform are resisting the changes, the combined 
approach is also the most appropriate, according to the findings, for the reasons discussed 
above. Where resistance to change is expected, evolutionary change is the indicated course of 




action (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) in order to ensure acceptance of the new system 
before embarking on more challenging reforms (starting off with presentational PB and then 
moving on to performance-informed budgeting). An evolutionary change and a combined 
(emphasising the bottom-up) approach are complementary, since a slower pace of change is 
more conducive to a higher involvement of street-level implementers in policy 
implementation. This is because there is more time for allowing the street-level implementers 
to come up with their ideas/programmes and subsequently engage in discussion with the 
central agency before the policy is implemented. Conversely, a revolutionary change, which 
occurs quickly, is facilitated by the top-down approach where clear direction for policy 
implementation has to come from the central agency to ensure successful and quick 
implementation. 
7.9 Relationship between PB and other institutional reforms 
This section discusses the relationship between PB reform and other institutional reforms that 
may be required within the Maltese public sector. 
The findings show that it may be premature to introduce accrual budgeting in the Maltese 
scenario
76
. One reason for this is that the public administration is presently in the early stages 
of implementing accrual accounting for historical reporting (with the target date having been 
set for 2019/2020). As a result, public officials would first have to get used to financial 
reporting on the accrual basis, before government considers the adoption of accrual 
budgeting. Another argument brought up during the interviews was that politicians are more 
comfortable with a cash budget for the purpose of making allocation decisions, because the 
cash basis is simpler to understand, whilst the accruals system is more cumbersome. During 
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the interviews, it was confirmed by the Accountant General that there are currently no plans 
to implement accrual budgeting. This position was taken notwithstanding the advice set out in 
the report compiled by the UK CIPFA, recommending that the budget framework should 
move to a full accrual basis in the medium to long-term, if the benefits of accrual reporting 
are to be realised
77
 (Camilleri, 2014). 
In line with Diamond‟s (2002) arguments, a number of interview participants claimed that 
accrual budgeting is not a prerequisite for the implementation of PB
78
. In this regard, there are 
countries, such as the US, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, which have a budget based 
on cash and commitments, and which have adopted a PB system (Sterck and Scheers, 2006: 
66; Sterck, 2007). It was, however, argued by some interviewees that an accrual accounting 
system which presents a more complete picture of government‟s reported revenues and costs, 
is important for the successful implementation of PB.  
Within this context, it can be concluded that though the adoption of accrual budgeting does 
not feature within the immediate plans of the Maltese public administration, this should not be 
considered as an obstacle for the implementation of PB. As regards the accurate reflection of 
revenue and costs in government‟s financial statements, this is currently being worked upon 
through government‟s plans to introduce accrual accounting for historical financial reporting. 
The implementation process for PB could still be kicked off in parallel with the preparation 
for the launch of accrual accounting, as the two systems are independent of each other. Once 
the accrual accounting system is up and running, the information fed from this system into the 
budgeting process would perhaps be more comprehensive, thus leading to an improvement in 
the development of performance measures and in the resulting budget allocation decisions. 
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The implementation of PB would potentially support other institutional reforms needed in the 
Maltese public sector, including the promotion of good governance and the strengthening of 
the macroeconomic situation.  
With regard to good governance, the publication of PI in budget documents keeps the citizens 
informed of what government is delivering with the public funds invested, thus enhancing 
transparency in government‟s dealings (Shah and Shen, 2007). Another aspect of good 
governance is the simplification of procedures – whether in fiscal matters, investment or other 
areas, administrative procedures have to be as simple as possible. In this respect, the findings 
have revealed that, since 2014, the highest-ranking civil servants (Permanent Secretaries) are 
being appraised on specific indicators, including „simplification of procedures‟, amongst 
others. As has been discussed earlier, it is suggested that PB implementation will be 
complemented with the establishment of reward and sanction mechanisms, in order to 
„remunerate‟ or „penalise‟ public officials in accordance with their performance, on the basis 
of pre-established KPIs. „Simplification of procedures‟ could be one of the indicators 
specified for performance measurement. A further area of good governance that government 
should focus on is the fight against corruption – this is imperative for strengthening economic 
management efficiency and promoting healthy competition.  
Lu et al (2015) believe that PB has an important role to play in public budgeting and 
governance, provided that PI is used in a functional rather than in a symbolic way for the sole 
purpose of establishing legitimacy (Mimba et al, 2013; Van Reeth, 2002). In turn, good 
governance promotes the development of a dynamic private sector, which is essential in view 
of its function as the main engine for economic growth. Thus, transparency vis-à-vis the 
spending of taxes paid by the private sector should be enhanced, burdensome bureaucratic or 




regulatory procedures that could slow the private sector‟s expansion should be minimised, 
and corruption which stifles competition should be tackled. 
The literature review (Robinson and Brumby, 2005; Murray and Efendioglu, 2011) and the 
empirical data have shown a link between PB and the macro-level environment. PB 
potentially enhances productive and allocative efficiency by directing resources towards 
programmes that are delivering products and services effectively and targeting budget cuts at 
programmes which contain wasteful spending or which are ineffective. In this regard, Caiden 
(1998) and Aristigueta and Justice (2006) claim that the application of outcome information in 
resource allocation could be problematic. According to the interviewees, PB will help to 
control the country‟s deficit situation and to facilitate the achievement of a balanced budget in 
structural terms, thus leading to the stabilisation of the macroeconomic situation. In this 
context, as discussed earlier, the recently enacted Fiscal Responsibility Act is an important 
institutional reform comprising a number of reforms impacting the budgetary framework. 
This law, which has placed budget process under greater scrutiny, will potentially pave the 
way for PB implementation. 
7.10 Education and health 
As part of the research undertaken, a number of interviews were conducted with 
representatives from the education and health sectors, as indicated in the discussion set out in 
this document. In this respect, it was considered important to take into account the views of 
the line ministries, in addition to the views of the central agency and those of other 
stakeholders in the budget process. The education and health ministries were selected for this 
purpose, firstly, because they represent the two largest spenders, and secondly, because 
expenditure within these ministries is expected to keep increasing.  




With respect to the education sector, the main concern which was brought up by a number of 
interviewees was the fact that the student population is decreasing, yet expenditure in this 
sector continues to rise. It was mentioned that one issue which is contributing to this situation 
is the inefficient use of resources and the lack of economies of scale which is driving up costs 
in this sector. In this respect, there are a number of government primary schools with a very 
small number of students; these schools, however, still include the full complement of 
teachers, administrative and maintenance staff. It was suggested that unless these primary 
schools, which are catering for a handful of students, are closed down, with the children being 
transferred to other schools, the costs in the education sector cannot go down substantially. 
This finding was subsequently substantiated by the results of a performance audit carried out 
by the NAO (National Audit Office, 2015) which suggested that the resources being 
consumed by schools with a small student population could be dedicated to other pressing 
needs within education.  
Another related issue which was mentioned during the interviews was the inferior academic 
results being achieved by Maltese students in comparison with students from other EU 
countries, notwithstanding the high spending on education and the low ratio of teachers and 
Learning Support Assistants to students. It was stated that this ratio is considerably lower than 
that of other EU countries, which possibly suggests a waste of resources.  
These issues could be partly addressed by the implementation of PB, which emphasises the 
results obtained rather than the money spent, as suggested by Carter (1994). Through the 
development of performance measures which link expenditure to deliverables, the input-
output relationship being achieved becomes clearer, such that allocation decisions would 
better reflect the results being targeted. The performance measures could also be 
benchmarked against international key performance indicators. If the input-output relationship 




is made clear, then it might be difficult for government to ignore the inefficiencies that the 
interviewees have referred to.  
As regards the health sector, expenditure is constantly increasing, in view of the country‟s 
ageing population. The main concern of a number of respondents, in respect of this sector, is 
whether free healthcare is sustainable in the long run. Whilst some interviewees argued that 
the existing free healthcare system can be maintained, others were of the opinion that 
providing free healthcare for all is unsustainable. Furthermore, the latter group argued that 
whilst the purpose of free healthcare is to provide accessibility to all, in reality, given the 
limited resources and the huge demands on healthcare, healthcare is only accessible to people 
who have contacts and/or money. In effect, the existing „free‟ system is giving rise to long 
waiting lists, overcrowding and bed shortage.  In this respect, there are doubts as to whether 
any government would take the plunge and make the provision of healthcare against payment, 
because this could potentially result in a political fall-out for the party in government.   
If the possibility of changing government‟s policy vis-à-vis the provision of free healthcare is 
remote, PB would at least provide a measure of performance in relation to the expenditure 
being dedicated to the various areas within the health sector. This could result in identifying 
areas where cost savings are possible and focusing public funds on other areas which require 
further investment.  
The findings have demonstrated that there are political considerations which are impeding 
government (and which have hindered past administrations) from addressing the structural 
problems in a number of policy areas, including education, health and the social welfare 
system (comprising pensions). In this context, PB assumes greater importance; firstly, 
because inefficiencies in the delivery of certain services might be uncovered resulting in cost 




savings, and secondly, to measure performance in the high spending sectors (education, health 
and social welfare, amongst others) such that underperformance would become evident and 
would possibly be addressed. 
7.11 Malta’s small size factor 
This section seeks to ascertain whether the concept of a small nation impinges on the 
budgetary reform. During the empirical data collection process, reference was made by a 
number of interviewees to the size factor of Malta (being the smallest EU country), as 
discussed below.  
The findings revealed that there is lack of adequately qualified public officials in government 
employment, which might hinder the implementation of PB. In this regard, the Minister for 
Education opined that the provision of training to civil servants has not been adequate in 
certain areas such as management, leadership, finance and administration. These skill 
deficiencies impede public officials who move up the ranks within the civil service. Civil 
servants who reach managerial positions have had to deliver results, notwithstanding the lack 
of training and professional development. The Minister attributes these constraints to Malta‟s 
small size, adding that it is common that “people have to wear different hats” in small 
countries. Specialisation is indeed difficult in a small country where people have to be fairly 
competent in various fields rather than excelling in one particular area. 
It was found that there is an element of political sensitivity and risk, should actual PI be made 
public. A former Prime Minister argued that though from a technical point of view, PB is 
undoubtedly the best budgeting system, from a political perspective, it is very risky to publish 
the actual outputs/outcomes achieved because of instances where performance falls short of 




the pre-established targets. It was suggested that in order to address this problem, government 
could consider keeping parts of the performance reports internal. However, the former Prime 
Minister cautioned that it is difficult to withhold information in a small island like Malta, 
where everyone knows everybody else. 
Reference was made by a number of respondents to the lack of economies of scale and the 
inefficient use of resources in the education sector, which is driving up government 
expenditure. It was mentioned that there are a number of government schools with a small 
number of students; yet such schools include the full complement of teachers and 
administrative staff. Lack of economies of scale and the resulting inefficiencies are an 
inherent issue of small countries, according to an interviewee. 
On a positive note, the findings show that the country‟s small size factor is contributing 
positively to the collaboration between the Budget Office and the EPD during the process of 
the fiscal projections compilation. An EPD official claimed that this strong liaison is possible 
in view of Malta‟s small size, where holding physical meetings between the two departments 
is very easy.  
As indicated above, the small size concept could potentially impinge on the budgetary reform. 
The lack of adequately qualified personnel, which is partly attributable to the difficulty of 
specialising in one area in a small country, has to be addressed by creating the necessary 
competences and capacities for the implementation of PB
79
. Keeping PI internal is difficult in 
a small country because of potential information leakages – thus, government should publish 
this information, also in view of its commitment to enhance transparency and accountability 
in the use of public funds. Regarding the lack of economies of scale in education (and 
                                                          
79
 Vide section 7.5.2 




potentially in various other sectors) arising from the country‟s small size, PB would make 
clear the input-output relationship, such that government would, as much as is possible (in the 
context of a small country), address the inefficiencies. The strong collaboration between 
government ministries and departments, which is feasible in view of their physical proximity, 
could facilitate the implementation of PB, since oversight by project leaders could be carried 
out more effectively through site visits. 
7.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the findings derived from the interviews carried out, seeking to 
satisfy the research objectives
80
 underlying the study and linking back the findings to the 
theoretical framework selected and the literature reviewed. 
In summary, the current line-item budgeting system has become deeply embedded in its 
institutional context. Nevertheless, institutional pressures and macro-level influences come 
into play which might trigger a budgetary reform. In addition, the findings have revealed a 
number of weaknesses in the current system, including its short term perspective, arbitrary 
budget allocations, lack of accountability for the results obtained, ineffective programmes 
which continue to be funded year after year and budget cuts effected across the board, 
amongst others. Furthermore, the inclusion of PI in budget documents is considered to be 
desirable, since it is believed to improve managerial and public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) 
and transparency and to enhance budget allocation decisions. Lu et al (2015) maintain that 
policy results, public service performance and budgeting are indivisible and thus, PB will 
remain important in public budgeting and governance. However, there are opposing forces 
which might inhibit the implementation of PB, including strong resistance to change, 
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personnel problems and high political influences. Such opposing pressures need to be 
effectively mitigated in order for the budgetary reform to happen. In this regard, it has been 
ascertained that political support from a powerful person/s at the top is fundamental for 
successfully adopting PB.  
The type of organisational change expected in the Maltese context has been analysed through 
an examination of the internal dynamics surrounding the budgetary framework, drawing upon 
Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model. A third enabler of radical change has been identified, 
being the political ability required to make the reform happen – this element is perhaps the 
most significant impediment to radical change in the Maltese budgeting system. In this 
regard, it has been determined that the reform has to be championed at the top, in order to 
ensure successful implementation. 
In view of the current system‟s deep embeddedness in its institutional context and the major 
policy changes involved to transition to PB, it has been established that successful 
implementation of the reform in the Maltese context requires a combined implementation 
approach, with more emphasis on the bottom-up perspective. Nevertheless, central 
intervention remains important for ensuring that government‟s priorities are being achieved 
and that this is being done within the available funding.  
On a final note, the interviewees have shown considerable support for the implementation of 
PB. It is to be noted that a number of participants who took part in the research are prominent 
people in the Maltese public financial management scenario, and thus, their opinions are 
































This chapter summarises and concludes the study. In this respect, section 8.2 provides a brief 
summary of the research, whilst section 8.3 sets out the conclusions drawn. Next, section 8.4 
lists the contributions of the research to the existing body of knowledge. This is followed by 
section 8.5, which presents a summary of the policy recommendations proposed. Section 8.6 
considers the value of the methods used, whilst section 8.7 makes some personal reflections. 
Section 8.8 then concludes the chapter.  
8.2 Summary 
The main aim of this study was to assess why and how the Maltese public administration 
might transition from the existing line-item budgeting system to a PB system. To this end, the 
research sought to identify both the pressures which support the implementation of PB in the 
Maltese scenario, as well as the opposing forces which inhibit such reform. The study also 
aimed to find out what recent reforms were implemented by the public administration, in the 
budgetary framework. It also endeavoured to ascertain the implications of including PI in 
budget documents and of holding public officials responsible for the performance of their 
department/programme. Furthermore, the study sought to propose a suitable implementation 
approach for adopting PB, highlighting the potential issues surrounding implementation. 
To achieve these objectives, a qualitative approach was embraced, using data gathered from 
documentary sources, corroborated with empirical evidence collected from the conduct of 
twenty-eight in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Access was obtained to discuss relevant 
issues with senior politicians from the government and the opposition, including former 
ministers and Prime Ministers.  




According to the respondents, the current line-item budgeting system exhibits a number of 
shortcomings. The existing system adopts a short-term perspective, focusing on changes in 
expenditure categories from one year to the next (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). Also, an 
incremental approach is embraced, whereby ministries expect the same budget allocation of 
the previous year plus something extra to cover for inflation. As a result, elements of waste 
are neither identified nor eliminated, because they are inbuilt into the system. In view of the 
lack of performance measurement within the current system, ineffective programmes continue 
to be funded year after year, because there is no public accountability for the results attained. 
The findings also reveal that budgetary cuts by the MOF during the course of the year have 
become a normal occurrence – these are aimed at keeping the fiscal deficit under control. 
Unfortunately, these budget cuts might disrupt the plans of the ministry/department affected 
(Van Reeth, 2002), in particular if diligence was practised during the year in order to save 
funds for future use. In this regard, the implementation of PB would potentially help to target 
budgetary cuts at programmes which contain an element of waste or which are ineffective. 
The empirical data shows that when ministries underspend their budget, the excess funds are 
returned to the central agency and the following year‟s budget for the said ministry is reduced 
accordingly. This practice has been strongly criticised by the interviewees, on the basis that it 
discourages cost saving and revenue generating initiatives by the ministries. 
The findings demonstrate that the current line-item budgeting system has become deeply 
embedded in government‟s existing practices. Indeed, institutional thinking suggests that the 
current system is an „institution‟ (Douglas, 1986). Nevertheless, there are both institutional 
pressures and macro-level forces which might trigger a budgetary reform. The three areas of 
institutional isomorphic pressures, namely, coercive, mimetic and normative influences 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), manifest themselves in the proposed budgetary reform. In 




particular, coercive pressures for change appear to be strong and comprise the EU‟s and the 
credit rating agencies‟ influence on Malta for reforming a number of sectors in order to reduce 
the fiscal deficit and the debt burden, together with the advice given by the IMF to Malta as 
regards improving its budgetary process. Furthermore, macro-level forces, including 
economic, political and socio-cultural influences (Munir et al, 2011), have been found to be 
significant factors which might drive the implementation of PB in Malta. In this regard, the 
participants have claimed that the current budgetary system should be radically changed, 
because it is not serving the purpose of effective economic decision-making. Political 
considerations are also highly relevant, since the existing high involvement of civil servants in 
budget allocation decisions might not be leading to the best results from a strategic, whole of 
government perspective.  
The empirical data also reveals that there are opposing pressures which might inhibit the 
implementation of PB. According to the respondents, changing the existing budgeting system 
will come up against high resistance (Burns and Scapens, 2000) from public officials and 
possibly also from politicians, for a number of reasons, including the fact that the stricter 
control on government spending offered by a PB system might not be viewed positively. 
Furthermore, a PB system will provide information on the performance of departments and 
programmes, necessarily highlighting weaknesses and underperformance, which would have 
to be justified. Resistance is also envisaged in view of the fact that the reform would be going 
against a deeply established culture, where the civil servants and the politicians are not used 
to performance measurement. In addition to resistance to change, the findings also show that 
the lack of adequately qualified public officials in government employment might act as a 
stumbling block for the implementation of budgetary reform. Furthermore, the 
implementation of PB could be seriously hindered by high political influences and 




interference, which at times might result in making popular rather than economically-viable 
decisions. It was determined that the successful implementation of PB depends on effectively 
mitigating the pressures inhibiting change. An important element identified for successfully 
reforming the budgetary system was the need for strong political support from a powerful 
person/s at the top (Willoughby, 2011), who has/have the power to overcome the obstacles 
hindering change. 
In the last couple of years (since the change in government in March 2013), a number of 
reforms have been effected in the budgetary framework. These include the launch of a 
Comprehensive Spending Review exercise to review expenditure on budget line items; the 
initiative to start preparing three-year revenue and expenditure projections covering the 
government ministries; the appointment of a Minister responsible for the implementation of 
the electoral manifesto who ensures that the yearly budget is linked to the pledges contained 
in the manifesto; the publication of a document entitled „The Implementation of the Budget‟, 
which sets out the implementation status of the budgetary measures that had been included in 
the previous year‟s budget; the establishment of specific indicators against which the 
Permanent Secretaries responsible for each ministry are appraised, for the purpose of 
awarding performance bonuses; and the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, aimed at 
ensuring sustainable public finances and enhancing accountability and transparency in 
government‟s financial activities. It was established that these reforms were driven by a 
combination of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic forces together with economic, 
political and socio-cultural pressures. Some of these changes could be a catalyst for a change 
in culture amongst the civil service and could thus be important precursors which will help 
promote the introduction of PB. 




The study ascertains that the inclusion of PI in budget documents is desirable, since it is 
believed that it will enhance managerial and public accountability (Sinclair, 1995) and 
transparency and it will enrich and guide the budget allocation process. The findings also 
show that public officials should be held responsible for the actual performance of their 
department, on the basis of the PI compiled. This requires the establishment of 
reward/sanction mechanisms (OECD, 2007; Hou et al, 2011) which should ideally be set at an 
entity level, rather than at a personal level, in order to avoid dubious behaviour by individuals. 
As regards the implementation approach for PB, a combined approach, with more emphasis 
on the bottom-up perspective, was recommended. A PB system allows for better control by 
the central agency in view of the fact that PI has to be prepared and presented by the line 
ministries; thus, shifting from the current top-down approach to a more bottom-up perspective 
appears to be feasible. Central intervention is, however, still important in order to ensure that 
government‟s priorities are being addressed and that this is being done within the pool of 
funds available. 
8.3 Conclusion 
The study concludes that PB could be a way forward for addressing the issues and 
weaknesses surrounding the existing budgeting system. Indeed, the majority of the interview 
respondents have shown considerable support for the implementation of PB within the 
Maltese public administration.  
A number of reasons have been identified for rationalising the introduction of PB. Amongst 
others, increased transparency, enhanced accountability and better allocative decision-making 
(Shah and Shen, 2007) have been highlighted by the interviewees as clear objectives for 




implementing a PB system. In addition, it is believed that performance measurement assumes 
greater importance where a country faces fiscal deficit and high debt issues, as is the case in 
Malta. The fact that the business plans currently compiled by the line ministries do not 
incorporate any output indicators to support their requests for funding shows that value for 
money concepts and efficiency measurement are not being adequately emphasised during the 
budget preparation process. In this regard, a PB system will serve to shift the focus of 
budgeting from inputs to expected outputs and outcomes. Also, the element of arbitrary 
budget allocations would potentially be reduced since decision-making would be better 
informed through the availability of PI. Furthermore, PB could serve as a tool for identifying 
ineffective programmes such that any budget cuts required during the course of the year, 
could be better targeted. Moreover, the EU Commission is also pressing the Maltese public 
administration to embark on this budgetary reform, according to the respondents. 
Notwithstanding the various reasons supporting the introduction of PB, there are a number of 
challenges which have to be tackled should this reform be launched. Amongst others, these 
include the envisaged strong resistance to change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) from the civil 
service and politicians alike; the required change in culture and in people‟s mind-set in order 
to embrace a performance measurement philosophy; the need to deploy suitably qualified 
personnel within ministries and departments in order to successfully implement and operate a 
PB system; the financial and time resources required for introducing a reform; and the 
political dimension that needs to be addressed since certain decisions that might be triggered 
as a result of the reform might be politically unpopular. Clearly, these challenges can only be 
overcome if the reform is championed by a person/s who is/are in a high position of power. 
In view of the challenges involved, it might make sense to introduce the reform gradually, by 
starting off with presentational PB (where PI is included in budget documents as background 




information, without playing a role in decision-making) – this could serve to start changing 
the culture and mind-set within the civil service. Eventually, moving towards a performance-
informed budgeting system (where the compiled PI would be used for budget decision-
making) would be a natural transition, since, at the end of the day, investing in the reform 
would only be beneficial if decision-making is influenced and improved accordingly. In 
accordance with Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, this course of action suggests an evolutionary 
rather than a revolutionary change, starting off with presentational PB (which does not 
constitute a radical change), but then moving on to a performance-informed budgeting system 
and perhaps direct PB in selected cases (both of which represent a radical change from the 
existing system). This takes into account the need for gradual introduction of PB in view of 
the challenges that have to be addressed to ensure successful implementation.  
8.4 Theoretical contributions 
This section sets out the contributions made by the study to the existing body of knowledge. 
Firstly, the research may lead to a refinement of the Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model, 
which was utilised for analysing the type of change expected in the Maltese context. The 
model comprises internal or intraorganisational elements, which are classified into 
precipitating dynamics and enabling dynamics. The current model lists stakeholders‟ 
dissatisfaction and value commitments as precipitating dynamics, and power dependencies 
and capacity for action as enabling dynamics. Within the Maltese scenario, a third enabler of 
radical change has been identified, being the political ability required to make the reform 
happen. Indeed, it has been determined that the potential lack of political ability to embark on 
the reform is perhaps the most significant impediment to radical change in the Maltese 
context. It is suggested that the Greenwood and Hinings‟ (1996) model might require an 




adjustment to incorporate the political dimension. Political ability, supported by a competitive 
or reformative pattern of value commitments and backed by top people in positions of power, 
could lead to radical change. 
A further contribution is made to the policy implementation theory, in particular to Matland‟s 
(1995) ambiguity/conflict model, which seeks to explain when it is appropriate to apply either 
the top-down or the bottom-up approach for policy implementation. The findings contradict 
Matland‟s (1995) assertion that a political implementation process reflects more closely the 
orientations of a top-down perspective. It has been established that the implementation of PB 
in Malta mainly reflects a political implementation; however, the suggested implementation 
approach is a mix of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches, with more emphasis on 
the bottom-up approach. Though no attempt is being made to make a new contribution to the 
typologies proposed by Matland (1995), the research shows that the implementation of 
budgetary reform in the Maltese scenario cannot be analysed through a neat policy type. A 
further lesson learnt is that it might be difficult to transfer policy learning across international 
boundaries, since such policies might undergo a transformation in a new institutional context. 
This implies that externally imposed policy recommendations might be problematic. Thus, 
where international bodies, such as the EU, impose blanket policy rules on countries they 
need to be aware of context and of the wide differences between countries.  
Furthermore, this study has integrated institutional theory, change theory and policy 
implementation theory, seeking to address gaps identified in the individual theoretical 
frameworks. Institutional theory has facilitated the understanding of the institutional context 
within which a budgetary reform in Malta would be implemented. It has also contributed 
towards the identification of institutional isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
and macro-level influences (Munir et al, 2011) which might trigger such a reform. Change 




theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) has been useful for determining the type of 
organisational change expected in the budgetary framework (radical versus convergent). This 
theory has also shed light on the envisaged pace of change (evolutionary versus revolutionary) 
and on the enabling dynamics required for a radical change to happen (institutional capacities, 
power dependencies and political ability). However, institutional and change theories were 
inadequate for indicating the most appropriate implementation approach for PB introduction 
in Malta. This shortcoming was addressed by complementing institutional and change 
theories with policy implementation theory, in particular Matland‟s (1995) model. The 
integration of the three theories has helped to address some limitations identified in Matland‟s 
(1995) model by linking to institutional and change theories. In this respect, it is being 
suggested that Matland‟s (1995) existing implementation model, which is based on a policy‟s 
ambiguity and conflict level, be augmented to embrace other variables that affect the 
implementation approach, as revealed by the theoretical review and the empirical evidence. 
Such variables comprise the institutional context within which the new policy is being 
implemented including the level of embeddedness of an existing system, the envisaged 
resistance to change, the pattern of value commitments and whether a revolutionary versus an 
evolutionary change is expected. Where an existing system is deeply embedded in its 
institutional context, such that a new policy would be expected to come up against resistance 
to change, then a combined (tending towards the bottom-up) approach would be more 
appropriate to ensure the support of street-level implements (Lipsky, 1980), thus reducing 
change resistance. Similarly, a competitive pattern of value commitment, whereby some 
groups are resisting the budgetary reform, is more supportive of a combined approach, in 
order to obtain the trust and build up the confidence of the groups resisting the changes. 
Where resistance to change is expected, the indicated type of change is evolutionary 




(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), in order to ensure acceptance of the new system before 
embracing more challenging reforms – this suggests that PB implementation should kick off 
with presentational PB and then move on to performance-informed budgeting, as was also 
recommended by the interview respondents. The study indicates that an evolutionary change 
and a combined (emphasising the bottom-up) approach are complementary, since a slower 
pace of change is more conducive to a higher involvement of street-level implementers in 
policy implementation, in view of the fact that more time is available for street-level 
implementers to come up with their ideas and subsequently engage in discussion with the 
central agency before the policy is implemented. Conversely, a revolutionary change, which 
occurs quickly, is facilitated by the top-down approach where clear direction for policy 
implementation has to come from the central agency to ensure successful and quick 
implementation.  
The research also made a contribution by studying the potential for the implementation of PB 
within the public sector of a small EU country. This was done by gaining access and 
interviewing senior politicians and senior administrative players in the country. Amongst 
others, interviewees in prominent positions included the Prime Minister, Ministers, former 
Prime Ministers and Ministers, and Permanent Secretaries.  
8.5 Policy recommendations 
The study makes a number of recommendations as summarised below. 
A. With respect to the recent reforms effected to the budgetary framework, it is 
suggested that such reforms be taken forward and improved upon. (Section 7.2.3) 




The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) process that has been launched in 2014 should 
be repeated and its scope should be widened to cover other spending areas. The results of the 
CSR exercise should then be incorporated in the budget process. The importance of this 
exercise is mainly twofold: to address the issue of waste in government spending such that the 
fiscal deficit is contained and to kick off a process of changing the culture within the civil 
service such that the link between inputs and outputs/outcomes will be emphasised. 
Furthermore, the CSR exercise could serve as a useful intermediary for moving on to a PB 
system, since ministries have already gained some familiarity in determining what outputs 
were delivered in respect of selected budget line items. 
The initiative of compiling forward estimates covering two years beyond the budget year is a 
healthy practice which aids medium-term planning. Presently, the revenue and expenditure 
projections for the two years following the budget year are being prepared by the MOF, rather 
than by the respective line ministries. It is suggested that the line ministries should assume 
responsibility for the preparation of forward estimates covering their expected operations, in 
order to ensure ownership and commitment for adhering to such financial plans.  
The Fiscal Responsibility Act has sought to strengthen the powers of the MOF, through the 
establishment of spending ceilings and through ensuring that the ceilings are consistent with 
the fiscal rules laid in the law. This law has placed the budget process under greater scrutiny 
and has laid down more onerous reporting requirements, which are covered by endorsements 
by the Fiscal Council. If this law is to serve its purposes, enforcement is fundamental; 
otherwise, the reform would have been carried out „on paper‟ only, possibly to satisfy EU 
obligations. 




The publication of the „Implementation of the Budget‟ document is an important tool of 
managerial and public accountability and transparency which sheds light on the performance 
of the ministries vis-à-vis the previous year‟s budgetary measures. The information contained 
in this document is of a descriptive and narrative nature, indicating the implementation status 
of the budgetary measure. It is suggested that the present information would be complemented 
by output and outcome information (results achieved through the budgetary measure). This 
will start to pave the way for the incorporation of PI in budget documents. Furthermore, 
where a budgetary measure of the previous year is still in the process of being implemented a 
year later, it has to be reported upon in the following year/s. 
The system of evaluating the performance of Permanent Secretaries and remunerating them 
on the basis of their attainments is a mechanism which motivates these people to work hard in 
order to deliver results. It is important that the criteria against which these civil servants are 
assessed are fair, challenging yet achievable and within their control. The findings indicate 
that this performance appraisal system will be cascaded down to other public officials. In this 
respect, it is suggested that the person or unit which carries out the appraisals should be 
independent, in order to ensure objectivity and to avoid familiarity threats. 
B. Budget cuts necessarily required during the course of the year should be targeted 
at ineffective programmes and at activities which contain an element of waste, 
rather than being carried out across the board. (Section 7.3.1) 
Though the MOF is endeavouring to target budgetary cuts at line items which are believed to 
include an element of surplus allocated funds, the research indicates that this assessment is not 
perhaps as effective as it should be, since budget cuts during the course of the year are 
upsetting the plans of some ministries/departments. The implementation of a PB system, 




providing information on the outputs and outcomes expected from the budget allocations, 
would potentially assist the MOF in carrying out a better assessment, which would result in 
reducing waste and at the same time, avoiding cutting funds allocated to sensitive 
programmes which might already be operating under tight funding conditions (Van Reeth, 
2002). 
C. A significant percentage of a ministry’s unspent funds at the end of the year 
should be made available to that ministry for the following year, to be used on 
projects which are approved by the MOF. (Section 7.3.2) 
Allowing ministries to carry forward a portion of saved funds to the next year (which portion 
has to be significant – in the region of say 40-60%) would potentially encourage cost saving 
and revenue generating initiatives by ministries/departments. This would, in turn, benefit 
ministries who can then undertake further projects/activities and at the same time, it would 
avoid „shopping sprees‟ by line ministries towards the end of the year, which spending could 
potentially be applied on items that do not represent a priority. Furthermore, cost savings and 
increased revenue would lead to deficit reduction (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011), which is 
one of government‟s top concerns. It is also proposed that where „shopping sprees‟ are 
identified, the person/s who would have authorised the expenditure should be penalised, either 
by negatively affecting the performance bonus awarded or by negatively impacting career 
progression. 
D. PI should be included in budget documents in order to enhance accountability 
and transparency and to enrich the decision-making process covering the 
allocation of funds. (Section 7.4.1) 




The compilation of PI will contribute to effective decision-making, even if the required 
decision might be difficult and politically sensitive. In this regard, if the outputs and outcomes 
of a programme do not justify the resources being allocated, corrective action would be 
inevitable. A case in point relates to the education sector, where it has been revealed that it is 
difficult to reconcile the increased spending on a yearly basis to the number of students being 
educated, since the latter is on the decline. PI would certainly highlight these issues, making 
action unavoidable. 
E. PI should be used to hold public officials responsible for the actual performance 
of their department/programmes (Young, 2003). Reward/sanction mechanisms 
should be established in order to be able to hold public officials accountable for 
their performance (OECD, 2007; Hou et al, 2011). (Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2) 
Where the actual performance is short of the pre-established targets, justification should be 
sought for such underperformance, in order to determine whether there were any factors 
affecting performance that were beyond the control of public officials, and also, to implement 
corrective action. The pre-determined performance targets should be achievable and realistic, 
yet challenging. 
It is suggested that reward/sanction mechanisms would be set at an entity level, rather than at 
a personal level, in order to avoid data manipulation, lack of social responsibility, greedy 
behaviour and possibly focusing on short term results at the expense of longer term gains. 
Reward mechanisms at an entity level could comprise adjusting a ministry/department‟s 
budget upwards in the following year or allowing such ministry/department to carry forward a 
portion of its savings to the next year. 




F. Addressing the resistance to change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) that is bound to 
arise should PB be introduced, is fundamental for the success of the reform. 
(Section 7.5.1) 
A number of suggestions are being put forward in this respect including the following: (i) 
external consultants, who have experience in PB implementation in other countries, should be 
roped in to advise on the reform process; (ii) the civil service should be involved and 
consulted during the system development stage; (iii) the necessary resources, including 
financial, time and human resources, should be deployed in order to ensure successful 
implementation; (iv) the system should be designed in such a way that underperformance is 
highlighted earlier on in the year, in order to allow for corrective action; (v) where 
circumstances change during the year which are beyond the control of public officials, there 
should be the possibility of revising the performance targets; (vi) performance targets should 
be realistic and the system for measuring public officials‟ performance should be just and fair; 
and (vii) the reform has to be backed up by a person/s who is/are in a high position of power, 
presumably the Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance and/or the Permanent Secretary 
within the MOF. 
G. Suitably qualified people have to be employed to beef up the finance function 
within the ministries in order to have the appropriate human resources for 
embarking upon a budgetary reform. (Section 7.5.2) 
Though this proposal might be quite challenging in view of the obstacles faced by the public 
sector when seeking to recruit professional people, such challenges could be overcome if 
government is truly committed to implement PB. People with the right competences could be 
employed by finding creative ways for offering a more generous package than that paid to 




professionals employed directly by government (as has been done in the health sector), thus 
avoiding distortion in government salaries. Furthermore, in order to ensure continuous 
professional development by public officials, it is suggested that a minimum number of hours 
of training (say, 20 to 30 hours per annum) would be made mandatory for civil servants in 
certain grades, especially for those who hold managerial posts. The fulfilment of the 
minimum mandatory training requirement by public officials could be linked to the award of 
their performance bonus and also to their career progression prospects. 
H. The successful implementation of PB will be possible if the people in positions of 
power support the proposed reform (Willoughby, 2011). (Section 7.6.3) 
Political support will push the reform to happen and will ensure that it is carried out faster 
from a timing perspective. In this regard, the support and championing of the reform by the 
Prime Minister is fundamental for the change to happen. 
I. A culture change is required throughout the civil service and amongst the 
politicians, in order to address the political factors that might hinder the 
implementation of PB. (Section 7.6.5) 
Political issues include, amongst others, political interference, the problem of budget plans 
being overridden by political decisions and the issue of political sensitivity when actual 
results falling short of targets are made public. The culture change required for tackling such 
issues entails extensive education and training. In order to start introducing this culture 
change, support from the people at the top of the new way of doing things, is fundamental. 
This includes dedicating the required resources to the reform and embracing accountability 
and transparency even where the PI published highlights weaknesses and under performance. 




J. The existing top-down approach should be changed to a combined approach, 
with a more bottom-up perspective, reflecting the need for more involvement of 
the line ministries in the preparation of the budget figures. (Section 7.7.1) 
With the introduction of a PB system, performance targets covering ministries‟ programmes 
and activities are developed as part of the budget process. An increased level of involvement 
in the development of performance measures and targets by line ministries becomes highly 
important, for ensuring that ownership and responsibility for the achievement of such targets 
is assumed by the ministries. Moreover, this enhanced participation of line ministries could 
serve to facilitate acceptance of the proposed budgetary system change; thus, reducing 
resistance to the budgetary reform. A more bottom-up approach is advisable such that the 
ideas for programmes and initiatives would emanate from the people on the ground, who are 
more in contact with the needs of the public. Central intervention is, however, fundamental in 
order to ensure that government‟s priorities and the resulting policies originate from the 
OPM; policy control is in the hands of people who have been elected democratically; and 
government‟s priorities can be executed within the established spending ceiling. 
K. The top-down and bottom-up approaches should be brought together as follows 
in the implementation of PB: (Section 7.7.1) 
From a top-down perspective, government‟s strategies and the resulting policies should 
originate from the OPM, in order to ensure that government‟s objectives for the country are 
being addressed. Subsequently, the budgetary framework setting out government‟s priorities 
and policies, should be approved by a Cabinet decision. The Cabinet decision would then be 
communicated to the MOF and to the line ministries, such that the financial plans that would 
be developed would reflect government‟s priorities. The responsibility for developing 




performance measures and targets would then lie with the line ministries, reflecting a bottom-
up perspective. Subsequently, the MOF would be responsible for reviewing the financial 
plans together with the performance measures that would have been developed by the line 
ministries. The final budget allocation for the line ministries has to be determined by the 
MOF, who is responsible for overseeing the whole budget process. However, in contrast to 
what is presently being done, the budget allocation proposed by the MOF should be discussed 
with the line ministries before it is finalised, to ensure that any concerns that line ministries 
have vis-à-vis the planned activities and the corresponding funding are being addressed. This 
would potentially reduce the existing problem of ministries regularly approaching the MOF 
during the year, to request additional funds. Furthermore, a higher level of involvement of the 
Finance Minister is desirable in the budget allocation process, in order not to leave final 
budget allocations in the hands of civil servants.  
L. The following suggestions are being made with respect to other implementation 
issues: (Section 7.7.2) 
 A unit should be selected for carrying out performance audit reports (OECD, 2007), 
covering the quality and coverage of PI. This would ensure that performance reports 
compiled by the line ministries adhere to principles of good practice. 
 It might make sense to start off with presentational PB and then move on to performance-
informed budgeting. Though the former PB category may not constitute a radical change 
because PI is included in budget documents as background information for accountability 
purposes, the latter type of PB represents a radical change since it affects allocative 
decision-making (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; OECD, 2007). This gradual introduction 
of PB, representing an evolutionary change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) would 
facilitate the culture change required in the civil service. 




 It might be advisable to introduce the reform through legislation. Though this will not 
guarantee successful implementation, the potential consequences of breaking a law might 
secure the ministries‟ and departments‟ cooperation in introducing the new system.    
 A time period of, say, three to five years is advisable for the implementation of a PB 
system. Whilst the introduction of the reform requires significant time effort, a time frame 
which is longer than five years would negatively affect the momentum of the reform. 
8.6 Value of the methods used 
This study is valuable as it accessed elite decision makers. This was possible because of the 
small scale of the country and the culture of closeness to voters that exists. As a result, the 
researcher has been able to study processes and policy making in a way that would be difficult 
to do in larger countries. This means that small country studies have the possibility to make 
contributions to theory and understanding in a way that larger country studies cannot. In this 
regard, one of the researcher‟s future plans is to test the generalisability of the conclusions 
emanating from this study to see if what happens in a small country is replicated (in a more 
complex manner perhaps) in larger countries.  
8.7 Personal reflections 
On a personal note, this research process has been extremely fulfilling and has served as a 
remarkable learning experience. This is not to say that there were no challenges along the 
way, but overcoming these challenges was part of the learning and self-confidence building 
process.  




At commencement stage, the researcher had planned to undertake the research on a part-time 
basis, but during the course of the study, the researcher became so deeply engrossed in the 
work that more and more time was dedicated to the research, becoming an almost full-time 
endeavour. This commitment to the study was partly the result of personal sacrifice and 
willpower, complemented with strong backing from the family. Trying to juggle the studies, 
the teaching and supervision work at the University of Malta, the directorship at the Malta 
Financial Services Authority and caring for two young kids is certainly no easy feat! This 
would not have been possible without the support and continuous encouragement of my 
extended family – my parents who baby-sat my kids on various occasions, who ran a number 
of errands for me and who pushed me to go on when it got tough; my mother-in-law who was 
always willing to baby-sit when needed and who provided us with hot meals on a daily basis; 
and, last but not least, my husband and mentor who was at my side throughout this journey, 
shared the kids‟ responsibilities and house chores with me and was my sounding board when I 
needed to brainstorm ideas or discuss my work. The strong support received from the 
University of Malta throughout the period of study, in the form of a reduced teaching and 
administrative load, was also extremely important for focusing on the study.  
One of the most difficult challenges of the study was making contact and getting access to 
elite interviewees, including the Prime Minister, Ministers, former Prime Ministers and 
Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and other people in prominent positions in Malta. 
Persistence and perseverance were extremely important for succeeding – in the case of some 
respondents, the researcher spent weeks and even months calling the secretary of the potential 
interviewee on a regular basis, to follow up on the original email sent and secure an 
appointment for an interview. It was also fundamental to accept without hesitation the date 
and time proposed by the interviewees for holding the interview – this required total 




flexibility and commitment from the researcher during the period when the interviews were 
being conducted. Support was provided by the Head of the Accountancy Department at the 
University of Malta and by the Deputy Auditor General at the National Audit Office, who 
contacted two participants each, on the researcher‟s behalf. In my view, getting access to the 
elite interviewees referred to above has been possible because Maltese politicians seek to keep 
direct contact with the people and may thus be more accessible.  
This research is only the beginning of my contribution to the academic world. It is hoped that 
the researcher will, in the future, contribute further to the wide academic knowledge and 
literature that already exists.  
As mentioned earlier, a future study may test the generalisability of the conclusions 
emanating from this study to see if what happens in a small country is replicated in larger 
countries. 
The timing of this study was such that it was not possible to comment on the effectiveness of 
the introduction of PB in Malta, since such reform has not yet been implemented. The 
analysis of the effectiveness or otherwise of PB implementation, once this reform is 
introduced, could be the subject of a future research project.  
8.8 Concluding remark 
Clearly, the Maltese public administration is seeking to improve government efficiency and to 
exert stricter control on public spending. Indeed, the use of performance measurement in the 
budgetary process and in particular, the role of such information in resource allocation 
decisions, is opportune in the country‟s current economic, social and political context. The 
Maltese government largely relies on expenditure cuts to meet the fiscal deficit and debt 




reduction targets. In this regard, PI would shed light on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
programmes and policies undertaken by ministries and departments, which would, in turn, 
inform decisions of where to cut spending. 
OECD (2011: 3) maintain that:  
“Not to be overlooked…is…the role of performance information in promoting greater 
government accountability through the budget process, and increasing the legitimacy 
of budgetary decisions…Performance information plays a role in informing the policy 
debate surrounding the budget, and providing managers and politicians with evidence 
with which to communicate their policy choices.” 
In her analysis on the 2011/2012 OECD Performance Budgeting Survey results, von Trapp 
(2014) concludes that:  
 “Performance budgeting is here to stay.” 
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